Description of document:	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) The Clandestine Service Historical Series: Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) 1948-1952, 5 volumes, 722 pages plus 3 appendices and 11 attachments, 1973
Requested date:	20-February-2025
Release date:	11-March-2025
Posted date:	31-March-2025
Source of document:	FOIA Request Information and Privacy Coordinator Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Fax: 703-613-3007 Filing a FOIA Records Request Online
Note:	The CIA redacted most of this document, and the bulk of the blank pages are omitted.

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 March 2025

Reference: F-2025-01463

Dear Requester:

This letter is an acknowledgment of and a final response to your 20 February 2025 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, received in the Office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator on 21 February 2025, seeking **a copy of the five volume history of the CUA** [sic] **Office of Policy Coordination, consisting of 722 pages plus three appendices and eleven attachments**. Your request was assigned the reference number provided above. Please cite this number in future correspondence to allow us to more efficiently locate your request information. We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended).

In the course of processing your request, we determined that we received an earlier FOIA request for records on the same subject. Accordingly, we conducted a search of our database of previously-released records and located the enclosed five documents, consisting of 1,166 pages, that were released to the previous requester. We hope you find this information useful.

As a matter of administrative discretion, this office is waiving fees associated with the administrative phase of your request.

If you have questions regarding our response, you may seek assistance by calling this office at 703-613-1287.

Sincerely,

Stephen Glenn
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

~~Secret~~
CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by DDP

CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Clandestine Service Historical Series

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION 1948-1952

VOLUME I

~~Secret~~
CS HP 228
Controlled by: O/DDP
February 1973
Copy 1 of 4

Approved for Release: 2023/10/19 C05500779

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION

1948-1952

I. Introduction

The Russian-actuated Communist movement gathered a great deal of momentum in the era immediately following World War II, slipping stealthily into the political vacuums created by the toppling of the German, Italian, and Japanese fascist movements. As a result of shifts in power after the war, Russia looked upon the United States as the leader of an opposite camp. Within Communist ideology, democracy was an ultimate target for destruction. A whole series of inimical actions engineered from Moscow served to engender a state of apprehension within the American body politic.*

---

* Modern day gurus often refer to those years as the "McCarthy era." As a consequence, his political reprehensibility is generally projected without adequate exposition of the unallayed anxiety that existed at the time in the public mind because of the aggressive actions of the USSR. To some, the manipulations of Senator Joseph McCarthy appeared more as a product of the existing public trepidation than as a cause of it as alleged by others.

In September 1946 an important state paper was prepared by Mr. Clark M. Clifford, an aide to President Harry S. Truman, on the subject of US relations with the Soviet Union. It supplied the President with every past detail of the wartime relationship with the USSR. More importantly, as it turned out, it charted the postwar prospect with startling prescience outlining the shape and thrust of Truman's subsequent programs, namely: the Greek-Turkish aid legislation or Truman Doctrine; the Marshall Plan; and the North Atlantic Alliance. Clifford's memorandum summarized the situation as follows:

> The gravest problem facing the United States today is that of American relations with the Soviet Union. The solution of that problem may determine whether or not there will be a third World War. Soviet leaders appear to be conducting their nation on a course of aggrandizement designed to lead to eventual world domination by the USSR. Their goal, and their policies designed to reach it, are in direct conflict with American ideals, and the United States has not yet been able to persuade Stalin and his associates that world peace and prosperity lie not in the direction in which the Soviet Union is moving but in the opposite direction of

international cooperation and friendship. 1/*

Postwar US foreign policy, shaped by aims toward world peace, awakened only slowly to the danger of the Russian threat at home and abroad. At home, a tocsin was sounded in 1948 by the exposure of the extent of the Russian espionage that had been conducted in the United States. Featured prominently in all of the media was the indictment of Mr. Alger Hiss of the Department of State. The related confessions of Mr. Whittaker Chambers and Mrs. Elizabeth Bentley were disconcerting disclosures of the perfidy of a wartime ally.

Overseas, the organization of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947 marked a resumption of the process of international revolution which purportedly had been discarded by the dissolution of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1943. This subversive formation was viewed by the American people as a portent of aggressive Russian intentions.

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

The Communist efforts to disrupt the political-economic system of the Western World were reaching a crescendo by 1948. France and Italy were beleaguered by a wave of Communist-inspired strikes. Italy was facing its first national election and the threat of a Communist victory. Greece was fighting the Communist guerrillas in its northern provinces.

The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 was followed by a total blockade of Berlin and its subsequent relief by American airlift. In China the defeat of the Nationalists by the Communist armies was impending. In the Philippines the Government was under continuing guerrilla attacks by the Communist Hukbalahaps.

US leaders were convinced that the Russian regime and its satellite satrapy were completely untrustworthy and, as later voiced by Premier Nikita S. Krushchev, out to "bury" the Americans. There was ample evidence to conclude that Russia aimed at hegemony over the industrial potential of Germany, France, Italy, and all of Europe. It was apparent that the Cominform was preparing to capitalize in

the undeveloped countries on the political uncertainties brought about by the voluntary and involuntary decolonization of territories previously occupied by the European powers.

With the imminent end of US nuclear monopoly following the explosion of an atomic bomb by the USSR in 1949, the US leaders did not know how far Russia might go to attain its objectives. With the Truman Doctrine as a takeoff point, US national policy came out in favor of the containment of Communism. This, of course, amounted to a decision to bring about a political confrontation with the Russians.

It was to be a peaceful confrontation; but should Russia react with hostile moves, it was deemed prudent that the United States should quietly prepare itself for any eventuality (1 July 1952 was a target date frequently mentioned). Diplomatic and economic measures would be the means of outright confrontation. The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty followed on the heels of the Greek-Turkish aid provided under the Truman Doctrine; but it was recognized that these measures could have little lasting impact unless the subversive aggression of Communism could be halted.

To gain ascendency, alternatives to the Communist ideology would require the strengthening and building of institutions of independent thought. At the same time, individuals and groups abroad motivated by political aspirations contrary to those of the Communists had few resources to advance their cause. They would need a strong source of secret support, financial, material and moral. It had to be secret to allay possible charges of foreign political meddling which might defeat the very purpose of the support. If covert aid of this sort were not forthcoming from the United States, it appeared that the Cominform might proceed unhampered in its program to envelop the world with Communist ideology.

To this end the United States decided to stem Soviet underground subversive operations and to create a clandestine agency for that purpose. This would have to be a new organization in order not to militate against the clandestine collection of intelligence and counterintelligence already assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by the National Security Act of 1947. On 18 June 1948, by directive of the National Security Council (NSC),

the task of confrontation on the clandestine front was assigned to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), then called the Office of Special Projects. OPC was formally established on 1 September 1948 and continued operating until its 1 August 1952 merger with OSO into a combined directorate which became the CIA Clandestine Service.

The NSC directive which created OPC in 1948 gave it a loose charter to undertake the full range of covert activities incident to the conduct of secret political, psychological, and economic warfare together with preventive direct action (paramilitary activities) - all within the policy direction of the Departments of State and Defense. This authority superseded a previous and much more limited directive whereby the Office of Special Operations (OSO) was to engage in certain secret psychological activities along with its existing commitments for the conduct of espionage and counterespionage. The new 1948 directive took cognizance of "the vicious covert activities of the USSR" and reflected the high state of arousal existing in US Government circles at that time.

OPC was placed in CIA alongside OSO with an

adjuration by the NSC that it was to operate as independently of the other offices of CIA as efficiency would permit. The head of OPC, Assistant Director of CIA for Policy Coordination (ADPC), was to be nominated by the Secretary of State (General George C. Marshall at the time) on the basis that he was to be acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and appointed by the NSC. The appointment was made in the summer of 1948.

By collateral accord with State and Defense the DCI, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, agreed that their policies would flow directly through departmental Designated Representatives to the head of OPC. When Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith replaced Hillenkoetter in October 1950, he put a different construction on the NSC directive. Thereafter, State and Defense policies reached OPC only through the DCI, who effectively installed himself in control of its operations.

During the corporate life of OPC, the top office of ADPC was held by just two individuals, Mr. Frank G. Wisner (1 September 1948 - 23 August 1951) and Colonel Kilbourne Johnston (23 August 1951 -

1 August 1952). Wisner, a man of intense application with a solid background in secret intelligence work, was a singular choice to create a covert organization from scratch; and Johnston with much managerial experience was well qualified to organize that establishment toward a more orderly existence. Wisner was promoted in 1951 to become the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), thereby assuming general direction of both OSO and OPC operations; and Johnston was General Smith's choice to succeed him as ADPC.

The scope of the OPC effort and the maintenance of its relationships with the highest levels of State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other governmental agencies was a tremendous challenge to these men and their staffs, and a heavy burden as well. Operational requirements emanating from State, Defense, and JCS taxed OPC capacities from the very moment of its establishment. As the US Government increased the pace of peaceful confrontation (the cold war), OPC grew faster and expanded further than initially anticipated.

Operational directives issued from the NSC in

a seemingly unending stream to the Departments of State and Defense which in turn called on OPC for covert support. Its relationships with these departments and with the JCS were salutary on the whole. There were however some temporary moments of tension with State's propaganda office and with the psychological warfare office of the Army, as well as with the Far East Command. Generally, they were all soon quieted, but one particular point of discomfort persisted. In 1949, inadvertently precipitated by CIA, a security and loyalty investigation of Mr. John Paton Davies, a senior Foreign Service Officer on State's policy Planning Staff, created considerable fanfare.* It generated extensive comment in the media over a period of several years and came to be a cause of chagrin to OPC.

To the United States and to OPC the conduct of political and psychological warfare in peacetime was a new art. Some of the techniques were known but doctrine and experience were lacking. OPC was to learn by doing. By 1952 OPC had built an organization

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

capable of executing covert action on a worldwide scale. It had gone through a period of rapid expansion in terms of both people and money. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] The secret war provided an immediate area of confrontation and, as a consequence, there was much governmental pressure to "get on with it." Operations grew apace, some successful and some not, as revealed by a quick look at what happened during the 1948-1952 period.

In the years 1948 to 1950, OPC concentrated its efforts on Europe and the West. Its representatives were placed first in the Western European countries [redacted] excepted); then in some of the Middle East- (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ern states, [redacted] and South Asia; and in the Far Eastern coun- (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct tries. South America and sub-Sahara Africa were low on the priority list. [redacted] At first most of the OPC sta- (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct tions and bases had only skeletal staffs. Their capabilities were limited; but their very presence was a

cogent factor. Local individuals, groups, and intelligence services quickly came to understand that there was a force abroad in the world around which they could rally and gain support in their own opposition to Communism. OPC began working with foreign intelligence services at an early date, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct The objective of the liaison was war planning, and, to a limited degree, political and psychological (PP) operations.

Highest on the Department of State's list of priorities was the need to deal with the political leadership of the countless thousands of refugees and emigres who had fled to the West from Russia and the satellite countries. The immediate problem was to deal with them outside of the Iron Curtain. These leaders could not be endorsed to head governments-in-exile for the realities of the situation ultimately demanded recognition of the Communist regimes that had assumed power; but they could be employed in the conduct of PP operations behond the Curtain.

As a consequence, the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE) was organized in 1949 with OPC support under the aegis of prominent financiers,

lawyers, industrialists, and savants in order to give the political energy of these foreign nationality groups some direction. The main activity of NCFE centered on Radio Free Europe (RFE) with broadcasting facilities directed toward the satellites.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Another project involved the organization of the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia which established Radio Liberty to broadcast to Russia itself. RFE and Radio Liberty were still operating in 1971 and had figured prominently in the press.

The Cominform, following its formation, concocted a number of wide-ranging front organizations (so called because they provided a facade for Communist indoctrination), including the World Peace Council; the World Federation of Democratic Youth; the World Federation of Scientific Workers; the International Union of Students; the Women's International Democratic Federation; the International

Organization of Journalists; and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers.

These international organizations spoke out in favor of peace and solidarity in order to prepare the unwary for subtle indoctrination into the Communist ideology. As instruments of psychological warfare, their announced aims were so estimable that it was difficult to devise a means of defense except in kind. Principally although not exclusively in the West, OPC became active in sponsoring rival international organizations of a non-Communist hue, specifically in the cultural, youth and student, veterans', women's, labor, and lawyers' fields.

Certain labor operations had been instigated by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) before OPC came into being. As a consequence, OPC initially concentrated its efforts within the circumference of the trade union movement with the assistance of the ECA which had certain counterpart funds available for the purpose,

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

produce a significant opposition to the Communist-dominated syndicate which, it appears, would have become overwhelmingly dominant had it gone on unchecked. In France, the democratic unions, although their leadership was weak, were able to bring about the failure of the Communist-inspired port strikes called to prevent the off-loading of the first shipment of US assistance materials.



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Some of this activity extended outward toward East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the other satellites.



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

In Munich, RFE established its programming headquarters and a part of its broadcasting equipment; other facilities were in Lisbon,

Portugal.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The US policy of containment was soon tested by Communists when the Republic of Korea was invaded on 25 June 1950. Up to this point, OPC's responsibility for preventive direct action or PM activity - or unconventional warfare as it came to be known - had been limited to the plans and preparations for staybehind networks in the event of a future war. Much of this effort was in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planning in the European countries Much of the preparatory work had been undertaken

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Korea precipitated a call for immediate PM operations in support of US participation in the United Nations (UN) intervention.

OPC's effort in the Far East had not made much headway up to 1950 except for certain nascent psychological operations directed against the [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct and against the Communist revolutionaries in Southeast Asia. This was due in part to the problem of an overburdened staff. A principal obstacle, however, was the fact that General Douglas MacArthur was as chary of CIA as he had been of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Now he wanted assistance from wherever possible, including OPC.

Having reached a modus vivendi with the Far East Command (FEC), OPC's Pacific operations expanded rapidly. Korea provided a testing ground for the support of conventional warfare with unconventional methods. The Americans had learned a great deal about unconventional offensive tactics in World War II but the Communist states had learned from the

Soviets a great deal about defensive tactics. As a result, unconventional warfare in Korea was something of a standoff. Some American aviators were recovered by "rat-line" operations.* A number of harassment operations, conducted overland and by small boats in coastal waters, were carried out successfully. It was quickly apparent that the Communist regimes knew a great deal about how to deal with their internal security; consequently little resistance by the civilian population could be located in the north on which either intelligence or action networks could be constructed by OSO and OPC respectively.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

* Specific routes over which escapers and evaders are passed through safe houses and safe areas to neutral or friendly territory.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Sometimes errors were made because officers were bemused by their own creative urges and ventured too far into activity that was overt by nature and not OPC's business. Ill-starred ventures into the production of motion pictures demonstrated this point.

There were many sound decisions and some injudicious ones; but the margin for error, it is clear, decreased as experience was gained.

When Smith became DCI in October 1950, he was perplexed, if not dumbfounded, at the wide-ranging responsibilities of OPC. A few months before his appointment the NSC had decided to expand US PP activities. Encouraged by some apparent cracks in the Bloc structure, there was even talk of separating the USSR from some of its satellites. OPC had been told to accelerate its activity but no one knew how far it was to go or from whence were to come the means to get there.

At an early moment, Smith deliberated on the

merger of OPC and OSO but deferred any action for fear that the self-revealing activities of OPC might interfere with OSO's long-range espionage and counterespionage (CE) mission. He decided to bridge the duality of their overseas representations by superimposing Senior Representatives of his own choosing and reporting to him.

In May 1951 Smith decided to seek further guidance from the NSC as to the scope and pace of OPC operations. He requested that the NSC initiate a comprehensive review of covert operations in light of the increase in their magnitude, that such review restate the responsibilities involved for US covert operations, and that if the review should reaffirm CIA's covert operational responsibility, he should be provided with a way to obtain the necessary support from other agencies.

He received half an answer from the NSC. The operational responsibility of CIA for covert activity was reaffirmed. But the review of operations and methods for the provision of their support was placed in the hands of a committee - the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). Evidently Smith was to have the

satisfaction of answering his own question, for he soon became chairman of the PSB. Separated from the making of strategic policy as it was, the PSB proved to be a frail reed, but it was the beginning of a process whereby mechanics were later established for better relating the conduct of covert operations to US national strategy.

The answer from NSC, unsatisfactory though it was, may have been the turning point in General Smith's considerations of merging OSO and OPC, a course urged on him by his deputy, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, and his operational deputy, Wisner. At least he knew that for the foreseeable future he would be privileged or saddled - depending on how he looked at it - with the responsibility for conducting covert operations. A number of actions began to take place within OSO and OPC and between them, looking toward integration.

By the time of the 1 August 1952 merger, OPC was active in all spheres of covert activity and, under the NSC direction and within departmental policy, was expending a major share of the CIA budget [redacted] In terms of the tools of its trade, it had acquired many installations and

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

facilities at home and abroad and had accumulated against planning contingencies for wartime a huge stockpile of ordnance items. It had acquired substantial numbers of aircraft for support purposes and the Air Force had undertaken to allocate to OPC support four air wings, again to fulfill planning contingencies.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

In strength levels OPC had overtaken and passed OSO. In the course of its growth, OPC had found it necessary to undergo several major reorganizations. By 1952 the leaders of CIA were of the opinion that OPC had grown to a point where a period of consolidation of its resources was in order. On the eve of

merger, a review board of senior OPC officers was appointed by General Smith to reduce OPC's monetary commitments by as much as one-third. It quickly became known as "the murder board." Although many projects were earmarked for termination, their liquidation was found to be a complicated and sometimes painful procedure. Further sorting out, it appeared, would have to take place after 1 August 1952 within the framework of the merged service.

In concluding this introduction to the history of OPC's tough encounter with the Soviets in the covert action (CA) field, it would be exciting to say that OPC emerged as the winner, but the most one can say is that the contest was a "see-saw" affair. The Soviets were ready at the end of World War II with an aggressive game plan and had taken an early lead. OPC, a new organization, was faced with trying to plan a catch-up game from the very start. No one can say how and when the contest ended - or if it has ever ended - but the Soviet Union no longer had the field completely to itself.

II. Enabling Directives and Related Actions

A. Introduction (NSC 4-A)

At the end of World War II, CA operations carried out by OSS and other agencies during the period of hostilities had come to a standstill with little indication as to when, how, or if they might be resumed short of another war.

The secret intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activity of OSS had passed into the trusteeship of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) on 1 October 1945. Its uncertain future was partially resolved when President Truman on 22 January 1946 directed the coordination of intelligence activities, including the formation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).[3/] This directive contained certain phrases that were ultimately to have significance in connection with the future conduct of covert operations.

The DCI was directed to perform those intelligence-related services which could be accomplished centrally with more efficacy as might be determined by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. The DCI

was also to "perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting national security as the President or the National Intelligence Authority" might direct. Although it was not clear that this clause envisioned the future conduct of covert activities, the same language was repeated in the National Security Act of 1947, which among its other provisions established the NSC and under it CIA to succeed CIG. Whatever the original intent, the NSC was to interpret these words as sufficient authorization to place the conduct of covert activities in CIA in tandem with OSO which was the office within the new CIA structure already conducting espionage and counterespionage on foreign soil. 4/

As US leaders in the postwar era came to recognize the need to repulse the underground attack by the USSR, countermeasures received the consideration of an interagency committee consisting of State Department and the Military Services which emerged as the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC).* Based on its deliberations

---

* The State, War, Navy Coordinating Comittee (SWNCC) formed 29 November - 4 December 1944, was renamed SANACC on 4 November 1947, and was terminated on 30 June 1949.

a decision to engage in covert psychological action was secretly formalized on 17 December 1947 by the NSC through the issuance of NSC 4-A. (See Attachment B.) This directive placed responsibility for covert operations on the DCI, directing him "to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities."

The DCI, Hillenkoetter, who served from 1 May 1947 to 7 October 1950, was not altogether convinced as to the advisability of conducting covert psychological operations in combination with secret intelligence operations. It was a responsibility, moreover, that he was ill-prepared to accept, as he was then deeply involved in organizational problems incident to the establishment of CIA. Nevertheless, Hillenkoetter, shaped by military tradition, deferred to his superiors in the NSC.

B. OPC's Basic Directive (NSC 10/2)

The Department of State apparently felt that it did not have enough influence over the burgeoning activities of the Special Procedures Group (SPG), the CIA operating component which Hillenkoetter had

established within OSO in response to NSC 4-A.* State, moreover, looked with a jaundiced eye on the planning activities then taking place within the JCS with respect to secret psychological and political warfare. Regarding itself as the prime source of policy in these matters, State was ready to jump at almost any chance to put a check-rein on the JCS, even to the acceptance of some joint vehicle for the conduct of covert activities. At the same time, sentiment for a more encompassing program of covert activity was growing at Cabinet level. The concatenation of all of these factors led to the issuance of a far-reaching directive on 18 June 1948, set forth in NSC 10/2, which established within CIA the new Office of Special Projects (OSP) "to plan and conduct covert operations." (See Attachment C.)

This was the basic directive leading to the establishment on 1 September 1948 of OPC, an innocuous title replacing OSP included in the initial wording of NSC 10/2. It stated that the OPC chief was to

---

* When established on 1 January 1948, this unit was called the Special Procedures Branch. It was redesignated Special Procedures Group on 22 March 1948.

report directly to the DCI, but to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, OPC was to operate independently of other CIA components. Policy guidance as to covert operations was to flow from the senior levels of State and Defense, and the JCS was to be consulted on the planning for covert activities in wartime. However, on the question of the responsibilities for the conduct of covert activities in wartime (as opposed to planning them), the document left considerable room for argument.

The external channels of OPC guidance and direction deriving from this directive had resulted from the fact that State and Defense were both determined to provide certain policy signals without actually playing in the secret political and psychological warfare game. CIA was again specified as the agency within which the instrument for these operations was to be housed. Both the Hoover Commission's working committee on National Security Organization under the chairmanship of Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt and NSC's Survey Group reviewing the national intelligence structure, comprising Messrs. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson,

which were active during the months that NSC 10/2 was in formulation, voiced the opinion that all clandestine activities to whatever end should be conducted in concert. Since CIA was already carrying out secret espionage and CE operations, both committees concluded that it should conduct covert activities also. Their advice was followed.

There is ample evidence among the historical documents of the time to indicate that interdepartmental rivalry in relation to the conduct of the burgeoning cold war was rampant and had its impact on the method whereby policy guidance to OPC was constituted by the NSC. 5/ OPC was on notice that it would have to walk the fence between its two mentors, State and Defense, with a delicate balance.*

The established cover story of OPC was based on the presumption that its existence would soon be known, or at least suspected, as its operations

---

* There is one document in the OPC files which reveals a high level of arousal within State caused by the discovery that the JCS were about to submit a psychological warfare plan to the NSC. This appears in an internal State memorandum dated 3 June 1948, handed to Wisner by Davies sometime after the former's appointment as OPC head. 6/

unfolded. Its presence within the CIA structure might then be imputed. It appeared advisable therefore that a fable be formulated in such fashion as to substitute vagueness for any strenuous effort at total secrecy that might not long be sustained. That was the thinking behind the choice of the name: Office of Policy Coordination. Its responsibilities were covered under the following legend:

> OPC was established to coordinate the activities of CIA with national security policy as adopted by those agencies of government responsible for the formation of such policy. 7/

It was felt that in this role, as a sort of a middleman, OPC might legitimately and logically evaluate both the intelligence and planning aspects of various covert activities. In explaining the OPC role to persons with a legitimate interest, no mention was to be made of action programs; only its planning, intelligence coordinating, and defensive aspects were to be stressed. To the greatest extent possible, contacts were to be arranged through secure cutouts, with no reference whatsoever to OPC.

The "covert operations" to be handled by OPC were defined by NSC 10/2 as all activities (except

as noted) which were to be conducted or sponsored by the US Government against hostile foreign states or groups, or in support of friendly foreign states or groups. They were to be so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them would not be evident to unauthorized persons. If uncovered the US Government was to be able to disclaim plausibly any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations were to include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World. Such operations were not to include armed conflict by recognized military forces, and excluded espionage, CE, and cover and deception for military operations.

The exception noted in the preceding paragraph referred to a statement in paragraph 4 of the directive which stated:

> In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.

This language was foredoomed to be the cause of much contention between OPC and the JCS as to their respective roles in wartime in regard to the conduct of covert activity.

C. Understanding of 6 August 1948 on Implementing NSC 10/2

On 6 August 1948 a meeting to clarify the implementation of NSC 10/2 was attended by: DCI Hillenkoetter; Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, and Mr. Robert Blum, representing the Secretary of Defense; Mr. George F. Kennan, chief of State's Policy Planning Staff; Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary, NSC; and Wisner, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for Occupied Areas who was about to take over on 1 September 1948 as CIA's Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (ADPC). It is reasonable to conclude that before taking that office Wisner was asking for an agreed interpretation of the parameters of the task

he was about to undertake. A memorandum of conversation and understanding was agreed to and initialed by those present. (See Attachment D.) Within the context of the understanding reached, OPC was to be given considerable latitude to operate independently of the CIA machinery of command and administration, with the proviso, however, that the DCI was to be "kept informed in regard to all important projects and decisions." "Important" was not delineated and as it turned out, the determination was largely left up to the head of the new instrumentality for covert activities. It was clear, moreover, that departmental advice was to flow to the ADPC directly, not through the DCI.* Wisner was installed as ADPC on 1 September 1948.

The relationship of OPC to CIA during the period when Admiral Hillenkoetter was DCI is described by Dr. Edward P. Lilly, an historical observer, in the following terms:

> OPC was in CIA administratively and with a strict reading of NSC 10/2, the Director of CIA would have control

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

over its policy and operations. When it commenced to operate, however, because of the personalities involved, because OPC received instructions and guidance directly from the Secretaries of State and Defense, and because of the special sensitivity of its operations, there was a general agreement among the officials involved that OPC should be a separate and independent entity within CIA. Independence even went so far that OPC's intelligence requests were handled by CIA as requests of a separate agency. OPC, on its part, was reluctant to tell the intelligence side of CIA about its operations even though the DCI had been given the responsibility of policy coordination and of appealing to NSC if policy disagreements arose. The practice developed, however, that the departmental policy representatives only consulted with OPC, and the DCI was initially left out of covert planning. This procedure initially gave OPC a relatively greater freedom of action, but removed the single responsible authority who could decide if a particular covert operation was in accord with American policy. 8/

D. Financing OPC

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Early in 1949 legislation highly important to the conduct of covert activities was enacted. Although the National Security Act of 1947 had given statutory recognition to CIA, it did not include enabling legislation authorizing the DCI to acquire or administer CIA funds in his own right. 9/ He continued to depend upon allocations from the Departmental Secretaries and tenuous understandings with Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO), and certain other Government agencies as to the purposes for which available funds could legally and properly be expended. On 20 June 1949, Public Law 110, 81st Congress, was approved "to provide for the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency, established pursuant to Section 102, National Security Act of 1947 and for other purposes." This legislation provided specifically that:

> . . . the sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary,

> or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.

This would appear to have given the DCI the authority to set up an organizational system to conduct clandestine activities in any way he saw fit, subject only to the rule of prudence and good sense. However, since established patterns of governmental procedure appeared to present the minimum risk to future interpellation, Admiral Hillenkoetter and his advisers chose not to pioneer.

E. Revision in the Understanding on Implementing NSC 10/2

General Smith replaced Admiral Hillenkoetter as DCI on 7 October 1950. He was the appointee of President Truman and had direct access to the President when required. Smith, differing from his predecessor, held uncompromising views with respect to the authorities and responsibilities of command. He determined that OPC would be an integral part of CIA responsive to his policy guidance.

Three years later, in 1953, General Smith was to describe his views on NSC 10/2 to the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on his nomination to the post of Under Secretary of State as follows:

> The Office of Policy Coordination . . . was set up under rather peculiar circumstances.
>
> It was created as a result of the recognition that something had to be done in the way of the cold war, and it was created at a time when, as you know, Secretary Johnson was Secretary of Defense, and Secretary Acheson, Secretary of State.*
>
> Anything that was created at that time in that field inevitably had to be a sort of compromise, and that was what this OPC thing was. It was created by an order of the National Security Council, which I thought was not a particularly sound order when I read it.
>
> It put in the Central Intelligence Agency this entity which was actually in but not of the agency. It took its direction largely from a policy group of officers of the Defense and State Departments. Admiral Hillenkoetter felt he did not have very much control over it.

---

* Smith was somewhat hazy in his chronology. These positions were held respectively by James V. Forrestal and General George C. Marshall when OPC was created on 1 September 1948. Johnson was appointed on 28 March 1949 and Acheson on 21 January 1949.

> On the other hand, it was the place where the money was spent, and all the rest of the agency was suspicious of it. 10/

Smith was advised by senior members of the CIA staff to seek modification or amendment to NSC 10/2 to eliminate the provisions which served to act in derogation of the DCI's full authority and responsibility for covert operations and to clarify its most controversial provision which pertained to wartime planning and covert operations in military theaters. Smith was not prepared to move in this fashion. At the same time, he found it impossible to accept a situation wherein the authority of the DCI to allocate resources was being hamstrung by the fact that the Departments of State and Defense were directing OPC policy without his prior approval.

Smith felt secure enough in his position to conclude that he could bring OPC under his full control by a change in existing procedures without opening up NSC 10/2 to modification. Accordingly, he instructed Wisner, OPC chief, to advise State, Defense, and the JCS that the 6 August 1948 memorandum was no longer applicable or effective in the light of altered circumstances (apparently altered in the

sense that he was on the scene).

Wisner's compliance with this instruction was reported to the DCI on 12 October 1950. (See Attachment E.) Wisner advised the representatives of State, Defense, and the JCS that General Smith saw no immediate necessity for a revision of NSC 10/2 in order to accomplish the full integration of OPC as an element of CIA under the authority and command of the DCI. Wisner explained that the advice and policy guidance from State, Defense, and the JCS would not thereafter be regarded by Smith as placing any or all of them in the position of giving orders or instructions to OPC. Such guidance thereafter would be considered as coming to CIA as an organization and not merely to OPC.

Smith then proceeded to take direct control of OPC, and OSO as well, by means of an internal reorganization which arrogated the principal supporting functions to a deputy director for administration responsible directly to the DCI. Thus, by taking control of resources (money and manpower) through a channel reporting directly to him, General Smith in effect took control of operations themselves.

F. Revision of Paragraph 4, NSC 10/2

By October 1950 controversy between OPC and the JCS over the interpretation of paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2, aggravated by the ambiguity surrounding command relationships in Korea and the Far East, had become so egregious that Smith was persuaded to reverse his previous decision and to seek a modification of the directive. The interpretation of the paragraph was, according to Wisner, "the subject of more divergent views and conflicting constructions than any other portion of the paper." From the vantage point of 20 years later, the divergent constructions may seem somewhat recondite; but a sense of reality is restored when it is recognized that the interpretations were being made by dedicated planners who believed that the United States was living in imminent peril of World War III.

Following conversations with Smith, Wisner on 23 October 1950 wrote a memorandum confirming the need for and reasons behind a definitive and authoritative interpretation of the troublesome paragraph. [11/] Wisner pointed out that the basic difficulties lay in the fact that nowhere in NSC 10/2 did it

specifically provide that OPC was to be "responsible for the conduct of covert operations in wartime." Related problems involved were: first, the specific participation of OPC planners in both peacetime and wartime preparation of plans for wartime covert operations; and second, the delineation of the manner in which covert operations would be set up and directed in military theaters.*

Paragraph 4 was suspended on 14 December 1950 by the NSC at the suggestion of General Smith in order that a supplementary draft directive tentatively designated as NSC 10/3 could be considered, incorporating a rewording of the controversial paragraph 4 along with certain other changes.** The JCS found NSC 10/3 unacceptable and at the 11 April 1951 NSC meeting it was withdrawn when a rewording of paragraph

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4 proposed by General Smith was approved, as follows:

> In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the JCS. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President. 12/

G. Scope and Pace of OPC Operations (NSC 68); NSC 10/5 and the Psychological Strategy Board

NSC 10/2 remained in force with this revision until 23 October 1951 when it was supplemented by further NSC action with regard to the "scope and pace of covert operations" through publication of a document identified as NSC 10/5.

In early 1950 US policymakers had determined that a more rapid buildup in the basic potential for waging cold war should be undertaken by all relevant branches of government. Thus, the formulation of a cold-war policy and appraisal of the assets necessary to wage it was undertaken by the NSC, culminating in the issuance in April 1950 of NSC 68.

NSC 68 provided for a nonmilitary counter-offensive against the USSR and for recapture of psychological initiative in the following terms:

> In regard to U.S.S.R. and satellites, offensive operations short of war, including intensive overt propaganda, encouragement to and organization of exiled groups and defectors, energetic prosecution of appropriate covert operations within the Soviet orbit, and vigorous exploitation of favorable opportunities as they occur, e.g. Korea . . . [were to get underway.] 13/

A State representative on 19 April 1950 briefed a number of top OPC officials by citing the particular NSC 68 provisions applying to the planning and operations of OPC as follows:*

> At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to encourage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.

---

* The underlining was made by the State representative, Robert P. Joyce.

Tasks relating to the OPC mission were described as:

> Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.
>
> Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries. 14/

In the course of its considerations, NSC called for budgetary estimates constituting a six-year projection for the period beginning 1 July 1950 and ending 30 June 1957. The assumptions conveyed to OPC in May 1950 in connection with the formulation of these projections were briefly that the US Government had decided to make a major effort in the field of covert operations; that there would be no overt hostilities during the period under consideration; and that, if the measures espoused by NSC 68 were successful, a shooting war might be avoided. Nonetheless, preparations for a shooting war (overt hostilities) were to be made and the year 1954 was

regarded as crucial. 15/

It was readily apparent that the pace of the cold war envisioned by the policymakers called for a more rapid expansion of resources than OPC had theretofore been able to undertake. A memorandum written in November 1951 commented on the fact that such broad and comprehensive undertakings as delineated by NSC 68 could only be accomplished by the establishment of a worldwide structure for covert operations on a much grander scale than OPC had previously contemplated. It would be a task similar in concept, magnitude, and complexity to the creation of widely deployed military forces together with the logistical support required to conduct manifold, complex, and delicate operations in a wide variety of overseas locations. 16/

These considerations had led Smith to seek clarification from the NSC. In a paper dated 8 May 1951, entitled "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations" sometimes known as the "Magnitude Paper," he commented on the extent of the resources which would be needed to accomplish the mission apparently envisioned under NSC 68 and concluded that a program of

such magnitude required further review by the NSC. 17/ He recommended: (a) that NSC should initiate a comprehensive review of the covert operations situation in view of the magnitude issue; (b) that this review should contain a restatement or redetermination of the several responsibilities and authorities involved in US covert operations; (c) that if the review should result in a reaffirmation of CIA's covert operational responsibility, then CIA should be provided the necessary support from other government agencies to insure the successful discharge of the responsibility, with certain specific assurances as to policy and planning relationships and provision of the needed quantities of personnel and logistical support; and (d) that guidance for covert operations of concern to more than one department should be coordinated and issued to CIA (and to other participating agences) by the newly created Psychological Strategy Board (PSB).

PSB had been constituted on 4 April 1951 by Presidential Directive.* It was to be responsible

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

for the formulation and promulgation of over-all national psychological objectives, policies, and programs and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort. There was reason to doubt, however, that the PSB would be able to muster the authority required for the proper discharge of its responsibilities.

NSC 10/5 was issued on 23 October 1951, responding to General Smith's "Magnitude Paper" and calling for an intensification of covert operations. (See Attachment F.) It "reaffirmed" the responsibility and authority of the DCI for the conduct of covert operations under NSC 10/2 subject to the approval of the PSB. NSC 10/5 established the general order of emphasis for covert operations: (a) to place maximum strain on the Soviet power structure; (b) to strengthen the orientation of the free world toward the United States; and (c) to develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations in strategic areas.

The role of the PSB was defined as follows: (a) to determine the desirability and feasibility of covert operational programs and of individual major

projects; (b) to establish the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations and the allocation of priorities among them; and (c) to coordinate action to ensure the adequate provision of personnel, funds, and logistical and other support to the DCI for the carrying out of approved operations. NSC 10/5 directed that the development of underground resistance and the conduct of covert and guerrilla operations should wherever practicable provide bases on which the military might expand military operations in time of war within active theaters of operations. The directive called for the advice and collaboration of the JCS in the formulation of PM operations during the period of the cold war.

As it applied to OPC, the purpose of NSC 10/5 was to provide through the PSB an authoritative assessment of the covert activity being conducted and to furnish policy guidance as to the future extent of such activity. It is evident that the PSB fell short of this purpose. As the "Jackson Committee"* was later to find, the creation of the PSB was based

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

on a misconception that psychological warfare strategy could exist apart from the total national strategy.

H. Summary

NSC 10/2 was the basic national directive under which OPC was constituted and covert activities begun. NSC 10/5 was intended to refine the earlier directive by providing the method whereby OPC could receive guidance as to the scope and pace of those activities. It fell short in this respect but did reconfirm the fact that responsibility of CIA for covert activities was to continue.

In addition to these basic directives, there was a steady stream of NSC policy guidances with respect to specific areas of the world or to specific problems. Sometimes CIA was called upon by name for covert action but generally CIA's role was more indirect through its provision of covert support to articulated courses of action assigned to State and

Defense.*

NSC 10/2 was, in effect, a treaty between State and Defense to define how US covert activities were to be conducted. Whether it was a sound idea to place the instrument for conducting those activities in CIA was thought to be beside the point. The executive arm of the Government was convinced that immediate action had to be taken to forestall "the vicious covert activities of the USSR."** CIA presented the only vehicle immediately available for undertaking such countermeasures without instituting action by Congress which would certainly make for delay and might in the long run prove to be unobtainable.

Like most treaties NSC 10/2 contained certain seeds of discord, such as:

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

a. The requirements placed on OPC by State and Defense were widely disparate. One involved the conduct of political and psychological warfare; the other, plans and preparations for paramilitary operations. This dichotomy of interests immediately posed a problem in priorites to OPC. It did not have either the personal or physical resources to meet both demands.

b. With Hillenkoetter acceding, the directive permitted the uncanalized admission of policy direction from State and Defense into OPC. With this shortcutting of command channels, the relationship between Hillenkoetter and Wisner became an uneasy one at best. In a memorandum dated 19 October 1948, General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston pointed out to the DCI a number of debatable provisions and interpretations deriving from the NSC 10/2 paper. 18/ Houston argued that there were no means under the existing law by which the Director could divest himself of, or be separated from, his personal responsibility

for the expenditure of unvouchered funds. Houston suggested a further clarification by NSC to the end that the DCI should have full administrative control of OPC personnel and supplies, final authority over the expenditure of its funds, and the right to initiate or veto its projects. In the alternative, if control and responsibility were to remain outside of CIA, then it should be made clear that the Director's responsibility was specifically limited to that of affording housekeeping support only. There was no clarification of NSC 10/2 until General Smith handled the matter to his own satisfaction by taking over full control of OPC.

c. Hillenkoetter made an accurate forecast in arguing that the proviso permitting OPC to operate independently of other CIA components would lead to continued argument and bickering over financial management. That in fact turned out to be the case.*

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

d. Until the controversial paragraph 4 was changed by mutual consent, the original wording led to endless negotiations and debate between CIA and the JCS on issues of "cold war" versus "hot war" responsibilities and prerogatives.

e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare were to be conducted by OPC "under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare" but where such responsibilities finally rested never came to light.

f. NSC 10/2 was an adequate document to get covert operations under way. As time went on and operations multiplied, however, it became clear that some determination would have to be made as to the extent and source of the resources to be devoted to the covert effort. An attempt to remedy this deficiency within the provisions of NSC 10/5 fell short of the mark. In fact, the creation of machinery to supply high policy in this category involved a whole historical episode in

itself, extending far into the future after OPC disappeared as such.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

renamed divisions instead of staffs. The Programs and Planning Division was split internally into three staffs: Staff I, with a supporting secretariat, was given the responsibility for policy planning and review, for war mobilization planning, for liaison control, and for intelligence support; Staff II consisted of a new geographic planning structure with area branches paralleling those in the operating structure; Staff III encompassed the seven previously existing functional program branches. The Operations Division consisted of the five previous area branches plus a sixth, Foreign Branch F, added in the March reshuffle, responsible for operations originating in the United States. The Operations Division also acquired a supporting staff, more in the nature of technical advisers than a staff, which was named the Operations Special Staff consisting of five groups, that is, Air Operations, Operational Security, Cover and Deception, Signal Operations, and Naval Operations (See Figure 3, page 132.)

The modification made at the end of 1949 brought to OPC an organization that was much

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Frustrated by lack of success in amusing intended audiences abroad, some of the staff members took refuge in amusing themselves and their colleagues. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Their selections of "gamesmanship," which had an appeal to an American audience were often only bizarre or incomprehensible to the "peasant in the Piazza." In common with other functional staffs, the Psychological Warfare Workshop appears to have gone pretty

much of its own merry way.*



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~Secret~~
~~CIA Internal Use Only~~
Access Controlled by DDP

CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Clandestine Service Historical Series

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION 1948-1952

VOLUME II

~~Secret~~
CS HP 228
Controlled by: O/DDP
February 1973
Copy 3 of 4

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 5B(1), (2), (3), (4) classified by [redacted] declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

~~SECRET~~

CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by DDP

HISTORICAL STAFF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORICAL SERIES

CS HP 228

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
1948-1952

by

Gerald E. Miller

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
February 1973

VOLUME II

One Copy Only: O/DDP

~~SECRET~~

Approved for Release: 2024/04/29 C05500780

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

[redacted] parti-

cularly close rapport with certain individuals in various positions of responsibility [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

Among these were: Joyce, [redacted]
Mr. Paul H. Nitze, [redacted]
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] These included: Lovett,

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[redacted]

Kennan,

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Clandestine Service Historical Series

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION 1948-1952

VOLUME III

February 1973

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 5B(1), (2), (3), (4) classified by [redacted] declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence

(b)(3) CIAAct

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

~~SECRET~~
~~CIA Internal Use Only~~
Access Controlled by DDP

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORICAL SERIES

CS HP 228

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
1948-1952

by

Gerald E. Miller

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
February 1973

VOLUME III

One Copy Only: O/DDP

~~SECRET~~

CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Clandestine Service Historical Series

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION

1948-1952

VOLUME IV

[redacted]
(b)(3) CIAAct

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 5B(1), (2), (3), (4) classified by [redacted] declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence

(b)(3) CIAAct

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

HISTORICAL STAFF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORICAL SERIES

CS HP 228

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
1948-1952

by

Gerald E. Miller

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
February 1973

VOLUME IV

One Copy Only: O/DDP

CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Clandestine Service Historical Series

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION 1948-1952

VOLUME V

CS HP 228
Controlled by: O/DDP
February 1973
Copy 4 of 4

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 5B(1) (2) (3) (4)
classified by
declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence

(b)(3) CIAAct

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

~~SECRET~~
~~CIA Internal Use Only~~
Access Controlled by DDP

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORICAL SERIES

CS HP 228

OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
1948-1952

by

Gerald E. Miller

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
February 1973

VOLUME V

One Copy Only: O/DDP

~~SECRET~~

Approved for Release: 2024/02/27 C05500784

the hope of liberation in the satellite states; increasing the difficulties of the satellite regimes; creating doubts and fears among the quislings and informers of the satellite states; and developing an atmosphere favorable to the growth of resistance movements within the Bloc.

It was next to impossible to get a balanced evaluation of the effectiveness of RFE's output. Evidence that it had a substantial degree of influence was obtained from: acknowledgement by escapees that RFE influenced their course of action; mounting attacks on RFE by satellite officials and media available to them; increased efforts by the regimes to jam the reception; and laudatory reports from within the satellite countries from State representatives and newspaper correspondents.

1. The Crusade for Freedom

The Crusade for Freedom was the fund-raising cover mechanism for the NCFE and CFA. As a separate corporate entity, it generally ran its own independent course and was regarded with some skepticism by the working personnel of NCFE. At the same time it had collected contributions from 23 million Americans by 1952; and this fact made it a potent factor, both for purposes of cover and for dealings with the German Government which was host to RFE. For example, Adenauer's government in defending itself from attacks on the RFE by the socialists cited the expressed determination by so many millions of Americans as the reason for the continuance of this radio activity. To apply on their budgets NCFE and CFA reasonably expected to raise respectively $2 million and $250,000 from the Crusade.

In 1951, under the auspices of the Crusade for Freedom, NCFE undertook a balloon project whereby

five million leaflets were dropped in Czechoslovakia and one-half million in the southwestern areas of Poland. The "stunt" value of the operation, judged from escapee reports and Moscow attacks was considerable.

As premiums to accompany future leaflet distributions, the Crusade had accumulated, mostly by gift, thousands of packets of needles, or razor blades, and of zippers, as well as a large supply of soap cakes - all attractive minor items in short supply behind the Curtain. 15/

2. Direction of NCFE

The President, Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, who held the office since the organization of the Committee in 1949, resigned during the year 1951 and was replaced by Mr. C.D. Jackson who took a year's leave from Fortune magazine to head the committee and incidentally to engage in Republican politics. Poole was a former diplomat, educator and scholar. He had headed the Foreign Nationalities Branch of OSS during World War II. As the Committee's activities widened, the position of President demanded wider managerial skills than those possessed by an intellectual as Poole, and he was replaced ad interim by Jackson. Poole took a less demanding post as vice chairman of the NCFE board. He resigned from that post on 31 May 1952 because of failing health and died the following September. Meanwhile, Jackson left the post of President and was replaced by Mr. H.B. Miller who it was felt would be less intransigent in his relations with CIA than Poole had been.

The directors and members of NCFE constituted a rather formidable aggregation of internationally oriented members of the establishment. The group, mostly New Yorkers, was comprised of prominent financiers, lawyers, industrialists and savants. Among them in the 1951-52 period were:

Approved for Release: 2024/02/27 C05500784

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

To equip and operate a clandestine radio transmitter from an aircraft.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

To create a clandestine border crossing group to distribute propaganda in Czechoslovakia. (T)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

D. Hungary

PP activities in Hungary had not been considered outstandingly successful. The sole existing project involved a team of eight script writers in Germany whose product was intended for distribution in Hungary by pamphlets and by radio. It had not been possible to achieve effective distribution in this manner, and the team was being reassessed for possible use in other phases of PP operations. During the remainder of FY 1953, it was planned to concentrate on limited assignments, activities of a broader scope to be planned out in the interim for initiation at a later date:

a. Development of communications systems running into Hungary through illegal border crossers (courier).

b. Recruitment of persons travelling legally to and from Hungary for the same purpose.

c. Inducement-harassment operations directed against individual Hungarian officials, both in and out of Hungary.

d. Investigation of resistance potential in Hungary, to the extent that personnel can be assigned to such tasks without detracting from more immediate targets.

Projects for Hungary are listed below:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] A development psychological project for initiation of clandestine broadcasts into Hungary. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] A propaganda project providing for production of printed material in Western Europe for smuggling into Hungary Termination recommended because of increasing border controls. (NR) (T) [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] A developmental project for the creation of resistance in Hungary. (NR) [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

E. Poland

NSC 20/4, NSC 68, and the CIA/OPC Strategic Plan dated 1 August 1951 laid down policies and objectives which in essence were directed toward the establishment, support, and maintenance of underground groups capable of limited political and psychological action in cold war and expansion into PM activities during hot war. The ultimate objective was the establishment in Poland of a democratic government friendly to the United States without recourse to war if possible but following a war should it take place. It was later discovered that certain of the refugee groups with which OPC had been working were penetrated and much of the early effort had gone for naught.

Projects for Poland are listed below:

[redacted] An over-all program to develop support, and exploit organized resistance in Poland with the

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Approved for Release: 2024/02/27 C05500784