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# CALIFORNIA HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

(2017-2020)



**Cal OES**  
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE  
OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

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For additional information about the Strategy or the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC), contact: [REDACTED] Homeland Security Coordinator, and liaison to the committee at [REDACTED] or via email at [REDACTED]



MESSAGE FROM THE GOVERNOR'S HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR:

As the most populous State in the nation, and the world's sixth largest economy, the mission to secure California from all threats and hazards is an ongoing effort that requires constant focus, ongoing vigilance, and collaboration. The 2017-2020 Homeland Security Strategy will serve as the overarching doctrine to guide California and its political subdivisions in achieving its homeland security vision to build critical capabilities and ultimately enhance the resiliency and security of the State against evolving and emerging threats.

This Strategy reinforces California's commitment to ensure for robust and integrated homeland security by establishing priorities, and identifying measurable and actionable performance metrics to assess and implement core capabilities. The Strategy is the direct result of stakeholder input and collaboration from over 150 subject matter experts representing 50 State, local, federal, non-governmental, and private sector partners.

The goals and objectives of the Strategy serve as the framework for prioritizing and developing statewide homeland security capabilities over the next three years. The implementation of the Homeland Security Strategy will enhance safety and preparedness in California through strong leadership, collaboration, and meaningful partnerships with State, local, federal, and private sector stakeholders.

Sincerely,

MARK S. GHILARDUCCI  
Director  
Governor's Homeland Security Advisor



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- American Red Cross
- California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC)
- California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA)
- California Department of Public Health (CDPH), Emergency Preparedness Office (EPO)
- California Department of Social Services (CDSS)
- California Department of Technology (CDT)
- California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
- California Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA)
- California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA)
- California Government Operations Agency (GovOps)
- California Highway Patrol (CHP)
- California Military Department (CMD)
- California State Sheriff's Association:
  - Alameda County Sheriff's Office
  - Butte County Sheriff's Office
  - Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office
  - Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office
  - San Bernardino County Sheriff's Office
  - San Mateo County Sheriff's Office
  - Shasta County Sheriff's Office
  - Solano County Sheriff's Office
- California Volunteers (Cal Volunteers)
- Central California Intelligence Center (CCIC)
- Coalition of California Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASIs)
  - Anaheim / Santa Ana UASI
  - Bay Area UASI
  - Los Angeles UASI
  - Riverside UASI
  - Sacramento UASI
  - San Diego UASI
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IX
- Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC)
- Los Angeles Mayor's Office





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- Los Angeles Regional Interoperable Communications System (LA-RICS)
- Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC)
- Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC)
- Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
- Port of Long Beach (POLB)
- Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District
- San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (SD-LECC)
- State Threat Assessment Center (STAC)
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of the 2017-2020 California Homeland Security Strategy (herein referred to as Strategy) is threefold; (1) to set forth the state's homeland security priorities, (2) establish performance metrics to measure implementation of the Strategy, and (3) to align and integrate these priorities with statewide funding and evaluation mechanisms. This Strategy outlines measurable actions to enhance capabilities that will guide the state's efforts to achieve the following goals:

1. Enhance Information Collection, Analysis, and Sharing, in Support of Public Safety Operations Across California
2. Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources From All Threats and Hazards
3. Strengthen Security and Preparedness Across Cyberspace
4. Strengthen Communications Capabilities Through Planning, Governance, Technology, and Equipment
5. Enhance Community Preparedness
6. Enhance Multi-Jurisdictional / Inter-Jurisdictional All-Hazards Incident Catastrophic Planning, Response, and Recovery Capabilities
7. Improve Medical and Health Capabilities
8. Enhance Incident Recovery Capabilities
9. Strengthen Food and Agriculture Preparedness
10. Prevent Violent Extremism Through Multi-Jurisdictional / Inter-Jurisdictional Collaboration and Coordination
11. Enhance Homeland Security Exercise, Evaluation, and Training Programs
12. Protect Against Effects of Climate Change

As the largest state in the nation, and with iconic critical infrastructure, California is at risk from a myriad of threats and hazards including acts of terrorism, technological hazards, and natural disasters. The goals and objectives of this Strategy focus on enhancing capabilities to reduce and mitigate risk by taking a capabilities-based approach in prioritizing homeland security efforts. This will enable California to better prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from all threats and hazards the State faces.

This Strategy builds on federal, state, and local homeland security strategies, plans, and frameworks, and seeks to ensure an integrated approach to building capabilities across the state. Homeland security is inherently a multi-jurisdictional / inter-jurisdictional effort. This Strategy will guide California in achieving its homeland security vision to enhance safety and preparedness in California through strong leadership, collaboration, and meaningful partnerships with state, local, and federal stakeholders.



Implementation and evaluation of the Strategy will occur through a series of working groups assigned to each goal and associated objectives. These working groups will monitor and track progress on the steps taken within the state to achieve the goals and objectives, and report to policymakers the status of implementation.

The mission to secure and prepare California, its people, and critical infrastructure from all threats and hazards is an ongoing effort that requires constant focus and attention. The current California Homeland Security Strategy is the latest iteration of the state's commitment to this vital mission.

There are five sections to the California Homeland Security Strategy: Purpose and Principles, Focus and Mission, California Homeland Security Environment, Goals and Objectives, and Implementation and Evaluation.

**Section I: Purpose and Principles**

Section One identifies the purpose, vision, core values, and guiding principles of the Strategy. It also describes the relationship of the Strategy to other plans and frameworks within the state, and at the federal level.

**Section II: Focus and Mission**

Section two establishes the focus and integration of the Strategy with the five mission areas and the 32 Core Capabilities outlined in the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). This section also provides a risk overview, and details the threats and hazards the Strategy aims to address.

**Section III: California Homeland Security Environment**

Section Three describes the homeland security environment of the state, the organizational structure of homeland security, as well as the coordination resources available for incident planning, response, and recovery across the state.

**Section IV: Goals and Objectives**

Section Four outlines the goals and objectives of the Strategy. Strategy goals outline California's homeland security priorities while objectives establish performance metrics to facilitate evaluation and implementation of the identified goals. Objectives are categorized under the Core Capabilities to ensure integration with Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funding, FEMA's Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), and the State Preparedness Report (SPR) framework.

**Section V: Strategy Implementation and Evaluation**

Section Five outlines the plan for Strategy implementation and evaluation. The section also covers how the Strategy aligns with existing funding and risk assessment mechanisms.

## **SECTION I: PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES**

The purpose of the 2017 - 2020 California Homeland Security Strategy is to set forth the state's strategic goals, objectives, and implementation framework over a three-year period for preventing, protecting against, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from homeland security threats and hazards facing California. This Strategy was developed by identifying capability gaps, prioritizing objectives to address the gaps, and establishing metrics for Strategy implementation and evaluation. The implementation of the Homeland Security Strategy will build critical capabilities and ultimately enhance the resiliency and security of the state. The goals within the Strategy represent statewide homeland security priorities established by the Governor's Homeland Security Advisor (HSA) in collaboration with the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC).

Given its population, land mass, the presence of critical infrastructure, and the state's impact on the national and global economy, it is imperative that California's homeland security system integrates a robust commitment from all levels of government and the private sector. As such, California's strategic approach to homeland security is to develop multi-discipline and multi-jurisdictional capabilities based on effective planning, organizing, equipping, training, and exercising activities across prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery mission areas.

### **Vision**

California will achieve and sustain security and preparedness to address all threats and hazards, across all of its communities, through strong leadership, agility, and effective, integrated partnerships.

### **Core Values**

#### ***Respect***

We will build and value integrated partnerships and embrace diversity. We will encourage open discussion to broaden our perspectives and facilitate the development of innovative approaches to new emerging threats. Our homeland security mission will demonstrate concern and compassion for the whole community. Teamwork will be encouraged to enlist and empower all involved in the homeland security mission in order to offer original perspectives to homeland security and emergency management challenges

#### ***Commitment***

California will remain focused and vigilant in order to effectively address the growing and evolving threats and hazards facing the state.

## **Guiding Principles**

### ***Innovation and Best Practices***

Understanding that resources are not unlimited, the State will foster best business practices, fully leverage existing resources and expertise, and use innovative technologies and systems to maximize mission capabilities across California.

### ***Agility***

The State, and all of its homeland security partners, must remain vigilant and consistently re-assess threat, maintain, and build, where necessary, the capabilities needed to protect all of California.

### ***Whole Community Approach***

California is among the largest, the most diverse states in the nation, and where the homeland security mission is bigger than any single agency or level of government. To achieve the State's vision, private and nonprofit sectors, including businesses, faith-based and access and functional needs organizations, residents, visitors, and government agencies at all levels must consistently and effectively engage in the homeland security mission.

### ***Integration***

The State's homeland security efforts will be based upon mutual aid and interoperable systems, plans, and procedures across all levels of government, the private and non-profit sectors, and across all mission areas –prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery.



## Relationship to Other Plans

The Strategy provides an overarching planning and preparedness framework for the entire state, and functions in tandem with California urban area homeland security strategies developed over the years.<sup>1</sup> Both the Strategy and urban area homeland security strategies influence the allocation of federal grants, state and local homeland security related funding, and serve as a means for tracking how that funding is utilized to enhance preparedness at the state and urban area levels.

While distinct, this Strategy and related plans provide a consistent framework to build and sustain core capabilities. This Strategy aligns with the following state, and federal policies, legal authorities, guidance and directives:

- California Catastrophic Incident Base Plan: Concept of Operations
- California Code of Regulations, Title 19
- California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement
- California Disaster Assistance Act
- California Disaster Recovery and Mitigation Handbook
- California Disaster Recovery Framework
- California Emergency Services Act
- California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan
- California Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan
- California State Hazard Mitigation Plan
- California Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan
- California Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)
- California-Federal Emergency Operations Center Guidelines: Integrating Federal Disaster Response Assistance with California's Standardized Emergency Management System
- Climate Change Research Plan
- Code of Federal Regulations Title 44
- Fire and Rescue Mutual Aid Plans
- Governor's Executive Order B-34-15
- Governor's Executive Order W-9-91
- Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents
- Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plans
- National Disaster Recovery Framework

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<sup>1</sup> Urban areas in California that have developed their own homeland security strategies at one time or another include: San Diego, Orange County, Los Angeles/Long Beach, Riverside, Sacramento, and the Bay Area.



## CALIFORNIA HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

- National Incident Management System
- National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
- National Preparedness Goal (NPG)
- National Response Framework (NRF)
- National Strategy for Information Sharing
- Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
- Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness
- Response Assistance with California's Standardized Emergency Management System
- Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended
- Safeguarding California Plan
- Standardized Emergency Management System Guidelines
- State of California Emergency Plan, October 2017
- The U.S. National Security Strategy, December 2017
- Urban Area Homeland Security Strategies in California

## SECTION II: FOCUS AND MISSION

The focus of the Strategy is to strengthen California’s homeland security capabilities in the five mission areas, and the 32 Core Capabilities as defined in the NPG. This will be achieved through 12 Strategy goals prioritized by the Governor’s HSA, with guidance from the HSAC. Using the combination of a threat and capabilities-based approach, subject matter experts and stakeholders from across California developed measurable objectives to achieve the 12 Homeland Security Strategy goals.

### **National Preparedness Goal**

In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the second edition of the NPG, identifying 32 Core Capabilities across the five homeland security mission areas necessary to address a wide range of threats and hazards based on the results of a DHS-led national risk assessment. The Core Capabilities and their related capability targets provide taxonomy for the state to use in building and sustaining capabilities. California has taken steps to better define, and use the Core Capabilities for consistent assessment, planning, and investing purposes across the entire state.

Implementing the NPG by addressing far-reaching threats and hazards requires a collaborative and “whole community” approach. Such an approach (discussed in more detail under [Goal 5](#)) necessitates engagement from individuals, families, communities, private and non-profit sectors, faith-based organizations, and all levels of government. As part of its whole community approach, California acknowledges that day-to-day public safety policy development and implementation is the responsibility of local jurisdictions, while also recognizing the need for support from state and federal departments and agencies to achieve the NPG at the local level.

### **Mission Areas**

Each goal and objective within this Strategy is built to help the state achieve one or more of the five homeland security mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.

#### ***Prevention***

Prevention actions seek to avoid, intervene, or stop a criminal or terrorism incident from occurring. Prevention involves applying intelligence to a range of activities that may include countermeasures such as deterrence operations, heightened inspections, improved surveillance and security operations, investigations to determine the full nature of the threat, and specific law enforcement operations aimed at interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending potential perpetrators.



### ***Protection***

Protection actions reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources to deter or neutralize a terrorist incident, major disasters, and other emergencies.

Protection includes elevating awareness and understanding of threats and vulnerabilities to critical facilities, systems, and functions, identifying and promoting effective sector-specific infrastructure protection practices and methodologies, and sharing information among private entities within the sector, as well as between government and the private sector.

### ***Mitigation***

Mitigation actions reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters.

Mitigation is achieved through risk analysis, which creates a foundation for activities that aim to reduce system or asset vulnerabilities, and the consequences of disasters. This may involve public education and outreach activities, and taking actions at critical infrastructure and key resource sites to reduce the vulnerability to technological, and human-caused threats and hazards.

### ***Response***

Response activities address short-term and direct effects of an incident. Response includes immediate actions taken to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. This involves executing emergency operation plans, and other immediate response activities designed to limit unfavorable outcomes from an incident.

### ***Recovery***

Recovery activities include the development, coordination, and execution of service-and-site-restoration plans; the reconstitution of government operations and services; individual, private-sector, non-governmental, and public-assistance programs; long-term care and treatment of affected persons; and additional measures for social, political, environmental, and economic restoration.



## Risk Overview

Homeland security risk is the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from a terrorist incident or natural hazard as determined by the likelihood and the consequences of the event. In order to make comparisons, this risk can be expressed as a number or value calculated as a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence: Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence.

As the most populous state in the nation, with an estimated 39.3 million individuals across 156,000 square miles, California faces risk from a number of vectors. The state's resident population is compounded by an annual visitor population equal to roughly 80% of the total U.S. population. For example, in 2016, California was the destination of 268.4 million domestic leisure and business travelers, with 17.3 million of those being international travelers.<sup>1</sup>

The state is divided into 58 counties, subdivided into over 475 incorporated cities, and includes 109 Tribal Nations. Eight of the top 50 U.S. cities in terms of population are in California. This includes Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, San Francisco, Long Beach, Fresno, Sacramento, and Oakland.

With a gross state product of \$2.6 trillion in 2016, California's economy remains the largest in the nation and the sixth largest in the world.<sup>2</sup> The state is home to a variety of industries including tourism, entertainment, agriculture, technology, and wine production. California produces more than \$1.8 trillion in goods and services annually, making it a prime hemispheric crossroad for trade and investment in the United States with annual exports totaling over \$260 billion.

The state has an extensive infrastructure system with critical assets covering all 16 DHS designated sectors under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. This includes over 130 DHS designated Tier I and II assets. The state has 400 public-use airports/heliports, including 11 airports ranked in the top 100 U.S. Commercial Services Airports, and has three of the top five busiest ports in the nation. Within California, there are almost 7,000 miles of freight rail track, and 51,236 miles of state highways lanes.

California has one of the largest public education systems in the world, comprised of the 23 campuses of the California State University system, nine campuses of the University of California system, and 114 community colleges, in addition to K-12 public and private schools. The State of California owns more than 20,000 buildings and leases space at more than 2,000 sites.

California has a robust defense industrial base sector with over 30 military installations. The Navy maintains the largest footprint in California of any military service; San Diego is home port to approximately 20 percent of the Navy's entire fleet.



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Risk is a dynamic attribute and can shift over time; this is especially true in the case of terrorism risk where adversarial intent and capabilities can change rapidly. A terrorist incident, infectious disease outbreak, disruption of critical infrastructure, and / or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) event can occur with little or no warning, and with catastrophic consequences. Those consequences can overwhelm the capabilities of local agencies to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs.



## Threats and Hazards

The threat landscape in California continues to evolve, encompassing a wide range of standing and emerging threats emanating from a diverse set of highly capable actors. Threat actors continue to become more sophisticated, leveraging new technologies to expand their operations statewide, presenting new challenges for tribal, local, state, and federal law enforcement.

Recent attacks targeting civilians in San Bernardino, California (2015); Orlando, Florida (2016); Charlottesville, Virginia (2017); Las Vegas, Nevada (2017); and New York City, New York (October 31 and December 11, 2017) highlight the significant threat terrorism poses to California and the nation. With the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) propaganda encouraging even more attacks on community gatherings, the risk of these types of emergencies continue to grow.

-  Active Shooter
-  Acts of Terrorism
-  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Incidents
-  Critical Infrastructure Disruption
-  Cyber Attacks
-  Food and Agriculture Incidents and Outbreaks
-  Public Health Incidents, Outbreaks, Epidemics, and Pandemics

Figure 1 - Potential Threats and Hazards

California and its people are vulnerable to a wide range of hazards that threaten communities, businesses, government, and the environment. The Strategy focuses primarily on terrorism preparedness, such as intentional human-caused incidents, while also addressing natural and technological threats and hazards as a derivative benefit. This dual-use concept is based on the established understanding that certain capabilities are applicable in addressing all threats and hazards, i.e., interoperable communications. The categories of threats and hazards California is preparing for are:

### ***Natural Hazards***

Natural hazards result from acts of nature, including animal disease outbreak, pandemics, or epidemics.

### ***Technological Hazards***

Technological hazards result from accidents or failures of systems and structures, such as hazardous materials spills, power failures, or radiological release.

### ***Human-Caused***

Human-caused incidents result from the intentional actions of an adversary, such as a threatened or actual chemical attack, biological attack, or cyber incident.<sup>3</sup>



Consequences of a threat or hazard can have devastating impacts on human health and safety, significantly disrupt the economy, and cause psychological impact resulting in reduced confidence in the government and economy. As part of its strategic risk assessment process, the state has developed a series of detailed scenarios to help further drive planning and investing efforts. These scenarios were constructed as part of the federally mandated Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) development process, and build from the general acts of terrorism described in [Annex B](#).

Identifying capability gaps and vulnerabilities for these specific threats and hazards ensures California has the right capabilities in place to mitigate the impact to the state, its people, and its critical infrastructure and key resources.

## **SECTION III: CALIFORNIA HOMELAND SECURITY**

### **ENVIRONMENT**

#### **State Homeland Security Agency**

California is one of nine states that house homeland security operations and oversight within the Governor's Office<sup>4</sup>. The California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) is responsible for both emergency management and homeland security initiatives throughout the state. This integrated approach to homeland security and emergency management is designed to strengthen the state's ability to address both naturally occurring and human-caused emergencies in an all-hazards approach

#### **Homeland Security Advisor (HSA)**

The Director of Cal OES is a member of the Governor's cabinet and serves as the Governor's Homeland Security Advisor (HSA). As the HSA, the Director serves as a liaison between the Governor's office, DHS, and other agencies both in and out the state. The HSA plays a key leadership role in critical statewide homeland security functions, and oversees statewide public safety, emergency management, emergency communications, counter-terrorism efforts, and the State Threat Assessment System (STAS).

#### **Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC)**

The Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC) is a requirement outlined within the DHS HSGP guidelines. The guidance requires the HSAC to have balanced representation among entities with operational responsibilities for terrorism / disaster prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities within the state.<sup>5</sup> A full list of HSAC member agencies and organizations is located in [Annex C](#). The purpose of the HSAC is to advise the HSA regarding the development and implementation of the state's Homeland Security Strategy, and related priorities to promote unified coordination of homeland security activities across disciplines. The HSAC identifies gaps in the state's homeland security efforts, and offers recommendations for how available preparedness resources can effectively support a whole community approach to enhancing capabilities.

HSAC members advocated for a measurable threat and capability-based approach for the 2017 – 2020 Homeland Security Strategy. HSAC members also advised that implementation and sustainment should be done through Homeland Security Strategy Working Groups. HSAC members designated over 150 subject matter experts representing 50 state, local, federal, and private partners to serve on Homeland



Security Strategy Working Groups. More information about working groups is in [Section V: Strategy Implementation and Evaluation](#).

## **State Organization and Key Stakeholders**

California promotes collaborative community-based planning and preparedness in which stakeholders from all sectors of society and public safety disciplines work together to ensure effective homeland security. Stakeholders include the Governor, state agencies, operational areas, local government, special districts, tribal governments, and the federal government. In addition, the private sector, individuals, utilities, community / faith-based, and volunteer organizations play a critical role in homeland security throughout the state.

### ***State Agencies***

While virtually every state agency and department has a role in homeland security, several departments and agencies are critical to achieving the 12 Strategy goals, and objectives. These include:

- California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
- California Department of Food and Agriculture
- California Department of Justice
- California Department of Motor Vehicles
- California Department of Public Health
- California Department of Social Services
- California Department of Technology
- California Department of Transportation
- California Governor's Office of Emergency Services
- California Highway Patrol
- California Military Department
- Emergency Medical Services Authority

### ***Federal Partners***

California works closely with federal agencies on statewide homeland security initiatives in order to build critical capabilities and enhance the resiliency and security of the State against evolving and emerging threats. Federal partners include:

- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- U.S. Department of Justice

***Tribal Governments***

There are 109 federally-recognized Native American tribes in California. The United States government recognizes tribes as domestic, independent nations with the right to self-governance, tribal sovereignty, and self-determination. Tribal governments are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, and the environment on tribal lands. Responsibilities may include deploying field-level emergency response personnel, activating emergency operations centers, and issuing orders to protect the public.

***Military***

More defense industrial base facilities and military personnel are assigned to California than any other state in the nation. California benefits economically from the large military and national security presence throughout the state. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) employs approximately 360,000 Californians, not including hundreds of thousands employed by private military contractors, and spends roughly \$70 billion dollars each year in California<sup>6</sup>. The California Military Department (CMD) composed of the California Army National Guard, the California Air National Guard, and the California State Military Reserve employs more than 22,000 soldiers and airmen across more than 100 statewide armories and installations.<sup>7</sup> As an economic sector, national security is one of California's largest and most important economic engines.

***National Defense***

In addition to over 30 military installations in California, the state is home to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations, and the U.S. Coast Guard. CBP has 14 stations and 3,600 agents responsible for protecting 931 miles of coastal border from Mexico to Oregon. The Coast Guard has over 12,000 reserve and active duty personnel<sup>8</sup> responsible for maritime safety and security across the entire Coast of California, including the ports of Long Beach, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, and others.

***Private Sector***

An important part of California's homeland security and emergency preparedness structure is the private sector. From banks to commercial facilities to telecom connections to utilities, much of California's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. The state's resiliency strongly depends on its capacity to quickly restore functionality of private infrastructure in the wake of disasters, and these businesses provide valuable resources that serve those impacted before, during, and after an emergency.

***Non-Governmental Organizations***

California recognizes the value and importance of organizations that perform voluntary services in their community. Community Based Organizations (CBOs) or Non-





Governmental Organizations (NGOs) provide critical resources before, during, and after a disaster. These resources can be effective assets at any level. These organizations have resources which can augment emergency response and recovery efforts.

Examples of voluntary organizations are:

- Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD): This coalition of non-profit organizations supports the emergency management efforts of local, state, and federal agencies by coordinating the planning efforts of a variety of voluntary organizations.
- American Red Cross (ARC): When a disaster threatens or strikes, the ARC, in coordination with all levels of government, provides shelter, food, and health or mental health services to address basic human needs to enable effected individuals to resume normal daily activities.



## **State Coordination**

A catastrophic event such as a terrorist attack or disruption of critical infrastructure has the potential to exhaust resources, and interrupt government operations and emergency services, making the state vulnerable to secondary threats. These factors underscore the importance of coordinated planning to allow for accelerated state, local, regional, or federal assistance.

California's comprehensive approach to homeland security is nationally recognized, and the strength of the response system is based on a mutual aid partnership among all levels of government. Cal OES is the homeland security and emergency management agency responsible for working with federal and state emergency responders to execute a coordinated response. Cal OES uses Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) based upon the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to coordinate with other emergency response agencies in the event of an incident.

### ***Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS)***

SEMS is the NIMS-compliant system required by California Government Code Section 8607 subdivision (a) for managing responses to multi-agency emergencies in California. There are five SEMS organization levels: state, regional, operational area, local, and field. Together with the private sector, these comprise the California Emergency Organization. This organization represents all resources available within California that may be applied in disaster response and recovery phases.

### ***Mutual Aid***

California's emergency assistance is based on the California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement (MMAA). This statewide mutual aid system is designed to ensure that necessary resources are provided to and between the state's political subdivisions whenever additional resources are required, or when their own resources are overwhelmed or inadequate.

### ***California Emergency Support Functions***

Following a catastrophic event such as an earthquake or terrorist attack, there may be significant disruption of the impacted area's critical infrastructure such as energy, transportation, telecommunications, law enforcement, public health, and health care systems. California Emergency Support Functions (CA-ESFs) consist of 18 disciplines deemed essential to the emergency management community in California.<sup>9</sup> Led by a state agency or agencies, each CA-ESF is designed to bring together discipline-specific stakeholders to collaborate and function for statewide mitigation, preparedness,



response, and recovery efforts. The CA-ESFs correspond with the federal Emergency Support Functions.

### ***Civil Support***

The Adjutant General of the California Military Department (CMD) initiates civil support activities at the request of the Governor to respond to incidents at the local, state, or regional level. The CMD, which includes the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and the California State Military Reserve, is an important state and federal resource available for planning, preparing, and responding to natural or human-caused incidents. Civil support operations are intended to supplement capabilities for a multitude of hazards and natural disasters, including:

- Hazardous material emergency
- Energy disruption
- Food / agriculture emergency
- Pandemic and epidemic
- Terrorist attack

The CMD has assets, capabilities, and expertise in critical areas such as incident awareness and assessment, security force augmentation to law enforcement, communications, logistics, aviation, search and rescue, engineering, CBRNE planning and response, and decontamination.

### ***CBRN Detection and Response***

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), through the Attorney General, leads law enforcement response to a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident. The FBI has the capability to detect, stabilize, and contain WMD devices, at the request, of and in coordination with any local, state, or federal agencies.

### ***Department of Homeland Security Office of Infrastructure Protection***

The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) assigned to a state or region deploy in support of local or state response activities upon request from the affected jurisdictions or as part of a coordinated federal disaster response. PSAs assist local and state response efforts by augmenting local and state staff, collating federal infrastructure information, and coordinating additional analytic and informational support. Such support is drawn from IP offices established in each of the federal regions or from nationally available assets such as the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis. Examples of support include:

- Liaison and information sharing with federal Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs);
- Analysis of hazards and potential impacts; and
- Mapping of infrastructure to known or anticipated impacts.

## SECTION IV: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The goals and objectives of the Strategy serve as the framework for prioritizing and developing statewide homeland security capabilities over the next three years. Implementation of goals and objectives will be reviewed biannually, and evaluated annually. More information about implementation and evaluation can be found in [Section V: Strategy Implementation and Evaluation](#). Recognizing that threats to California are constantly evolving, the Strategy is intended to be flexible and adaptable with the changing homeland security environment of the state.

The 12 goals of the Strategy were identified by the HSAC with the endorsement of the HSA, and are aligned wherever possible with California's 10 HSGP investment justifications. This alignment allows the state to accurately and efficiently track how HSGP and other grant investments influence and impact the implementation of the Strategy. As such, the goals serve as an organizational construct to combine similar homeland security activities together for management and tracking purposes.

Each objective is implemented through steps that are broken out by the elements of capability: planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises (POETE) as defined in the figure below entitled "Elements of Capability." In some cases, an objective will not have every POETE element as part of the objective's implementation. This is the result of having no significant gap or need identified during the workshops in that particular POETE element.



Figure 2: Elements of Capability

## Methodology

Strategy objectives were developed to address capability gaps identified by Homeland Security Strategy Working Group members, with each objective aligned with a primary Core Capability from the NPG. By aligning each objective to a primary capability, the state will ensure the Strategy is centered on enhancing and sustaining capabilities through investments and other activities.<sup>10</sup> However, objective alignment with a primary Core Capability does not mean that no other capability is relevant to the objective. Capabilities beyond those listed are likely implicated across objectives in the Strategy, but for ease of organization and consistency with DHS guidance, only the primary Core Capability is highlighted for each objective.

The goals and objectives are inter-related with each one reinforcing and supporting the other. For example, building Operational Coordination capabilities under Goal 1 will support implementation and execution of capabilities under Goal 2 when executing Goal 2's capabilities in an operational context. Thus, the placement of a capability under a particular goal is a function of organizational convenience and simplicity for strategy management and tracking purposes, and not a limitation of that capability's applicability in a real-world context.

Strategy objectives are intended to serve as a guide to enhance capabilities for the state and do not represent an exhaustive list nor are they meant to limit other projects, programs, or efforts in support of the Homeland Security Strategy goals that may be developed over future grant and budget cycles.

## **Goal 1: Enhance Information Collection, Analysis, and Sharing, in Support of Public Safety Operations across California**

### ***Background***

Information sharing is critical to enhancing homeland security statewide. The clear and ongoing threat posed by terrorists, and other malicious actors in California and the United States has resulted in unprecedented efforts by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to build new partnerships and share critical information to protect California. Despite significant progress, and greatly expanded information sharing accomplishments, much remains to be done.

In order to enhance the ability to better protect Californians, the state has developed a robust capacity to collect, investigate, assess, and disseminate threat information. Collecting, analyzing, and sharing threat information needs to be continuous and fully integrated at local, regional, state, and national levels. Threat information needs to be circulated not only amongst law enforcement, but across public safety disciplines and the private sector. California has partnered with federal and local agencies to build the capacity to facilitate this information-sharing, threat assessment, and coordination.

### ***State Threat Assessment System (STAS)***

The State Threat Assessment System (STAS) comprises California's State Threat Assessment Center (STAC), regional fusion centers, and the terrorism liaison officer (TLO) network designed to detect, deter, and prevent homeland security threats to the citizens and critical infrastructure of California. It fosters a collaborative effort to enhance the reporting, tracking, analysis, and assessment of threat



information and suspicious activities. The STAS also produces and shares timely and actionable homeland security information, which enhances the safety of the citizens of California while rigorously protecting their privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.



The locally facilitated fusion centers are located in Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Orange County, and San Diego, and collectively make up California's fusion center network. These fusion centers operate in coordination with the State Threat Assessment Center via authorities outlined by state and federal law, and meet metrics designated by the Homeland Security Advisor (HSA):

- Central California Intelligence Center (<https://sacrtac.org>)
- Joint Regional Intelligence Center (<https://www.irc.org>)
- Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (<https://ncric.org>)
- Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (<https://ociac.ca.gov>)
- San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (<https://sd-lecc.org>)

Each center assesses its regional threats and shares relevant and timely information with the fusion center network. The centers' areas of responsibility mirror the four Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field offices in California, minimizing reporting conflicts, providing statewide coverage, and facilitating coordination with the FBI. The STAS also provides direct linkage to Cal OES, the STAC, and federal agencies and operations centers such as the National Counter Terrorism Center, Terrorist Screening Center, and DHS' National Operations Center.

Due to their unique and frontline access to first responders, private sector security personnel, and critical infrastructure owners and operators, a primary function of each locally operated center is to receive, gather, analyze, and share suspicious activity reporting (SAR) information with federal, state, tribal, and local partners. Each center participates in the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), which establishes standardized processes and policies to scrutinize observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning associated with terrorism or other criminal activity.

On an annual basis, the STAS identifies the top threats to each center's region and compiles an assessment of top threats and HSA priority metric reporting to the STAC using its annual statewide Threat Assessment Process (TAP) for the Governor, the HSA, and each center's local executives and customers.

### ***California State Threat Assessment Center (STAC)***

The State Threat Assessment Center (STAC) is California's primary state-level fusion center, as designated by Governor of California and DHS. The STAC resides in Cal OES, and the California Department of Justice, California Highway Patrol (CHP), California National Guard, California Police Chiefs Association, California Sheriffs Association, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation are all members of the STAC Governance Board.

The STAC, along with more than 70 other fusion centers nationwide, was built as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks, and the national information sharing deficiencies preceding

the event. In 2004, the former Governor's Office of Homeland Security (OHS) developed a plan as part of its homeland security strategy to establish one state-level, and five regional-level fusion centers to form the State Threat Assessment System (STAS).

The STAC at the state level produces tailored, all-source strategic intelligence designed to inform California's policymakers and other public safety personnel on the top homeland security threats facing the state every day, including:

- International and domestic terrorism
- Transnational organized crime (including illicit narcotics and contraband trafficking)
- Border security
- Street and prison gangs and their links to transnational organized crime
- Threats to California's critical infrastructure and key resources
- Threats developing from emerging and disruptive technologies

### ***Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO)***

At the state and local level, law enforcement and public safety agencies designate TLOs to review and assess local reporting, and conduct outreach to other public safety agencies, critical infrastructure operators, the private sector, and community groups. A TLO is the local agency point of contact for all terrorism-related alerts, requests for information, warnings, and other notifications from regional, state, or federal homeland security agencies.

The STAS fusion centers in the state use the TLO network as the conduit through which homeland security and crime-related information flows from the field to the center for assessment and analysis. The TLO network also serves as the vehicle to impart relevant information from the regional center to field personnel. TLOs have access to a variety of terrorism and security alerts, trainings, and threat assessments with key federal, state, and local agencies.

### ***Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)***


The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead domestic agency responsible for deterring, defeating, and responding to the domestic and international terrorist attacks.

The FBI coordinates Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) composed of other federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies, as a means to facilitate information sharing among JTTF members. JTTFs leverage the collective resources of the member agencies for the prevention, preemption, deterrence and investigation of terrorist acts that affect United States interests, and to disrupt and prevent terrorist acts and apprehend individuals who may commit or plan to commit such acts.





**Objectives**



**Planning**

1.1.1 Starting January 1, 2018, the STAS leadership will conduct an annual STAS data call to [redacted]



1.1.2 By December 31, 2018, and continuing annually, the STAS will develop a common set of Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ) to address statewide intelligence and analytic priorities for the upcoming year.

1.1.3 By December 31, 2018, each fusion center in partnership with the State Threat Assessment Center will [redacted]



[redacted] and the STAS as a whole.

1.1.4 By December 31, 2019, all STAS members will adopt and adhere to all appropriate and applicable [redacted]



1.1.5 By December 31, 2019, the State Threat Assessment Center will [redacted]

[redacted] in partnership with other STAS members in order to outline how the STAS plans on operating during steady state, and incident operations.

1.1.6 By December 31, 2019, the State Threat Assessment Center, in partnership with other STAS members, will [redacted]



**Organization**

- 1.1.7 Starting January 1, 2018, and continuing annually, the State Threat Assessment Center will [REDACTED] by December 31, 2020.
- 1.1.8 Starting January 1, 2018, the State Threat Assessment Center, and the Cal OES Law Enforcement Branch will [REDACTED]
- 1.1.9 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES will [REDACTED]
- 1.1.10 By December 31, 2019, the STAS members will be able to share information and conduct outreach to all law enforcement agencies in their area of responsibility.
- 1.1.11 Starting January 1, 2018, and continuing annually, Cal OES, via the State Threat Assessment Center, will issue annual reporting metrics guidance to the STAS requesting weekly and monthly metric reports covering [REDACTED]
- 1.1.12 By December 31 2018, and continuing annually, the State Threat Assessment Center will work with the STAS to [REDACTED]
- 1.1.13 Starting March 1, 2018, and continuing annually, the State Threat Assessment Center will work with the STAS to [REDACTED]
- 1.1.14 Starting March 1 2018, and continuing annually, the STAC will work with the STAS to author a STAS Annual Report for the HSA.
- 1.1.15 Starting January 1 2018, and continuing annually, the STAC will work to arrange quarterly meetings between the STAS Directors and the HSA (or his or her designee).

**Equipment**

1.1.16 Starting January 1, 2018, and continuing annually, the State Threat Assessment Center will [REDACTED]

**Training**

1.1.17 Starting July 31, 2018, STAS members will reconvene the annual STAS analyst training meeting to provide training and sharing of best practices among STAS analysts, and other STAS members.

1.1.18 By January 1, 2019, the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), in coordination with the STAS, will develop training standards and a timeline for reviewing training materials to ensure the TLO network receives high-quality training that is coordinated with appropriate federal, state, and local partners, and which is consistent in content and delivery state-wide.

**Exercises**

1.1.19 By December 31, 2018, and continuing biennially, [REDACTED]

1.1.20 By December 31, 2019, [REDACTED]

**1.2 Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment**

*The STAS will assess risk and disaster resilience across California so that decision makers, responders, and community members can take informed action to reduce risk, and increase resilience to threats and hazards.*

**Equipment**

1.2.1 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Response Directorate, in partnership with Cal OES Geospatial Information Systems, and the State Threat Assessment Center Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit, will develop a tool(s) to collect CBRNE risk assessment information using a standard methodology and interoperable data standards to facilitate streamlined information sharing.



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## ***1.3 Threats and Hazard Identification***

*The STAS will identify the threats and hazards that occur in California, determine their frequency and magnitude, and incorporate this information into analytic products that support California's homeland security planning process.*

### **Planning**

- 1.3.1 Starting January 1, 2018, and continuing annually, the State Threat Assessment Center will consolidate STAS assessments of current and emerging homeland security threats facing California into a consolidated statewide threat assessment product.

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## **Goal 2: Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources from All Threats and Hazards**

### ***Background***

A vital component of California's Homeland Security Strategy is the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. Critical infrastructure are sites and systems, both physical and virtual, deemed most crucial in terms of public health and safety, iconic value and symbolism, governance, and economic security. California has an extensive infrastructure system with over 130 DHS designated Tier I and Tier II critical infrastructure assets covering all 16 DHS-designated infrastructure sectors under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

Physical or cyber-attacks disrupting statewide critical infrastructure have the potential to produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident. Natural, human-caused, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of casualties, property destruction, economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence.

For these reasons, infrastructure protection and cybersecurity efforts are increasingly integrated. Recognizing the interconnected nature of cyber threats to critical infrastructure, Cal OES has collocated the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC) and the STAC. For more information about the Cal-CSIC, see [Goal 3](#). For more information about the STAC, see [Goal 1](#).

### ***National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)***

In 2013, DHS released the latest version of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP represents the national level plan and effort for critical infrastructure protection, which is a collaborative responsibility across all levels of government and the private sector. The goal of the NIPP is to enhance the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure from terrorist attack, and to strengthen the ability to timely respond, and rapidly recover in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. The NIPP's supporting Sector-Specific Plans provide for a coordinated approach led by designated agencies to establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for protection across each of the 16 sectors as illustrated in figure 3 below.



**Figure 3: NIPP Critical Infrastructure Sectors**

### ***Critical Infrastructure Protection Units***

California's STAS maintains critical infrastructure protection or risk management units in each of the fusion centers making up the system. These units implement a variety of regionally tailored programs to include comprehensive assessments of risk to critical infrastructure, incident response planning, information sharing with private sector partners, emergency operations center staffing, and onsite security reviews. For more information about the STAS, see [Goal 1](#).

### ***Private Sector Coordination***

The majority of critical infrastructure in California is owned and operated by private companies; therefore, information sharing between the government and the private-sector is necessary to reduce the risk of disruptions to critical infrastructure. California's STAS works in collaboration with the FBI InfraGard Program, and the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection's Protective Security Advisor (PSA) personnel to coordinate outreach and develop trusted partnerships within private sector critical infrastructure stakeholders.

There is a critical need for the organized exchange of information and resources between public and private sector organizations in mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from emergencies. To meet that need, Cal OES has agreements in-place with private sector and non-profit organizations that will provide support to the state during times of crisis. These private organizations form the Business and Utility Operations Center (BUOC). The BUOC is comprised of the Business Operations Center (BOC), and the Utility Operations Center (UOC) which serve as critical components in emergency response.

### ***Federal Partnerships***

State and local infrastructure protection efforts in California work in concert with DHS initiatives such as Regional Resiliency Assessment Program, National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program, Special Events Assessment Ratings, and Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, as well as programs overseen by federally designated Sector-Specific Agencies.

**Objectives**

[Redacted]

**Planning**

2.5.1 By December 31, 2019, the STAS leadership will [Redacted]

[Redacted]

2.5.2 By July 1, 2018, the STAS, in coordination with the Cal OES Policy Office, will

[Redacted]

2.5.3 By December 31, 2019, the STAS, in consultation with Cal OES Office of Legal Affairs, will

[Redacted]

2.5.4 By December 31, 2018, the STAS, in partnership with federal and local stakeholders, will

[Redacted]

2.5.5 By December 31, 2018, the STAC, in coordination with STAS members, Cal OES Response Directorate, Public Utilities Commission, Transportation Security Administration, and the California Department of Transportation will hold a meeting

[Redacted]

2.5.6 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Fire & Rescue, in partnership with Caltrans, the STAS, rail industry, and other stakeholders, will

[Redacted]

**Organization**

2.5.7 By January 31, 2019, the STAS will create sector specific distribution lists for product dissemination among critical infrastructure owners and operators.



### **Equipment**

- 2.5.8 By December 31, 2020, the STAS, in partnership with Cal OES Geographic Information Systems, will develop data layers for map visualization to identify critical assets and systems across all DHS recognized infrastructure sectors.

### **Training**

- 2.5.9 Starting January 1, 2018, the STAS will provide state and local law enforcement personnel training on critical infrastructure and key resource assessments and protective measures to include: site vulnerability assessments, analysis, and mitigation methodologies; terrorist indicators, warnings, and pre-operational surveillance tactics; and counter IED training.
- 2.5.10 By December 31, 2020, the STAS will work with the California Public Utilities Commission, the State Water Resources Control Board, and the Department of Water Resources to integrate suspicious activity reporting into continuing education training, and certification for the water and waste water sectors.

## **2.6 Physical Protective Measures**

*State, local, and federal agencies, in partnership with the private sector, will support the design and implementation of risk-informed physical countermeasures, and policies protecting people, structures, and systems across all critical infrastructure sectors in California.*

### **Planning**

- 2.6.1 By December 31, 2019, the Food and Agriculture Defense Steering Committee, Cal OES Policy Office, in conjunction with the State Threat Assessment Center, will develop voluntary access control and physical security guidelines for livestock producers.

## **2.7 Access Control and Identity Verification**

*Public safety agencies and critical infrastructure owners and operators in California will apply and support necessary physical and technological measures to control admittance to critical locations and systems.*

### **Planning**

- 2.7.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Office of Policy, California Department of Transportation, and California Highway Patrol will meet to discuss the development and implementation of a statewide access control policy for contractors performing work on iconic bridges.

## **2.8 Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction**

*The whole community across California will build and sustain resilient systems, communities, and critical infrastructure and key resources lifelines to reduce their long-term vulnerability to natural and technological hazards.*

### **Planning**

- 2.8.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Policy Office, and Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, in partnership with CSTI, will identify corrective action plans relevant to vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure sectors (such as energy, water, and wastewater systems) from grant-funded exercise After Action Reports (AARs), and real-world incident AARs.
- 2.8.2 By February 7, 2018, Cal OES Climate Change Working Group will meet with Resources Agency (Ocean Protection Council), and other stakeholders, to discuss critical infrastructure planning and mitigation gaps for sea level rise and saltwater intrusion.

## **2.9 Infrastructure Systems**

*California responders and infrastructure owners and operators will develop processes and systems to stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and revitalize critical systems and services to support community restoration following a major disaster.*

### **Planning**

- 2.9.1 By February 7, 2018, Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, in coordination with the Climate Change Working Group, will meet with the state stakeholders to identify gaps related to climate impacts to energy and water infrastructure planning.
- 2.9.2 By December 31, 2020, the STAS, in conjunction with state and federal partners, will develop a mechanism to conduct an assessment of the interdependencies of lifeline sectors based on specific disaster scenarios.
- 2.9.3 By December 31, 2020, the STAS, Cal OES Fire & Rescue, in partnership with Caltrans, rail industry, and other stakeholders, will develop consequence management best practices for incident response to major bridge disruptions (naturally or human-caused) for local first responders across California.

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**Goal 3: Strengthen Security and Preparedness across Cyberspace**

***Background***

Cybersecurity remains one of the top security concerns for California, threatening critical infrastructure from state networks to private industry. As technology evolves, cyber threats are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity. The ranges of cyber threat actors, methods of attack, and targets are also expanding.

The internet provides a simple and anonymous vehicle for perpetrating financial crimes, black market deals, theft, terrorism, vandalism, human trafficking, espionage, and the promulgation of malicious software. Sustained training, personnel, and resources are required to effectively and expeditiously respond to, investigate, and prosecute cyber-related crimes.

Malicious cyber activities can have catastrophic consequences, such as the failure of a power grid or disruption to financial systems. The cascading impacts increase the potential severity of such cyber incidents. California has a high number of virtually connected industrial control systems, which operate and regulate critical infrastructure including oil facilities, electricity, and internet backbone lines. The connectivity of critical infrastructure systems, and the potential for exploitation puts California's security, economy, and public safety at risk.

***California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC)***

In 2015, Governor Jerry Brown issued Executive Order B-34-15 to bolster California's preparedness and response to destructive cyber-attacks. The order directed Cal OES to establish the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC), to strengthen the state's cybersecurity strategy, and improve inter-agency, cross-sector coordination to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber-attacks that could damage California's economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks. The Cal-CSIC coordinates with the STAS, DHS, and FBI to facilitate integrated information sharing and communication with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations.<sup>11</sup>



The Cal-CSIC is inherently collaborative and is comprised of representatives from several partner organizations including the:

- California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES)
- California Department of Technology, Chief Information Security Office



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- California State Threat Assessment Center
- California Highway Patrol
- California Military Department
- California Office of the Attorney General
- California Health and Human Services Agency
- California Utilities Emergency Association
- California State University
- University of California
- California Community Colleges
- United States Department of Homeland Security
- United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
- United States Secret Service
- United States Coast Guard
- Other members as designated by the Director of Cal OES.

The Cal-CSIC is designed to share cyber threat information, and provides warnings of cyber-attacks to government agencies and non-governmental partners, and assesses risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks. The center prioritizes cyber threats and supports public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure. The Cal-CSIC also enables cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and provides incident response coordination for all of its statewide partners. Currently, no other state cyber entity executes this activity.






### ***California Cybersecurity Task Force***

To address the growing cyber threat to networks, personal privacy, and critical infrastructure, Governor Jerry Brown directed Cal OES, in coordination with the California Department of Technology to establish the California Cybersecurity Task Force in 2013<sup>12</sup>. The California Cybersecurity Task Force is a statewide partnership comprised of key stakeholders, subject matter experts, and cybersecurity professionals from California's public sector, private industry, academia, and law enforcement. The Task Force serves as an advisory body to the State of California senior administration officials in cybersecurity matters. By fostering a culture of cybersecurity through education, information sharing, workforce development, and economic growth, the Task Force hopes to advance the state's cybersecurity, and position California as a national leader and preferred location for cyber business, education, and research.

**Objectives**



**Planning**

- 3.1.1 By December 31, 2019, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in coordination with the STAS, will 
- 3.1.2 By December 31, 2018, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in partnership with the California Highway Patrol, California Military Department, California Department of Technology, California Urban Area Security Initiatives, State Threat Assessment System, and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners, will 
- 3.1.3 By December 31, 2019, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in partnership with the California Highway Patrol, California Military Department, California Department of Technology, California Urban Area Security Initiatives, State Threat Assessment System, and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector (SLTTP) partners, 
- 3.1.4 By December 31, 2020, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in partnership with the California Highway Patrol, California Military Department, California Department of Technology, California Urban Area Security Initiatives, State Threat Assessment System, and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners, will 
- 3.1.5 By June 30, 2019, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center will 



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3.1.6 By June 30, 2019, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in partnership with California Department of Technology, California Government Operations Agency, and the California Department of Human Resources, will [REDACTED]

3.1.7 By June 30, 2019, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in partnership with California Department of Technology, California Government Operations Agency, and the California Department of Human Resources, will [REDACTED]

3.1.8 By June 30, 2019 California Government Operations Agency, California Department of Technology, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, regional training managers for California Urban Area Security Initiatives, and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners will [REDACTED]

## Organization

3.1.9 By December 31, 2018, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in partnership with California Department of Technology, California Government Operations Agency, and the California Department of Human Resources, will meet to [REDACTED]

3.1.10 By December 31, 2018, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in partnership with California Department of Technology, California Government Operations Agency, and the California Department of Human Resources, will meet to [REDACTED]

3.1.11 By June 1, 2018, California Government Operations Agency, California Department of Technology, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, regional training managers for California Urban Area Security Initiatives, and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners will meet to discuss opportunities to [REDACTED]

## Exercises

3.1.12 By December 31, 2019, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center will conduct a cyber incident response exercise with state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners.

## **Goal 4: Strengthen Communications Capabilities through Planning, Governance, Technology, and Equipment**

### ***Background***

Timely and effective emergency alert, warning, public information, and communications interoperability are important to the state's inherent resilience by empowering citizens to make informed decisions, and allowing first responders to take action to save lives, property, and critical infrastructure.<sup>13</sup> Interoperable emergency communications and information sharing among responders during all threats and hazards is paramount to the safety and security of all Californians.<sup>14</sup>

Communications interoperability is commonly defined as "the ability of public safety emergency responders to communicate with whom they need to, when they need to." Communications interoperability is vital for first responders, public safety, and emergency management professionals during response efforts and task force operations. This capability streamlines coordination efforts in major incidents that employ emergency responders from multiple agencies or jurisdictions.

Public information messaging and warning is critical during response to any emergency or disaster. Government officials, emergency managers, and public safety personnel must be coordinated, and unified in their public information messaging on life protective measures. In the event of a catastrophic incident, such as a CBRNE detonation, delivering coordinated, timely, and actionable information to the whole community through clear, consistent, and accessible methods will be a critical factor in building trust, comforting the population, saving lives, and minimizing injury.<sup>15</sup>

### ***California Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (CalSCIP)***

California recognizes the value of fully interoperable communications throughout the state. The California Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (CalSCIP) provides strategic direction for interoperable communications and a unified public safety response communications framework that promotes national standards, and addresses the unique requirements of emergency responders and designated public service organizations serving the people of California.<sup>16</sup>

### ***California Public Alert and Warning System (CalPAWS) Plan***

Cal OES coordinates the state's emergency public information efforts and provides support to other state agencies to ensure that the state government issues a timely, clear, concise, and consistent message. To accomplish this, Cal OES developed an integrated California Public Alert and Warning System (CalPAWS) Plan. The CalPAWS Plan formalizes effective processes and standardized policies for alerting and warning the general public during local and state disasters or emergencies.



***California State Warning Center (CSWC)***

The California State Warning Center (CSWC) is the central information hub for statewide emergency communications and notifications. The CSWC operates as a resource for emergency management, law enforcement, and key decision making personnel throughout the state.

The CSWC receives, coordinates, verifies, and disseminates information pertaining to incidents, which occur within California or that could affect California; such as terrorist attacks, active shooter, or hazardous materials incidents. CSWC personnel maintain contact with County Warning Points, state and federal agencies, the National Warning Center, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.

***Public Safety Communications (PSC)***

The Cal OES Public Safety Communications (PSC) Office serves the State of California by providing public safety communications to the state's first responders and oversight of the 9-1-1 system. The PSC is dedicated to the preservation and protection of human life by delivering reliable and dependable communication services during times of crisis.

PSC is responsible for the design, installation, maintenance, and repair of the statewide microwave network, and public safety radio communications systems, used at all times by the state's public safety agencies. PSC also serves as California's point of contact for the design and development of the National First Responders Network (FirstNet) that is being implemented to provide broadband data to emergency service personnel.

## **Objectives**

### **4.1 Operational Communications**

*Local, regional, tribal, state and federal public safety personnel, emergency responders, and designated public service organizations operating within California will be able to communicate in real time, across disciplines and jurisdictions, enabling them to respond more effectively during day-to-day operations, and major incidents.*

#### **Planning**

- 4.1.1 By January 1, 2019, Cal OES PSC, in conjunction with the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, will develop a social media messaging recovery plan and procedures (which may include links to Cal OES Newsroom articles on the Cal OES website).
- 4.1.2 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES PSC will assess and prioritize legacy communications systems.
- 4.1.3 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES PSC will integrate the legacy systems prioritized in the assessment into existing communications plans.
- 4.1.4 By December 31, 2019, the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator, in coordination with Cal OES PSC, and Cal OES Telecommunications, will review, assess, and update the CalSCIP.
- 4.1.5 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES PSC will assess the functionality and utility of the California Public Safety Microwave Network Plan.
- 4.1.6 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES PSC will fund and implement a working System of Systems pilot to support statewide interoperable communications.
- 4.1.7 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES PSC, in partnership with the California Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee, and the California First Responders Network, will develop policies and best practices in support of FirstNet to be included in the CalSCIP.
- 4.1.8 By May 31, 2018, Cal OES PSC will deploy an electronic, mobile friendly, searchable version of the 2016 California Interoperability Guide for all public safety radio users, planners, and emergency managers to use as a reference tool for communications interoperability.

### **Equipment**

- 4.1.9 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES PSC will perform an assessment of statewide digital microwave systems to identify roadblocks to enhancement, and develop recommendations.

### **Training**

- 4.1.10 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES PSC will develop a FirstNet training plan for first responders.
- 4.1.11 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES PSC will have quarterly interoperable communications training opportunities that are designed and offered statewide to California's public safety personnel, and designated public service practitioners.

### **Exercises**

- 4.1.12 By December 31, 2017, Cal OES Telecommunications, and Cal OES PSC will coordinate with CSTI to incorporate the use of communications equipment and personnel in exercises.
- 4.1.13 By December 31, 2018, CSTI, Cal OES Telecommunications, Law Enforcement Branch, Fire & Rescue Branch, and PSC will hold a meeting to assess the feasibility of conducting a multi-jurisdictional / multi-regional 9-1-1 re-direction exercise. Cal OES PSC will host and coordinate the meeting.

## **4.2 Public Information and Warning**

*Local and state public safety personnel across California will deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay protective information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.*

### **Planning**

- 4.2.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Public Information Office, in conjunction with public information subject matter experts from various federal, state, and local agencies, will review the state's Public Information Plan to determine if it has homeland security / cybersecurity gaps, and if it needs to include homeland security and cybersecurity scenarios for public messaging.

- 4.2.2 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES OAFN, in partnership with incident responders, local governments, and non-profits, will develop best practices related to access and functional needs notification and evacuation for all hazards.
- 4.2.3 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Response Directorate will review existing operational plans and procedures to identify those that may entail the state issuing public alerts and warnings, and annotate such plans with specific procedures for issuing such warnings.

**Organization**

- 4.2.4 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Public Information Office will perform an assessment of existing statewide systems and determine the need for a Public Information Officer mutual aid system.
- 4.2.5 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Response Directorate will convene an ongoing series of webinar / meetings for all operational areas, introducing the State Warning Plan, identifying obstacles to effective public alert and warning, and soliciting suggestions for additions or improvements in alert and warning protocols and systems.
- 4.2.6 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Response Directorate will implement the California Public Alert and Warning Plan statewide.

**Equipment**

- 4.2.7 By December 31, 2019 Cal OES Response Directorate will request all operational areas to provide a description of each operational area's alert and warning capabilities, and those of their sub-jurisdictions.

**Training**

- 4.2.8 By January 1, 2019, CSTI will integrate public alert and warning in homeland security and cybersecurity incident response training.

**Exercises**

- 4.2.9 By January 1, 2019, CSTI will integrate public alert and warning into homeland security and cybersecurity annual multi-jurisdictional / inter-jurisdictional exercises.

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## Goal 5: Enhance Community Preparedness

### *Background*

Community resilience is an integral element in homeland security preparedness and mitigation efforts. Resilient communities can withstand and recover from incidents more quickly, regardless if they are natural or human-caused. With the catastrophic potential of CBRNE attacks, or disruptions of critical infrastructure sectors, the capabilities of responders and local government could be overwhelmed, which highlights the importance of a prepared and resilient community.

California fully embraces the “whole community” approach to emergency preparedness outlined in the NPG. There are three core principles for the whole community approach.

- **Understand and meet the actual needs of the whole community.** This includes understanding demographics, values, norms, community structures, networks, and relationships. This inward-looking focus allows public health and safety officials to gain a better understanding of the community’s needs and how to meet those needs.
- **Engage and empower all parts of the community.** Engaging the whole community and empowering local action will better position stakeholders and community members to plan for and meet their own needs.
- **Strengthen what works well in communities on a daily basis.** Building from institutions, mechanisms, and systems already in place is the most efficient and effective way to strengthen preparedness and resiliency across a community.

Enhancing preparedness campaigns, programs, and efforts is a shared responsibility between all levels of government, the private and non-profit sectors, and individual citizens<sup>17</sup>. The state’s community preparedness and resilience initiatives are led by California Volunteers (Cal Volunteers). By engaging the whole community through Citizen Corps Programs, Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, the private sector, and other state and local organizations, California Volunteers works to strengthen the state’s preparedness and resilience against the wide spectrum of threats and hazards.

### *Access and Functional Needs Communities*

No two disasters are ever the same; yet, virtually all incidents disproportionately affect individuals with access and functional needs. Access and functional needs (AFN) refers to individuals who are or have:

- Physical, developmental, or intellectual disabilities
- Chronic conditions or injuries
- Limited English proficiency
- Older adults



## CALIFORNIA HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

- Children
- Low income, homeless, and/or transportation disadvantaged (i.e., dependent on public transit)
- Pregnant women

In order for successful whole community planning, it is imperative to understand the complexities of homeland security incidents and their impacts on individuals with disabilities and AFN. A key component is addressing how to effectively plan for individuals with disabilities and AFN. To assist with this effort and to improve the ability and capacity of emergency managers to ensure individuals with disabilities and AFN are better able to maintain their independence, health, and safety during disasters, the Governor created the Cal OES Office of Access and Functional Needs (OAFN) in 2008.

The purpose of the Cal OES OAFN is to identify the needs of individuals with disabilities, and AFN before, during, and after disasters, and to integrate those needs into all aspects of the state's emergency management system. OAFN utilizes a whole community approach by offering training and guidance to emergency managers and planners, disability advocates and other service providers responsible for planning for, responding to, and helping communities recover from disasters.

### ***Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program***

The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program educates residents about disaster preparedness for hazards that may impact their area, and trains them in basic disaster response skills, such as fire safety, light search and rescue, team organization, and managing disaster medical operations.

### ***Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD)***

Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) associations improve outcomes for residents affected by disasters and other catastrophic incidents by facilitating cooperation, communication, coordination, and collaboration among non-profit, community based organizations, government agencies, and the private sector. Due to its size and geography, California is home to two regional VOAD associations—NorCal VOAD, and SoCal VOAD which together share the California State VOAD seat at National VOAD. These VOAD associations enable information sharing, and the coordinated deployment of resources to improve outcomes for people affected by terrorist attacks and other catastrophic incidents.<sup>18</sup>

## **Objectives**

### **5.1 Community Resilience**

*Across all levels of government in California, there will be ongoing collaboration between government and non-governmental entities to recognize, understand, communicate, and plan for high risk threats and hazards, and empower individuals, families, and communities to make informed risk management decisions necessary to adapt to, withstand, and quickly recover from future incidents.*

#### **Planning**

- 5.1.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal Volunteers, in partnership with Cal OES, will post the template for a Volunteer and Donations Management Annex on the Cal Volunteers, and Cal OES Websites.
- 5.1.2 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES, in partnership with Cal Volunteers, will develop the Volunteer and Donations Management Technical Assistance tools.
- 5.1.3 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES, in partnership with Cal Volunteers, will conduct an assessment of existing volunteer and donation management systems and identify software solutions.
- 5.1.4 By December 31, 2018, Cal Volunteers, in partnership with Cal OES Office of Private Sector / NGO Coordination, will conduct a statewide assessment / survey of CERT organization and equipment needs.
- 5.1.5 By January 1, 2019, Cal OES OAFN, in partnership with Department of Developmental Services, will codify their partnership with a joint operations guide that will be made available for use as a template by other state agencies.
- 5.1.6 By January 1, 2020, Cal OES OAFN will promote its website map with all 58 counties, and track operational areas that update resources on the map.
- 5.1.7 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES OAFN will conduct a survey / assessment to identify statewide adoption of California Assembly Bill 2311 at the local level.
- 5.1.8 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Office of Private Sector / NGO Coordination, in conjunction with Cal Volunteers, will conduct an assessment of volunteer and donations management capabilities.



**Organization**

- 5.1.9 Starting June 28, 2017, Cal OES Office of Private Sector / NGO Coordination, in conjunction with Cal Volunteers, will establish a Donations Management Working Group under California Emergency Support Function # 17 (Volunteers and Donations Management).

**Training**

- 5.1.10 By December 31, 2020, the CSTI, in partnership with Cal Volunteers, will provide training on the Volunteer and Donations Management Technical Assistance tools.

**Exercises**

- 5.1.11 Starting December 31, 2018, the CSTI will integrate California Emergency Support Function # 17 (Volunteers and Donations Management) into the Capstone Exercise program's planning and execution.

## **Goal 6: Enhance Multi-Jurisdictional / Inter-Jurisdictional All-Hazards Incident Catastrophic Planning, Response, and Recovery Capabilities**

### ***Background***

Preparing for catastrophic incidents, whatever the cause, requires integrated multi-discipline and multi-jurisdictional planning, organizing, training, equipping, and exercising. A terrorist attack involving CBRNE material would have significant, even catastrophic consequences that the state must be prepared for. A catastrophic terrorist incident or natural disaster in California has the potential to overwhelm local jurisdictions' capabilities, and will require support from federal, and state agencies, and non-governmental organizations.

Beyond the devastating health and medical impacts, a detonation of a CBRNE device would have significant economic impacts, due to the relocation of thousands of people, disruption of commerce, wide-spread contamination of buildings, and disposal of debris. California must continue to adapt its homeland security planning, response, and recovery efforts to address emerging and evolving terrorist tactics, and other hazards that could have catastrophic impacts.

### ***California Military Department Civil Support Teams***

At the request of the Governor or the Homeland Security Advisor, the California Military Department (CMD) Civil Support Teams (CST) can assist the state with identifying CBRNE agents / substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assist with appropriate requests for state support.

The CMD's CBRNE Task Force, and Region IX Homeland Response Force (HRF) also have the capability to respond to CBRN incidents for state and local agencies, and provide urban search and rescue, mass casualty decontamination, medical triage, and fatality search and recovery. The Region IX HRF is able to coordinate additional out of state National Guard CBRNE forces for additional and long-term support to a CBRNE incident.

### ***California Large Stadium Initiative (CA-LSI)***

The terrorist attack on a Manchester, United Kingdom concert venue on May 22, 2017, and the largest mass shooting in U.S. history that took place on October 1, 2017 in Las Vegas Nevada, highlight the importance of planning and training to protect venues that host large gatherings such as concerts and sporting events.

Cal OES oversees the California Large Stadium initiative (CA-LSI), which provides an all-hazards approach to protecting mass gathering events by coordinating multi-agency security planning and training. CA-LSI capabilities include: security planning to evaluate

emergency policies and procedures, planning for multi-casualty incidents, application of command post and unified command systems, and venue and security assessments.<sup>19</sup>

**Objectives**

**6.1 Operational Coordination**

*Across all levels of government in California there is a fully integrated all threats and hazards response system built upon the Standardized Emergency Management System, Incident Command System, and Unified Command, including the use of emergency operations centers, multi-agency coordination groups, emergency plans and standard operating procedures, and incident action plans to execute effective operations.*

**Planning**

- 6.1.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Law Enforcement Branch, and Cal OES Fire & Rescue Branch will review and update the 2006 Mass Casualty and Mass Decontamination Plan for First Responders.
- 6.1.2 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Law Enforcement Branch, and Cal OES Fire & Rescue, in coordination with the Cal OES Response and Recovery Directorates, will review and revise all CBRNE core guidelines and planning documents to support key partner agencies, and the direct mission of Cal OES.
- 6.1.3 By December 31, 2020, all Cal OES Response Directorate reference material including policies, standard operating procedures, workflow, and Incident Command System position specific guidelines will be updated for official use and full distribution to all key partners by Cal OES Response Directorate.
- 6.1.4 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Policy Office, in conjunction with Cal OES Response Directorate and Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, will review existing plans and determine if California Military Department civil support capabilities are properly reflected under CBRNE and terrorist incident response roles and responsibilities.

**Organization**

- 6.1.5 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Response Directorate will fully integrate the 18 California Emergency Support Functions defined in the 2017 California State Emergency Plan into state level response and recovery operations.

**Equipment**

- 6.1.6 Starting January 1, 2018, Cal OES Response Directorate will leverage existing facility / equipment assets and future funding to develop and fully support operationally ready, modernized emergency operations centers at the local and state levels in preparation for response to any hazard or threat faced in the State of California.
- 6.1.7 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Geospatial Information Systems (GIS), in coordination with Cal OES Response Directorate, and Cal OES Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit, will identify all relevant and available CBRNE / PRND real-time data services, and incorporate into the Cal OES GIS Data Catalog for use in appropriate GIS products and tools, including online situational awareness maps, map journals, planning maps, operational maps, and the Cal OES GIS Library.

**6.2 Planning**

*State and local agencies across California will use a systematic process and engage the whole community in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or tactical-level plans to meet defined homeland security objectives.*

**Organization**

- 6.2.1 By March 31, 2018, Cal OES Policy Office will assess the need for a statewide multi-jurisdictional / inter-jurisdictional CBRNE Working Group as a sub-group of the All-Hazards Working Group.

**6.3 Screening, Search, and Detection**

*Across California, responders will be able to rapidly detect, locate, identify, and interdict CBRNE materials, and other threats, through active and passive surveillance and search procedures at borders and ports of entry, critical infrastructure locations, and public spaces, including major public events.*

**Planning**

- 6.3.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Response Directorate, in partnership with the State Threat Assessment Center, Cal OES Radiological Preparedness Unit, and the Cal OES Policy Office, will conduct an assessment to identify the resources and capabilities of all state and federal entities in California that assist with PRND activities.

- 6.3.2 By July 1, 2019, Cal OES Response Directorate, in partnership with the State Threat Assessment Center, Cal OES Radiological Preparedness Unit, and the Cal OES Policy Office, will identify gaps in PRND capabilities and identify solutions that directly support programs at the local and regional level.
- 6.3.3 By December 31, 2019, the PRND Working Group, in coordination with the Cal OES Policy Office, will conduct an assessment of statewide PRND programs and activities to help determine whether and how to develop an integrated statewide PRND program in coordination with the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.

**Organization**

- 6.3.4 By July 1, 2018, Cal OES Policy Office, in partnership with Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, the STAS, and other stakeholders, will discuss establishing a PRND Working Group comprised of state, federal, and local subject matter experts.

**6.4 Environmental Response / Health and Safety**

*California responders will conduct health and safety hazard assessments following an incident by deploying hazardous material response teams and/or sensors to the incident area in order to detect, identify, contain, decontaminate, remove, dispose of, or minimize discharges of hazardous materials ensuring the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment.*

**Planning**

- 6.4.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Fire & Rescue, in partnership with the Cal OES Response Directorate, will assess the need and feasibility of upgrading the 12 type-2 HazMat units to the type-1 level to improve statewide CBRNE response capabilities.

**6.5 Mass Care Services**

*The state, and local governments, in coordination with private sector partners and non-governmental organizations, will provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population following an incident. Services will include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.*

**Planning**

- 6.5.1 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Logistics will develop a statewide equipment resource and contracts list that can be used during incident response operations.

- 6.5.2 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Office of Legislative and External Affairs in consultation with the Cal OES Office of Legal Affairs will issue guidance regarding the statewide adoption of California Assembly Bill 2311 for mass care services.
- 6.5.3 By December 31, 2019, California Department of Social Services, in coordination with Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, Cal OES Office of Private Sector / NGO Coordination, and the American Red Cross, will develop an Emergency Support Function # 6 (Care and Shelter) communication protocol to be used during incident response operations
- 6.5.4 By December 31, 2020, California Department of Social Services and Cal OES Recovery Directorate, in partnership with the American Red Cross, will develop guidance for reimbursement and funding mechanisms under different financial conditions, such as Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG), Presidential Declaration, mutual aid, etc.
- 6.5.5 By December 31, 2020, the Emergency Support Function # 6 (Care and Shelter) agencies will create standard operating procedures for a Shelter Task Force to be used during emergency response.
- 6.5.6 By December 31, 2020, in accordance with the National Mass Care Strategy, California Department of Social Services and Cal OES OAFN, in partnership with American Red Cross, will create a Shelter Operations Guide for operational areas that will include access and functional needs considerations.
- 6.5.7 By December 31, 2020 California Department of Social Services and Cal OES OAFN, in partnership with American Red Cross, will discuss developing a training plan for operational area Functional Assessment Service Team (FAST) training to increase awareness and build capacity for shelter operations statewide.

**Organization**

- 6.5.8 By December 31, 2020, California Department of Social Services, in partnership with the American Red Cross, Emergency Support Function #7 (Resources) agencies, and Cal OES OAFN, will create a working group to oversee a statewide shelter assessment that will include a review of accessibility, and the availability of AFN showers.



## Exercises

- 6.5.9 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Office of Private Sector / NGO Coordination, and Cal Volunteers, in coordination with Emergency Support Function # 6 (Care and Shelter) agencies, will conduct regional informational workshops for county emergency management regarding donations management, organizing spontaneous volunteers, and mass care and sheltering planning and operations.

## 6.6 *Logistics and Supply Chain Management*

*California's emergency response agencies have a system to track and manage critical resources to enhance emergency response operations and aid disaster victims. Essential commodities, equipment, and services will be available to incident managers and emergency responders upon their coordinated request for proper distribution.*

### Organization

- 6.6.1 By March 31, 2018, Cal OES will canvass the CBRNE Working Group to determine whether to conduct a statewide CBRNE resource assessment for prevention, protection, response, and recovery operations.
- 6.6.2 By June 1, 2019, Cal OES, in partnership with the CBRNE Working Group, will conduct a statewide CBRNE resource inventory and assessment (assuming the assessment is agreed to objective 6.6.1).

## 6.7 *On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement*

*Public safety agencies across California will keep the public, critical infrastructure, and emergency response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life sustaining operations safe during and immediately after an incident by securing an incident scene, and maintaining law and order.*

### Planning

- 6.7.1 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Fire & Rescue Branch, in partnership with Cal OES Law Enforcement Branch, will develop and administer an online survey / assessment to identify statewide needs for active shooter training for law enforcement and fire, and other first responders.
- 6.7.2 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Fire & Rescue, in partnership with Cal OES Law Enforcement Branch, will perform an assessment to identify statewide needs for active shooter personal protective equipment for fire and emergency medical services (EMS). Assessment results will be shared with Cal OES Office of Access and Functional Needs to support training, and will be included in quarterly Emergency Management Performance Grant reports.

**Equipment**

6.7.3 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Response Directorate will conduct a statewide resource assessment for equipment needed to sustain Rescue Task Forces.

**Training**

6.7.4 By March 31, 2019, Cal OES Response Directorate will review Rescue Task Force best practices to develop a statewide training plan / guidance.

**Exercises**

6.7.5 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Response Directorate will review Rescue Task Force best practices to develop a statewide exercise plan.



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## **Goal 7: Improve Medical and Health Capabilities**

### ***Background***

The wide array of threats and hazards facing California requires a robust set of health and medical capabilities. A foreign and emerging infectious disease outbreak, or the malicious dissemination of a CBRNE agent or device would require a comprehensive public health and medical response. Additionally, human-caused emergencies have evolved since 9/11, and foreign-terrorist organizations and domestic extremists have employed simple tactics such as vehicle ramming and edged-weapon attacks targeting community gatherings, and large venues that may cause mass casualties requiring medical assistance.

As mass casualty / fatality incidents are becoming a more frequent occurrence in the United States, health and medical capabilities must adapt to enhance incident response. A mass casualty / fatality incident is a complex and resource intensive event that may require decontamination efforts and a multi-jurisdictional response. This requires close cooperation and assistance among the various health and safety disciplines at all levels of government. <sup>20</sup>

### ***California Department of Public Health (CDPH)***

Within the California Department of Public Health (CDPH), the Emergency Preparedness Office (EPO) coordinates overall planning and preparedness efforts. EPO plans and executes activities to prepare Californians for public health emergencies, coordinates planning for the Strategic National Stockpile, maintains contact names and numbers for crisis response, oversees statewide public health disaster planning, and distributes and oversees funds to local health departments for disaster planning.

EPO coordinates functions related to risk communication and professional training, planning and response, policy and coordination, program administration, duty officer program, web, geographic information systems (GIS), and the California Health Alert Network. EPO has developed a disaster planning website, [Be Prepared California](#), to assist Californians in understanding and preparing for catastrophic threats to public health.

### ***California BioWatch Advisory Committee (CABAC)***

DHS deployed BioWatch to California after the Anthrax attacks in 2001 to protect citizens from future biological attacks. BioWatch is an early warning system that is designed to detect specific biological agents of concern in the environment prior to symptom onset in humans.<sup>21</sup> The California BioWatch Advisory Committee (CABAC) is a collaborative project between DHS, CDPH, Cal OES, and local public health and emergency management officials, which support the development of planning,

statewide notification and risk communication protocols, and bioterrorism response plans. For information about statewide efforts to enhance response capabilities, see [Goal 6: Enhance Multi-Jurisdictional / Inter-Jurisdictional All-Hazards Incident Catastrophic Planning, Response, And Recovery Capabilities](#).

### ***Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA)***

EMSA is the lead state agency for coordinating California's medical response to disasters, and provides medical resources to local governments in support of their disaster response. This may include the identification, acquisition, and deployment of medical supplies and personnel from unaffected regions of the state to meet the needs of disaster victims. Response activities may also include arranging for evacuation of injured victims to hospitals in areas / regions not impacted by a disaster. EMSA's responsibilities for disaster medical services preparedness and response also include the following:

- Development and maintenance of disaster medical response plans, policies, and procedures.
- Provision of guidance and technical assistance to local EMSAs, county health departments, and hospitals for the development of local disaster medical plans, policies, and procedures.
- Enhancement of state level, and local disaster medical response capabilities through the development of civilian disaster medical response teams, response management teams, disaster medical communications systems, and a statewide medical mutual aid system.
- Testing disaster medical response plans through periodic exercises with local, State of California, and federal agencies, and the private sector; and management of California's medical response to a disaster.

### ***California Tactical Casualty Care and Tactical Medicine***

Over the past two decades, there has been significant progress in the development of emergency medical response strategies, and training standards to improve casualty outcomes of active shooter and terrorism incidents. California recognizes two distinct categories of specialized tactical field medical response during active shooter incidents: tactical casualty care, and tactical medicine. California statutes require training standards for first responders to provide emergency medical services during active shooter, and terrorism incidents.

**Objectives**

**7.1 Environmental Response, Health, and Safety**

California responders can conduct appropriate measures to ensure the health and safety of the public and responders, as well as the environment, [REDACTED]

**Planning**

7.1.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES [REDACTED]

7.1.2 By July 1, 2020, Cal OES Radiological Preparedness Unit, in partnership with the Cal OES Science and Technology Advisor, and Emergency Support Function # 8 (Public Health and Medical) lead agencies, [REDACTED]

**Organization**

7.1.3 By July 1, 2018, Cal OES, in partnership with Emergency Support Function # 8 (Public Health and Medical) lead agencies, will develop an Information Sharing Interoperability Working Group to address the interoperability of WebEOC, NC4, and other systems used in emergency operations centers, and department operations centers during incident management operations.

**Exercises**

7.1.4 By December 31, 2019, the Cal OES [REDACTED]

**7.2 Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services**

California's public health, healthcare, and emergency medical community can provide timely lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations, and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical, and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations following an incident.

### **Planning**

- 7.2.1 By December 31, 2017, Cal OES Office of Private Sector / NGO Coordination, in collaboration with Emergency Support Function # 8 (Public Health and Medical) lead agencies, will have a meeting about developing a Private Sector Partnership Plan for health and medical readiness and sustainment.
- 7.2.2 By June 30, 2018, EMSA, with collaboration from CDPH, California Military Department, and regional local partners, will host a meeting to identify funding to support exercising medical volunteers from California Medical Response Teams, Medical Reserve Corps, and Disaster Healthcare Volunteers for medical surge events.
- 7.2.3 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES, in partnership with CDPH, and EMSA, will expand the Bay Area Medical Countermeasures supplement to the FEMA Region IX Bioterrorism Base Plan for Medical Countermeasures Distribution into a California Medical Countermeasures Plan.
- 7.2.4 By December 31, 2020, Emergency Support Function # 8 (Public Health and Medical) lead agencies, in partnership with Cal OES will develop the Public Health and Medical Emergency Assistance Plan, to include mutual aid and cooperative agreements, for pandemic / emerging infectious disease outbreaks.
- 7.2.5 By December 31, 2020, Emergency Support Function # 8 (Public Health and Medical) lead agencies will develop statewide Crisis Care Guidelines and Scarce Resource Allocation Plan for a pandemic or emerging infectious disease outbreak.

### **Organization**

- 7.2.6 Starting August 1, 2017, the California Tactical Emergency Medical Services Advisory Committee will meet three times annually to advance tactical casualty care issues, standardized training, and guidance.
- 7.2.7 By February 28, 2018, EMSA will establish a Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) Advisory Committee to provide technical advice on the development, implementation, and maintenance of EMSA's HICS program and activities to advance facility preparedness and response capability.
- 7.2.8 By June 30, 2019, EMSA will work with Health Information Exchanges to implement the Patient Unified Lookup System for Emergencies (PULSE) that gives the ability to search and return personal health information about patients during major medical surge events.

**Equipment**

7.2.9 By June 30, 2019, EMSA will acquire and maintain four emergency response vehicles for the Emergency Response Medical Team to support statewide response to a CBRNE incident or major disaster.

**Exercises**

7.2.10 By October 31, 2019, EMSA, with collaboration from CDPH, California Military Department, and regional local partners, will conduct a medical surge event exercise with medical volunteers from California Medical Response Teams, Medical Reserve Corps, and Disaster Healthcare Volunteers.

7.2.11 By December 31, 2019, CDPH in partnership with Caltrans will exercise the use of dump truck fleet for distribution of medical countermeasures in response to a bioterrorism incident or an infectious disease outbreak.

**7.3 Fatality Management Services**

*Public health and safety agencies in California will ensure the proper recovery, handling, identification, transportation, tracking, storage, and disposal of human remains and personal effects, and certify cause of death following a mass fatality incident.*

**Planning**

7.3.1 By December 31, 2018, Cal OES Law Enforcement Branch, and Cal OES Fire & Rescue Branch will review 2006 Mass Casualty and Mass Decontamination Plan to ensure it includes CBRNE fatality management.

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## **Goal 8: Enhance Incident Recovery Capabilities**

### ***Background***

Recovery is both a Homeland Security Strategy goal and a mission area under the NPG. Recovery from human and technological caused hazards such as complex coordinated terrorist attacks, active shooters, disruption of critical infrastructure, or an act of bio-terrorism in California will be a major challenge to all levels of government and affected communities.

Recovery operations aim to restore a community to a state of normalcy, which sometimes can take years. Recovery has three distinct phases and each phase has specific priorities. Operations occur along a continuum of short-term, intermediate, and long-term. These recovery phases include individual priorities to repair, restore, strengthen, and revitalize a community.

Recovery requires engagement of the whole community and pre-disaster collaboration with governmental, non-profit, voluntary organizations, and the private sector to facilitate a more efficient and effective recovery process. As part of the whole community concept of recovery, the AFN community needs to be integrated into the recovery framework planning process from the beginning.

Cal OES is the state recovery lead and is responsible for coordinating state disaster recovery operations, and providing disaster assistance to local and tribal governments, special districts, individuals, businesses, and agricultural communities impacted by disasters. The California Disaster Assistance Act (CDAA) authorizes the Director of Cal OES to administer a disaster assistance program, which provides disaster-related state financial assistance for some or all of the following: emergency protective measures, debris removal, permanent restoration of public facilities and infrastructure, and certain mitigation measures.

### ***National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF)***

In order to enhance recovery from a devastating incident that may have pervasive psychological and economic consequences, DHS released the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) in 2011. The NDRF is a guide to promote effective recovery from large-scale catastrophic incidents such as a terrorist attack. This framework outlines how to promote effective recovery to restore the health, and economy of impacted communities in order to build a more resilient nation<sup>22</sup>.

### ***California Disaster Recovery Framework (CDRF)***

California's disasters require recovery efforts on the part of individuals, governments, non-profit and private sectors, and faith-based organizations. The California Disaster



Recovery Framework (CDRF) builds on the state's experience and current recovery documents and guidance. The CDRF:

- Establishes a state recovery coordination structure consistent with the federal NDRF model to facilitate the delivery of state and federal disaster assistance to impacted communities.
- Describes the concepts and principles to promote effective state recovery assistance.
- Applies to all hazards (natural and human-caused) and is scalable dependent on the scope of the disaster.
- Links local, state, tribal, and federal governments, the private sector and non-governmental and community organizations with vital roles in recovery.
- Is consistent with state and federal emergency management doctrine.
- Recognizes that local hazard mitigation and disaster preparedness activities are keys to reducing the impact of disasters and reliance on mutual/state/federal aid.
- Recognizes that individual preparedness and local resiliency are necessary for successful recovery.<sup>23</sup>

The CDRFs primary goal is to support local government in its recovery efforts. This process is best described as a sequence of interdependent and often concurrent activities to progressively advance a community toward successful recovery. The CDRF identifies scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities of state agencies to effectuate the timely restoration, strengthening, and revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and a sustainable economy, as well as the health, social, cultural, historical, and environmental fabric of communities impacted by a disaster.

## **Objectives**

### **8.1 Planning**

*California will develop and maintain a recovery framework that provides an overall strategy and timeline, addresses all key functions, and integrates socioeconomic, demographic, accessibility, technology, and risk assessment considerations necessary to recovery from major disasters.*

#### **Planning**

- 8.1.1 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will develop and maintain six state Recovery Support Function annexes that address 1) community planning and capacity building, 2) economic resources, 3) health and social services, 4) housing, 5) infrastructure systems, and 6) natural and cultural resources for the California Disaster Recovery Framework.
- 8.1.2 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will meet with Cal OES Response Directorate, Cal OES Fire & Rescue Branch, and Cal OES Planning and Preparedness to identify gaps in pre-disaster recovery and response to a CBRNE incident.
- 8.1.3 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will finalize the California Disaster Recovery Framework, a statewide approach to facilitate and coordinate recovery efforts.

#### **Training**

- 8.1.4 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate, in partnership with CSTI, and Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, will develop and implement recovery training and education as a tool for building recovery capacity, and will make the training available to all state, local, tribal, territorial, and non-profit stakeholders.

#### **Exercises**

- 8.1.5 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate, in partnership with OAFN, Cal OES Public Information Office, and CSTI, will test and evaluate pre- and post-disaster recovery plans and frameworks through an exercise including state, local, tribal, territorial, and non-profit stakeholders.

#### **Organization**

- 8.1.6 By December 31, 2019, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will identify responsibilities for the position of a State Disaster Recovery Coordinator (SDRC) or equivalent, and resources for state Recovery Support Functions.

8.1.7 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will identify and engage stakeholders including, but not limited to, the general public, community leaders, tribal leaders, faith-based organizations, non-profit organizations, and private sector entities for development of the Recovery Support Function Annexes.

**8.2 Infrastructure Systems**

*The State of California, local jurisdictions, and private sector partners can stabilize critical infrastructure functions, including energy, transportation, telecommunications, water/wastewater services, and public health and medical systems, and efficiently restore and revitalize critical infrastructure systems and services to support full recovery following a disaster.*

**Planning**

8.2.1 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will meet with Cal OES Response Directorate, Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, and Cal OES Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit, Recovery Support Function (RSF) # 5 (Infrastructure Systems), and Emergency Support Function (ESF) # 12 (Utilities) to identify gaps in pre-disaster recovery and response plans to a wide-spread disruption of critical energy infrastructure.

8.2.2 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will meet with Cal OES Response Directorate, Planning and Preparedness, and Critical Infrastructure, Protection Unit, and Recovery Support Function (RSF) # 5 (Infrastructure Systems) to identify gaps in pre-disaster recovery and response to a wide-spread disruption of critical water infrastructure.

8.2.3 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will meet with Cal OES Response Directorate, Planning and Preparedness, and Critical Infrastructure, Recovery Support Function (RSF) # 5 (Infrastructure Systems), and Emergency Function (EF) # 1 (Transportation) to identify gaps in pre-disaster recovery and response plans to a wide-spread disruption of critical transportation infrastructure.

### **8.3 *Natural and Cultural Resources***

*The State of California, local jurisdictions, and private sector partners can protect natural and cultural resources and historic properties to preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, and restore them consistent with post-disaster community priorities and best practices, and in compliance with applicable environmental and historic preservation laws and executive orders.*

#### **Planning**

- 8.3.1 By December 31, 2020, Cal OES Recovery Directorate will incorporate sustainable development, including environmental, historic preservation, and financial elements into recovery planning guidelines for recovery support functions.

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## **Goal 9: Strengthen Food and Agriculture Preparedness**

### ***Background***

California leads the nation in agricultural production and exports. California's top 20 crop and livestock commodities accounted for more than \$35.5 billion in value in 2015.<sup>24</sup> Over a third of the country's vegetables, and two-thirds of the country's fruits and nuts are grown in California. California ranks seventh in the nation for the production of cattle, and produces the most milk and cream in the country.<sup>25</sup> California is America's number one wine producing state, and the fourth largest wine producer in the world.<sup>26</sup>

Foreign animal disease outbreaks and acts of bioterrorism pose a threat to food and agriculture security in California. A disruption in the U.S. food supply would result in significant economic consequences, and human health can be at risk if contaminated food reaches the table, or if an animal disease is transmitted to humans (zoonosis). In fact, the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak in 2015 was the largest animal health emergency in U.S. history, with economic losses totaling over \$3 billion.<sup>27</sup>

The California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) coordinates the inter-governmental preparedness for, response to, recovery from, and mitigation of animal and plant diseases and pests. This involves overseeing the control and eradication of outbreaks of highly contagious or economically devastating livestock diseases, foreign animal diseases, or outbreaks of harmful or economically significant plant pests and diseases.<sup>28</sup>

The CDFA Animal Health and Food Safety Services (AHFSS) leads California's efforts to assure the safety, availability, and affordability of agricultural products by promoting California agriculture, and protecting public and animal health through the prevention, detection, and eradication of livestock and poultry diseases. AHFSS has statewide responsibility for the development and maintenance of programs intended to prepare for or respond to emergencies that fall under its jurisdiction. This technical expertise has been consolidated at the state level, and similar resources are no longer found in most local jurisdictions.

### ***Animal Disease Outbreak Response***

AHFSS is responsible for and maintains an enormous volume of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an emergency response to a catastrophic animal disease outbreak. AHFSS has obtained federal funding to move these SOPs into a web accessible, relational database to enhance access and just-in-time training during a response involving multiple agencies.

AHFSS is responsible for and maintains two state-federal blended incident management teams (IMT) prepared for immediate deployment anywhere in the state for initial disease containment. AHFSS is developing position standards and training materials

addressing the IMT elements unique to outbreak response, and is participating in national working groups to ensure interoperability. Regional preparedness and full local integration is a goal, but has been inconsistently achieved due to resource limitations.

AHFSS conducts catastrophic disease outbreak coordination calls with all State Veterinarians, the U.S. Chief Veterinary Officer (USDA), with each leadership group of key stakeholders including the California Agricultural Commissioners, Public and Environmental Health Officers, 10 different CDFA animal agriculture related advisory boards, and the boards of 12 industry business organizations.

AHFSS, in partnership with Cal OES is in the process of revitalizing the Food and Agriculture Defense Steering Committee (FADSC). Historically, the FADSC has been vital for setting interagency food safety and security priorities for the state. The Committee includes representatives from all state and local agencies (federal agencies will be added soon) that have food safety regulatory responsibility.

### ***Early Detection System***

CDFA and CDPH are responsible for and maintain an early detection system for catastrophic animal or plant disease outbreaks and food contamination. The system is comprised of state and local experts located strategically throughout California, and includes outreach to industry partners related to detection and reporting, active and passive surveillance systems, and robust laboratory networks. Efforts are currently focusing on enhancing electronic identification of samples and animals, and electronic messaging of laboratory submissions, and results between Laboratory Information Networks and emergency response management databases. Early detection initiatives are also focusing on genomic contributions to understanding epidemiology (whole genome sequencing) and rapid test development for a more targeted and efficient response.

### ***Secure Food Supply Project***

Continuity of business and supply chain integrity and security is an increasing focus for private-public partnerships during emergency preparedness and response. As such, AHFSS has launched a major initiative, Secure Food Supply project, with the goal of enhancing resiliency of farms and processors to a major disease outbreak, and



**Figure 5 - Secure Food Supply Projects**

maximizing the potential for continued movement of food to consumers in the face of state quarantines that prohibit specific unpermitted movements. The Secure Food Supply project includes the following agricultural commodities listed in figure 5 above.

**Objectives**

**9.1 Supply Chain Integrity and Security**

The State of California, local jurisdictions, and private sector partners can provide security for California's agricultural sector and products by protecting public and animal health through the prevention, detection, and eradication of livestock and poultry diseases, and other threats and hazards facing the food and agriculture sector.

**Planning**

- 9.1.1 By February 7, 2018, Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, in coordination with the Climate Change Working Group, will [REDACTED]
- 9.1.2 By July 31, 2018, Cal OES Climate Change Working Group, in coordination with Cal OES Office of Legislative and External Affairs, will meet with California Department of Public Health and California Department of Food and Agriculture to [REDACTED]
- 9.1.3 By December 31, 2018, the Cal OES Food and Agriculture Working Group in partnership with California Department of Food and Agriculture Plant Health Division and Office of Environmental Farming & Innovation will meet to identify planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise [REDACTED]
- 9.1.4 By December 31, 2019, California Environmental Protection Agency, in coordination with California Department of Food and Agriculture and California Department of Public Health, will [REDACTED]
- 9.1.5 By December 31, 2019, California Department of Food and Agriculture will [REDACTED]
- 9.1.6 By December 31, 2019, the Food and Agriculture Defense Steering Committee, and Cal OES Policy Office, in conjunction with the State Threat Assessment Center, will [REDACTED]



- 9.1.7 By June 30, 2020, California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), in coordination with Cal OES, will [REDACTED]
- 9.1.8 By December 31, 2020, California Department of Food and Agriculture, in coordination with California Environmental Protection Agency, California Department of Public Health, and Cal OES, will [REDACTED]
- 9.1.9 By December 31, 2020, California Department of Food and Agriculture, in conjunction with Agricultural Commissioners, and Cal OES Administrative Regions, will [REDACTED]
- 9.1.10 By December 31, 2020, Emergency Support Function # 11 (Food and Agriculture), in conjunction with Emergency Support Function #10 (Hazardous Materials) and Emergency Support Function # 8 (Public Health and Medical), will [REDACTED]
- 9.1.11 By December 31, 2020, the California Department of Food and Agriculture, in coordination with the Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, and other stakeholders, will [REDACTED]

**Organization**

- 9.1.12 By January 1, 2018, California Department of Food and Agriculture, in partnership with California Department of Public Health, and Cal OES Policy Office, will reconvene the Food and Agriculture Defense Steering Committee.
- 9.1.13 By May 31, 2018, the Cal OES Preventing Violent Extremism Program, in conjunction with California Department of Food and Agriculture, will host a meeting with the food and agriculture industry stakeholders to strengthen resilience against domestic violent extremists (to include animal rights and environmental extremist groups).
- 9.1.14 By July 31, 2019, California Department of Food and Agriculture and California Environmental Protection Agency will identify subject matter experts to establish and sustain an Emergency Agricultural Mortality Disposal Strike Team.



## CALIFORNIA HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

### **Equipment**

9.1.15 By December 31, 2019, California Department of Food and Agriculture, in partnership with UC Davis, will update the laboratory information management system for Foreign Animal Disease and dairy food safety surveillance and response.

### **Exercises**

9.1.16 By December 31, 2020, California Department of Food and Agriculture and Cal OES, in conjunction with California Department of Public Health, and the California Environmental Protection Agency, will conduct an exercise for a zoonotic agroterrorism incident.

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**Goal 10: Prevent Violent Extremism through Multi-Jurisdictional / Inter-Jurisdictional Collaboration and Coordination**

***Background***

The State of California recognizes that there are many forms of violent extremism. Inspired by both international terrorist organizations and domestic extremism movements, radicalized individuals may commit violence at home or attempt to travel to join terrorist groups abroad. In general, violent extremists encourage, condone, justify, or support violence as a means to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals.

Modern tactics by terrorist groups highlight the increasing need to strengthen collaboration and coordination among statewide partners. Terrorist groups use social media and emerging technology to recruit and radicalize vulnerable youth, and distribute propaganda, operational instructions, and training.

Terrorists groups' sophisticated use of these tools and targeted messaging campaigns have made some Californians vulnerable to extremist messaging. California and its partners recognize an increasing need to prevent individuals from radicalizing toward violence before law enforcement interdiction is necessary.

This goal can only be accomplished through a collaborative and coordinated multi-jurisdictional network aiming to identify challenges and share best practices for prevention programs, unify counter messaging efforts, and raise awareness for mental health, training, public education, and grant resources available to communities statewide.

The state is also committed to preserving the integrity of First Amendment rights for all Californians, and intends to make civil liberty protections for religious and cultural minorities a primary focus in its approach to preventing all kinds of violent extremism in California.



## CALIFORNIA HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

### *Cal OES Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Program*

Cal OES established a Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Program in order to coordinate a statewide effort aimed at supporting and enriching community resilience against ideologically motivated violence in January 2017.

The Cal OES PVE Program leverages existing state, federal, and private partner resources in order to support community-led preventing violent extremism programs, and to encourage further engagement in prevention efforts. As part of this effort, Cal OES has identified and assessed relevant trainings, funding opportunities, social service programs, and education initiatives offered by state, federal, and private partners in California.



Every community is unique, and experiences different challenges related to violent extremism. The Cal OES PVE Program works to highlight and connect statewide resources to these communities throughout California. Cal OES engages and supports the following types of communities: schools, prisons, local governments, cultural hubs (refugee / inter-faith populations), and private industry.

Further, the Cal OES PVE Program manages an online platform, equipped with an interactive community forum, and a resource database, aimed at strengthening coordination and communication between stakeholders and communities.

## **Objectives**

### **10.1 Planning**

*The State of California and its partners will implement community-led efforts aimed at improving coordination and collaboration among community stakeholders to raise awareness for the indicators of homegrown violent extremism. This will include training and education initiatives, counter violent extremism messaging, building community trust, and strengthening intervention programs to mitigate the threat of violent extremism.*

#### **Planning**

- 10.1.1 Beginning April 15, 2017, the Cal OES Policy Office will establish, and convene monthly, an internal Cal OES PVE Working Group to increase engagement and coordination with federal, state, local, and non-governmental partners, including faith-based and health organizations, and the private sector.
- 10.1.2 Beginning June 30, 2017, the Cal OES Policy Office, in conjunction with the Cal OES Legal Department, will review and consider federal and state civil liberty requirements for all PVE Program messaging to the public.
- 10.1.3 By September 31, 2017, Cal OES will create an online portal to share training and grant opportunities, relevant social service programs, and academic research related to preventing violent extremism.

#### **Organization**

- 10.1.4 By September 31, 2017, Cal OES will launch an interactive online community forum, within the Cal OES online platform, aimed at increasing coordination and conversation among state, federal, and local partners to share preventing violent extremism promising practices, identify challenges, and unify messaging efforts.

#### **Training**

- 10.1.5 By May 31, 2018, the Cal OES Policy Office, in partnership with CSTI, will assess the need for cultural awareness and indicators of radicalization to violence training for state health workers and providers, state employees in the public school system, and the public.
- 10.1.6 By December 31, 2018, the Cal OES Policy Office, in conjunction with the CSTI, will create training aimed at educating communities on the first steps necessary to building locally-led preventing violent extremism programs.

**Exercises**

10.1.7 Beginning May 31, 2017, the Cal OES Policy Office will help to connect interested stakeholders with existing federal community resilience exercises to empower communities to develop comprehensive violence prevention and intervention frameworks.

**Goal 11: Enhance Homeland Security Exercise, Evaluation, and Training Programs**

***Background***

Homeland security training and exercises have become increasingly important as the state experiences new and evolving threats to communities and critical infrastructure. Maintaining agile and robust homeland security training and exercise program remains a priority to meet the counter-terrorism preparedness needs of California's law enforcement community and emergency first responders.

Homeland security exercise, evaluation, and training programs are designed to address statewide goals, build and test against capability targets within this Strategy, and improve the operational readiness of the homeland security system in California across the full spectrum of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. For example, the terrorist attacks on December 2, 2015 at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino revealed the need for guidance regarding AFN in active shooter training. To address this issue, Cal OES brought together a working group consisting of representatives from law enforcement, the California State Council on Developmental Disabilities, emergency managers, the CSTI, and other disability stakeholders to update the state's Active Shooter Awareness Guidance to be more inclusive of AFN considerations.

***California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI)***



The CSTI is the statewide enterprise responsible for supporting training, exercises and education in a wide variety of areas including but not limited to: emergency management, public safety, homeland security, counter-terrorism hazardous materials, disaster recovery, and crisis communications. CSTI provides resources to support government, non-profit, and private sector organizations.

CSTI provides training in all phases of emergency management/homeland security: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Homeland security courses are provided by federal training partners such as: FEMA's Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and the Center for Domestic Preparedness, Texas Engineering-Counter Terrorism Operations, Louisiana State University, New Mexico Tech's National Disaster Preparedness Center, and over 15 additional centers of excellence.



## **Objectives**

### **11.1 Planning**

*California has a multi-discipline risk and capabilities based training program that enhances and sustains priority capabilities in order to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from high risk threats and hazards.*

#### **Planning**

- 11.1.1 Beginning December 31, 2017, and continuing each calendar year, the CSTI will conduct a state Training and Exercise Planning Workshop and update the state Multi-Year Training & Exercise Plan each calendar year, and distribute to the operational areas upon approval.
- 11.1.2 By June 30, 2018, the CSTI will implement a professional training credentialing program for emergency management and homeland security disciplines. CSTI will review / update the program annually thereafter.
- 11.1.3 By December 31, 2017, the CSTI will develop, and annually update a comprehensive strategic plan for scheduling Cal OES homeland security exercises in the following calendar year.
- 11.1.4 By December 31, 2017, the CSTI and Cal OES Planning and Preparedness will conduct an assessment to identify resource needs to fully develop and maintain the after action and corrective action / improvement planning process for real world Governor Proclaimed events, and for Cal OES training and exercise events. This assessment will include recommendations for how to share lessons learned and improvement plans with local jurisdictions as appropriate.
- 11.1.5 Beginning January 1, 2018, the CSTI will develop and deliver after action reports and improvement plans no later than 90 days after each CSTI-conducted exercise.

#### **Organization**

- 11.1.6 By March 1, 2018, Cal OES Law Enforcement Branch will identify and maintain necessary staffing levels to operate and sustain the large venue / active shooter training program.
- 11.1.7 By July 1, 2018, the CSTI, with support from Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, will establish and maintain adequate staffing to support the after action / corrective action / improvement planning process.

**Equipment**

- 11.1.8 Beginning October 31, 2017, the CSTI will conduct initial fielding of Cal OES's learning management system which will include student registration and an on-line course.
- 11.1.9 By December 31, 2017, the CSTI, and Cal OES Planning and Preparedness, in coordination with Cal OES Information Technology, will identify applications, software, and / or systems to track corrective action plans and improvement plans from statewide exercises and real world events.

**Training**

- 11.1.10 Beginning January 1, 2018, the CSTI will continue to meet at least annually with state training partners and other professional organizations to review, update, develop, and certify terrorism and all-hazards courses.
- 11.1.11 Beginning January 1, 2018, the CSTI will continue to coordinate and make emergency management, homeland security / terrorism, and other public safety discipline training available to public and private entities operating within and / or in support of California on a monthly basis.
- 11.1.12 Starting January 1, 2018, CSTI will revise and deliver four homeland security / terrorism training series per calendar year to include courses in domestic terrorism, international terrorism, counterterrorism strategies, terrorism intelligence analysis, and terrorism updates and special seminars.

**11.2 Operational Coordination**

*California has a statewide exercise program that tests and evaluates the capabilities needed to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from high risk threats and hazards with an evaluation process that feeds identified capability gaps and strengths directly into the state's risk management and planning process for remediation or sustainment.*

**Exercises**

- 11.2.1 Starting January 31, 2018, the CSTI will deliver four Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) mobile courses per calendar year, with the capability of increasing the number of certified exercise planners by up to 200 per year.



## CALIFORNIA HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

- 11.2.2 By December 31, 2020, the CSTI will develop and conduct four Capstone California Annual Exercise Series events to test and evaluate catastrophic incident response plans, and will share after action reports developed from these exercises with local jurisdictions.
- 11.2.3 Starting January 31, 2018, the CSTI will support Cal OES in state-to-state exercises to test mutual aid, and the emergency management assistance compact annually.

## **Goal 12: Protect Against Effects of Climate Change**

### ***Background***

Extreme weather, caused by a changing climate, is resulting in tangible impacts to homeland security in California and across the nation. Extreme weather caused by climate change threatens California's critical infrastructure and food security. Additionally, extreme weather makes California more vulnerable to cascading events that could lead to catastrophic scenarios or human-caused emergencies. Research suggests that climate change will disrupt individuals and whole communities, leading to homeland security risks such as terrorism and violent conflicts over natural resources.<sup>22</sup>

Climate change may cause populations to migrate in response sea levels rising, conflict and economic losses due to resource scarcity, and changing living conditions due to higher average temperatures. It is expected that populations will settle disproportionately inland in California, in contrast to historical trends.<sup>30</sup> Higher populations in inland California may stimulate more development of the urban-wildland interface and increase public safety risk associated with wildfires.

Climate change increases the risk of energy infrastructure disruption due to damage from fire, soot build-up, and heat.<sup>31</sup> Wildfires can clear land and cause larger debris or more sedimentation to travel through streams, posing a threat to the continuity of water conveyance structures like canals and dams.<sup>32</sup> It may also place an increased stress on energy infrastructure due to rising average temperatures and air conditioning usage.

Extreme weather also destabilizes the food and agricultural industry, threatening economic and food security. Shifting seasons can disrupt traditional growing seasons for farmers, flood agricultural fields during wet winters, and cause uncertainty of water availability that can also result in reduced crop yields. The Third California Climate Change Assessment predicts warmer temperatures to cause longer and more intense droughts in California, such as the statewide drought that lasted from 2012-2016<sup>33</sup>. The 2012-2015 drought had a significant impact on California's agriculture, costing \$603 million dollars and more than 4,000 jobs, according to a UC Davis study.<sup>34</sup>

California state agencies are involved in various ongoing activities that promote resiliency against the effects of climate change. The Climate Adaptation Team (CAT), coordinated by the California Environmental Protection Agency, is made up of stakeholders from different state agencies, and leads the state in climate change policy coordination.<sup>35</sup>



### ***Climate Change Research Plan***

The Climate Change Research Plan, developed by the CAT, identifies research priorities aimed at minimizing the effects of extreme weather. The Climate Change Research Plan acknowledges the need for increased precipitation monitoring and sensor networks; improved modeling methods for extreme events; research into low probability-high impact scenarios and incorporation into planning; research into the economic risks associated with climate change impacts; vulnerability assessments for California's populations, infrastructure, property, food, and agriculture; and adaptation strategies to assess the adequacy of surge and response capacity.<sup>36</sup>

### ***Safeguarding California Plan***

The Natural Resources Agency coordinates a statewide Safeguarding California Plan, in which state agencies catalog their recommendations and ongoing activities to address climate change.<sup>37</sup>

### ***Cal Adapt***

The California Energy Commission (CEC) developed an interactive tool for climate change data and projections called Cal Adapt.<sup>38</sup> The tool monitors wildfire activity and assesses wildfire risk per locality. The tool allows users to view the electrical grid located in the area.

### ***Building Resilience Against Climate Effects (CalBRACE)***

The Department of Public Health tool, Building Resilience Against Climate Effects (CalBRACE), provides individual county-specific reports that compile climate change impacts specific to the area, including heat-related illness and wildfire risk.<sup>39</sup> The Climate Change and Health Equity Program, within the Department of Public Health, specifically addresses climate-related health threats to environmental justice groups.<sup>40</sup>



**Objectives**

**12.1 Planning**

*The State of California will conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or tactical-level approaches to address the impacts of climate change in California.*

**Organization**

- 12.1.1 By December 31, 2017, Cal OES Climate Change Working Group will meet with California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) to identify how to extract corrective action plans or gaps relevant to climate impacted food and economic security from exercise after action reports.
- 12.1.2 By December 31, 2017, Cal OES Climate Action Team representative will identify funding streams and existing projects that address climate impacted food and agriculture security.

**Training**

- 12.1.3 By December 31, 2017, Climate Change Working Group and the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), in partnership with Cal OES Office of Access and Functional Needs, will identify existing training within California, and then determine if there is a gap in state-provided training on mitigating climate change impacts.

**12.2 Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment**

*The state of California will continue to assess risk and disaster resilience to climate change so that decision makers, responders, and community members can take informed action to reduce their entity's risk and increase their resilience to climate change.*

**Planning**

- 12.2.1 By July 31, 2018, Cal OES Climate Change Working Group will meet with academic and other stakeholders to discuss developing a California-specific Homeland Security Climate Impacts Assessment (including economic impacts, mass migration, ground water, etc.).

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## SECTION V: STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

This Strategy outlines actionable objectives to enhance statewide homeland security, the execution of which will take place at the local and state level with funding from multiple sources. Implementation requires a clearly defined process and a mechanism that link the state's investments back to the Strategy's goals and objectives.

Objectives delineate what activities or resources are needed for the state to achieve each Strategy goal using the POETE framework. Objectives serve as a guide for the state to accomplish efforts or projects that will result in building or enhancing Core Capabilities. As such, they are not an exhaustive list meant to limit steps necessary to achieve a goal or objective, but instead operate as a roadmap.

Objectives follow the SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound) methodology and serve as the metrics for measuring Strategy implementation. Objectives identify the efforts to be completed, when they will be completed, and who will be completing them. The Cal OES Policy Office is responsible for managing and tracking implementation of the Strategy in coordination with Cal OES Grants Management, with support from stakeholders and Homeland Security Strategy Working Groups as needed.

### Strategy Implementation

The Homeland Security Strategy Working Groups that developed the SMART objectives will be used to report on the implementation and progress of the objectives throughout the duration of the Strategy, or until the objective has been achieved, whichever comes sooner.

Strategy Implementation will be tracked biannually by collecting information on the activities conducted in support of each objective, identifying problems encountered and recommended solutions, and any deliverables produced or milestones achieved during the course of the objective's completion. Implementation will coincide with federal reporting conducted through the Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR), with supplemental state-focused questions. Implementation data will be aggregated annually to facilitate evaluation of the progress, status, and management of all Strategy goals and objectives.

Each objective is numbered and categorized based on the POETE element under which it falls. Implementation of objectives is tracked using the following status updates:

- **No Progress:** No progress means little or no activity has occurred yet concerning the implementation step.





- **Limited Progress:** Limited progress means that some actions have been taken to begin implementation of the step, e.g., an RFP has been issued, a purchase order has been cut, or a contract has been signed, but substantial progress in the form of actual deliverables for the step's implementation have not been achieved.
- **Substantial Progress:** Substantial progress means that major elements of the step have been completed, e.g., draft reports, major milestones or deliverables on the way to completion have been met, and there is a specific plan in place to achieve completion.
- **Complete/Ongoing:** A complete or ongoing step is one that is finished and requires no additional resources for implementation, or is finished insofar as the plan has been written or the equipment has been purchased, but additional resources are needed for long term sustainment.

### ***Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR)***

All Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) recipients are required to complete the Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR). The BSIR is designed to outline how expenditures support POETE, and to show progress of project implementation, including any significant developments. Aligning the Homeland Security Strategy implementation reporting with federal grant reporting requirements ensures each project or objective:

- Aligns to at least one core capability identified in the goal;
- Effectively addresses capability targets identified in the THIRA, and gaps noted in the SPR.

### ***Homeland Security Strategy Working Groups***

In 2017, at the request of the Governor's Homeland Security Advisor, the HSAC members nominated subject matter experts from their agencies and organizations to serve on Homeland Security Strategy Working Groups. The purpose of these working groups is twofold; (1) Working Group members develop meaningful and measurable objectives for the Homeland Security Strategy, and (2) play an integral role in Strategy implementation by reporting on the work accomplished in support of Strategy objectives.

### ***Investment Justifications***

Cal OES is the State Administering Agent for federal homeland security grants. While this Strategy is not a grant strategy, the State of California recognizes that federal grants play a vital role in helping implement the Strategy. Submitting homeland security or emergency preparedness investment justifications or grant applications to federal agencies facilitates the funding necessary to implement the goals and objectives of this Strategy.

As outlined in table 1 below, 11 of the 12 Homeland Security Strategy goals are aligned with the ten Homeland Security Grant Program investment justifications. Aligning Strategy goals with investment justifications ensures the state can track and link investments to Strategy goals and objectives efficiently and effectively throughout the planning and investment process.

**Table 1: California Homeland Security Investment Areas and Strategic Goals**

Investment Justifications		Homeland Security Strategy Goals	
1	Strengthen Capabilities of the State Threat Assessment System	1	Enhance Information Collection, Analysis, and Sharing, in Support of Public Safety Operations across California
2	Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (includes Food and Agriculture)	2	Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources from All Threats and Hazards
3	Enhance Cybersecurity	3	Strengthen Security and Preparedness Across Cyberspace
4	Strengthen Communications Capabilities Through Planning, Governance, Technology, and Equipment	4	Strengthen Communications Capabilities Through Planning, Governance, Technology, and Equipment
5	Enhance Medical and Public Health Preparedness	7	Improve Medical and Health Capabilities
6	Preventing Violent Extremism Through Multi-Jurisdictional/Inter-Jurisdictional Collaboration and Coordination	10	Preventing Violent Extremism Through Multi-Jurisdictional / Inter-Jurisdictional Collaboration and Coordination
7	Enhance Community Resilience, Including Partnerships With Volunteers and Community Based Organizations and Programs	5	Enhance Community Preparedness
8	Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration	9	Strengthen Food and Agricultural Preparedness
9	Enhance Multi-Jurisdictional/Inter-Jurisdictional All-Hazards Incident Planning, Response & Recovery Capabilities	6	Enhance Multi-Jurisdictional/Inter-Jurisdictional All-Hazards Incident Planning, Response & Recovery Capabilities
10	Homeland Security Exercise, Evaluation, and Training Programs	11	Enhance Homeland Security Exercise, Evaluation, and Training Programs
		8	Enhance Recovery Capabilities
		12	Protect Against Effects of Climate Change

## **Strategy Evaluation**

The metrics for each of the Strategy objectives obtained via biannual implementation reporting will be aggregated and presented to the HSA and the HSAC on an annual basis. Strategy evaluation will detail the work accomplished, best practices, lessons learned, and deliverables completed for the Strategy goals. The Strategy will be updated as needed based upon the recommendations of the HSA and input from the HSAC representing state, local, tribal, and private sector stakeholders.

### ***THIRA / SPR***

The federally mandated THIRA / SPR process will be used to help the state and its partners continue to identify the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the State of California, identify capability targets in each of the 32 Core Capabilities to address those threats and hazards, along with the resources required to meet the capability targets, and determine gaps in capability linked to the resources and targets. The HSAC will advise the HSA on current and future homeland security priorities using the results of the THIRA, SPR, and the Strategy evaluation process to identify gaps and promote unified coordination of homeland security activities across disciplines.

The results of the annual THIRA / SPR process will provide valuable capability gap and strength data relative to the primary risks facing the state. This data will in turn be used to help determine whether the Strategy's objectives are being implemented, and whether new objectives are required based on new gaps identified.

## ACRONYMS

<b>Acronyms</b>	
AAR	After Action Report
AFN	Access and Functional Needs
AP	Action Plan
ARC	American Red Cross
CAEPA	California Environmental Protection Agency
CA-ESF	California Emergency Support Function
CAHAN	California Health Alert Network
Cal OES	California Governor's Office of Emergency Services
Cal-CSIC	California Cybersecurity Integration Center
CalHR	California Department of Human Resources
CalPAWS	California Public Alert and Warning System
CalSCIP	California Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan
CA-LSI	California Large Stadium Initiative
CalSIEC	California Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee
Caltrans	California Department of Transportation
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CBP	Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive
CDAA	California Disaster Assistance Act
CDCR	California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
CDFA	California Department of Food and Agriculture
CDHHS	California Department of Health and Human Services
CDPH	California Department of Public Health
CDPH-EPO	California Department of Public Health - Environmental Protection Office
CDRF	California Disaster Recovery Framework
CDSS	California Department of Social Services
CDT	California Department of Technology
CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
CHP	California Highway Patrol
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CMD	California Military Department
CNG	California National Guard
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPUC	California Public Utilities Commission
CSTI	California Specialized Training Institute

<b>Acronyms</b>	
CSU	California State University
CSWC	California State Warning Center
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DHV	Disaster Healthcare Volunteers
DoD	Department of Defense
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMSA	Emergency Medical Services Authority
EO	Executive Order
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FAD	Foreign Animal Disease
FADSC	Food and Agriculture Defense Steering Committee
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FirstNet	National First Responders Network
FMAG	Fire Management Assistance Grant Program
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GovOps	California Government Operations Agency
HAZ MAT	Hazardous Materials
HSA	Homeland Security Advisor
HSAC	Homeland Security Advisory Committee
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSGP	Homeland Security Grant Program
IAP	Incident Action Plan
ICS	Incident Command System
IST	Incident Support Team
IT	Information Technology
JIC	Joint Information Center
MMAA	California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement
MRC	Medical Reserve Corps
NDRF	National Disaster Recovery Framework
NGOs	Non- Governmental Organizations
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIPP	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NPG	National Preparedness Goal
NRF	National Response Framework
OA	Operational Area

<b>Acronyms</b>	
OAFN	Cal OES Office of Access and Functional Needs
PA	Public Assistance
PIO	Public Information Officer
POETE	planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises
PRND	Preventative Radiological / Nuclear Detection
PSC	Public Safety Communications
SAR	Suspicious Activity Reporting
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SEMS	Standardized Emergency Management System
SEP	State of California Emergency Plan
SLTP	State, local, tribal, territorial, and private
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
STAC	State Threat Assessment Center
STAS	State Threat Assessment System
SWRCB	State Water Resources Control Board
TAP	Threat Assessment Process
THIRA	Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
TLO	Terrorism Liaison Officers
UC	University of California
UC	Unified Command
US&R	Urban Search and Rescue
VOAD	Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

**GLOSSARY**

<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>After Action Report</b>	A report that examines response actions, application of SEMS, modifications to plans and procedures, training needs, and recovery activities. AARs are required under SEMS after any emergency that requires a gubernatorial state of emergency proclamation. Local government AARs must be submitted to Cal OES within 90 days.
<b>Agency</b>	A division of government with a specific function offering a particular kind of assistance. In the Incident Command System (ICS), agencies are defined either as jurisdictional (having statutory responsibility for incident management) or as assisting or cooperating (providing resources or other assistance). Governmental organizations are most often in charge of an incident, though in certain circumstances private sector organizations may be included. Additionally, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) may be included to provide support.
<b>All-Hazards</b>	Any incident, natural or human-caused, that warrants action to protect life, property, environment, public health or safety, and minimize disruptions of government, social, or economic activities.
<b>California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement (MMAA)</b>	An agreement entered into by and between the State of California, its various departments and agencies, and the various political subdivisions, municipal corporations, and public agencies of the State of California to assist each other by providing resources during an emergency. Mutual Aid occurs when two or more parties agree to furnish resources and facilities and to render services to each other in response to any type of disaster or emergency.



TERM	DEFINITION
<b>California Emergency Support Functions (CA-ESF)</b>	The CA-ESFs are a grouping of State agencies, departments and other stakeholders with similar functional activities/responsibilities whose responsibilities lend to improving the state's ability to collaboratively prepare for, effectively mitigate, cohesively respond to, and rapidly recover from any emergency. CA-ESFs unify a broad-spectrum of stakeholders with various capabilities, resources, and authorities to improve collaboration and coordination for a particular discipline. They also provide a framework for the state government to support regional and community stakeholder collaboration and coordination at all levels of government and across overlapping jurisdictional boundaries.
<b>Catastrophic</b>	According to the Stafford Act, the term refers to an event of a magnitude exceeding available local and state response and recovery resources. In more recent history, the term "catastrophic" has been redefined by events such as the 9/11 World Trade Center and U.S. Pentagon disaster attacks and Hurricane Katrina to mean disasters emergencies large enough to stretch national resources.
<b>Communications</b>	Process of the transmission of information through verbal, written, or symbolic means.
<b>Coordination</b>	The process of systematically analyzing a situation, developing relevant information, and informing appropriate command authority of viable alternatives for selection of the most effective combination of available resources to meet specific objectives. The coordination process (which can be either intra- or inter-agency) does not involve dispatch actions. However, personnel responsible for coordination may perform command or dispatch functions within the limits established by specific agency delegations, procedures, legal authority, etc. Multiagency or interagency coordination is found at all SEMS levels.
<b>Corrective Action</b>	Implementing procedures based on lessons learned from actual incidents or from training and exercises.



<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>Critical Infrastructure</b>	Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.
<b>Cyber Threat</b>	An act or threat that poses potentially devastating disruptions to critical infrastructure, including essential communications such as voice, email, and Internet connectivity
<b>Cybersecurity</b>	The protection of data and systems in networks that are connected to the Internet, including measures to protect critical infrastructure services. These services may include essential communications such as voice, email, and Internet connectivity.
<b>Disaster</b>	A major detrimental impact of a hazard upon the population and the economic, social, and built environment of an affected area.
<b>Emergency</b>	Any incident(s), whether natural or human-caused, that requires responsive action to protect life or property. Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, an emergency means any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.
<b>Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)</b>	A congressionally-ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through EMAC, a disaster-affected state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues upfront: liability and reimbursement.

<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>Emergency Operations Center (EOC)</b>	The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOC may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement, and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., federal, state, regional, tribal, city, county), or some combination thereof.
<b>Emergency Response Personnel</b>	Personnel affiliated with or sponsored by emergency response agencies.
<b>Evacuation</b>	Organized, phased and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas and their reception and care in safe areas.
<b>Function</b>	Function refers to the five major activities in ICS: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance/Administration. The same five functions are also found at all SEMS EOC Levels. At the EOC, the term Management replaces Command. The term function is also used when describing the activity involved, (e.g., the planning function). A sixth function, Intelligence/Investigations, may be established, if required, to meet emergency management needs.
<b>Group</b>	Established to divide the incident management structure into functional areas of operation. Groups are composed of resources assembled to perform a special function not necessarily within a single geographic division. Groups, when activated, are located between branches and resources in the Operations Section.
<b>Hazard</b>	Means an event or physical condition that has the potential to cause fatalities, injuries, property damage, infrastructure damage, agricultural losses, damage to the environment, interruption of business, or other types of harm or loss.

<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>Incident</b>	An occurrence or event, natural or human-caused, which requires a response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response.
<b>Incident Command</b>	Responsible for overall management of the incident and consists of the Incident Commander, either single or unified command, and any assigned supporting staff.
<b>Incident Command System (ICS)</b>	A standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. It is used for all kinds of emergencies, and is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents. ICS is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, to organize field-level incident management operations.
<b>Information</b>	Pieces of raw, unanalyzed data that identifies persons, evidence, events; or illustrates processes that specify the occurrence of an event. May be objective or subjective, and is intended for both internal analysis and external (news media) application. Information is the "currency" that produces intelligence.

<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>Intelligence</b>	Product of an analytical process that evaluates information collected from diverse sources, integrates the relevant information into a cohesive package, and produces a conclusion or estimate. Information must be real, accurate, and verified before it becomes intelligence for planning purposes. Intelligence relates to the specific details involving the activities of an incident or EOC, and current and expected conditions, and how they affect the actions taken to achieve operational period objectives. Intelligence is primarily intended for internal use and not for public dissemination.
<b>Interoperability</b>	Allows emergency management/response personnel and their affiliated organizations to communicate within and across agencies and jurisdictions via voice, data, or video-on-demand, in real-time, when needed and when authorized.
<b>Joint Information Center (JIC)</b>	A facility established to coordinate all incident-related public information activities. It is the central point of contact for all news media. Public information officials from all participating agencies should co-locate at the JIC.
<b>Jurisdiction</b>	A range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to their legal responsibilities and authority. Jurisdictional authority at an incident can be political or geographical (e.g., federal, state, tribal, and local boundary lines) or functional (e.g., law enforcement, public health).
<b>Key Resources</b>	Any publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.
<b>Liaison</b>	A form of communication for establishing and maintaining mutual understanding and cooperation.
<b>Liaison Officer</b>	A member of the Command Staff (Management Staff at the SEMS EOC Levels) responsible for coordinating with representatives from cooperating and assisting agencies or organizations. At SEMS EOC Levels, reports directly to the EOC Director and coordinates the initial entry of Agency Representatives into the Operations Center and also Provide guidance and support for them as required.



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TERM	DEFINITION
<b>Local Government</b>	According to federal code <sup>36</sup> a county, municipality, city, town, township, local public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under state law), regional or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a local government; an Indian tribe or authorized tribal entity, or in Alaska a Native village or Alaska Regional Native Corporation; a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity.
<b>Logistics</b>	Providing resources and other services to support incident management.
<b>Mitigation</b>	Provide a critical foundation in the effort to reduce the loss of life and property from natural and/or human-caused disasters by avoiding or lessening the impact of a disaster and providing value to the public by creating safer communities. Mitigation seeks to fix the cycle of disaster damage, reconstruction, and repeated damage. These activities or actions, in most cases, will have a long-term sustained effect.
<b>Mutual Aid Agreements</b>	Written or oral agreements between and among agencies/organizations and/or jurisdictions that provide a mechanism to quickly obtain emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, and other associated services. The primary objective is to facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of emergency support prior to, during, and/or after an incident.
<b>National</b>	Of a nationwide character, including the federal, state, tribal, and local aspects of governance and policy.
<b>National Incident Management System (NIMS)</b>	Provides a systematic, proactive approach guiding government agencies at all levels, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life or property and harm to the environment.

<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>National Response Framework (NRF)</b>	A guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards incident management.
<b>Non-governmental Organization (NGO)</b>	An entity with an association based on the interests of its members, individuals, or institutions. It is not created by a government, but it may work cooperatively with the government. Such organizations serve a public purpose, not a private benefit. Examples of NGO include faith-based charity organizations and the American Red Cross.
<b>Operational Area (OA)</b>	An intermediate level of the state emergency organization, consisting of a county and all other political subdivisions within the geographical boundaries of the county.
<b>Organization</b>	Any association or group of persons with like objectives. Examples include, but are not limited to, governmental departments and agencies, private sector, and/or non-governmental organizations.
<b>Political Subdivisions</b>	Includes any city, city and county, county, tax or assessment district, or other legally authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries.
<b>Preparedness</b>	A continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident response. Within NIMS, preparedness focuses on the following elements: planning, procedures and protocols, training and exercises, personnel qualification and certification, and equipment certification.

<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>Prevention</b>	Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property. It involves applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice.
<b>Private Sector</b>	Organizations and entities that are not part of any governmental structure. The private sector includes for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, formal and informal structures, commerce and industry.
<b>Public Information</b>	Processes, procedures, and systems for communicating timely, accurate, and accessible information on the incident's cause, size, and current situation; resources committed; and other matters of general interest to the public, responders, and additional stakeholders (both directly affected and indirectly affected).
<b>Public Information Officer (PIO)</b>	Processes, procedures, and systems for communicating timely, accurate, and accessible information on the incident's cause, size, and current situation; resources committed; and other matters of general interest to the public, responders, and additional stakeholders (both directly affected and indirectly affected).



TERM	DEFINITION
<b>Recovery</b>	The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans; the reconstitution of government operations and services; individual, private-sector, non-governmental, and public assistance programs to provide housing and to promote restoration; long-term care and treatment of affected persons; additional measures for social, political, environmental, and economic restoration; evaluation of the incident to identify lessons learned; post-incident reporting; and development of initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.
<b>Recovery Plan</b>	A plan developed to restore the affected area or community.
<b>Resources</b>	Personnel and major items of equipment, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment to incident operations and for which status is maintained. Resources are described by kind and type and may be used in operational support or supervisory capacities at an incident or at an EOC.
<b>Response</b>	Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of EOP and of mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other unfavorable outcomes. As indicated by the situation, response activities include applying intelligence and other information to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident; increased security operations; continuing investigations into nature and source of the threat; ongoing public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and specific law enforcement operations aimed at preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending actual perpetrators and bringing them to justice.



<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>Section</b>	1) The organizational level having responsibility for a major functional area of incident or EOC Management, (e.g., Operations, Planning, Logistics, Finance/Administration) and Intelligence/Investigations (if established). The section is organizationally situated between the branch and the Incident Command. 2) A separate part or division as: a. A portion of a book, treatise, or writing. b. A subdivision of a chapter. c. A division of law.
<b>Special District</b>	A unit of local government (other than a city, county, or city and county) with authority or responsibility to own, operate, and maintain systems, programs, services, or projects [(as defined in California Code of Regulations (CCR) Section 2900(s)] for purposes of natural disaster assistance. This may include joint powers authority established under Section 6500 et. seq. of the California Code of Regulations.
<b>Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)</b>	Complete reference document or an operations manual that provides the purpose, authorities, duration, and details for the preferred method of performing a single function or a number of interrelated functions in a uniform manner.
<b>Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS)</b>	A system required by California Government Code and established by regulations for managing response to multiagency and multijurisdictional emergencies in California. SEMS consists of five organizational levels, which are activated as necessary: Field Response, Local Government, Operational Area, Region, and State.
<b>State</b>	When capitalized, refers to any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and any possession of the United States. See Section 2 (14), Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
<b>Strategy</b>	The general plan or direction selected to accomplish incident objectives.
<b>System</b>	An integrated combination of people, equipment, and processes that work in a coordinated manner to achieve a specific desired output under specific conditions.

<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>Technical Assistance</b>	Support provided to state, tribal, and local jurisdictions when they have the resources, but lack the complete knowledge and skills needed to perform a required activity (such as mobile-home park design or hazardous material assessments).
<b>Terrorism</b>	Defined under federal law as "...unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."
<b>Threat</b>	An indication of possible violence, harm, or danger.
<b>Tools</b>	Those instruments and capabilities that allow for the professional performance of tasks, such as information systems, agreements, doctrine, capabilities, and legislative authorities.
<b>Tribal</b>	Any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaskan Native Village as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (85 stat. 688) [43 U.S.C.A. and 1601 et seq.].
<b>Type</b>	1) An ICS resource classification that refers to capability. Type 1 is generally considered to be more capable than Types 2, 3, or 4, respectively, because of size, power, capacity, or (in the case of incident management teams) experience and qualifications. 2) A class, kind, or group sharing one or more characteristics; category. 3) A variety or style of a particular class or kind of things.
<b>Unified Command</b>	An ICS application used when more than one agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the UC, often the senior person from agencies and/or disciplines participating in the UC, to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and a single IAP.
<b>Volunteer</b>	A volunteer is any individual accepted to perform services by the lead agency (which has authority to accept volunteer services) when the individual performs services without promise, expectation, or receipt of compensation for services performed. See 16 U.S.C. 742f(c) and 29 CFR 553.101.

<b>TERM</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>
<b>Vulnerability</b>	Indicates the level of exposure of human life and property to damage from natural and manmade hazards



**ANNEX A: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL CORE  
CAPABILITIES DESCRIPTION**

<b>CORE CAPABILITY</b>	<b>MISSION AREA(S)</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
Planning	<i>All</i>	Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or tactical-level approaches to meet defined objectives.
Public Information and Warning	<i>All</i>	Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken, and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.
Operational Coordination	<i>All</i>	Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
Forensics and Attribution	<i>Prevention</i>	Conduct forensic analysis and attribute terrorist acts (including the means and methods of terrorism) to their source, to include forensic analysis as well as attribution for an attack and for the preparation for an attack in an effort to prevent initial or follow-on acts and/or swiftly develop counter-options.
Intelligence and Information Sharing	<i>Prevention Protection</i>	Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information concerning physical and cyber threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of WMDs; or any other matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland security by local, state, tribal, territorial, federal, and other stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data, or



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CORE CAPABILITY	MISSION AREA(S)	DESCRIPTION
		knowledge among government or private sector entities, as appropriate.
Interdiction and Disruption	<i>Prevention Protection</i>	Delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats and / or hazards.
Screening, Search and Detection	<i>Prevention Protection</i>	Identify, discover, or locate threats and/or hazards through active and passive surveillance and search procedures. This may include the use of systematic examinations and assessments, bio surveillance, sensor technologies, or physical investigation and intelligence.
Access Control and Identity Verification	<i>Protection</i>	Apply and support necessary physical, technological, and cyber measures to control admittance to critical locations and systems.
Cybersecurity	<i>Protection</i>	Protect (and if needed, restore) electronic communications systems, information, and services from damage, unauthorized use, and exploitation.
Physical Protective Measures	<i>Protection</i>	Implement and maintain risk-informed countermeasures, and policies protecting people, borders, structures, materials, products, and systems associated with key operational activities and critical infrastructure sectors.
Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities	<i>Protection</i>	Identify, assess, and prioritize risks to inform protection activities, countermeasures, and investments.
Supply Chain Integrity and Security	<i>Protection</i>	Strengthen the security and resilience of the supply chain.
Community Resilience	<i>Mitigation</i>	Enable the recognition, understanding, communication of, and planning for risk and empower individuals and communities to make informed risk management decisions necessary to adapt to, withstand, and quickly recover from future incidents.
Long-Term	<i>Mitigation</i>	Build and sustain resilient systems, communities,



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<b>CORE CAPABILITY</b>	<b>MISSION AREA(S)</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
Vulnerability Reduction		and critical infrastructure and key resources lifelines to reduce their vulnerability to natural, technological, and human-caused threats and hazards by lessening the likelihood, severity, and duration of the adverse consequences.
Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment	<i>Mitigation</i>	Assess risk and disaster resilience so that decision makers, responders, and community members can take informed action to reduce their entity's risk and increase their resilience.
Threats and Hazards Identification	<i>Mitigation</i>	Assess risk and disaster resilience so that decision makers, responders, and community members can take informed action to reduce their entity's risk and increase their resilience.
Critical Transportation	<i>Response</i>	Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.
Environmental Response / Health and Safety	<i>Response</i>	Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.
Fatality Management Services	<i>Response</i>	Provide fatality management services, including decedent remains recovery and victim identification, working with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal authorities to provide mortuary processes, temporary storage or permanent internment solutions, sharing information with mass care services for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains, and providing counseling to the bereaved.
Fire Management and Suppression	<i>Response</i>	Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities to manage and suppress fires of all types, kinds, and complexities while protecting the lives, property, and the environment in the affected area.



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<b>CORE CAPABILITY</b>	<b>MISSION AREA(S)</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
Infrastructure Systems	<i>Response Recovery</i>	Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community.
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	<i>Response</i>	Deliver essential commodities, equipment, and services in support of impacted communities and survivors, to include emergency power and fuel support, as well as the coordination of access to community staples. Synchronize logistics capabilities and enable the restoration of impacted supply chains.
Mass Care Services	<i>Response</i>	Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.
Mass Search and Rescue Operations	<i>Response</i>	Deliver traditional and atypical search and rescue capabilities, including personnel, services, animals, and assets to survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of endangered lives in the shortest time possible.
On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	<i>Response</i>	Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
Operational Communications	<i>Response</i>	Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impacted area and all response forces.



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Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	<i>Response</i>	Provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations, and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical, and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.
Situational Assessment	<i>Response</i>	Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.
Economic Recovery	<i>Recovery</i>	Return economic and business activities (including food and agriculture) to a healthy state and develop new business and employment opportunities that result in an economically viable community.
Health and Social Services	<i>Recovery</i>	Restore and improve health and social services capabilities and networks to promote the resilience, independence, health (including behavioral health), and well-being of the whole community.
Housing	<i>Recovery</i>	Implement housing solutions that effectively support the needs of the whole community and contribute to its sustainability and resilience.
Natural and Cultural Resources	<i>Recovery</i>	Protect natural and cultural resources and historic properties through appropriate planning, mitigation, response, and recovery actions to preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, and restore them consistent with post-disaster community priorities and best practices and in compliance with applicable environmental and historic preservation laws and executive orders.



**ANNEX B: THREAT SCENARIOS**

The table below lists the threat, the targeted critical infrastructure sector, and a description of the scenario.

Threat	Sector	Scenario
Cyber Attack	Energy	A terrorist organization launches a sustained cyber-attack against several regional power grids across the nation to include two major California-based distribution systems during a summer heat wave. The near simultaneous attacks at multiple locations are capable of destroying critical components that are in limited supply.
VBIED	Government	A previously unknown terrorist organization or single actor employs a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a government office providing direct services to the public such as a Department of Motor Vehicles office. Office is crowded with customers during a known/observable period of heavy use.
CCTA	Transportation and Emergency Services	A known terrorist organization attacks a tourist bus stopped near a crowded location of economic or psychological significance to California. The bus is occupied by a group targeted in accordance with the political objectives or ideological motives of the attackers. The attack is initiated by an explosive device (a man-portable device in the bus or VBIED in close proximity to the bus) followed by direct assault on first responders/surviving victims/any gathering crowd near the attack.
VBIED	Energy	VBIED attack against a power sub-station resulting in widespread power failure mid-day during the summer. Affected area may be entire regional distribution system (e.g. PG&E, Southern California Edison).

**ANNEX C: HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
MEMBERS**

The HSAC is an advisory body convened by the California HSA to advise on the development and implementation of the Homeland Security Strategy and related priorities. The HSA appoints HSAC members. Each member will be appointed to a two-year term and each member is a voting member. The HSA may also appoint additional members, or extend members as necessary.

HSAC membership meets the requirements outlined in the Homeland Security Grant Program guidance and includes representatives from the following entities;

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| I. Governor’s Cabinet Secretary                                     | XVI. Secretary, California Government Operations Agency                                     |
| II. Adjutant General, California Military Department                | XVII. Executive Director, California State Association of Counties                          |
| III. Commissioner, California Highway Patrol                        | XVIII. Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Alameda   |
| IV. Director, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection | XIX. Regional Director, Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security |
| V. Secretary, California State Transportation Agency                | XX. Representative, Fusion Center Fiduciary   |
| VI. Secretary, California Health and Human Services Agency          | XXI. Private Sector Partners (PG&E)   |
| VII. President, California State Sheriff’s Association              | XXII. Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IX  |
| VIII. President, California Police Chief’s Association              | XXIII. Director, California Department of Technology  |
| IX. President, California Fire Chief’s Association                  | XXIV. Director of Security, Port of Long Beach  |
| X. President, California Metropolitan Fire Chief’s Association      | XXV. Deputy Executive Director, Port of Los Angeles   |
| XI. Tribal Representative   | XXVI. Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation                    |
| XII. Chair, Coalition of California UASIs                           |   |
| XIII. SAC, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sacramento              |   |
| XIV. Commander, State Threat Assessment Center                      |   |
| XV. Secretary, California Department of Food and Agriculture        |   |



## END NOTES

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- <sup>3</sup> "Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide," (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Second Edition, August 2013,) [https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/8ca0a9e54dc8b037a55b402b2a269e94/CPG201\\_htirag\\_2nd\\_edition.pdf](https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/8ca0a9e54dc8b037a55b402b2a269e94/CPG201_htirag_2nd_edition.pdf)
- <sup>4</sup> "Overview of State Homeland Security Governance Structures," (National Governors Association, July 2015,) <https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/2014/HomelandStateGovernanceStructures.pdf>
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- <sup>6</sup> "Maintaining and Expanding California's National Security Mission, Report and Recommendations of the Governor's Military Council," (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., June 2015,) [https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/GOV\\_MIL\\_REPORT\\_June.pdf](https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/GOV_MIL_REPORT_June.pdf)
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup> "Military Active-Duty Personnel, Civilians by State," (Governing Magazine: State and local Government News for America's Leaders, October 2017) <http://www.governing.com/gov-data/military-civilian-active-duty-employee-workforce-numbers-by-state.html>
- <sup>9</sup> "State of California Emergency Plan & Emergency Support Functions," (California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, 2017,) [http://www.caloes.ca.gov/PlanningPreparednessSite/Documents/California\\_State\\_Emergency\\_Plan\\_2017](http://www.caloes.ca.gov/PlanningPreparednessSite/Documents/California_State_Emergency_Plan_2017).
- <sup>10</sup> Each HSGP funded project must align with a "primary core capability." This requirement coupled with the capability-based objectives in the Strategy will further allow the State to link HSGP funded projects to specific Strategy objectives, in certain cases.
- <sup>11</sup> "Governor Brown Signs Executive Order To Bolster Cybersecurity," (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. Newsroom, August 31, 2015,) <https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19083>

<sup>12</sup> "About: Cybersecurity Task Force," (California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, October 2017,) <http://www.caloes.ca.gov/Cal-OES-Divisions/Cybersecurity-Task-Force>

<sup>13</sup> California State Warning Plan, December 2016

<sup>14</sup> National Emergency Communications Plan, 2014

<sup>15</sup> Improvised Nuclear Device Response and Recovery, Communicating in the Immediate Aftermath, June 2013

<sup>16</sup> "California Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (CalSCIP)," (California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, July 2013,) [http://www.water.ca.gov/floodmgmt/funding/docs/CA\\_2013\\_SCIP.pdf](http://www.water.ca.gov/floodmgmt/funding/docs/CA_2013_SCIP.pdf)

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<sup>18</sup> "Improving Outcomes for People Affected by Disasters," (California Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, October 2017,) <http://www.calvoad.org/>.

<sup>19</sup> "About: Law Enforcement Branch," (California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, October 2017,) <http://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/law-enforcement>

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<sup>21</sup> "State of California Emergency Plan," (California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, October 2017,) [http://www.caloes.ca.gov/PlanningPreparednessSite/Documents/California\\_State\\_Emergency\\_Plan\\_2017.pdf](http://www.caloes.ca.gov/PlanningPreparednessSite/Documents/California_State_Emergency_Plan_2017.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> "National Disaster Recovery Framework," (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Second Edition, June 2016,) [https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14660149981234bec8550930f774269e0c5968b120ba2/National\\_Disaster\\_Recovery\\_Framework2nd.pdf](https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14660149981234bec8550930f774269e0c5968b120ba2/National_Disaster_Recovery_Framework2nd.pdf)

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<sup>26</sup> "The Economic Impact of the California Wine and Winegrape Industry," (Wine Institute, 2015,) [http://www.wineinstitute.org/files/Wine\\_Institute\\_2015\\_Economic\\_Impact\\_Highlights.pdf](http://www.wineinstitute.org/files/Wine_Institute_2015_Economic_Impact_Highlights.pdf)

<sup>27</sup> "Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015," (Congressional Research Service, July 2015,) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44114.pdf>



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