



# governmentattic.org

*"Rummaging in the government's attic"*

Description of document: National Security Agency (NSA) Various Reports to Congress 2007-2009

Requested date: 09-December-2010

Release date: 15-November-2024

Posted date: 27-January-2025

Source of document: FOIA Request  
National Security Agency  
Attn: FOIA/PA Office  
9800 Savage Road, Suite 6932  
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6932  
Fax: 443-479-3612  
[Online Form](#)

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is a First Amendment free speech web site and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

11 January 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - NSA Continues Making  
Progress on Power, Space and Cooling for Cryptanalytic Computers -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S//SI//REL) I am pleased to advise you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has succeeded in significantly increasing its general-purpose cryptanalytic capability ahead of schedule. NSA has instituted a series of measures designed to protect against future power, space and cooling shortfalls to include stringent acquisition management controls; creative power conservation and management measures; further collaboration with the local utility company; and short-term reworking of space allocations. In addition, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, NSA is addressing funding allocations. Through aggressive mission management, there has been no measurable effect on our counterterrorism and other high priority missions. While continuing to manage a complex situation in the short term, NSA's focus is now on developing methodologies and metrics to support the potential for additional data centers to provide effective mission assurance and continue the growth of required computational capabilities.

(S//SI//REL)

[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] The ongoing explosion of sophisticated global communications requires NSA to continue to pursue additional cryptanalytic and data storage capabilities for the foreseeable future. Through a combination of new power management processes and the planned addition of specific [Redacted] we will be able to move forward with accommodating power, space and cooling requirements for NSA's planned priority system upgrades and additions through fiscal year 2007. Although progress is being made, NSA continues to manage small, short-term facilities and mission risk on a daily basis until additional power capacity comes on line.

(S//SI//REL) To ensure better planning and management of requirements for new systems, I have chartered a senior cross-functional team to review all new

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20041123

Declassify On: 20291123

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Information Technology (IT) acquisitions and the purchase of any other equipment requiring power, to ensure power, space and cooling are available for the highest priority systems. The team has produced a consolidated system priority list and is developing detailed implementation plans.

(S//SI//REL) Additionally, within the existing Ft. Meade, MD complex, retrofitting of existing spaces to maximize currently available power will take place over the next 36 months. This work will [redacted]

[redacted] These areas will allow advanced planning to occur for proposed FY08 purchases and provide the needed power headroom to aid in the deliberation of NSA's cross functional team. NSA is also working with the local utility company, Baltimore Gas and Electric. The company has committed to providing additional electrical capacity as NSA identifies funding for upgrades to our aging electrical power distribution systems.

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Michael G. Lawrence [redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Ranking Member, Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11 January 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RANKING MEMBER, PERMANENT SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - NSA Continues Making  
Progress on Power, Space and Cooling for Cryptanalytic Computers -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S//SI//REL) I am pleased to advise you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has succeeded in significantly increasing its general-purpose cryptanalytic capability ahead of schedule. NSA has instituted a series of measures designed to protect against future power, space and cooling shortfalls to include stringent acquisition management controls; creative power conservation and management measures; further collaboration with the local utility company; and short-term reworking of space allocations. In addition, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, NSA is addressing funding allocations. Through aggressive mission management, there has been no measurable effect on our counterterrorism and other high priority missions. While continuing to manage a complex situation in the short term, NSA's focus is now on developing methodologies and metrics to support the potential for additional data centers to provide effective mission assurance and continue the growth of required computational capabilities.

(S//SI//REL)

[Redacted]

The ongoing explosion of sophisticated global communications requires NSA to continue to pursue additional cryptanalytic and data storage capabilities for the foreseeable future. Through a combination of new power management processes and the planned addition of specific [Redacted] we will be able to move forward with accommodating power, space and cooling requirements for NSA's planned priority system upgrades and additions through fiscal year 2007. Although progress is being made, NSA continues to manage small, short-term facilities and mission risk on a daily basis until additional power capacity comes on line.

(S//SI//REL) To ensure better planning and management of requirements for new systems, I have chartered a senior cross-functional team to review all new

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20041123  
Declassify On: 20291123

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Information Technology (IT) acquisitions and the purchase of any other equipment requiring power to ensure power, space and cooling are available for the highest priority systems. The team has produced a consolidated system priority list and is developing detailed implementation plans.

(S//SI//REL) Additionally, within the existing Ft. Meade, MD complex, retrofitting of existing spaces to maximize currently available power will take place over the next 36 months. This work will [redacted]

[redacted] These areas will allow advanced planning to occur for proposed FY08 purchases and provide the needed power headroom to aid in the deliberation of NSA's cross functional team. NSA is also working with the local utility company, Baltimore Gas and Electric. The company has committed to providing additional electrical capacity as NSA identifies funding for upgrades to our aging electrical power distribution systems.

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Michael G. Lawrence [redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Chairman, Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11 January 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Congressional Notification - NSA Continues Making Progress on Power, Space and Cooling for Cryptanalytic Computers - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S//SI//REL) I am pleased to advise you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has succeeded in significantly increasing its general-purpose cryptanalytic capability ahead of schedule. NSA has instituted a series of measures designed to protect against future power, space and cooling shortfalls to include stringent acquisition management controls; creative power conservation and management measures; further collaboration with the local utility company; and short-term reworking of space allocations. In addition, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, NSA is addressing funding allocations. Through aggressive mission management, there has been no measurable effect on our counterterrorism and other high priority missions. While continuing to manage a complex situation in the short term, NSA's focus is now on developing methodologies and metrics to support the potential for additional data centers to provide effective mission assurance and continue the growth of required computational capabilities.

(S//SI//REL) [Redacted]

The ongoing explosion of sophisticated global communications requires NSA to continue to pursue additional cryptanalytic and data storage capabilities for the foreseeable future. Through a combination of new power management processes and the planned addition of specific [Redacted] we will be able to move forward with accommodating power, space and cooling requirements for NSA's planned priority system upgrades and additions through fiscal year 2007. Although progress is being made, NSA continues to manage small, short-term facilities and mission risk on a daily basis until additional power capacity comes on line.

(S//SI//REL) To ensure better planning and management of requirements for new systems, I have chartered a senior cross-functional team to review all new

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20041123

Declassify On: 20291123

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Information Technology (IT) acquisitions and the purchase of any other equipment requiring power to ensure power, space and cooling are available for the highest priority systems. The team has produced a consolidated system priority list and is developing detailed implementation plans.

(S//SI//REL) Additionally, within the existing Ft. Meade, MD complex, retrofitting of existing spaces to maximize currently available power will take place over the next 36 months. This work will [redacted]

[redacted] These areas will allow advanced planning to occur for proposed FY08 purchases and provide the needed power headroom to aid in the deliberation of NSA's cross functional team. NSA is also working with the local utility company, Baltimore Gas and Electric. The company has committed to providing additional electrical capacity as NSA identifies funding for upgrades to our aging electrical power distribution systems.

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Michael G. Lawrence [redacted]



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Vice Chairman, Select  
Committee on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11 January 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Congressional Notification - NSA Continues Making Progress on Power, Space and Cooling for Cryptanalytic Computers - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S//SI//REL) I am pleased to advise you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has succeeded in significantly increasing its general-purpose cryptanalytic capability ahead of schedule. NSA has instituted a series of measures designed to protect against future power, space and cooling shortfalls to include stringent acquisition management controls; creative power conservation and management measures; further collaboration with the local utility company; and short-term reworking of space allocations. In addition, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, NSA is addressing funding allocations. Through aggressive mission management, there has been no measurable effect on our counterterrorism and other high priority missions. While continuing to manage a complex situation in the short term, NSA's focus is now on developing methodologies and metrics to support the potential for additional data centers to provide effective mission assurance and continue the growth of required computational capabilities.

(S//SI//REL)

[Redacted]

The ongoing explosion of sophisticated global communications requires NSA to continue to pursue additional cryptanalytic and data storage capabilities for the foreseeable future. Through a combination of new power management processes and the planned addition of specific [Redacted] we will be able to move forward with accommodating power, space and cooling requirements for NSA's planned priority system upgrades and additions through fiscal year 2007. Although progress is being made, NSA continues to manage small, short-term facilities and mission risk on a daily basis until additional power capacity comes on line.

(S//SI//REL) To ensure better planning and management of requirements for new systems, I have chartered a senior cross-functional team to review all new

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20041123

Declassify On: 20291123

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Information Technology (IT) acquisitions and the purchase of any other equipment requiring power to ensure power, space and cooling are available for the highest priority systems. The team has produced a consolidated system priority list and is developing detailed implementation plans.

(S//SI//REL) Additionally, within the existing Ft. Meade, MD complex, retrofitting of existing spaces to maximize currently available power will take place over the next 36 months. This work will [redacted]

[redacted] These areas will allow advanced planning to occur for proposed FY08 purchases and provide the needed power headroom to aid in the deliberation of NSA's cross functional team. NSA is also working with the local utility company, Baltimore Gas and Electric. The company has committed to providing additional electrical capacity as NSA identifies funding for upgrades to our aging electrical power distribution systems.

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Michael G. Lawrence [redacted]



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Chairman, Select Committee  
on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11 January 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - NSA Continues Making  
Progress on Power, Space and Cooling for Cryptanalytic Computers -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S//SI//REL) I am pleased to advise you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has succeeded in significantly increasing its general-purpose cryptanalytic capability ahead of schedule. NSA has instituted a series of measures designed to protect against future power, space and cooling shortfalls to include stringent acquisition management controls; creative power conservation and management measures; further collaboration with the local utility company; and short-term reworking of space allocations. In addition, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, NSA is addressing funding allocations. Through aggressive mission management, there has been no measurable effect on our counterterrorism and other high priority missions. While continuing to manage a complex situation in the short term, NSA's focus is now on developing methodologies and metrics to support the potential for additional data centers to provide effective mission assurance and continue the growth of required computational capabilities.

(S//SI//REL)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The ongoing explosion of sophisticated global communications requires NSA to continue to pursue additional cryptanalytic and data storage capabilities for the foreseeable future. Through a combination of new power management processes and the planned addition of specific [Redacted] we will be able to move forward with accommodating power, space and cooling requirements for NSA's planned priority system upgrades and additions through fiscal year 2007. Although progress is being made, NSA continues to manage small, short-term facilities and mission risk on a daily basis until additional power capacity comes on line.

(S//SI//REL) To ensure better planning and management of requirements for new systems, I have chartered a senior cross-functional team to review all new

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20041123  
Declassify On: 20291123

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Information Technology (IT) acquisitions and the purchase of any other equipment requiring power to ensure power, space and cooling are available for the highest priority systems. The team has produced a consolidated system priority list and is developing detailed implementation plans.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ Additionally, within the existing Ft. Meade, MD complex, retrofitting of existing spaces to maximize currently available power will take place over the next 36 months. This work will [redacted]

[redacted] These areas will allow advanced planning to occur for proposed FY08 purchases and provide the needed power headroom to aid in the deliberation of NSA's cross functional team. NSA is also working with the local utility company, Baltimore Gas and Electric. The company has committed to providing additional electrical capacity as NSA identifies funding for upgrades to our aging electrical power distribution systems.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Michael G. Lawrence [redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11 January 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - NSA Continues Making  
Progress on Power, Space and Cooling for Cryptanalytic Computers -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~S//SI//REL~~) I am pleased to advise you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has succeeded in significantly increasing its general-purpose cryptanalytic capability ahead of schedule. NSA has instituted a series of measures designed to protect against future power, space and cooling shortfalls to include stringent acquisition management controls; creative power conservation and management measures; further collaboration with the local utility company; and short-term reworking of space allocations. In addition, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, NSA is addressing funding allocations. Through aggressive mission management, there has been no measurable effect on our counterterrorism and other high priority missions. While continuing to manage a complex situation in the short term, NSA's focus is now on developing methodologies and metrics to support the potential for additional data centers to provide effective mission assurance and continue the growth of required computational capabilities.

(~~S//SI//REL~~)

[Redacted]

The ongoing explosion of sophisticated global communications requires NSA to continue to pursue additional cryptanalytic and data storage capabilities for the foreseeable future. Through a combination of new power management processes and the planned addition of specific [Redacted] we will be able to move forward with accommodating power, space and cooling requirements for NSA's planned priority system upgrades and additions through fiscal year 2007. Although progress is being made, NSA continues to manage small, short-term facilities and mission risk on a daily basis until additional power capacity comes on line.

(~~S//SI//REL~~) To ensure better planning and management of requirements for new systems, I have chartered a senior cross-functional team to review all new

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20041123  
Declassify On: 20291123

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36


(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Information Technology (IT) acquisitions and the purchase of any other equipment requiring power to ensure power, space and cooling are available for the highest priority systems. The team has produced a consolidated system priority list and is developing detailed implementation plans.

(S//SI//REL) Additionally, within the existing Ft. Meade, MD complex, retrofitting of existing spaces to maximize currently available power will take place over the next 36 months. This work will

These areas will allow advanced planning to occur for proposed FY08 purchases and provide the needed power headroom to aid in the deliberation of NSA's cross functional team. NSA is also working with the local utility company, Baltimore Gas and Electric. The company has committed to providing additional electrical capacity as NSA identifies funding for upgrades to our aging electrical power distribution systems.

(S//SI//REL)



(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Michael G. Lawrence

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11 January 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - NSA Continues Making Progress on Power, Space and Cooling for Cryptanalytic Computers - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S//SI//REL) I am pleased to advise you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has succeeded in significantly increasing its general-purpose cryptanalytic capability ahead of schedule. NSA has instituted a series of measures designed to protect against future power, space and cooling shortfalls to include stringent acquisition management controls; creative power conservation and management measures; further collaboration with the local utility company; and short-term reworking of space allocations. In addition, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, NSA is addressing funding allocations. Through aggressive mission management, there has been no measurable effect on our counterterrorism and other high priority missions. While continuing to manage a complex situation in the short term, NSA's focus is now on developing methodologies and metrics to support the potential for additional data centers to provide effective mission assurance and continue the growth of required computational capabilities.

(S//SI//REL) [Redacted]

[Redacted] The ongoing explosion of sophisticated global communications requires NSA to continue to pursue additional cryptanalytic and data storage capabilities for the foreseeable future. Through a combination of new power management processes and the planned addition of specific [Redacted] we will be able to move forward with accommodating power, space and cooling requirements for NSA's planned priority system upgrades and additions through fiscal year 2007. Although progress is being made, NSA continues to manage small, short-term facilities and mission risk on a daily basis until additional power capacity comes on line.

(S//SI//REL) To ensure better planning and management of requirements for new systems, I have chartered a senior cross-functional team to review all new

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20041123  
Declassify On: 20291123

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Information Technology (IT) acquisitions and the purchase of any other equipment requiring power to ensure power, space and cooling are available for the highest priority systems. The team has produced a consolidated system priority list and is developing detailed implementation plans.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ Additionally, within the existing Ft. Meade, MD complex, retrofitting of existing spaces to maximize currently available power will take place over the next 36 months. This work will [redacted]

[redacted] These areas will allow advanced planning to occur for proposed FY08 purchases and provide the needed power headroom to aid in the deliberation of NSA's cross functional team. NSA is also working with the local utility company, Baltimore Gas and Electric. The company has committed to providing additional electrical capacity as NSA identifies funding for upgrades to our aging electrical power distribution systems.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~

[Large redacted block]

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Michael G. Lawrence [redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11 January 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - NSA Continues Making Progress on Power, Space and Cooling for Cryptanalytic Computers - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~S//SI//REL~~) I am pleased to advise you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has succeeded in significantly increasing its general-purpose cryptanalytic capability ahead of schedule. NSA has instituted a series of measures designed to protect against future power, space and cooling shortfalls to include stringent acquisition management controls; creative power conservation and management measures; further collaboration with the local utility company; and short-term reworking of space allocations. In addition, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, NSA is addressing funding allocations. Through aggressive mission management, there has been no measurable effect on our counterterrorism and other high priority missions. While continuing to manage a complex situation in the short term, NSA's focus is now on developing methodologies and metrics to support the potential for additional data centers to provide effective mission assurance and continue the growth of required computational capabilities.

(~~S//SI//REL~~)

[Redacted]

The ongoing explosion of sophisticated global communications requires NSA to continue to pursue additional cryptanalytic and data storage capabilities for the foreseeable future. Through a combination of new power management processes and the planned addition of specific [Redacted] we will be able to move forward with accommodating power, space and cooling requirements for NSA's planned priority system upgrades and additions through fiscal year 2007. Although progress is being made, NSA continues to manage small, short-term facilities and mission risk on a daily basis until additional power capacity comes on line.

(~~S//SI//REL~~) To ensure better planning and management of requirements for new systems, I have chartered a senior cross-functional team to review all new

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20041123  
Declassify On: 20291123



~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291129~~

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Information Technology (IT) acquisitions and the purchase of any other equipment requiring power to ensure power, space and cooling are available for the highest priority systems. The team has produced a consolidated system priority list and is developing detailed implementation plans.

(S//SI//REL) Additionally, within the existing Ft. Meade, MD complex, retrofitting of existing spaces to maximize currently available power will take place over the next 36 months. This work will

[redacted] These areas will allow advanced planning to occur for proposed FY08 purchases and provide the needed power headroom to aid in the deliberation of NSA's cross functional team. NSA is also working with the local utility company, Baltimore Gas and Electric. The company has committed to providing additional electrical capacity as NSA identifies funding for upgrades to our aging electrical power distribution systems.

(S//SI//REL)

[redacted]

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Michael G. Lawrence [redacted]



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291129~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

AUG 04 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCESUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – Foreign Language Success Stories –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) The purpose of this notification is to provide the Committee with information on a number of foreign language success stories at the National Security Agency (NSA).

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) **University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of  
Language (CASL):**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Through the University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL), NSA is reaching out to the education community by being an active supporter of language education in the United States. CASL transcends boundaries to conduct unprecedented, academically rigorous research in foreign language and cognition that supports national security. It has set a goal of dramatically improving language learning and teaching through research on cognitive neural science, human language technology, aptitude for language learning, testing and job skills. It is also looking at predicting future language needs and determining the human and technological investments required to meet those future needs.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CASL is very successfully collaborating with the Language Flagship program of the National Security Education Program (NSEP) in the following areas:

- Groundbreaking innovation based on cognitive neural science and technology to change the paradigm of language learning in the United States;
- Exploring cooperation with researchers in the European Union, the National Science Foundation, and the American Councils for International Education on the cognitive advantages of bilingualism; and
- Linking STARTALK, a major project supporting critical language learning in our nation's schools, to the groundbreaking efforts in the Language Flagship program.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The research is both strategic and tactical, so that it not only advances areas of knowledge, but also directly serves the critical needs of the Nation.

Approved for Release by NSA on 11-11-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**2. (U//FOUO) The Language Enhancement Program: An Experiment Gone Right**

(U//FOUO) Jointly created by the Senior Language Authority (SLA) and Associate Directorate of Education and Training (ADET) in the fall of 2004, the Language Enhancement Program (LEP) was launched to fulfill the goals of an enormous 200+-per-year language hiring program. With few clearable candidates in languages of long-term strategic interest to national security, the SLA and ADET decided to grow their own highly skilled language analysts. Individuals with some background in Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Korean, or Chinese were hired to enhance their existing skills to level 3/3; others with a demonstrated aptitude for learning foreign languages were trained from scratch into one of the above languages. Enhancers had 2 years to achieve 3/3 in the program; cross-trainers had 3 years to achieve the same.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~CONFIDENTIAL//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Through a combination of National Cryptologic School (NCS) coursework, vendor training, and overseas language immersion, LEP has enjoyed a great success rate, delivering highly skilled language analysts to Operations who have hit the ground running. LEP enrollment reached an all-time high of [redacted] in the fall of 2006, when the last individuals were hired into the program. To date, of these [redacted] participants, [redacted] are successfully working in operations and [redacted] are still participants in the program, scheduled to graduate in the fall of 2009. The remaining [redacted] left through attrition. Largely based on the success of LEP, we are [redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

**3. (U//FOUO) Responsiveness to Changes in Critical Language Requirements:**

(U//FOUO) ADET teamed with the SLA office to meet changing Analysis and Production [redacted] intelligence requirements by implementing a cross-training program for five languages. The training of [redacted] new linguists began in 2008 and is still underway for the following languages: [redacted] Persian linguists ([redacted] completed), [redacted] Turkish (completed), [redacted] Pashto ([redacted] completed), [redacted] Urdu, and [redacted] Arabic (completed). This included the first basic Turkish acquisition course ever taught by NCS. Many of the Persian, Turkish, and Arabic students reached their language milestones ahead of time. Two language analysts achieved Level 3 upon completing their courses. The average of this milestone for Level 3 is about 2 1/2 years.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

**4. (U//FOUO) Arabic Dialect Training:**

(U//FOUO) Based on a successful pilot program of Iraqi Dialect Arabic at NSA/CSS Georgia, the Defense Language Institute (DLI) is now conducting three Iraqi dialect acquisition courses. This approach mirrors the experience of native speakers, who first learn how to converse and interact in their native dialect and then integrate Modern Standard Arabic as they are exposed to media, school and religious discourse. Graduates of these courses will be prepared to immediately work in operational elements. In the past, students have had to take dialect training after graduation. A Levantine dialect course following this model will be

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

conducted at DLI next fiscal year. DLI, ADET, NSA/CSS Georgia, NSA/CSS SLA, military service representatives and other members of the Cryptologic Language Advisory Council (C-LAC) coordinated course establishment.

(U) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) - P. L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

Deputy Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, House Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

AUG 04 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCESUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – Foreign Language Success Stories -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) The purpose of this notification is to provide the Committee with information on a number of foreign language success stories at the National Security Agency (NSA).

**1. (U//~~FOUO~~) University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of  
Language (CASL):**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Through the University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL), NSA is reaching out to the education community by being an active supporter of language education in the United States. CASL transcends boundaries to conduct unprecedented, academically rigorous research in foreign language and cognition that supports national security. It has set a goal of dramatically improving language learning and teaching through research on cognitive neural science, human language technology, aptitude for language learning, testing and job skills. It is also looking at predicting future language needs and determining the human and technological investments required to meet those future needs.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CASL is very successfully collaborating with the Language Flagship program of the National Security Education Program (NSEP) in the following areas:

- Groundbreaking innovation based on cognitive neural science and technology to change the paradigm of language learning in the United States;
- Exploring cooperation with researchers in the European Union, the National Science Foundation, and the American Councils for International Education on the cognitive advantages of bilingualism; and
- Linking STARTALK, a major project supporting critical language learning in our nation's schools, to the groundbreaking efforts in the Language Flagship program.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The research is both strategic and tactical, so that it not only advances areas of knowledge, but also directly serves the critical needs of the Nation.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Language Enhancement Program: An Experiment Gone Right**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Jointly created by the Senior Language Authority (SLA) and Associate Directorate of Education and Training (ADET) in the fall of 2004, the Language Enhancement Program (LEP) was launched to fulfill the goals of an enormous 200+-per-year language hiring program. With few clearable candidates in languages of long-term strategic interest to national security, the SLA and ADET decided to grow their own highly skilled language analysts. Individuals with some background in Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Korean, or Chinese were hired to enhance their existing skills to level 3/3; others with a demonstrated aptitude for learning foreign languages were trained from scratch into one of the above languages. Enhancers had 2 years to achieve 3/3 in the program; cross-trainers had 3 years to achieve the same

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, EVEN~~

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

through a combination of National Cryptologic School (NCS) coursework, vendor training, and overseas language immersions. LEP has enjoyed a great success rate, delivering highly skilled language analysts to Operations who have hit the ground running. LEP enrollment reached an all-time high of [ ] in the fall of 2006, when the last individuals were hired into the program. To date, of these [ ] participants, [ ] are successfully working in operations and [ ] are still participants in the program, scheduled to graduate in the fall of 2009. The remaining [ ] left through attrition. Largely based on the success of LEP, we are

[ ]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

**3. (U//~~FOUO~~) Responsiveness to Changes in Critical Language Requirements:**

(U//~~FOUO~~) ADET teamed with the SLA office to meet changing Analysis and Production [ ] intelligence requirements by implementing a cross-training program for five languages. The training of [ ] new linguists began in 2008 and is still underway for the following languages: [ ] Persian linguists ([ ] completed), [ ] Turkish (completed), [ ] Pashto ([ ] completed), [ ] Urdu, and [ ] Arabic (completed). This included the first basic Turkish acquisition course ever taught by NCS. Many of the Persian, Turkish, and Arabic students reached their language milestones ahead of time. Two language analysts achieved Level 3 upon completing their courses. The average of this milestone for Level 3 is about 2 1/2 years.

**4. (U//~~FOUO~~) Arabic Dialect Training:**

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) Based on a successful pilot program of Iraqi Dialect Arabic at NSA/CSS Georgia, the Defense Language Institute (DLI) is now conducting three Iraqi dialect acquisition courses. This approach mirrors the experience of native speakers, who first learn how to converse and interact in their native dialect and then integrate Modern Standard Arabic as they are exposed to media, school and religious discourse. Graduates of these courses will be prepared to immediately work in operational elements. In the past, students have had to take dialect training after graduation. A Levantine dialect course following this model will be

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

conducted at DLI next fiscal year. DLI, ADET, NSA/CSS Georgia, NSA/CSS SLA, military service representatives and other members of the Cryptologic Language Advisory Council (C-LAC) coordinated course establishment.

(U) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

[redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

Deputy Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Staff Director, House Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

AUG 04 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – Foreign Language Success Stories –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) The purpose of this notification is to provide the Committee with information on a number of foreign language success stories at the National Security Agency (NSA).

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) **University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of  
Language (CASL):**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Through the University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL), NSA is reaching out to the education community by being an active supporter of language education in the United States. CASL transcends boundaries to conduct unprecedented, academically rigorous research in foreign language and cognition that supports national security. It has set a goal of dramatically improving language learning and teaching through research on cognitive neural science, human language technology, aptitude for language learning, testing and job skills. It is also looking at predicting future language needs and determining the human and technological investments required to meet those future needs.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CASL is very successfully collaborating with the Language Flagship program of the National Security Education Program (NSEP) in the following areas:

- Groundbreaking innovation based on cognitive neural science and technology to change the paradigm of language learning in the United States;
- Exploring cooperation with researchers in the European Union, the National Science Foundation, and the American Councils for International Education on the cognitive advantages of bilingualism; and
- Linking STARTALK, a major project supporting critical language learning in our nation's schools, to the groundbreaking efforts in the Language Flagship program.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The research is both strategic and tactical, so that it not only advances areas of knowledge, but also directly serves the critical needs of the Nation.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



**2. (U//FOUO) The Language Enhancement Program: An Experiment Gone Right**

(U//FOUO) Jointly created by the Senior Language Authority (SLA) and Associate Directorate of Education and Training (ADET) in the fall of 2004, the Language Enhancement Program (LEP) was launched to fulfill the goals of an enormous 200+-per-year language hiring program. With few clearable candidates in languages of long-term strategic interest to national security, the SLA and ADET decided to grow their own highly skilled language analysts. Individuals with some background in Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Korean, or Chinese were hired to enhance their existing skills to level 3/3; others with a demonstrated aptitude for learning foreign languages were trained from scratch into one of the above languages. Enhancers had 2 years to achieve 3/3 in the program; cross-trainers had 3 years to achieve the same.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[REDACTED] through a combination of National Cryptologic School (NCS) coursework, vendor training, and overseas language immersions, LEP has enjoyed a great success rate, delivering highly skilled language analysts to Operations who have hit the ground running. LEP enrollment reached an all-time high of [REDACTED] in the fall of 2006, when the last individuals were hired into the program. To date, of these [REDACTED] participants, [REDACTED] are successfully working in operations and [REDACTED] are still participants in the program, scheduled to graduate in the fall of 2009. The remaining [REDACTED] left through attrition. Largely based on the success of LEP, we are [REDACTED]

**3. (U//FOUO) Responsiveness to Changes in Critical Language Requirements:**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) ADET teamed with the SLA office to meet changing Analysis and Production [REDACTED] intelligence requirements by implementing a cross-training program for five languages. The training of [REDACTED] new linguists began in 2008 and is still underway for the following languages: [REDACTED] Persian linguists ([REDACTED] completed), [REDACTED] Turkish (completed), [REDACTED] Pashto ([REDACTED] completed), [REDACTED] Urdu, and [REDACTED] Arabic (completed). This included the first basic Turkish acquisition course ever taught by NCS. Many of the Persian, Turkish, and Arabic students reached their language milestones ahead of time. Two language analysts achieved Level 3 upon completing their courses. The average of this milestone for Level 3 is about 2 1/2 years.

**4. (U//FOUO) Arabic Dialect Training:**

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) Based on a successful pilot program of Iraqi Dialect Arabic at NSA/CSS Georgia, the Defense Language Institute (DLI) is now conducting three Iraqi dialect acquisition courses. This approach mirrors the experience of native speakers, who first learn how to converse and interact in their native dialect and then integrate Modern Standard Arabic as they are exposed to media, school and religious discourse. Graduates of these courses will be prepared to immediately work in operational elements. In the past, students have had to take dialect training after graduation. A Levantine dialect course following this model will be

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

conducted at DLI next fiscal year. DLI, ADET, NSA/CSS Georgia, NSA/CSS SLA, military service representatives and other members of the Cryptologic Language Advisory Council (C-LAC) coordinated course establishment.

(U) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

[redacted]

Deputy Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

AUG 04 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCESUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – Foreign Language Success Stories -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) The purpose of this notification is to provide the Committee with information on a number of foreign language success stories at the National Security Agency (NSA).

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) **University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of  
Language (CASL):**

(U//~~FOUO~~) Through the University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL), NSA is reaching out to the education community by being an active supporter of language education in the United States. CASL transcends boundaries to conduct unprecedented, academically rigorous research in foreign language and cognition that supports national security. It has set a goal of dramatically improving language learning and teaching through research on cognitive neural science, human language technology, aptitude for language learning, testing and job skills. It is also looking at predicting future language needs and determining the human and technological investments required to meet those future needs.

(U//~~FOUO~~) CASL is very successfully collaborating with the Language Flagship program of the National Security Education Program (NSEP) in the following areas:

- Groundbreaking innovation based on cognitive neural science and technology to change the paradigm of language learning in the United States;
- Exploring cooperation with researchers in the European Union, the National Science Foundation, and the American Councils for International Education on the cognitive advantages of bilingualism; and
- Linking STARTALK, a major project supporting critical language learning in our nation's schools, to the groundbreaking efforts in the Language Flagship program.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The research is both strategic and tactical, so that it not only advances areas of knowledge, but also directly serves the critical needs of the Nation.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**2. (U//FOUO) The Language Enhancement Program: An Experiment Gone Right**

(U//FOUO) Jointly created by the Senior Language Authority (SLA) and Associate Directorate of Education and Training (ADET) in the fall of 2004, the Language Enhancement Program (LEP) was launched to fulfill the goals of an enormous 200+-per-year language hiring program. With few clearable candidates in languages of long-term strategic interest to national security, the SLA and ADET decided to grow their own highly skilled language analysts. Individuals with some background in Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Korean, or Chinese were hired to enhance their existing skills to level 3/3; others with a demonstrated aptitude for learning foreign languages were trained from scratch into one of the above languages. Enhancers had 2 years to achieve 3/3 in the program; cross-trainers had 3 years to achieve the same.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Through a combination of National Cryptologic School (NCS) coursework, vendor training, and overseas language immersions, LEP has enjoyed a great success rate, delivering highly skilled language analysts to Operations who have hit the ground running. LEP enrollment reached an all-time high of [ ] in the fall of 2006, when the last individuals were hired into the program. To date, of these [ ] participants, [ ] are successfully working in operations and [ ] are still participants in the program, scheduled to graduate in the fall of 2009. The remaining [ ] left through attrition. Largely based on the success of LEP, we are

[REDACTED]

**3. (U//FOUO) Responsiveness to Changes in Critical Language Requirements:**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) ADET teamed with the SLA office to meet changing Analysis and Production [ ] intelligence requirements by implementing a cross-training program for five languages. The training of [ ] new linguists began in 2008 and is still underway for the following languages: [ ] Persian linguists ([ ] completed), [ ] Turkish (completed), [ ] Pashto ([ ] completed), [ ] Urdu, and [ ] Arabic (completed). This included the first basic Turkish acquisition course ever taught by NCS. Many of the Persian, Turkish, and Arabic students reached their language milestones ahead of time. Two language analysts achieved Level 3 upon completing their courses. The average of this milestone for Level 3 is about 2 1/2 years.

**4. (U//FOUO) Arabic Dialect Training:**

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) Based on a successful pilot program of Iraqi Dialect Arabic at NSA/CSS Georgia, the Defense Language Institute (DLI) is now conducting three Iraqi dialect acquisition courses. This approach mirrors the experience of native speakers, who first learn how to converse and interact in their native dialect and then integrate Modern Standard Arabic as they are exposed to media, school and religious discourse. Graduates of these courses will be prepared to immediately work in operational elements. In the past, students have had to take dialect training after graduation. A Levantine dialect course following this model will be

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

conducted at DLI next fiscal year. DLI, ADET, NSA/CSS Georgia, NSA/CSS SLA, military service representatives and other members of the Cryptologic Language Advisory Council (C-LAC) coordinated course establishment.

(U) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

[redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

[redacted]

Deputy Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Staff Director, Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20360215~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Former NSA Employee  
Inadvertently Issued Security Clearance - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002; and held SGI access.

(b)(6)

(C//~~REL~~) On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction"- a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108

Approved for Release by NSA on 11-10-2013, E.O. 13526 # 63701

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20360215~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(b)(6)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(I). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].



JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Former NSA Employee  
Inadvertently Issued Security Clearance - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment -- an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b) (6)

(U//~~REL~~) On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction" - a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

(U//FOUO) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(U//FOUO) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(I). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(6)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted Signature]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Former NSA Employee Inadvertently Issued Security Clearance - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b)(6)

(U//~~REL~~) On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction"- a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(b)(6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(I). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Select  
Committee on Intelligence

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Former NSA Employee Inadvertently Issued Security Clearance - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(~~U//FOUO~~) This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b)(6)

(~~C//REL~~) On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record, from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction" - a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(I). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Select  
Committee on Intelligence

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Former NSA Employee  
Inadvertently Issued Security Clearance - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b)(6)

(C//~~REL~~) On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction" - a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(b)(6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(I). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20360215~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Former NSA Employee  
Inadvertently Issued Security Clearance - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(~~U//FOUO~~) This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment, - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b)(6)

(~~C//REL~~) On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudication's System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction"- a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20360215~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(I). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(6)

[redacted signature box]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Former NSA Employee  
Inadvertently Issued Security Clearance - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b)(6)

(C//REL) On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction" - a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(b)(6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(L). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted Signature]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20360215~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

## MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Former NSA Employee  
Inadvertently Issued Security Clearance - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b)(6)

(U//~~REL~~) On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction" - a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20360215~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(b)(6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(I). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20960215~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

Honorable Rush Holt  
 Chairman, Select Intelligence Oversight Panel  
 United States House of Representatives  
 H-149, The Capitol  
 Washington, DC 20515

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Dear Mr. Chairman:

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment, - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b)(6)

~~(C//REL)~~ On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction"- a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
 Dated: 20070108  
 Declassify On: 20320108

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(L). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(6)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted Signature]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Honorable Ray LaHood, Ranking Member,  
Select Intelligence Oversight Panel

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20360215~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

OCT 12 2007

Honorable Ray LaHood  
 Ranking Member, Select Intelligence Oversight Panel  
 United States House of Representatives  
 H-149, The Capitol  
 Washington, DC 20515

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Dear Congressman LaHood:

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This is to inform you of a recent issue involving the inadvertent issuance of a U. S. Government security clearance to [redacted]. In the last several years [redacted] has come to the attention of several congressional committees after his employment at the National Security Agency (NSA) was terminated. [redacted] was a civilian employee of NSA from November 2002 until 16 May 2005 when he was removed for failure to maintain a mandatory condition of employment, - an SCI level security clearance. Prior to his employment at NSA, [redacted] was a civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from January 1999 to 2 November 2002, and held SCI access.

(b)(6)

~~(C//REL)~~ On 8 August 2007, the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI) was advised that [redacted] had recently been granted a U.S. Government security clearance as a defense contractor (not for NSA). A review of the Department of Defense Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) revealed that [redacted] current clearance was apparently granted under the rules of reciprocity based on a DIA record from 1999, which had not been amended upon his resignation from DIA. [redacted] JPAS record also did not reflect his loss of clearances from NSA, because we refrain from including civilian employees' personnel security data on the internet-based JPAS since it potentially exposes our employees who serve in and out of covered positions throughout their career. We did, however, notify DIA telephonically in May 2005 of [redacted] debriefing, as we routinely do when one of our affiliates is debriefed for cause. Once we learned of the recent reinstatement of [redacted] clearances, DIA officials were immediately contacted and they updated his JPAS records to reflect "loss of jurisdiction"- a term used in JPAS to state that the listed sponsor no longer maintains oversight of the individuals' clearance. DIA subsequently effected [redacted] debrief as a result of this updated JPAS action.

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Date: 20070108

Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA recognizes the value of information sharing within the security clearance community. In order to strengthen the identified weaknesses in the reciprocity process, on 24 August, NSA began inputting clearance information from all security clearance denials and revocations to ensure the JPAS community is fully aware. This change will ensure that significant clearance decision information, which is valuable to the JPAS community, is available, while still providing the requisite protection to on-board NSA employees.

(b)(6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) We fully anticipate that [redacted] will be raising this issue within numerous Congressional, government and media avenues. The content of this notification has been coordinated with DIA and USD(I). Should you have any questions or require additional information about [redacted] [redacted] history while an NSA affiliate, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Honorable Rush Holt, Chairman,  
Select Intelligence Oversight Panel

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20320108~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



from the desk of  
**Jonathan E. Miller**  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office  
National Security Agency  
Phone: [redacted]



28 May 2008

Subject: (U//~~FOUO~~) NSA Received Inquiry from *Wall Street Journal* Reporter;  
Expect Story to Run Tomorrow

*Andy* Andrew W. Johnson  
Majority Staff Director,  
Senate Select Committee  
on Intelligence

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(S//NF) NSA has been contacted by a reporter from *The Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) regarding an article that may be published tomorrow. [redacted]

[redacted] According to the reporter, the story concerns allegations previously raised by a former employee of MVM. [redacted] The employee subsequently sued his employer but lost his lawsuit.

(S//NF) The WSJ reporter is questioning how NSA handled his allegations and why no one from the NSA Inspector's General Office (IGO) spoke to the contractor employee as he had requested in February 2005. [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20320108~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20020100~~

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

(S//NF) The WSJ reporter also questioned why, when the contractor employee followed up with Senator Stevens, NSA responded that it would not get involved in matters between contractors and their employees. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S//NF) The reporter has also asked about the contractor's performance since its inception and why the contract was not competitively bid. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Should you have any questions, please contact [Redacted] of my staff at [Redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

*V/R,*

[Redacted]

(b) (6)

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20020100~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20320108~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



from the desk of  
**Jonathan E. Miller**  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office  
National Security Agency  
Phone: [redacted]



28 May 2008

Subject: (U//FOUO) NSA Received Inquiry from *Wall Street Journal* Reporter;  
Expect Story to Run Tomorrow

*Louis*

Louis Tucker  
Minority Staff Director,  
Senate Select Committee  
on Intelligence

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//NF) NSA has been contacted by a reporter from *The Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) regarding an article that may be published tomorrow. [redacted]

[redacted]

According to the reporter, the story concerns allegations previously raised by a former employee of MVM [redacted]

The [redacted] employee subsequently sued his employer but lost his lawsuit.

(S//NF) The WSJ reporter is questioning how NSA handled his allegations and why no one from the NSA Inspector's General Office (IGO) spoke to the contractor employee as he had requested in February 2005. [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20320108~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20020100~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

(S//NF) The WSJ reporter also questioned why, when the contractor employee followed up with Senator Stevens, NSA responded that it would not get involved in matters between contractors and their employees. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S//NF) The reporter has also asked about the contractor's performance since its inception and why the contract was not competitively bid. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Should you have any questions, please contact [Redacted] of my staff at [Redacted]

(b) (6)

*V.R.*  
[Redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20020100~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20320108~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



from the desk of  
**Jonathan E. Miller**  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office  
National Security Agency  
Phone: [redacted]



28 May 2008

Subject: (U//~~FOUO~~) NSA Received Inquiry from *Wall Street Journal* Reporter;  
Expect Story to Run Tomorrow

*Mike,*

Michael Delaney  
Majority Staff Director,  
House Select Committee  
on Intelligence

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//NF) NSA has been contacted by a reporter from The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) regarding an article that may be published tomorrow. [redacted]

[redacted] According to the reporter, the story concerns allegations previously raised by a former employee of MVM, [redacted] The employee subsequently sued his employer but lost his lawsuit.

(S//NF) The WSJ reporter is questioning how NSA handled his allegations and why no one from the NSA Inspector's General Office (IGO) spoke to the contractor employee as he had requested in February 2005. [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20320108~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20920108~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

(S//NF) The WSJ reporter also questioned why, when the contractor employee followed up with Senator Stevens, NSA responded that it would not get involved in matters between contractors and their employees. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S//NF) The reporter has also asked about the contractor's performance since its inception and why the contract was not competitively bid. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Should you have any questions, please contact [Redacted] of my staff at [Redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (6)

*W/R*  
[Redacted]

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, House  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20920108~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20320108~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



from the desk of  
**Jonathan E. Miller**  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office  
National Security Agency  
Phone: [redacted]



28 May 2008

Subject: (U//~~FOUO~~) NSA Received Inquiry from *Wall Street Journal* Reporter;  
Expect Story to Run Tomorrow

*Jim* Jim Lewis  
Minority Staff Director,  
House Select Committee  
on Intelligence

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//NF) NSA has been contacted by a reporter from The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) regarding an article that may be published tomorrow. [redacted]

[redacted] According to the reporter, the story concerns allegations previously raised by a former employee of MVM, [redacted] The employee subsequently sued his employer but lost his lawsuit.

(S//NF) The WSJ reporter is questioning how NSA handled his allegations and why no one from the NSA Inspector's General Office (IGO) spoke to the contractor employee as he had requested in February 2005. [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20320108~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN//20820108~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[Redacted]

(S//NF) The WSJ reporter also questioned why, when the contractor employee followed up with Senator Stevens, NSA responded that it would not get involved in matters between contractors and their employees. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S//NF) The reporter has also asked about the contractor's performance since its inception and why the contract was not competitively bid. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Should you have any questions, please contact [Redacted] of my staff at [Redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (6)

11/10  
[Redacted]

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, House  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

~~SECRET//NOFORN//20820108~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure  
Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~U//FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, House Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence

Approved For Release by NSA on 11-15-2014, FOIA Case # 63721



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure  
Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~U//FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007,  
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure  
warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That  
employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has  
access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related  
documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission  
of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time  
as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional  
information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, House Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence



Doc ID: A384246

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure  
Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Senate Select  
Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000



NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure  
Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~U//FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007,  
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure  
warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That  
employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has  
access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related  
documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission  
of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time  
as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional  
information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Senate Select  
Committee on Intelligence

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000



NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure  
Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional information will be provided.



(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure  
Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~U//FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional information will be providedd.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 28 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office





NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RANKING MEMBER, HOUSE SELECT INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PANEL

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~U//FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Chairman, House Select Intelligence Oversight Panel



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SELECT INTELLIGENCE  
OVERSIGHT PANEL

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure  
Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~U//FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007,  
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure  
warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That  
employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has  
access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related  
documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission  
of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time  
as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional  
information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Ranking Member, House Select Intelligence Oversight Panel



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

NOV 29 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SELECT INTELLIGENCE  
OVERSIGHT PANEL

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Federal Search and Seizure  
Warrant Executed at the Home of an NSA Employee –  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) This memorandum is to inform you that on 28 November 2007,  
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a federal search and seizure  
warrant at the home of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA). That  
employee's security clearance has been suspended and the employee no longer has  
access to classified information. The search warrant affidavit and all related  
documents are currently under seal and cannot be disclosed absent the permission  
of a United States Magistrate Judge, as the investigation is ongoing. At such time  
as the search warrant affidavit and related documents are unsealed, additional  
information will be provided.

[Redacted Signature]

(b) (6)

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Ranking Member, House Select Intelligence Oversight Panel



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

JUL 02 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Extends  
GROUNDBREAKER Contract by Three Years - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

[redacted] (b) (6) [redacted]  
JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

JUL 02 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Extends  
GROUNDBREAKER Contract by Three Years - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted]  
[redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]  
JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

JUL 02 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Extends  
GROUNDBREAKER Contract by Three Years - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

[redacted] (b) (6) [redacted]  
JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Select  
Committee on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

JUL 02 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Extends  
GROUNDBREAKER Contract by Three Years - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

[redacted] (b) (6) [redacted]  
JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Select  
Committee on Intelligence





NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

JUL 02 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Extends  
GROUNDBREAKER Contract by Three Years - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted]  
[redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

JUL 02 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Extends  
GROUNDBREAKER Contract by Three Years - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted]  
[redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office



JUL 02 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Extends  
GROUNDBREAKER Contract by Three Years - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

JUL 02 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Extends  
GROUNDBREAKER Contract by Three Years - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted]  
[redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office



JUL 02 2007

Honorable Rush Holt  
Chairman, Select Intelligence Oversight Panel  
United States House of Representatives  
H-149 The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy furnished:  
Honorable Ray LaHood, Ranking Member,  
Select Intelligence Oversight Panel



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

JUL 02 2007

Honorable Ray LaHood  
Ranking Member, Select Intelligence Oversight Panel  
United States House of Representatives  
H-149 The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman LaHood:

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is pleased to inform you that the GROUNDBREAKER contract with Eagle Alliance (a Computer Sciences Corporation-led joint venture in partnership with Northrop Grumman) has been extended by three years. Based on the original contract award, the 3-year option has an estimated value of \$528 million. The service contract, established in 2001, provides for information technology (IT) infrastructure support, including distributed computing, telephony, networks, and enterprise management services, within a 50-mile radius of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. By exercising the contract's option to extend the initial seven-year ordering period by an additional three years, NSA/CSS may acquire IT services from Eagle Alliance until 2011.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Should you require additional information, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (6)

[redacted signature box]

JONATHAN E. MILLER  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy furnished:  
Honorable Rush Holt, Chairman,  
Select Intelligence Oversight Panel

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – NSA Names New Associate  
Director of Legislative Affairs - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [Redacted]

[Large redacted block]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO. [Redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [Redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [Redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Ranking Member, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RANKING MEMBER, PERMANENT SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – NSA Names New Associate  
Director of Legislative Affairs - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~). Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [redacted]

*Keith B. Alexander*  
KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Chairman, Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – NSA Names New Associate Director of Legislative Affairs - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [Redacted]

[Large redacted block]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~). Should you have any questions, please contact [Redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [Redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Vice Chairman, Select  
Committee on Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – NSA Names New Associate  
Director of Legislative Affairs - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)


(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [redacted]

  
KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Chairman, Select Committee  
on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – NSA Names New Associate  
Director of Legislative Affairs - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)


(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [redacted]

  
KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – NSA Names New Associate  
Director of Legislative Affairs - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)


(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~). Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [redacted]

  
KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – NSA Names New Associate  
Director of Legislative Affairs - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)


(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [redacted]

  
KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000


22 June 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Notification – NSA Names New Associate  
Director of Legislative Affairs - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [redacted]



(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

Honorable Rush Holt  
Chairman, Select Intelligence Oversight Panel  
United States House of Representatives  
H-149, The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20515

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~). Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] [redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Honorable Ray LaHood, Ranking Member,  
Select Intelligence Oversight Panel



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

22 June 2007

Honorable Ray LaHood  
Ranking Member, Select Intelligence Oversight Panel  
H-149, The Capitol  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman LaHood:

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Effective 25 June 2007, I have appointed Jonathan E. Miller to serve as the National Security Agency's (NSA's) Associate Director of Legislative Affairs. [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Also, effective 25 June 2007, Michael G. Lawrence, the current Associate Director of Legislative Affairs, will assume the position of Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). As such, Mr. Lawrence will be responsible for legislative, foreign, and public affairs for the NRO.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] Deputy Director Legislative Affairs Office, at [redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Honorable Rush Holt, Chairman,  
Select Intelligence Oversight Panel



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 April 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Establishment of  
the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC) -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36


(~~U//FOUO~~) Given the complexity of today's global communications environment, and the need to optimize the United States Cryptologic System in providing vital information and protecting national security systems, I am pleased to inform you that I have established the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC).

(~~U//FOUO~~) The GCIC provides a forum and structure to resolve, with vigor and discipline, cryptologic challenges that involve the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and at least one other external component. These issues may pertain to signals intelligence, information assurance, or support to network warfare. The GCIC will facilitate complete analysis and discussion of solutions, through horizontal integration and coordination with issue owner(s), stakeholders, and subject matter experts from across the cryptologic community.

(~~U//FOUO~~) The GCIC will also serve as



(~~U//FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Mr. Michael G. Lawrence, at

  
KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Ranking Member, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED // ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2 April 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR RANKING MEMBER, PERMANENT SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Establishment of  
the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC) -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Given the complexity of today's global communications environment, and the need to optimize the United States Cryptologic System in providing vital information and protecting national security systems, I am pleased to inform you that I have established the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC).

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC provides a forum and structure to resolve, with vigor and discipline, cryptologic challenges that involve the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and at least one other external component. These issues may pertain to signals intelligence, information assurance, or support to network warfare. The GCIC will facilitate complete analysis and discussion of solutions, through horizontal integration and coordination with issue owner(s), stakeholders, and subject matter experts from across the cryptologic community.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC will also serve as



(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Mr. Michael G. Lawrence, at

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Chairman, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2 April 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Establishment of  
the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC) -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM


(~~U//FOUO~~) Given the complexity of today's global communications environment, and the need to optimize the United States Cryptologic System in providing vital information and protecting national security systems, I am pleased to inform you that I have established the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC).

(~~U//FOUO~~) The GCIC provides a forum and structure to resolve, with vigor and discipline, cryptologic challenges that involve the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and at least one other external component. These issues may pertain to signals intelligence, information assurance, or support to network warfare. The GCIC will facilitate complete analysis and discussion of solutions, through horizontal integration and coordination with issue owner(s), stakeholders, and subject matter experts from across the cryptologic community.

(~~U//FOUO~~) The GCIC will also serve as



(~~U//FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Mr. Michael G. Lawrence, at

  
KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Vice Chairman, Select  
Committee on Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED // ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2 April 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Establishment of the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Given the complexity of today's global communications environment, and the need to optimize the United States Cryptologic System in providing vital information and protecting national security systems, I am pleased to inform you that I have established the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC).

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC provides a forum and structure to resolve, with vigor and discipline, cryptologic challenges that involve the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and at least one other external component. These issues may pertain to signals intelligence, information assurance, or support to network warfare. The GCIC will facilitate complete analysis and discussion of solutions, through horizontal integration and coordination with issue owner(s), stakeholders, and subject matter experts from across the cryptologic community.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC will also serve as



(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Mr. Michael G. Lawrence, at

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Chairman, Select Committee  
on Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2 April 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (~~U//FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Establishment of  
the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC) -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(~~U//FOUO~~) Given the complexity of today's global communications environment, and the need to optimize the United States Cryptologic System in providing vital information and protecting national security systems, I am pleased to inform you that I have established the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC).

(~~U//FOUO~~) The GCIC provides a forum and structure to resolve, with vigor and discipline, cryptologic challenges that involve the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and at least one other external component. These issues may pertain to signals intelligence, information assurance, or support to network warfare. The GCIC will facilitate complete analysis and discussion of solutions, through horizontal integration and coordination with issue owner(s), stakeholders, and subject matter experts from across the cryptologic community.

(~~U//FOUO~~) The GCIC will also serve as



(~~U//FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Mr. Michael G. Lawrence, at



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 April 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification -- Establishment of  
the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC) -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Given the complexity of today's global communications environment, and the need to optimize the United States Cryptologic System in providing vital information and protecting national security systems, I am pleased to inform you that I have established the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC).

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC provides a forum and structure to resolve, with vigor and discipline, cryptologic challenges that involve the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and at least one other external component. These issues may pertain to signals intelligence, information assurance, or support to network warfare. The GCIC will facilitate complete analysis and discussion of solutions, through horizontal integration and coordination with issue owner(s), stakeholders, and subject matter experts from across the cryptologic community.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC will also serve as [redacted]



(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Mr. Michael G. Lawrence, at [redacted]

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 April 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – Establishment of the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM


(U//~~FOUO~~) Given the complexity of today's global communications environment, and the need to optimize the United States Cryptologic System in providing vital information and protecting national security systems, I am pleased to inform you that I have established the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC).

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC provides a forum and structure to resolve, with vigor and discipline, cryptologic challenges that involve the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and at least one other external component. These issues may pertain to signals intelligence, information assurance, or support to network warfare. The GCIC will facilitate complete analysis and discussion of solutions, through horizontal integration and coordination with issue owner(s), stakeholders, and subject matter experts from across the cryptologic community.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC will also serve as [redacted]



(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Mr. Michael G. Lawrence, at [redacted]

  
KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

UNCLASSIFIED ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2 April 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Establishment of the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Given the complexity of today's global communications environment, and the need to optimize the United States Cryptologic System in providing vital information and protecting national security systems, I am pleased to inform you that I have established the Global Cryptologic Integration Center (GCIC).

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC provides a forum and structure to resolve, with vigor and discipline, cryptologic challenges that involve the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and at least one other external component. These issues may pertain to signals intelligence, information assurance, or support to network warfare. The GCIC will facilitate complete analysis and discussion of solutions, through horizontal integration and coordination with issue owner(s), stakeholders, and subject matter experts from across the cryptologic community.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GCIC will also serve as



(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Mr. Michael G. Lawrence, at



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 July 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCESUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Establishment  
of a Director of Compliance – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In April 2009 NSA/CSS formed a study team to review its oversight and compliance activities across all mission areas. A key finding of the team, based in part on discussions with Congress, was the need to establish an enterprise-level compliance position, modeled on the Chief Compliance Officer construct found in the private sector. I am pleased to report that we have created the new position of NSA/CSS Director of Compliance, who will report directly to the NSA/CSS Deputy Director and me.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Compliance will have several important authorities—primarily the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive compliance program. This compliance program will include: (1) integrating compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS mission, technology, and policy organizations; (2) ensuring a robust compliance training and education program; and (3) maintaining and reporting on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective measures. This new office will complement and reinforce a robust intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The new Director of Compliance will be responsible for continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have selected Mr. John DeLong to serve as the first Director of Compliance. He is currently the Deputy Director of the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) and has 12 years of experience at NSA/CSS in a broad range of activities from technical, to mission, to policy. Mr. DeLong is widely recognized and respected for his strong leadership qualities and his integrity. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from Harvard College and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


(U//~~FOUO~~) As changes are implemented and communicated with stakeholders, NSA/CSS looks forward to your continued support. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] in the Legislative Affairs Office at [redacted]

[redacted]

.....

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

*vr*



**KEITH B. ALEXANDER**  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director,  
House Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 July 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCESUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Establishment  
of a Director of Compliance – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In April 2009 NSA/CSS formed a study team to review its oversight and compliance activities across all mission areas. A key finding of the team, based in part on discussions with Congress, was the need to establish an enterprise-level compliance position, modeled on the Chief Compliance Officer construct found in the private sector. I am pleased to report that we have created the new position of NSA/CSS Director of Compliance, who will report directly to the NSA/CSS Deputy Director and me.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Compliance will have several important authorities—primarily the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive compliance program. This compliance program will include: (1) integrating compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS mission, technology, and policy organizations; (2) ensuring a robust compliance training and education program; and (3) maintaining and reporting on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective measures. This new office will complement and reinforce a robust intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The new Director of Compliance will be responsible for continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have selected Mr. John DeLong to serve as the first Director of Compliance. He is currently the Deputy Director of the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) and has 12 years of experience at NSA/CSS in a broad range of activities from technical, to mission, to policy. Mr. DeLong is widely recognized and respected for his strong leadership qualities and his integrity. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from Harvard College and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) As changes are implemented and communicated with stakeholders, NSA/CSS looks forward to your continued support. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] in the Legislative Affairs Office at [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

*vx*



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director,  
House Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 July 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCESUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Establishment  
of a Director of Compliance – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In April 2009 NSA/CSS formed a study team to review its oversight and compliance activities across all mission areas. A key finding of the team, based in part on discussions with Congress, was the need to establish an enterprise-level compliance position, modeled on the Chief Compliance Officer construct found in the private sector. I am pleased to report that we have created the new position of NSA/CSS Director of Compliance, who will report directly to the NSA/CSS Deputy Director and me.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Compliance will have several important authorities—primarily the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive compliance program. This compliance program will include: (1) integrating compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS mission, technology, and policy organizations; (2) ensuring a robust compliance training and education program; and (3) maintaining and reporting on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective measures. This new office will complement and reinforce a robust intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The new Director of Compliance will be responsible for continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have selected Mr. John DeLong to serve as the first Director of Compliance. He is currently the Deputy Director of the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) and has 12 years of experience at NSA/CSS in a broad range of activities from technical, to mission, to policy. Mr. DeLong is widely recognized and respected for his strong leadership qualities and his integrity. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from Harvard College and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) As changes are implemented and communicated with stakeholders, NSA/CSS looks forward to your continued support. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] in the Legislative Affairs Office at [redacted]

*VR*



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

[redacted]  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Senate Select  
Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 July 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCESUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Establishment  
of a Director of Compliance – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In April 2009 NSA/CSS formed a study team to review its oversight and compliance activities across all mission areas. A key finding of the team, based in part on discussions with Congress, was the need to establish an enterprise-level compliance position, modeled on the Chief Compliance Officer construct found in the private sector. I am pleased to report that we have created the new position of NSA/CSS Director of Compliance, who will report directly to the NSA/CSS Deputy Director and me.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Compliance will have several important authorities—primarily the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive compliance program. This compliance program will include: (1) integrating compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS mission, technology, and policy organizations; (2) ensuring a robust compliance training and education program; and (3) maintaining and reporting on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective measures. This new office will complement and reinforce a robust intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The new Director of Compliance will be responsible for continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have selected Mr. John DeLong to serve as the first Director of Compliance. He is currently the Deputy Director of the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) and has 12 years of experience at NSA/CSS in a broad range of activities from technical, to mission, to policy. Mr. DeLong is widely recognized and respected for his strong leadership qualities and his integrity. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from Harvard College and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) As changes are implemented and communicated with stakeholders, NSA/CSS looks forward to your continued support. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] in the Legislative Affairs Office at [redacted]

[redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

*vx*



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Staff Director, Senate Select  
Committee on Intelligence

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 July 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON  
THE JUDICIARYSUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Establishment  
of a Director of Compliance – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In April 2009 NSA/CSS formed a study team to review its oversight and compliance activities across all mission areas. A key finding of the team, based in part on discussions with Congress, was the need to establish an enterprise-level compliance position, modeled on the Chief Compliance Officer construct found in the private sector. I am pleased to report that we have created the new position of NSA/CSS Director of Compliance, who will report directly to the NSA/CSS Deputy Director and me.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Compliance will have several important authorities—primarily the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive compliance program. This compliance program will include: (1) integrating compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS mission, technology, and policy organizations; (2) ensuring a robust compliance training and education program; and (3) maintaining and reporting on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective measures. This new office will complement and reinforce a robust intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The new Director of Compliance will be responsible for continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have selected Mr. John DeLong to serve as the first Director of Compliance. He is currently the Deputy Director of the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) and has 12 years of experience at NSA/CSS in a broad range of activities from technical, to mission, to policy. Mr. DeLong is widely recognized and respected for his strong leadership qualities and his integrity. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from Harvard College and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.


~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) As changes are implemented and communicated with stakeholders, NSA/CSS looks forward to your continued support. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] in the Legislative Affairs Office at [redacted]

[redacted]

*re*



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director,  
House Committee on the Judiciary

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 July 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, HOUSE COMMITTEE  
ON THE JUDICIARYSUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Establishment  
of a Director of Compliance – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In April 2009 NSA/CSS formed a study team to review its oversight and compliance activities across all mission areas. A key finding of the team, based in part on discussions with Congress, was the need to establish an enterprise-level compliance position, modeled on the Chief Compliance Officer construct found in the private sector. I am pleased to report that we have created the new position of NSA/CSS Director of Compliance, who will report directly to the NSA/CSS Deputy Director and me.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Compliance will have several important authorities—primarily the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive compliance program. This compliance program will include: (1) integrating compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS mission, technology, and policy organizations; (2) ensuring a robust compliance training and education program; and (3) maintaining and reporting on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective measures. This new office will complement and reinforce a robust intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The new Director of Compliance will be responsible for continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have selected Mr. John DeLong to serve as the first Director of Compliance. He is currently the Deputy Director of the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) and has 12 years of experience at NSA/CSS in a broad range of activities from technical, to mission, to policy. Mr. DeLong is widely recognized and respected for his strong leadership qualities and his integrity. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from Harvard College and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) As changes are implemented and communicated with stakeholders, NSA/CSS looks forward to your continued support. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] in the Legislative Affairs Office at [redacted]

[redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

VL



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Staff Director,  
House Committee on the Judiciary

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 July 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE  
JUDICIARYSUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Establishment  
of a Director of Compliance – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In April 2009 NSA/CSS formed a study team to review its oversight and compliance activities across all mission areas. A key finding of the team, based in part on discussions with Congress, was the need to establish an enterprise-level compliance position, modeled on the Chief Compliance Officer construct found in the private sector. I am pleased to report that we have created the new position of NSA/CSS Director of Compliance, who will report directly to the NSA/CSS Deputy Director and me.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Compliance will have several important authorities—primarily the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive compliance program. This compliance program will include: (1) integrating compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS mission, technology, and policy organizations; (2) ensuring a robust compliance training and education program; and (3) maintaining and reporting on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective measures. This new office will complement and reinforce a robust intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The new Director of Compliance will be responsible for continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have selected Mr. John DeLong to serve as the first Director of Compliance. He is currently the Deputy Director of the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) and has 12 years of experience at NSA/CSS in a broad range of activities from technical, to mission, to policy. Mr. DeLong is widely recognized and respected for his strong leadership qualities and his integrity. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from Harvard College and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) As changes are implemented and communicated with stakeholders, NSA/CSS looks forward to your continued support. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] in the Legislative Affairs Office at [redacted]

[redacted]

.....

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

*vr*



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director,  
Senate Committee on the Judiciary

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

2 July 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE COMMITTEE  
ON THE JUDICIARYSUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification – NSA/CSS Establishment  
of a Director of Compliance – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) In April 2009 NSA/CSS formed a study team to review its oversight and compliance activities across all mission areas. A key finding of the team, based in part on discussions with Congress, was the need to establish an enterprise-level compliance position, modeled on the Chief Compliance Officer construct found in the private sector. I am pleased to report that we have created the new position of NSA/CSS Director of Compliance, who will report directly to the NSA/CSS Deputy Director and me.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Compliance will have several important authorities—primarily the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive compliance program. This compliance program will include: (1) integrating compliance strategies and activities across NSA/CSS mission, technology, and policy organizations; (2) ensuring a robust compliance training and education program; and (3) maintaining and reporting on a comprehensive status of mission compliance at NSA/CSS, including performing trend analysis and ensuring prompt corrective measures. This new office will complement and reinforce a robust intelligence oversight program carried out by the NSA/CSS Inspector General and the oversight responsibilities of the NSA/CSS General Counsel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The new Director of Compliance will be responsible for continuous modernization and enforcement of our mission compliance strategies and activities to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. At the same time, this new position will serve as an ongoing reminder of the importance of compliance work, and provide greater visibility and transparency in this essential area.

(U//~~FOUO~~) I have selected Mr. John DeLong to serve as the first Director of Compliance. He is currently the Deputy Director of the NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center (NCSC) and has 12 years of experience at NSA/CSS in a broad range of activities from technical, to mission, to policy. Mr. DeLong is widely recognized and respected for his strong leadership qualities and his integrity. He holds a B.A. in Physics and Mathematics from Harvard College and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(U//~~FOUO~~) As changes are implemented and communicated with stakeholders, NSA/CSS looks forward to your continued support. If you have any questions, please contact [redacted] in the Legislative Affairs Office at [redacted]

[redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

*vr*



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Copy Furnished:  
Staff Director,  
Senate Committee on the Judiciary

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

FROM THE DESK OF ...



**MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE**

Principal Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency

Fort Meade, MD - [redacted]  
Outreach Office, Washington, D. C. - [redacted]

29 March 2007

TO: Michael Delaney, Majority Staff Director, HPSCI

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

SUBJECT: ~~(S//SI//REL)~~ NSA to Test New Generators & Uninterruptible Power Supply Gear Installed at the Tordella Super Computer Building

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ The National Security Agency (NSA) wishes to inform you that the Tordella Super Computer Building (SCB) will be placed on full generator power for short periods [redacted] in order to test recently installed, new generators and uninterruptible power source (UPS) equipment. [redacted]

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ As part of NSA's effort to certify its electrical power system at NSA, the main commercial electrical power feeder to the Tordella Super Computer Building will be shutdown between placing the SCB on generator power. The newly installed UPS system will carry the building's electrical demand during the start of the new Cummins generator plant. Contractors will perform certification testing on these recently installed generators and supporting UPS equipment. This work is scheduled [redacted] each day. In order to certify the electrical power system, two consecutive successful tests are required. [redacted] are the primary testing dates. [redacted] will be used for additional testing if needed. Similar tests are conducted at other government facilities on a regular basis to operationally certify UPS systems and back-up generators.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ To the extent that there is an impact to operations, it should be limited to [redacted]. Every reasonable effort is being made to anticipate and mitigate potential degradation of operations. It is our plan to [redacted] system administrators and proper support personnel will be on standby as a precaution in the event any electrical equipment fails. As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time.

(U//FOUO) The backup systems being certified by these tests significantly strengthen our confidence in providing reliable electrical power to a critical facility. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (6)

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
DECL ON: 20320108

~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

FROM THE DESK OF ...



**MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE**

Principal Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency

Fort Meade, MD - [redacted]  
Outreach Office, Washington, D. C. - [redacted]

29 March 2007

TO: Michael Meermans, Minority Staff Director, HPSCI

SUBJECT: ~~(S//SI//REL)~~ NSA to Test New Generators & Uninterruptible Power Supply Gear Installed at the Tordella Super Computer Building.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ The National Security Agency (NSA) wishes to inform you that the Tordella Super Computer Building (SCB) will be placed on full generator power for short periods [redacted] in order to test recently installed, new generators and uninterruptible power source (UPS) equipment. [redacted]


~~(S//SI//REL)~~ As part of NSA's effort to certify its electrical power system at NSA W, the main commercial electrical power feeder to the Tordella Super Computer Building will be shutdown between placing the SCB on generator power. The newly installed UPS system will carry the building's electrical demand during the start of the new Cummins generator plant. Contractors will perform certification testing on these recently installed generators and supporting UPS equipment. This work is scheduled [redacted] [redacted] each day. In order to certify the electrical power system, two consecutive successful tests are required. [redacted] are the primary testing dates. [redacted] will be used for additional testing if needed. Similar tests are conducted at other government facilities on a regular basis to operationally certify UPS systems and back-up generators.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ To the extent that there is an impact to operations, it should be limited to [redacted]. Every reasonable effort is being made to anticipate and mitigate potential degradation of operations. It is our plan to [redacted] system administrators and proper support personnel will be on standby as a precaution in the event any electrical equipment fails. As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time.

(U//FOUO) The backup systems being certified by these tests significantly strengthen our confidence in providing reliable electrical power to a critical facility. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Permanent  
Select Committee on Intelligence



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (6)

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
DECL ON: 20320108

~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

FROM THE DESK OF ...



**MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE**

Principal Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency

Fort Meade, MD - [redacted]  
Outreach Office, Washington, D. C. - [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

29 March 2007

TO: Andrew W. Johnson, Majority Staff Director, SSCI

SUBJECT: ~~(S//SI//REL)~~ NSA to Test New Generators & Uninterruptible  
Power Supply Gear Installed at the Tordella Super Computer Building

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ The National Security Agency (NSA) wishes to inform you that the Tordella Super Computer Building (SCB) will be placed on full generator power for short periods [redacted] in order to test recently installed, new generators and uninterruptible power source (UPS) equipment. [redacted]

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ As part of NSA's effort to certify its electrical power system at NSA, the main commercial electrical power feeder to the Tordella Super Computer Building will be shutdown between placing the SCB on generator power. The newly installed UPS system will carry the building's electrical demand during the start of the new Cummins generator plant. Contractors will perform certification testing on these recently installed generators and supporting UPS equipment. This work is scheduled [redacted] each day. In order to certify the electrical power system, two consecutive successful tests are required. [redacted] are the primary testing dates. [redacted] will be used for additional testing if needed. Similar tests are conducted at other government facilities on a regular basis to operationally certify UPS systems and back-up generators.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ To the extent that there is an impact to operations, it should be limited to [redacted]. Every reasonable effort is being made to anticipate and mitigate potential degradation of operations. It is our plan to [redacted] system administrators and proper support personnel will be on standby as a precaution in the event any electrical equipment fails. As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The backup systems being certified by these tests significantly strengthen our confidence in providing reliable electrical power to a critical facility. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

(b) (6)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Select  
Committee on Intelligence

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
DECL ON: 20320108

~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

FROM THE DESK OF ...



**MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE**

Principal Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency

Fort Meade, MD - [redacted]  
Outreach Office, Washington, D. C. - [redacted]

29 March 2007

TO: Louis Tucker, Minority Staff Director, SSCI

SUBJECT: ~~(S//SI//REL)~~ NSA to Test New Generators & Uninterruptible Power Supply Gear Installed at the Tordella Super Computer Building.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ The National Security Agency (NSA) wishes to inform you that the Tordella Super Computer Building (SCB) will be placed on full generator power for short periods [redacted] in order to test recently installed, new generators and uninterruptible power source (UPS) equipment. [redacted]

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ As part of NSA's effort to certify its electrical power system at NSA, the main commercial electrical power feeder to the Tordella Super Computer Building will be shutdown between placing the SCB on generator power. The newly installed UPS system will carry the building's electrical demand during the start of the new Cummins generator plant. Contractors will perform certification testing on these recently installed generators and supporting UPS equipment. This work is scheduled [redacted] each day. In order to certify the electrical power system, two consecutive successful tests are required. [redacted] are the primary testing dates. [redacted] will be used for additional testing if needed. Similar tests are conducted at other government facilities on a regular basis to operationally certify UPS systems and back-up generators.

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ To the extent that there is an impact to operations, it should be limited to [redacted]. Every reasonable effort is being made to anticipate and mitigate potential degradation of operations. It is our plan to [redacted] system administrators and proper support personnel will be on standby as a precaution in the event any electrical equipment fails. As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The backup systems being certified by these tests significantly strengthen our confidence in providing reliable electrical power to a critical facility. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Select  
Committee on Intelligence

[redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (6)

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
DECL ON: 20320108

~~SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR~~

FROM THE DESK OF ...



**JONATHAN E. MILLER**  
Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
Fort Meade, MD - [redacted]  
Outreach Office, Washington, D. C. - [redacted]



1 August 2008

TO: Andrew W. Johnson, Staff Director,  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U) NSA to Release Documents Responsive to FOIA Requests Relating  
to Protest Organization Activities

(U) This is to notify you that the National Security Agency (NSA) will release documents responsive to three Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests on 1 August 2008. The requests, sent by the Baltimore Sun, WMAR-TV in Baltimore, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maryland, asked for information related to activities by several protest organizations that occurred at NSA from 2000 through February 2006.

[redacted] (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The information to be released is contained in 126 documents. It consists of factual descriptions of the protestors' actions and the general NSA response to the activities. Consistent with applicable FOIA exemptions, information about [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) NSA received the ACLU request six months after the other requests and, therefore, conducted an updated search for records through August 2006. NSA will complete the review of the additional set of documents responsive only to that request within the next couple of months. Should you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted]

Very respectfully,

[redacted] (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

[redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Mr. Louis Tucker, Minority Staff Director,  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Approved for Release by NSA on 11-15-2024, FOIA Case # 63721

FROM THE DESK OF ...



**JONATHAN E. MILLER**

Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
Fort Meade, MD - [redacted]  
Outreach Office, Washington, D. C. - [redacted]



1 August 2008

TO: Mr. Louis Tucker, Minority Staff Director,  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U) NSA to Release Documents Responsive to FOIA Requests Relating  
to Protest Organization Activities

(U) This is to notify you that the National Security Agency (NSA) will release documents responsive to three Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests on 1 August 2008. The requests, sent by the Baltimore Sun, WMAR-TV in Baltimore, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maryland, asked for information related to activities by several protest organizations that occurred at NSA from 2000 through February 2006.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The information to be released is contained in 126 documents. It consists of factual descriptions of the protestors' actions and the general NSA response to the activities. Consistent with applicable FOIA exemptions, information about [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) NSA received the ACLU request six months after the other requests and, therefore, conducted an updated search for records through August 2006. NSA will complete the review of the additional set of documents responsive only to that request within the next couple of months. Should you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted]

Very respectfully,

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

[redacted signature box]  
Deputy Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Andrew W. Johnson, Staff Director,  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

FROM THE DESK OF ...



**JONATHAN E. MILLER**  
Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (L.AO)  
National Security Agency  
Fort Meade, MD - [redacted]  
Outreach Office, Washington, D. C. - [redacted]



1 August 2008

TO: Mr. James Lewis, Minority Staff Director  
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U) NSA to Release Documents Responsive to FOIA Requests Relating  
to Protest Organization Activities

(U) This is to notify you that the National Security Agency (NSA) will release documents responsive to three Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests on 1 August 2008. The requests, sent by the Baltimore Sun, WMAR-TV in Baltimore, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maryland, asked for information related to activities by several protest organizations that occurred at NSA from 2000 through February 2006.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The information to be released is contained in 126 documents. It consists of factual descriptions of the protestors' actions and the general NSA response to the activities. Consistent with applicable FOIA exemptions, information about [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) NSA received the ACLU request six months after the other requests and, therefore, conducted an updated search for records through August 2006. NSA will complete the review of the additional set of documents responsive only to that request within the next couple of months. Should you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted]

Very respectfully,

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

[redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Mr. Michael Delaney, Staff Director,  
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

FROM THE DESK OF . . .



**JONATHAN E. MILLER**  
Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
Fori Meade, MD - [redacted]  
Outreach Office, Washington, D. C. - [redacted]



1 August 2008

TO: Mr. Michael Delaney, Staff Director,  
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U) NSA to Release Documents Responsive to FOIA Requests Relating  
to Protest Organization Activities

(U) This is to notify you that the National Security Agency (NSA) will release documents responsive to three Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests on 1 August 2008. The requests, sent by the Baltimore Sun, WMAR-TV in Baltimore, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maryland, asked for information related to activities by several protest organizations that occurred at NSA from 2000 through February 2006.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The information to be released is contained in 126 documents. It consists of factual descriptions of the protestors' actions and the general NSA response to the activities. Consistent with applicable FOIA exemptions, information about [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) NSA received the ACLU request six months after the other requests and, therefore, conducted an updated search for records through August 2006. NSA will complete the review of the additional set of documents responsive only to that request within the next couple of months. Should you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted]

Very respectfully,

[redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Mr. James Lewis, Minority Staff Director,  
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted] Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: David Grannis, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the  
NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations.

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted] NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>1</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing. [Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

Approved for Release by NSA on 11-15-2024, FOIA Case # 63721

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, SSCI

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: Louis Tucker, Minority Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the  
NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted]. NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>3</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing.

<sup>4</sup> [Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

Copy Furnished:  
Staff Director, SSCI

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: Michael Delaney, Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted]. NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>5</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing.

[Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

Very respectfully,

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, HPSCI

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: James Lewis, Minority Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted]. NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>7</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing.

<sup>8</sup> [Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

Copy Furnished:  
Staff Director, HPSCI

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: Charles Houy, Majority Clerk, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Appropriations Committee

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted]<sup>9</sup>. NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>9</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing.

<sup>10</sup> [Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted] .....

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: Paul Juola, Majority Clerk, Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted]. NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>11</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing.

<sup>12</sup> [Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: Richard DeBobes, Majority Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the  
NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted]. NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>13</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing.

<sup>14</sup> [Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

.....

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: Erin Conaton, Majority Staff Director, House Armed Services Committee

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the  
NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted]. NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>15</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing.

<sup>16</sup> [Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FROM THE DESK OF



[Redacted]  
Deputy Associate Director, Legislative Affairs Office (LAO)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road  
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6282  
Phone [Redacted]

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7 (b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

29 January 2009

TO: Adam Hafris, Majority Staff Director, House Intelligence Oversight Panel, House Committee on Appropriations

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Upcoming NOVA Program about NSA and Update on the NSA IG Investigation into [Redacted] Allegations

(U//FOUO) In follow-up to our 6 October 2008 notification, this is to inform you that the previously scheduled airing of the PBS NOVA program, "The Spy Factory," based on the book *The Shadow Factory* by James Bamford, was delayed and is now scheduled to air on 3 February. This also provides an updated status of the NSA Inspector General investigation into the allegations of improper intelligence activities made by [Redacted]

(U//FOUO) According to the NOVA website, "The Spy Factory" will "examine the high-tech eavesdropping carried out by the National Security Agency and the pitfalls of surveillance in the age of terrorism." We think the program might also include interviews with [Redacted]. NSA provided footage and still shots of the NSA campus but declined requests for interviews.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) The IG investigators have completed most of the field work for the investigation, though some interviews remain. They have conducted [Redacted] interviews, including [Redacted]. The team has taken three separate trips to NSA/CSS Georgia, and may require one final trip in February or March to complete the discussions there. They are currently reviewing thousands of documents [Redacted]

<sup>17</sup> A parallel investigation by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General of similar allegations made by [Redacted] is still ongoing.

<sup>18</sup> [Redacted] who continues to allege that his termination from Agency employment was in retaliation for disclosures he made to [Redacted]. A joint DoD IG/NSA OIG investigation revealed no evidence to support his allegations and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decision to revoke [Redacted] access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), a condition of continued employment, was reasonable based upon [Redacted] behavior and rationally grounded in Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to SCI. A copy of the DoD IG/NSA OIG report dated 7 September 2005 is available upon request. Copies of correspondence previously provided in response to Congressional inquiries are attached. Since his termination, [Redacted] has made a number of public allegations of improper intelligence activities by NSA.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (3) - IG Act of 1978, Sec 7(b), P.L. 95-452  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

[redacted] worked in from 2004 to 2005. The IG's office anticipates that they will complete the investigation and draft a report by the end of March 2009.

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Very respectfully,

[redacted signature block]

Encls:  
a/s

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//COMPARTMENTED//NOFORN//MR~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

AUG 17 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-18 USC 798  
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - Implementation of the Protect America Act of 2007 - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S//SI) This is to notify you that the National Security Agency (NSA) has completed its first stage of implementing the Protect America Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-55).

(TS//SI//COMPARTMENTED//NF) [redacted] NSA effectively closed the gap described by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in covering the highest priority terrorism threats. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] This has eliminated a significant gap in our intelligence capabilities that resulted from the need, under controlling interpretations of FISA prior to the enactment of the Protect America Act, to provide individualized probable cause statements on overseas terrorism targets to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//SI) NSA's implementation is consistent with the certification of the DNI and the Attorney General required by the new law (DNI/AG 105B Certification 07-01, [redacted]). This certification was supported by an affidavit from DIRNSA. As required by the Act, NSA documented procedures addressing the process by which NSA determines that acquisition of foreign intelligence under the Act concerns persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States. These same procedures ensure that the acquisition is directed at persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States, and thus does not constitute electronic surveillance as defined by the FISA. These procedures also address compliance and oversight. They were filed with the Court [redacted]. Further, NSA will apply minimization procedures previously approved by the FISC to this acquisition. I wanted to get this notification to you as quickly as possible. All of these documents will be provided for your reference no later than [redacted].

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: MR

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//COMPARTMENTED//NOFORN//MR~~

Approved for Release by NSA on 11-15-2024, FOIA Case # 63721

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//COMPARTMENTED//NOFORN//MR~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//SI) The modernization of the FISA is an important step in providing the tools needed to protect our country in modern times. [redacted]

[redacted]

We will keep you informed of our progress. We are keenly aware of our duty to the Nation to protect U.S. privacy rights while providing the best security possible. I pledge to you that NSA will apply this new law in accordance with the highest ideals of our country.

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Legislative Affairs, Jonathan E. Miller, [redacted]

*vr*



KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Chairman, Select Committee  
on Intelligence

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//COMPARTMENTED//NOFORN//MR~~

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

JAN 16 2007

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - [redacted]  
- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]


(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

Approved for release by NSA on 11-15-2004, E.O. 13526

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

[redacted]  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36



MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

[redacted]  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence

[redacted]  
(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JAN 18 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - [Redacted]  
- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(TS//SI//REL) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S//SI//REL) [Redacted]


[Redacted]

(TS//SI//REL) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



**MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE**  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence





NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JAN 16 2007

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - [redacted]  
- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]


[redacted]

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)



MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Copy Furnished:  
Minority Staff Director, Select  
Committee on Intelligence



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JAN 16 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - [redacted]  
- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]


[redacted]

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time. Should you have any questions, please contact  of my staff at

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

**MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE**  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

Copy Furnished:  
Majority Staff Director, Select  
Committee on Intelligence

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JAN 16 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Congressional Notification - [redacted]  
- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]


[redacted]

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]


[redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]



MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108~~



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JAN 11 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Congressional Notification - [redacted]  
- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S//SI//REL) [redacted]


[redacted]

(TS//SI//REL) [redacted]

[redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798  
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36





NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JAN 16 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(TS//SI//REL)

[Redacted]

(S//SI//REL)


[Redacted]

(TS//SI//REL)

[Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE  
Director  
Legislative Affairs Office

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

JAN 11 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Congressional Notification - [Redacted]  
- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM


(TS//SI//REL) [Redacted]

(S//SI//REL) [Redacted]

(TS//SI//REL) [Redacted]

(b) (1)  
(b) (3) -18 USC 798  
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1.59  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



(U//~~FOUO~~) As always, execution of these plans will be contingent upon world events at the time. Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted]

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



MICHAEL G. LAWRENCE

Director

Legislative Affairs Office

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36  
(b) (6)

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36