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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC

November 14, 2024

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This letter provides an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), received June 1, 2022, requesting 22 specific theses written by students at the National Intelligence University.

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Sincerely,



Erin Morrison
Chief, Information Review and Release Group
Information Management Office

INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE POWS IN WWII:
U.S. RESPONSE TO A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE

by

Captain, USAF
NDIC Class 2007

Unclassified thesis submitted to the faculty
of the National Defense Intelligence College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence

July 2007

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the hundreds of U.S. military interrogators who served in the Pacific during the Second World War. In particular, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Mr. Grant Hirabayashi, a Japanese-American World War II veteran and graduate of the Army's Military Intelligence Service Language School, who contributed significantly to the content of this thesis by sharing his personal experiences. Additionally, special gratitude goes to all the World War II veterans and their families who persevered through hardship, discrimination, and incarceration; and who suffered personal sacrifices during this chaotic and troubled period in our nation's history.

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CHAPTER 1

THE HARVEST: EXTRACTING HUMAN INTELLIGENCE THROUGH ENEMY PRISONER INTERROGATION

THE ISSUE

Gathering vital intelligence through the interrogation of enemy prisoners is one of the greatest challenges our nation faces today in the struggle against terrorism. During an address to the nation leading up to the five-year anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush told Americans that, with the twin towers and Pentagon still smoldering, his administration had faced an immediate challenge – to respond to the attack on our country. He explained, “We have to wage an unprecedented war against an enemy unlike any we had fought before.” Elaborating on this challenge, the President said, “In this new war, the most important source of information on where the terrorists are hiding and what they are planning is the terrorists, themselves.” In other words, this intelligence information is not available any other place. “To win the war on terror, we must be able to detain, question, and when appropriate, prosecute terrorists captured here in America, and on the battlefields around the world.”¹

¹ George W. Bush, President of the United States, “President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists,” briefing presented at the White House, Washington, D.C., 6 September 2006, URL: <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html>, accessed 2 February 2007.

The U.S. military was ill prepared to confront its new pressures and the difficult task of obtaining human intelligence through prisoner interrogation. The scarcity of Arabic, Dari, Pashto, and other Middle Eastern and Central Asian language specialists has limited the effectiveness of available U.S. interrogators. A lack of cultural understanding and knowledge of the psychology of the enemy contributes to the complexity of this challenge. Finally, the unimaginable devastation, sorrow, and anger stirred by the 9/11 terrorist attacks stimulated a powerful racial hatred and prejudice among Western citizens towards Middle Eastern society. Many in the United States perceive the current enemy as religious extremists, terrorists, rag-heads, and merciless barbarians; Western media have described them as suicidal, ruthless, and even subhuman. In a recent *Wall Street Journal* article, the author portrayed Middle Eastern terrorists as, “not nationalists or extremists or even fanatics, but something like a band of real-life Hannibal Lecters for whom human slaughter is both business and religious fulfillment.”²

In many respects, the jihadists we face today in the Global War on Terrorism share many of the attributes of the fanatical enemy we faced in World War II – the Japanese soldier. During the weeks and months that followed Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, anti-Japanese hysteria spread throughout the United States and wartime propaganda fueled existing prejudices. Many Americans considered the Japanese as uncivilized, treacherous, and born fanatics. They were monkey men, savages, rats, mad dogs, or crazed samurai, as ready to kill themselves as others.³ The Western media were frequently even more apocalyptic in their expressions. They declared the war in Asia

² “The Savages,” *Wall Street Journal*, 22 June 2006, A16, accessed via ProQuest on 11 February 2007.

³ Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: First Mariner Books, 2005), viii.

very different from that in Europe, for Japan was a “racial menace” as well as a cultural and religious one, and if Japan proved victorious in the Pacific, there would be “perpetual war between Oriental ideals and Occidental.”⁴ At the time, the war was perceived as a true clash of civilizations and evidence of extremism illuminated the hostility and rage. In the nation’s capital, a protestor chopped down a pair of cherry trees – a gift from a group of Japanese schoolchildren years earlier. In Montpelier, Vermont, an activist disturbed the holiday street decorations by removing all the silver bells made in Japan. In Boston, the Museum of Fine Arts closed its Japanese exhibits to protect them from vandals; in various areas of the United States, Americans boycotted Japanese goods.⁵

Military and civilian leaders faced the difficult challenge of cutting through this wrath to develop realistic responses to the actual challenge. This was particularly complicated, as many of these leaders shared the same feelings and emotions. Colonel Milton A. Hill, General Douglas MacArthur’s inspector general in the Philippines, suggested that American soldiers receive tougher battle training, including developing an actual urge to kill Japanese and Nazi troops. Colonel Hill contended “Most American soldiers don’t have much honest hate for the German and Jap until some of their comrades have been killed by the enemy, or until they themselves have been made to suffer at the enemy’s hands. This was true right on Bataan...but the Jap hates the American with a downright hate that carries him through in battle to success or death.”⁶ In 1943, during the Guadalcanal campaign, the commanding officer of a U.S. Marine

⁴ John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 7.

⁵ “Wartime Fanaticism,” *Christian Science Monitor* (1908 – Current file), 12 December 1941, 24, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 27 January 2007.

⁶ “MacArthur Aide Says Yanks Must Be Taught to Hate Foe,” *The Washington Post* (1877 – 1990), 3 October 1942, 2, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 27 January 2007.

regiment reprimanded his men for bringing in prisoners, saying, “Don’t bother to take prisoners, shoot the sons of bitches!”⁷ It goes without saying that the attitudes of their superiors inherently guided mind-set of the men.

The United States also faced the dilemma of understanding how this enemy would behave in a time of war and beyond. The Japanese soldier had many characteristics of an ideal fighting man. Among these qualities were courage, endurance, physical strength, no fear of death, and a fanatical sense of patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor.⁸ Still, many unanswered questions remained: Did the Japanese consider themselves a superior race? Would they surrender or fight to the last man? If captured, could they be convinced to talk? Leaders recognized that a more nuanced understanding of the culture and psychology of the Japanese would prove critical to the successful prosecution of the Second World War and the occupation that followed.

To complicate matters further, the United States faced an enemy who spoke a remarkably complex language. Japanese officers were not concerned about the security of their sensitive military communications because they thought Westerners could never learn to read and write Japanese, especially the abbreviated styles of writing known as *gyosho* and *sosho*.⁹ These cursive styles of Japanese calligraphy are as similar to the printed Japanese character as a shorthand symbol is to an English word. To read and

⁷ John A. Burden, Captain, U.S. Army, “Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners in the Southwest Pacific: Intelligence Memo No. 4,” 22 July 1943; Enemy Prisoner of War Interrogation Files (MIS-Y), 1943 - 1945; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, 2. Cited hereafter as Burden, “Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners in the Southwest Pacific: Intelligence Memo No. 4,” NARA.

⁸ Hallett Abend, “Japan’s Soldiers – Unsoldierly Yet Fanatic,” *New York Times (1857 – Current file)*, 11 January 1942, SM12, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 27 January 2007.

⁹ “The Military Intelligence Service Language School,” n.d.; Correspondence and Reports Relating to the Operation of Language Schools, 1943-1949; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD, 2. Cited hereafter as “The Military Intelligence Service Language School,” NARA.

write anything beyond the simplest and most basic text, one needed knowledge of thousands of Chinese characters. To make matters worse, the written language was not just a visual representation of everyday spoken Japanese, but an intricate system that reflected the influence of Chinese linguistic forms as well as older Japanese forms.¹⁰

At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, very few Americans of military age were fluent in Japanese. The United States relied on previously trained military officers, Caucasian-Americans who had grown up and studied in Japan, and *Nisei* (second generation Japanese-Americans living in the United States) to address this linguistic challenge. Employing *Nisei* presented the greater challenge, as many Americans doubted the *Nisei* could stand the decisive test of battle against their own race and blood. Civilian and military leaders were very suspicious of their loyalty. In fact, on 19 February 1942, President Roosevelt signed the infamous Executive Order 9066 authorizing the internment of tens of thousands of American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

To develop a comprehensive understanding of Japanese psychology and culture, and address the growing need for qualified linguists, the U.S. Army and Navy established separate Japanese language schools to train their military interrogators and interpreters as they deployed military forces across the Pacific. Throughout the war, prisoner of war (POW) interrogation played a crucial role in gathering valuable information about Japanese military operations and intentions. Many senior military officers believed that

¹⁰ Christopher Seeley, "The 20th Century Japanese Writing System: Reform and Change," *The Journal of Simplified Spelling Society* J19 (1995), URL: <www.spellingsociety.org/journals/j19/japanese.php>, accessed 5 February 2007.

the Allied success in harvesting this crucial intelligence shortened the war effort by as much as two years.¹¹

RESEARCH QUESTION

An evaluation of how U.S. military interrogation methods used against the Japanese during World War II may assist in identifying costs and benefits associated with modern-day interrogation training and techniques applied during the Global War on Terrorism. In addition, it may help determine whether current U.S. military interrogation training reflects changes in warfare and incorporates lessons learned from past conflicts. This study of World War II interrogation will answer the question: *What can we learn from the U.S. experience during World War II of recruiting and preparing interrogators and conducting interrogations of Japanese POWs that will inform current and future doctrine and practices related to educing information?*

THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter 2 presents the literature review and research methodology. This review explores World War II experiences in interrogating Japanese prisoners as well as contemporary issues surrounding the art and science of interrogation. The research methodology describes the analytical framework used to evaluate the effectiveness of the interrogation of Japanese prisoners.

Chapter 3 provides some important historical and cultural context that influenced Japanese soldiers during the war. The objective here is to provide the reader with a

¹¹ Edwin M. Nakasone, *The Nisei Soldier: Historical Essays on World War II and the Korean War*, 2d rev. ed. (Brainerd: J-Press, 1999), 54.

sufficient understanding of Japanese thought processes and mental attitudes in order to appreciate the challenges that U.S. interrogators faced in executing their mission. This brief historical review also provides insight into Japanese loyalty to the Emperor, the disgrace of surrender, and U.S. expectations of the prisoners' implacability.

Chapter 4 describes the U.S. Army's experience in preparing for and conducting interrogations of Japanese prisoners. It follows the evolution of the Army's Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS), where students received extensive training in language, interrogation, document translation, and cultural awareness. The chapter concludes with a wartime case study designed to illustrate the Army's methodology.

Chapter 5 outlines the unique training approach developed by the U.S. Navy. This includes an evaluation of the historical progression of the Navy's Oriental Language School and details the Navy's methods of wartime interrogation. As in Chapter 4, the second half of this chapter presents a case study to illustrate the Navy's method.

The thesis concludes with an examination of the numerous lessons drawn from the analysis of the Army and Navy case studies presented in the previous chapters. The final chapter also contains recommendations for additional research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN METHODOLOGY

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A preliminary review of available literature has uncovered a considerable amount of material to assist in answering the research question. This includes books, periodicals, and academic research, as well as historical newspaper and magazine articles. Although no single book or academic study provides a complete, comprehensive analysis of World War II interrogation of Japanese prisoners, several sources refer to elements of the various challenges U.S. interrogators faced during the war.

The History of MIS-Y: U.S. Strategic Interrogation During World War II, a Joint Military Intelligence College thesis written by Major (now Colonel) Steven M. Kleinman, USAFR, discusses the U.S. Army's World War II strategic interrogation program and the challenges it overcame in obtaining intelligence from high-value German prisoners of war. This program was code-named MIS-Y.¹² Major Kleinman's thesis examines the key elements of the MIS-Y's strategic interrogation mission: program organization; procedures for screening, selecting and handling POWs; training for interrogators; methods of interrogation; information requirements; and intelligence

¹² The German military intelligence organization.

collected. He concludes by pointing out a number of lessons drawn from this examination. First, control over the operation and administration of a strategic interrogation program should be direct and unambiguous. Next, no single interrogator can be an expert in all matters, and therefore, interrogators should be organized into “specialized subsections” based on their expertise. Finally, the nature of strategic interrogation requires comprehensive training that addresses a sophisticated understanding of human behavior, intelligence requirements and interpersonal dynamics.

Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field is a report written by Major Sherwood Moran, a senior U.S. interrogator assigned to the First Marine Force during World War II. It details the importance of attitude and language skills for an effective interpreter. Although the report was written in 1943, it resurfaced in 2003 when Gunnery Sergeant Mitchell P. Paradis, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), a member of the Marine Corps Interrogator Translator Teams Association, obtained a copy of the document located at the Alfred M. Gray Research Center in Quantico, Virginia, and distributed it within the community. In the report, Moran rejects aggressive tactics in favor of a kind and humane treatment. Moran boasts that he always talked to his prisoners like human beings. He also points out that knowledge and proper use of the language are essential skills. With regard to knowledge, he highlights the special importance of a large general vocabulary and idiomatic language skills.

The Acme of Skill: Embracing the Potential of Strategic Interrogation, written by then-Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman, offers an assessment of strategic-level interrogation and a way ahead based upon successful U.S. and British operations conducted during World War II. Kleinman concludes that basic military interrogation programs conducted

by the U.S. Army at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and by the U.S. Marine Corps at Dam Neck Naval Air Station, Virginia, focus on the tactical level and fail to prepare graduates for exploiting intelligent, high-value targets.

The Interrogator: The Story of Hanns Joachim Scharff Master Interrogator of the Luftwaffe, written by Raymond T. Toliver and Hanns Joachim Scharff, describes the techniques used by a German intelligence officer, Hanns Scharff, who was regarded as master interrogator of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force). Scharff gained a reputation through his extraordinary success in educing information from captured American pilots during the Second World War. “Instead of torture and degradation, [Scharff] offered captured airmen the utmost courtesy and consideration,” the authors explain. Scharff spoke English almost as well as he spoke German and had a sound knowledge of American slang. His office walls were covered with pictures of pin-up girls and his desk was cluttered with American cigarettes and magazines (including the latest issue of *Stars and Stripes*¹³). After introducing himself, he would almost always craft an excuse to leave the room and offer the cigarettes and magazines to the prisoners. This put the Americans at ease and caused them to lower their guard somewhat. Scharff also maintained comprehensive dossiers of every Air Force unit in each of the Allied countries and updated them continuously. He collected information from home-town newspapers and metropolitan magazines from all over the world, transcripts of conversations with prisoners, and pocket litter from captured Airmen. With this information at his disposal, Scharff would convince the captured pilots he already knew everything and would eventually elicit secret information through conversation rather

¹³ The *Stars and Stripes* is a newspaper published by the U.S. Armed Forces overseas. During World War II, the newspaper was printed in several editions in several operating theaters.

than coercion. Scharff's story was first told in an article titled "Without Torture," published in the May edition of *Argosy*, a former American pulp magazine.

Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies, written by Oliver Hoare, offers a collection of formerly classified British government dossiers and tells the story of Latchmere House, MI5's wartime holding center for captured enemy agents during the Second World War. Lieutenant Colonel Robin W.G. Stephens, former Commandant of Camp 020, recorded details about over 400 spies. The main goals of his staff were first to establish the guilt of the prisoners and then obtain as much valuable information about the enemy's intentions as possible. His methods included psychological ruses such as the use of stool pigeons but he avoided physical violence at all cost – Stephens's first unbreakable rule. Stephens claimed, "Violence is taboo, for not only does it produce answers to please, but it lowers the standard of information."¹⁴

The Anguish of Surrender: Japanese POWs of World War II, by Ulrich Straus, provides a firsthand look at the Japanese military mindset prior to, during, and after the war. Straus, who resided in Japan for over 21 years, both as a child and an adult, served as a U.S. Army language officer during the occupation. He interviewed dozens of former Japanese prisoners of war to provide a better understanding of Japan's harsh code that precluded the possibility of capture, the circumstances of surrender, and their personal experiences under the direct control of U.S. interrogators. He discovered that, contrary to expectations, most Japanese POWs, psychologically unprepared to deal with direct confrontation, provided information to their interrogators. Trained linguists, many of whom were Japanese-Americans serving in the Army, learned how to collect intelligence information by treating the POWs humanely. The fifth chapter of the book is titled

¹⁴ Oliver Hoare, *Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies* (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), 19.

“America’s Secret Weapon: The Army and Navy Japanese Language Schools.” As indicated in the title, America’s secret weapon was its ability to educate Japanese linguists, which enabled the United States to break Japanese codes and interrogate enemy prisoners to obtain information vital to the war effort. To accomplish these tasks, the United States mounted a truly extraordinary effort to educate thousands of Americans to become conversant in the enemy’s language.

The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, by Ruth Benedict, an anthropologist commissioned by the U.S. government to write a cultural analysis of the Japanese in June 1944, offers a unique look at the social customs and traditions found in Japan at the outbreak of the Second World War. Benedict had no direct access to Japan because of the ongoing war, so she used well-researched historical, literary, and anecdotal data to describe the Japanese culture and explain why the Japanese people envisioned victory through “spirit over matter.” Benedict also analyzed Japan’s no-surrender policy and the country’s code of honor, which meant fighting to the death.

War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, by John W. Dower, offers a glimpse of the U.S. attitude toward the Japanese following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the manner in which the media portrayed the Japanese soldier, which is very useful for the purposes of the present thesis. Dower concluded that although Western allies were approaching victory, pure racism fueled the continuation and intensification of hostilities in the Pacific Theater during the final year of World War II. During this one-year period, there were as many casualties (on both sides) as in the first five years of the conflict combined.

The Nisei Soldier: Historical Essays on World War II and the Korean War, by Edwin M. Nakasone, a professor of history, serves as a fundamental reference for examining the contribution of Americans of Japanese ancestry to the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence Service. The author concludes that the utilization of Japanese-American interrogators was one of the decisive factors that brought the war to an end. Nakasone also offered a brief overview of Executive Order 9066, the presidential order issued during World War II by President Franklin D. Roosevelt that authorized the expulsion of all ethnic Japanese from the West Coast of the United States, and a historical record of the creation of the Army's Military Intelligence Service Language School.

Yankee Samurai: The Secret Role of Nisei in America's Pacific Victory, by Joseph D. Harrington, helps define the problem faced by U.S. military leaders who, in the aftermath of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, lacked sufficient numbers of intelligence officers qualified to read or write Japanese. The book provided invaluable background on the contribution of Americans of Japanese ancestry, many of whom served as interrogators during the war. This information aided immeasurably in the preparation of this thesis by providing a detailed historical account of numerous military intelligence operations in the Pacific, the China-Burma-India Theater, and in Europe.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

My preliminary review of available literature reinforced my recognition of the need to study the U.S. experience during World War II of recruiting and preparing linguists and conducting interrogations of Japanese prisoners of war. I selected the case study method as a mechanism to thoroughly examine and compare these events within

their true setting – the United States and the Pacific Theater during the Second World War.

Researcher Robert K. Yin emphasizes the technically critical features of this strategy in his two-part definition. The first part begins with the “scope” of the case study:

1. *A case study is an empirical inquiry that*

- investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when
- the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.¹⁵

Second, because context and phenomenon are not always obvious in real-life situations, a set of technical characteristics, including data collection and data analysis strategies, completes the second half of Yin’s definition:

2. *The case study inquiry*

- copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interests than data points, and as one result
- relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
- benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.¹⁶

The key point Yin makes is that the case study method is much more than a “logic of design,” as Jennifer Platt suggests in her historical overview of the case study in American methodological thought. Instead, it represents a deliberate approach to covering contextual conditions, as well as the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis.¹⁷

¹⁵ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003), 13.

¹⁶ Yin, 13 – 14.

The Multiple-Case Design

My thesis employs a “multiple-case” or “comparative” design methodology, exploring two carefully selected cases to accurately predict similar results (a *literal replication*) or contrasting results for predictable reasons (a *theoretical replication*). This method is often considered more robust than a single-case design, because the evidence is more compelling. On balance, the conduct of a multiple-case study often requires extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single investigator.¹⁸ The replication approach applied to this thesis is illustrated in Figure 2-1.




Figure 2-1. Case Study Method

Source: Author’s modified version of Case Study Method, Yin, 50.

¹⁷ Yin, 13 – 14.

¹⁸ Yin, 46 – 47.

Posing the Research Question

Figure 2-1 indicates that the first step in designing the study consists of posing the research question. For the current thesis, this question, presented in Chapter 1, is: *What can we learn from the U.S. experience during World War II of recruiting and preparing interrogators and conducting interrogations of Japanese POWs that will inform current and future doctrine and practices related to educating information?*

Case Selection and Data Collection

Case selection and definition of specific data measures represent important steps in the design and data collection process. I chose two cases for analysis, the U.S. Army and Navy, because during World War II the Army and Navy were the only U.S. military services recruiting, preparing, and employing U.S. military interrogators.¹⁹

For the purpose of this thesis, data collection protocols include an overview of the case study, field procedures (access to case materials, sources of information, etc.), and specific case study questions. Chapter 1 provided the overview of the case study project as a whole. The field procedures emphasize the major tasks in collecting data, which include gaining access to research facilities and interviewees, developing procedures for seeking guidance from my thesis committee, and making a schedule of research activities.²⁰

My thesis relies heavily on previously classified archival records maintained at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland. Because of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998, NARA made thousands of

¹⁹ The Marine Corps employed U.S. military interrogators also, but they were organized under the Department of the Navy, and as such, included in the Navy study.

²⁰ Yin, 72 – 73.

previously classified U.S. military records (from 1939 to 1976) available to the public. These newly released records provide insight into U.S. military intelligence activities in the Pacific during World War II and the subsequent occupation of Japan. NARA's declassification efforts enabled me to gain access to reports, memoranda, policy documents, prisoner of war interrogation files, training records, various analytical products, and general topics of intelligence interest. To supplement the NARA records, I conducted a comprehensive oral history interview with a veteran World War II interrogator to provide a firsthand, human interest perspective. The transcript appears as Appendix C to this thesis.

The heart of the protocol encompasses a set of questions developed to guide the investigation. Figure 2-2 lists these questions as they relate to the case study project:

- How did the Army or Navy project Japanese language requirements in the event of war with Japan?
- What methods of recruitment were employed by each service?
- How did Executive Order 9066 effect recruitment efforts?
- How were U.S. military personnel trained in the Japanese language and interrogation?
- What sources of training material were used?
- Did they receive training in Japanese psychology and culture?
- What role did the Nisei have in training?
- How was training different between the services?
- Were methods taught in the classroom, employed in the field?
- Was there debate over interrogation methods or techniques that were more "humane" than others?
- What interrogation methods were employed that proved "most" successful?
- What lessons learned might apply to current and future educating information doctrine?

Figure 2-2. Case Study Questions

Source: Compiled by the author

Conducting and Writing the Cases

According to Yin, “Each individual case study consists of a “whole” study, in which convergent evidence is sought regarding the facts and conclusions for the case; each case’s conclusions are then considered to be the information needing replication by other individual cases.”²¹ The first case examines the Army’s approach to recruiting and training of *Nisei* as linguists and interrogators. It offers a general assessment of their success or failure in convincing enemy prisoners to cooperate and provide information through direct interrogation methods. The second half of the study highlights the wartime experiences of one American hero, Sergeant Grant Hirabayashi, a Japanese-American World War II veteran who served as a Military Intelligence Service interrogator during World War II.

The second case illustrates the Navy’s contrasting approach of employing and educating American linguists. Unlike the Army, the Navy focused its recruitment and training efforts on Caucasian-Americans. After the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the Navy refused to recruit *Nisei*, as the Army had done. A presentation of the Navy’s approach is followed by a summary of the experiences of one of the school’s best-known graduates, Lieutenant Otis Cary, the son of a missionary, who was raised in Japan. Cary was commissioned in the U.S. Navy and went on to become one of the most highly successful and well-respected interrogators during the Second World War.

Cross-Case Conclusions and the Summary Report

Following the presentation of the Army and Navy cases, cross-case analysis completes the study. The overall summary report – the final chapter of this thesis – draws conclusions from the findings and reflects the results. Overall, this thesis

²¹ Yin, 50.

represents a “thick” multiple-case study designed to offer the reader a comprehensive record addressing this research topic.

CHAPTER 3

SPIRIT WARRIORS: PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE OF THE JAPANESE DURING WORLD WAR II

Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.

- - Sun Tzu

HISTORICAL SETTING

In the early 17th century, Ieyasu Tokugawa, a skilled warrior and first Shogun of the Tokugawa Shogunate that ruled Japan as the true governing power until the Meiji Restoration in 1868, created a plan to bring lasting peace to the nation. His vision focused on a complete reordering of Japanese society and the expulsion of the *gaijin* (outside people). It resulted in *Taihai* (the “Great Peace”) – over 250 years without war. Japan became ideologically sealed, and, for nearly two and a half centuries, had no standing army or navy. Tokugawa held that large military forces were not necessary because his system guaranteed that no external or internal conflicts would occur. This amazing stretch of absolute peace was unmatched by any other country over a comparable period of time.²² Regrettably, this peace did not last.

²² James Bradley, *Flyboys: A True Story of Courage* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), 17.

By the mid-1800s, a look across the Sea of Japan made it clear that seclusion and tranquility were a thing of the past. Western merchants had exploited China and imposed opium on its citizens. Farther south, the Dutch had conquered Indonesia; the French ruled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and the British held colonies in India, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. To the north, Russia was growing in size and conquering everything in its path.²³ It is no surprise that Japanese leaders felt obligated to build a strong military to protect their citizens and national sovereignty.

When he came to the throne in 1868, Emperor Meiji declared an imperial "restoration" and stripped the Shogunate of its powers. As a result, a new era of Japanese society began. As in the early days in Japanese history, the Emperor became a centerpiece of Japanese national life and a symbol that united the country ideologically. Emperor Meiji was determined to make Japan a strong and modern nation; however, isolationism was no longer an option for achieving that goal.

In 1894/1895, Japan invaded and defeated China, proving to the rest of the world that Japan was a powerful nation. The country's military obsession did not end with China, but instead continued for nearly 50 years. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese launched the infamous sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, which forced the United States into World War II – a conflict that John Dower, professor of Japanese history at the University of California at San Diego, appropriately termed a "War Without Mercy." The surprise attack and the ruthless war that followed presented unique challenges to educating information from enemy POWs.

To appreciate the challenges faced by U.S. military interrogators in obtaining intelligence from enemy prisoners, it is necessary to examine, even if briefly, the rich

²³ Bradley, 24.

cultural history and psychology of the Japanese. For simplicity, this discussion is divided into four sections: the Emperor-tradition; the Japanese soldier and armed forces; the shame of capture and surrender; and the fear of torture.

THE EMPEROR-TRADITION

One of the critical questions regarding Japanese psychology concerned the head of the Imperial Family, *Tennō* (the Emperor). What control did His Majesty have over the Japanese people? Japan was clearly an Emperor-centered nation with an imperial line extending back further than the royal line of any other country. Historically, Japan's citizens viewed the Emperor as the rallying point of devotion and the radiating center of government.²⁴ This general sense of unrestricted and unconditional loyalty to the Emperor by the Japanese people was a crucial concern that U.S. military forces needed to understand and address.

Many Americans believed that the Emperor had been merely an indistinct figurehead throughout Japan's seven feudal centuries. However, those who lived in Japan before the Second World War knew that nothing infuriated the Japanese, and reinforced their morale, more than a negative comment about the Emperor or an outright attack against him. The testimony of Japanese POWs confirmed this assumption. Many POWs attributed their extreme militarism to the Emperor and claimed they were

²⁴ Sherwood F. Moran, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, "The Psychology of the Japanese," 4 June 1942; Training Records of MITC, Camp Ritchie, MD; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD, 1. Cited hereafter as Moran, "The Psychology of the Japanese," NARA.

“carrying out his will” and “dying at the Emperor’s command.” As one prisoner explained, “The Emperor led the people into war and it was my duty to obey.”²⁵

The idea that the entire population internalized this view was unprecedented by Western standards; however, prisoner interrogations clearly showed that this was the unified viewpoint of Japan, even after its defeat. Interrogators concluded early on in the war that it was unnecessary to write, “Refuses to speak against the Emperor” on each interview record. In fact, a survey of POW interrogation records revealed only three interviews that were even mildly anti-Emperor and only one prisoner went so far as to say, “It would be a mistake to leave the Emperor on the throne.”²⁶

Throughout the Meiji Restoration and the period leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, citizens received thorough conditioning from Japanese authorities on providing proper respect to the Emperor. For example, as a form of super-patriotism and super-nationalism, the Japanese government suggested that all public and private schools display a portrait of the Emperor inside their facilities. This was not just any photograph, framed and hung on the wall. This portrait had a certain size requirement, was specially prepared and furnished by the Department of Education, and was installed with a formal ceremony. The case surrounding the portrait had curtained doors and the Japanese considered it a shrine. Schools seldom opened the curtains, but during formal ceremonies they were drawn and students were required to bow in unison at the direction of the staff. As time went on, the imperial portrait assumed even greater significance and the

²⁵ Benedict, 29 – 31.

²⁶ Benedict, 32.

government required schools to house the photograph in an entirely separate fireproof building. This was costly to the schools and took up additional space.²⁷

THE JAPANESE SOLDIER AND ARMED FORCES

On 14 December 1941, in a letter to *The Washington Post* titled “Our Enemy’s Strength,” Seymour DeKoven wrote, “The other night Lieutenant Commander Gene Tunney said something over the air that should make all Americans more aware of what lies ahead than most of what we’ve been hearing of late...He emphasized the fact that the Japs are not only not going to be a pushover, but that unless we learn to modify greatly some of our fighting ethics, we may be in for some severe disappointments.” The author goes on to describe the Japanese soldier as having “been trained for decades to be the most ruthless death-dealer on earth.” He says, “The nearest things to [the Japanese soldier] might be a Nazi or a jungle head-hunter; but even these latter pale into insignificance when compared with the warrior of the Rising Sun.”²⁸

The Japanese Soldier

The true warriors and backbone of the Japanese armed services were the simple country boys. Their superiors commonly referred to these draftees as “*issen gorin*.” *Issen gorin* meant “one yen, five rin”: the cost of mailing a draft notice – less than a penny. For most, basic military training resembled a brutal gulag, and in many regards, the Japanese army they served was like a feudal slave system. At the top were the imperial officers, who demanded the highest level of respect. “The officer class in

²⁷ Moran, “The Psychology of the Japanese,” NARA, 5 - 6.

²⁸ Seymour DeKoven, “Our Enemy’s Strength,” *The Washington Post (1877 – 1990)*, 21 December 1941, B6, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 21 February 2007.

general had the status and authority of feudal lords. The privates, especially the new recruits, were at the miserable bottom of the pyramid. They had no human rights. They were non-persons.”²⁹ “Brutality and cruelty were the rule rather than the exception in the Japanese army. It was the last primitive infantry army of modern times.” Officers would slap, kick and beat new recruits on a daily basis.³⁰

Since a new recruit’s former life on the farm was rigorous and physically demanding, the transition to military life was not overly challenging. Moreover, once he completed training, he became one of the “Emperor’s soldiers” establishing him as a model of perfection and discipline within the nation. The fact that each soldier wore the uniform of his Emperor raised his status in his own estimation and in that of his fellow citizens. In keeping with the ethics of his spiritual belief, he considered himself endowed with superhuman power.³¹

On the battlefield, the typical Japanese soldier wore the standard-issue olive-green uniform and a dome-shaped steel helmet. Inside the helmet was a Rising Sun flag presented to the soldier by his friends before leaving home and inscribed with their names. He also wore a bellyband, or *Senninbari* (a belt of a thousand stitches), which conferred invulnerability, each stitch having been sewn by a different person while he or she prayed for the well-being of the wearer.³²

²⁹ Bradley, 37.

³⁰ Bradley, 39.

³¹ H.S. Sewell, Brigadier General, U.S. Army, “The Japanese Soldier,” June 1944; Office of the Director of Intelligence Correspondence and Reports; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD, 2. Cited hereafter as Sewell, “The Japanese Soldier,” NARA.

³² Sewell, “The Japanese Soldier,” NARA, 1.

In addition to their standard equipment, most soldiers carried a copy of the Imperial Rescript of 1882, the official code of ethics for Japanese military personnel. On January 4, 1882, Emperor Meiji presented this document to the Army Minister in a special ceremony held at the Imperial Palace. This action symbolized the personal bond between the Emperor and the military, making the military, in effect, the Emperor's personal army. By design, the code stressed absolute personal loyalty to the Emperor which calls to mind one prominent image of loyalty and sacrifice -- that of the “*Kamikaze*” pilot.

The *Kamikaze* Pilot

In the latter stages of the war, particularly in the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese Air Force was in dire straits and knew Allied forces were close to invading the Japanese mainland. To compensate for their military inferiority, the Japanese resorted to the most fanatical forms of defense. The employment of “*Kamikaze*” or suicide attacks proved to be the most extreme form of these measures. When Genghis Khan’s invading fleet threatened their homeland in the thirteenth century, a “divine wind” drove him back and overturned his ships, but this time, the Japanese contrived a “divine wind” of their own – the *Kamikaze* or Special Attack Corps.

In 1944, a Japanese Army plane attacked a ship near the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. When the pilot ran out of bombs without achieving any hits, he decided to do his part for the Emperor by flying his plane into the target. A Japanese garrison on a neighboring island watched the event unfold, including the resulting explosion and saw

the plane, pilot, and ship disappear. Thereafter, word reached Imperial Headquarters that a secret weapon had been discovered.³³

Lieutenant Colonel Naomichi Jin, a staff officer at Imperial General Headquarters and a Japanese intelligence officer on Okinawa during the war, explained to his interrogators, “I think there were four main reasons” the Japanese used suicide units:

- (1) There were no prospects of victory in the air by employment of orthodox methods.
- (2) Suicide attacks were more effective because of the power of impact of the plane was added to that of the bomb, besides which the exploding gasoline caused fire – further, achievement of the proper angle effected greater speed and accuracy than that of normal bombing.
- (3) Suicide attacks provided spiritual inspiration to the ground units and to the Japanese public at large.
- (4) Suicide attack was the only sure and reliable type of attack at the time such attacks were made (as they had to be) with personnel whose training had been limited because of shortage of fuel.³⁴

Lieutenant General Masakazu Kawabe, former Commanding General, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, and Director of *Kamikaze* Operations during the Philippine and Okinawa Campaigns, told his interrogators following the occupation of Japan, “The Japanese to the very end, believed that by spiritual means they could fight on equal terms with you, yet by any other comparison it would not appear equal. We believed our spiritual confidences in victory would balance any scientific advantages and we had no intention of giving up the fight.” General Kawabe also cautioned, “I wish to explain something, which is a very difficult thing and which you may not be able to

³³ Headquarters Army Air Forces, *Mission Accomplished: Interrogation of Japanese Industrial, Military, and Civil Leaders of World War II* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1946), 34. Cited hereafter as HAAF, *Mission Accomplished*.

³⁴ HAAF, *Mission Accomplished*, 34.

understand. You call our *Kamikaze* attacks ‘suicide’ attacks. This is a misnomer and we feel very badly about you calling them ‘suicide’ attacks. They were in no sense ‘suicide.’ The pilot did not start out on his mission with the intention of committing suicide. He looked upon himself as a human bomb, which would destroy a certain part of the enemy fleet for his country. They considered it a glorious thing, while suicide may not be so glorious.”³⁵ Based on their ethics and spiritual beliefs, *Kamikaze* pilots and the traditional Japanese soldier proved a very formidable adversary against the United States and its allies.

The Japanese Armed Forces

Major Sherwood F. Moran, a U.S. Marine interrogator who joined the Corps in 1942 at the age of 57, after spending his previous 20 years in Japan, described three groups of Japanese men whom he referred to as the true “hell-bent military:”

(1) Certain higher officers, professional fire-eaters, such as Admiral Suetsugu and General Araki, to mention just two; holding high motives according to their limited light, and thinking of nothing but the national prestige of a Greater Japan, and their Emperor’s expanding glory.

(2) Groups of younger officers, particularly of the army, itching for action, thinking they could “lick the world,” contemptuous of democracy and modern international obligations, whose only code they express with the phrase the “Imperial Way” (*Kodo*).

(3) Fanatics among the laymen, narrow super-patriots, ranting against any spirit of internationalism, taking the Emperor-myth literally, and witch-hunting for any who do not swallow it whole. The Black Dragon Society³⁶ with the elderly fanatic, Tomaya, in Tokyo, is a primary spark plug of this group.³⁷

³⁵ HAAF, *Mission Accomplished*, 35.

³⁶ The Black Dragon Society was a prominent paramilitary, ultra-nationalist right-wing group in Japan during the early to mid-1900s.

³⁷ Moran, “The Psychology of the Japanese,” NARA, 13.

Moran explained that these three groups would stop at nothing to accomplish their ends, even against their own government. In fact, a few years before the war, one of the young officers described above killed one of the highest officers in the army, the Inspector General of Military Training, with his own sword. The young officer declared the Inspector was negligent in his duties in that he did not adequately realize the grievous conditions into which the country was heading. Moreover, the young officer argued that in a time of emergency and danger to the fundamental principles of the Imperial Way, the Inspector had no right to hold a position of such importance in His Majesty's armed services. Regrettably, this group of "hell-bent" military fanatics supplied the leaders who controlled Japan during the Second World War and were responsible for selling the war to its people.³⁸

THE SHAME OF CAPTURE AND SURRENDER

While American forces succeeded in capturing and interrogating some Japanese prisoners, most soldiers fought to the death or committed hara-kiri (*seppuku*).³⁹ As the Imperial Army and Navy fell on the defensive and began to face defeat in all theaters of the war, groups of armed forces began to kill their fellow citizens and take their own lives in desperate acts of suicide. American soldiers witnessed the all-too-familiar "banzai charge" and the reluctance of Japanese soldiers to surrender in battle after battle, from Guadalcanal to Tokyo.⁴⁰

³⁸ Moran, "The Psychology of the Japanese," NARA, 13.

³⁹ Seppuku was the more elegant term for suicide according to the samurai code. Warriors would kill themselves by piercing their abdomen. In feudal times, this was the exclusive privilege of the nobles and samurai.

⁴⁰ Dower, 45.

On 9 July 1944, to the horror of American troops advancing on Saipan, mothers clutching their babies hurled themselves over the cliffs to avoid capture. Not only were there virtually no survivors of the 30,000 strong Japanese garrison on Saipan, two out of every three civilians – some 22,000 in all – also died.⁴¹ The Saipan operation, however, represented the Americans' first experience in the Pacific area in handling a large number of POWs, and they did it without developing a detailed plan before the campaign. Interrogators had to persuade a large percentage of the prisoners to come out of caves, dugouts, and other hiding places.⁴²

Several distinct beliefs influenced the decisions of Japanese soldiers and civilians regarding surrender and required a commensurate approach by interrogators. By and large, Japanese citizens feared their family and country would disown them and they would become outcasts. This belief system could be traced back to three contributing factors of daily life: *Shinto*, *Hoko*, and *Bushido*.⁴³

***Shinto* (Way of the Gods)**

Among the most prominent factors that shaped the attitude of the Japanese people was Shintoism, the native religion of Japan and the official state religion until the end of World War II. It involved the worship of several different *Kami* (gods). The term *Shinto*

⁴¹ David Powers, "Japan: No Surrender in World War Two," *BBC* (June 2001), online report, URL: <www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/japan_no_surrender_01.shtml>, accessed 22 February 2007. Cited hereafter as Powers, "No Surrender in World War Two."

⁴² W.A. Tracy, Captain, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Assistant Ground Adjutant General, memorandum to the Commanding General, subject: "Intelligence Extracts of Special Action Reports - Saipan," 319.1/172, 24 January 1945; Correspondence and Reports Relating to the Operation of Language Schools, 1943 – 1949; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD, 3. Cited hereafter as Tracy, "Intelligence Extracts of Special Action Reports - Saipan," 319.1/172, NARA.

⁴³ "The Psychology of Surrender and the Psychological Approach to Interrogation," 14 August 1946; Office of the Director of Intelligence Correspondence and Reports; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD, 2. Cited hereafter as "The Psychology of Surrender and the Psychological Approach to Interrogation," NARA.

was coined in the sixth century using the Chinese characters *shen* (divine being) and *tao* (the way). As such, *Shinto* is commonly translated as, “The Way of the Gods.” The origins of *Shinto* are blurred in the fog of the prehistory of Japan. The religion has no founder, no official sacred scriptures, and no fixed system or doctrine.⁴⁴ In effect, *Shinto* provided the underlying value orientation of the Japanese people that formed the foundation of their culture and overall way of thinking.

The *Kojiki*, referred to in English as the “Records of Ancient Matters,” maintained that the Japanese people were direct descendents of Amaterasu, the sun goddess, who created Japan. Amaterasu populated this “divine” nation through her direct descendant Jimmu, Japan’s first Emperor. According to mythology, Emperor Jimmu assumed the throne in 660 B.C. Fundamentally, therefore, the *Shinto* religion is based on the belief that the Japanese people are direct descendants of the sun goddess, and therefore divine. According to this belief, the Emperor was the highest-ranking divine person and thereby god of the Japanese people.

Hoko

Hoko, or the communal “spy-hostage” system, was the structure that made all members of every group of 10 neighboring houses punishable for a crime or the failure to report any wrongdoing. There was a “warden” for each house, each group of 10 houses, and each group of 100 houses. These wardens had to be acceptable to the police and were actually spy-hostages who ensured that all required measures were carried out.

Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai, a student at Columbia University in New York, wrote a doctoral dissertation centered on the functional organization, development structure, and operational mobilization of the *Hoko* system. Hui-Yu began the study by examining the

⁴⁴ *The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions*, 1997, under the term “*Shinto*.”

system as a political mechanism for social control. During peacetime, the system evolved into an “administrative base for local governments.” In the 1930s, Japan used the system as a vehicle for its wartime mobilization. Hui-Yu concludes, however, that the *Hoko* system should be regarded as a social organization as well as a political institution. As such, “the *Hoko* functioned largely within a moral society; the organization relied heavily on the mediating role of a local elite, which shared a set of values based on acknowledged status and established trust with the rest of society.” Consequently, “the system worked less for social reform than for social control and mobilization.”⁴⁵

***Bushido* (Way of the Samurai)**

Along with the religious foundation of Japanese culture, the Japanese developed a unique set of laws during the 11th and 13th centuries known as *Bushido*. This code of conduct involved blind loyalty to superiors, disregard of death in carrying out duty, and continuous attack climaxed by annihilating the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. It taught all Japanese from birth the principles of honor, courage, loyalty, the ability to endure pain, self-sacrifice, reverence for the Emperor and contempt of death.⁴⁶ The principles of the *Bushido* code formed an integral part of Japan’s national identity and its citizens were indoctrinated with the idea that to die for the Emperor was the most glorious achievement to which they could aspire.

A Japanese soldier captured in Myitkyina, Burma, on 7 August 1944 wrote an essay while under interrogation titled, “*Bushido* and the Japanese Prisoner of War” (see

⁴⁵ Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ ai, *One Kind of Control: The 'Hoko' System in Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945*, online Ph.D. Dissertation (New York: Columbia University, 1990), URL: <digitalcommons.libraries.columbia.edu/dissertations/AAI9127988/>, accessed 14 June 2007.

⁴⁶ Nakasone, 75.

Appendix A). The essay expressed his personal views, which illustrated the outlook of one Japanese POW and how he reconciled it with the fact of becoming a prisoner. He wrote, “This ‘*Bushido*,’ which was developed in an age when contact with foreign nations was not even thought of, arose out of necessity in fighting against small forces whose weapons were limited to the simple sword.” However, the prisoner questioned whether this code applied to soldiers fighting the technically superior allied forces during World War II. He continued, “According to ‘*Bushido*,’ to become a prisoner of war is a great disgrace. But is it logical to die, simply because it is a disgrace?” The prisoner concluded, “The nation’s future can never be assured with this kind of thinking. The nation and its people must consider the position of a prisoner of war, who as a Japanese soldier, fought valiantly, even down to the last man, and who, on becoming prisoner, lost all freedom” (see Appendix A for a complete transcript of the essay).⁴⁷

Because of the teachings of *Shinto*, *Hoko*, and *Bushido*, the Japanese soldier did not even consider surrender until the instinct of self-preservation overcame his beliefs. As is evident from the small number of Japanese prisoners taken during the war, the majority of Japanese soldiers preferred death to capture. Those who did surrender always feared the unknown, and many believed that Americans would kill or torture them.

FEAR OF TORTURE

In a report dated June 1945, the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) noted that 84 percent of one group of interrogated Japanese prisoners (many of them injured or

⁴⁷ South-East Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, “Interrogation Bulletin No. 1,” 19 December 1944; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD, 1. Cited hereafter as South-East Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, “Interrogation Bulletin No. 1,” NARA.

unconscious when captured) said that they had expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken prisoner. The OWI analyst described this as typical, and concluded that fear of the consequences of surrender, “rather than *Bushido*,” was the motivation for many Japanese battle deaths in hopeless circumstances.⁴⁸ As such, fear of torture may have contributed equally or even more than the previously mentioned factors.

Evidence obtained through interrogation of enemy prisoners suggested this fear was not a result of propaganda by the Japanese military, but instead arose because most Japanese soldiers had previously served in China and witnessed atrocities firsthand.⁴⁹ The Japanese truly believed the Chinese guerilla forces took no prisoners, and that those captured were tortured and put to death. The Japanese considered the Chinese to be masters in the art of torture. After training and serving under these conditions in China for years, as many Japanese soldiers had, it is hardly surprising that these troops expected such a fate, regardless of the opponent.

Actions by U.S. Marine and Army soldiers did little to change this perception. Reports indicated the Japanese were known to come out of the jungle unarmed with their hands raised above their heads, crying, “Mercy, mercy,” only to be mowed down by machine-gun fire.⁵⁰ In many battles, neither U.S. soldiers nor their commanders wanted to take POWs. This was not official policy; however, it was common practice in the Pacific. On one occasion, a Marine Raider Battalion on patrol stumbled across a Japanese hospital bivouac area and killed over 400, including patients and corpsmen.

⁴⁸ Dower, 68.

⁴⁹ Burden, “Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners in the Southwest Pacific: Intelligence Memo No. 4,” NARA, 10.

⁵⁰ Burden, “Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners in the Southwest Pacific: Intelligence Memo No. 4,” NARA, 10.

During this attack, U.S. Marines took no prisoners. American forces justified this behavior on the basis of stories of Japanese treachery. It was rumored that Japanese soldiers would approach American lines indicating surrender and ultimately attack using hand grenades when U.S. forces were in range. Another story told of a wounded Japanese soldier who drew a grenade from his pocket while being transported on a stretcher by four American soldiers, and pulled the pin to detonate the device.⁵¹

CONCLUSION

During World War II, the conflict in Asia differed greatly from that in Europe, for Japan was considered to be a “racial menace” as well as a cultural and religious one. If Japan proved victorious in the Pacific, there would be “perpetual war between Oriental ideals and Occidental.”⁵² At the time, the conflict was perceived as a true clash of civilizations.

The United States thus faced the dilemma of understanding how this enemy would behave in a time of war and beyond. The “divine” citizens of Japan truly believed they were a superior race and forged a powerful sense of super-patriotism. They were raised in a society that prohibited free thought and one in which outside influence was severely limited based on strict immigration laws. The addition of national loyalty to the Emperor and a strong sense of military fanaticism created a cohesive nation whose morale and spirit seemed impossible to undermine.

⁵¹ Burden, “Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners in the Southwest Pacific: Intelligence Memo No. 4,” NARA, 10.

⁵² Dower, 7.

U.S. military interrogators confronted the remarkably difficult challenge of harvesting vital intelligence from an enemy who would rather fight to the death or commit *hara-kari* (ritualized form of suicide) to avoid capture. A thorough understanding of the rich cultural history and psychology of the Japanese was critical to the collection of human intelligence and to the successful prosecution of the Second World War and the Allied occupation that followed.

CHAPTER 4

SECRET SOLDIERS: JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERROGATORS SERVING IN THE U.S. ARMY DURING WORLD WAR II

One of the great lessons that the Army learned from the last war is the tremendous value of intelligence. Lack of knowledge of the enemy can lead to catastrophe. Efforts to increase have led to the establishment of many agencies and specialties, which were little known prior to the war. These consist of the techniques of photographic interpretation, prisoner of war interrogation, exploitation of signal intelligence, the use of airplanes to gain information, Counterintelligence Corps activities, operation behind the enemy lines, and your own specialty of language interpretation. Each one of these specialties has played a vital role in winning the war, and it is not exaggerated to say that the rapid progression of military events in the Pacific was assisted in no small measure by the timely and accurate intelligence produced by Japanese linguists, most of whom are graduates of this school.

- - Graduation Speech Provided to the Final Class of Military Intelligence Service Language School Students, Fort Snelling, Minnesota, 8 June 1946

FORECASTING LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a small group of U.S. Army officers working within the War Department's General Staff recognized that few Americans, military or civilian, could speak the Japanese language. As tensions rose between the United States and Japan, these former language officers realized the United States needed qualified Japanese linguists if the country were to successfully prosecute a war against Japan. Japanese officers had boasted the security of Japanese military documents posed no problem at all, as occidentals could never learn to read or write Japanese, especially

the abbreviated style of writing known as *sosho* (Japanese “fluid grass” style of writing).⁵³

As tensions escalated, the military had little time to train non-Japanese speaking personnel. In June 1941, Major Carlisle C. Dusenbury, a former Japanese language student working in the Intelligence Division of the War Department, suggested using *Nisei* to solve the linguist problem. Lieutenant Colonel Wallace Moore, a former missionary who had served in Japan, agreed and subsequently planned the organization of the Army’s first Japanese language school.⁵⁴

The decision to employ *Nisei* personnel was considered risky since many in the United States, including senior leadership within the Department of the Navy, felt they were not trustworthy. Like other Americans, *Nisei* were subject to the draft of 1940, and many were serving in the Army when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Shortly after the attack, many *Nisei* soldiers were discharged and reclassified as enemy aliens. Additionally, after the war broke out, some *Nisei* learned that their family members were trapped in Japan for the remainder of the war. Although they were American citizens, the Japanese government treated them as Japanese nationals and many were forced to serve in the Japanese armed forces.⁵⁵

To inaugurate the new school, Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) John Weckerling, a linguist and former military attaché in Tokyo, was recalled from duty in

⁵³ “The Military Intelligence Service Language School,” NARA, 2.

⁵⁴ Richard S. Oguro, *Sempai Gumi: Manuscript Collection of the First Group of Americans of Japanese Ancestry from Hawaii and American Concentration Camps to Attend Army Language School at Camp Savage, Minnesota*, Library of Etsu and Mike Masaoka and the University of Utah Libraries, Salt Lake City, Utah, 42.

⁵⁵ Ulrich Straus, *Anguish of Surrender: Japanese POWs of World War II* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 95 – 96.

Panama. His assistant, Captain (later Colonel) Kai Rasmussen, a West Point graduate, had also served as a military attaché in Tokyo.⁵⁶ Since the majority of Japanese-Americans lived on the West Coast of the United States at the time, Colonel Weckerling and Captain Rasmussen decided to open the school in California. Their first task was to locate and recruit qualified students.

In a survey of nearly 4,000 *Nisei*, Colonel Weckerling and Captain Rasmussen discovered that very few had advanced language skills. It was soon evident that many *Nisei* had become “too” Americanized and that those who did speak Japanese had little or no training in military vocabulary or special forms of Japanese writing. On one of the screening tours of *Nisei* already serving in the military they discovered John Fujio Aiso, who was very proficient in Japanese. Aiso was a cum laude graduate of Brown University and received a juris doctorate from Harvard. He had studied legal Japanese at Chuo University while working as an attorney for British businesses in Japan. Ironically, the U.S. Army was using him as an enlisted mechanic in a motor maintenance battalion, although he knew little about mechanics. Weckerling and Rasmussen chose Aiso as their Director of Academic Training.⁵⁷ Aiso became the heart and soul of the new school, bringing his language skills and cultural understanding of his Japanese ancestors. In addition to Aiso, Weckerling and Rasmussen discovered three other highly qualified Japanese-American civilians eager to help launch the new school: Akira Oshida, Tetsuo Imagawa, and Shigeya Kihara.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Lyn Crost, *Honor by Fire: Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1994), 22.

⁵⁷ Crost, 23.

⁵⁸ Crost, 23.

FOURTH ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

On 1 November 1941, the Fourth Army Intelligence School began operations in an abandoned airplane hanger on Crissy Field, adjoining San Francisco Bay at the Presidio of San Francisco. The War Department began its first Japanese language course with eight instructors and 60 students. Fifty-eight of the students were *Nisei*, and two were Caucasians who had studied Japanese at the University of California and the University of Washington.⁵⁹ The War Department allocated a meager \$2,000 budget for the new program and essentials needed for instruction were extremely scarce.⁶⁰



Figure 4-1. *Nisei* Soldiers of the Military Intelligence Service at their Lessons in the Former Airmail Hangar at Crissy Field

Source: National Park Service, *Presidio of San Francisco*,
URL: <www.nps.gov/archive/prsf/history/crissy/misls.htm>, accessed 20 May 07.

Thirty-six days after classes began, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Immediately following the attack, the War Department issued an order that *Nisei* were not allowed to serve overseas. The policy would have crippled the Army's effort to

⁵⁹ "The Military Intelligence Service Language School," NARA, 4.

⁶⁰ Nobuo Furuiye and Clarke M. Brandt, *I am MIS*, (Aurora: Defense Printing Service, 1999), 17.

employ *Nisei* linguists, so in response, advocates on the G-2 staff fought back and the War Department rescinded the order, allowing the new school to proceed as planned.

In May 1942, the first class graduated 45 of its 60 original students; 15 dropped the program after failing to meet academic standards. The Army deployed all but 10 of the enlisted students to combat zones in small teams. The remaining 10, all *Kibei* (a *Nisei* sent by his or her parents at a young age to be educated in Japan), stayed on as instructors.⁶¹ The foundation of the Army's language program rested on the rich heritage and cultural experience of these original *Kibei* instructors.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066: RESULTING IN THE RELOCATION OF JAPANESE

On 19 February 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the infamous Executive Order 9066 authorizing the internment of Japanese-Americans. Shortly thereafter, all American citizens of Japanese descent were prohibited from living, working, or traveling on the Pacific Coast of the United States. Initially, the exclusion was designed to be a voluntary relocation, but the policy failed, and eventually the U.S. Army forcibly removed these citizens from their homes. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the Fourth Army's West Coast military commander responsible for ordering the evacuation was quoted as saying, "A Jap is a Jap. It makes no difference whether the Jap is a citizen or not."⁶²

Many of the citizens who were removed were eventually allowed to leave the camps to join the Army, attend college, or pursue private employment outside the West

⁶¹ Furuiye and Brandt, 18.

⁶² "The Japanese-Americans," *The Washington Post (1974-Current file)*, 15 July 1981, A22, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 16 January 2007.

Coast. In fact, over 33,000 Japanese-Americans served in the armed forces, many of them serving honorably in the Military Intelligence Service (MIS).⁶³ A larger number of internees spent the war years behind barbed wire until the order was lifted in December 1944. Executive Order 9066 ultimately led to the detention of 120,000 Japanese-Americans and Japanese residents of the United States. This made the task of recruiting additional students and instructors from within the military and civilian communities extremely challenging.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING CENTER: CAMP RITCHIE, MARYLAND

On 19 June 1942, shortly after President Roosevelt signed E.O. 9066, the War Department activated the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC), Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to offer specialized intelligence training for qualified commissioned and enlisted personnel (including *Nisei*). The regular course of instruction was eight weeks long and divided into three sections: General Instruction, Specialized Instruction, and Terrain Exercises.⁶⁴

The “general instruction” consisted of basic military intelligence training provided to all students as follows:⁶⁵

⁶³ “The Japanese-Americans,” 15 July 1981.

⁶⁴ Charles Y. Banfill, Brigadier General, Commandant, Military Intelligence Training Center, G-2, memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, subject: “Brief of Pertinent Facts and Data Concerning the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland,” 3 June 1944; Training Records of the MITC; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD. Cited hereafter as Banfill, “Brief of Pertinent Facts and Data Concerning the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland,” NARA.

⁶⁵ Banfill, “Brief of Pertinent Facts and Data Concerning the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland,” NARA, 2.

1. Terrain Intelligence	50 hours
2. Signal Intelligence	25 hours
3. Staff Duties	51 hours
4. Counterintelligence in Theater of Operation	21 hours
5. Enemy Armies	42 hours
6. Aerial Photo Interpretation	28 hours
7. Military Intelligence Interpreters and Foreign Maps	28 hours
8. Combat and Operations	27 hours
9. Visual Demonstration	Included above
10. Order of Battle	Included above

The “specialized instruction” consisted of unique training given to qualified groups concurrently with the “general instruction,” which included 82 hours of instruction in the following areas:⁶⁶

1. Interrogation of Enemy Prisoners of War and Identification and Translation of Documents
2. Aerial Photo Interpretation
3. Military Intelligence Interpreters (Allied and neutral)
4. Terrain Intelligence
5. Signal Intelligence

After 265 hours of general instruction and 82 hours of specialized training, students participated in an eight day “terrain exercise.” During this training period, students completed 20 intelligence-related problem and solution exercises, a 48-hour patrol, and night compass training. Student assumed the roles of various intelligence positions and rotated through each position to enable diverse training.⁶⁷

The “Visual Demonstration Section” of the training center was particularly interesting. The section was comprised of professional actors who presented a number of theatrical demonstrations to emphasize the most important intelligence lessons. Among the performances was one play focused on POW interrogation designed to illustrate the

⁶⁶ Banfill, “Brief of Pertinent Facts and Data Concerning the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland,” NARA, 2.

⁶⁷ Banfill, “Brief of Pertinent Facts and Data Concerning the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland,” NARA, 2.

correct and incorrect methods of search, segregation, and interrogation. By June 1944, the War Department provided this production to approximately 150,000 personnel in Army Maneuver Areas, Special Service Schools, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and the U.S. Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia.⁶⁸

Another production presented by the Visual Demonstration Section staff was a three scene play titled, "A Scrap of Paper." Among the cast were a Caucasian Language/Interrogation Team Captain and a *Nisei* Language/Interrogation Team Sergeant. The stage was set on the island of Formosa (Taiwan). At the beginning of the play, the lights in the theater were dimmed and a spotlight illuminated a Japanese soldier standing center stage at the position of attention. The announcer began:⁶⁹

This is a Jap! This is the enemy! Perhaps the chief weapon a soldier can have against his enemy is knowledge of him. This demonstration penetrates into some aspects of his thinking and behavior. The Jap is a person! The Jap is a soldier (the lights fade and the soldier disappears).

This is a story of a scrap of paper...a Japanese attack order, from the moment it was written to the time when information obtained from it aided our forces in reducing a vital enemy strong-point. Observe the Japanese military behavior, his relationship to people, both his own and others. Watch how a Language Team handles a Japanese prisoner. Notice how the various Intelligence agencies operate in close liaison to make more effective their individual jobs. Observe all this..."

As the play progresses, the storyline demonstrates the emphasis military leaders placed on humane treatment of Japanese prisoners and the vital of importance of the *Nisei* to the war and their loyalty to America. During one exchange between the Caucasian

⁶⁸ Banfill, "Brief of Pertinent Facts and Data Concerning the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland," NARA, 4.

⁶⁹ "A Scrap of Paper," M14.1, 30 May 1945; Training Records of the MITC; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD. Cited hereafter as "A Scrap of Paper," M14.1, NARA.

interrogator and another U.S. military officer, the interrogator said, “You can’t interrogate a Jap as you would an Italian or a German...here, our humaneness must be shown. Kindness...just...simple kindness...that’s how you get a Jap to talk.”⁷⁰ Equally important, this play illustrates a unique method of training presented to U.S. service members during the Second World War (see Appendix B for a complete script of the play).

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE LANGUAGE SCHOOL: CAMP SAVAGE

Because of Executive Order 9066, the Fourth Army Intelligence School was forced to move to Camp Savage, Minnesota, in June of 1941. In fact, the school had outgrown its facilities at the Presidio of San Francisco and needed to relocate to a community that would accept Japanese-American citizens. With the exception of Governor Harold Stassen of Minnesota, every western state governor rejected the transfer of Japanese-Americans to their areas.⁷¹ Colonel Rasmussen, the school’s Commandant, said, “We needed room – not just physical room, but room in people’s hearts. We could work here without interruption, or prejudice, or bias.”⁷²

The War Department assumed control of the institution and renamed it the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS). The Army recalled Colonel Weckerling to Washington to serve on the intelligence staff and Captain Rasmussen remained in charge of the school. The MISLS was charged with:

⁷⁰ “A Scrap of Paper,” M14.1, NARA, 20.

⁷¹ Crost, 25.

⁷² “Eyes and Ears of Allied Pacific Drive: Nisei Won Spurs – and Medals,” *ProQuest Historical Newspapers Christian Science Monitor (1908-1993)*, 9 Nov 1945, 11, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 17 January 2007.

1. Operating a Japanese language school at Camp Savage to prepare Interpreter-Interrogator Translator Teams and individual Japanese linguists for duty with United States field forces and other special assignments as directed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
2. Operating a radio station at Camp Savage to train personnel in radio intercept, radio monitoring, and voice broadcast.
3. Operating an Army language school at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor to provide officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men with instruction in the Japanese language prior to assignment at Camp Savage.
4. Providing intelligence training to educate intelligence specialists in their duties as intelligence team members (i.e., the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military intelligence).
5. Conducting courses in specialized intelligence.
6. Coordinating activities with sister and allied services.
7. Making certain students, previously approved by the G-2, available for special missions.
8. Maintaining a complete up-to-date intelligence library on activities in all Pacific Theaters.
9. Conducting experiments in order to develop new methods of intelligence procedure and instruction techniques, offering a basis for improvement.
10. Maintaining a pool of trained language officers.⁷³

The greatest challenge the MISLS faced after moving to Camp Savage was locating and recruiting an adequate number of students to carry on the recently expanded program. Evacuation from the West Coast had been completed and thousands of Japanese-Americans were relocated to internment camps across the United States.

Within these relocation camps, loyal *Nisei* and pro-Japanese elements found themselves

⁷³ Clayton Bissell, Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, memorandum to the Commandant, Military Intelligence Service Language School, subject: "Policy Directive, Military Intelligence Service Language School," MID 908, 22 March 1944; Office of the Director of Intelligence Correspondence and Reports; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD.

in violent conflict over support for the war. Pro-Japanese elements apparently dominated the relocation centers and loyal *Nisei* were reluctant to volunteer for Army service. Furthermore, the *Nisei* felt that placing them and their families in camps surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by armed soldiers, violated their rights as American citizens. After the War Department implemented the policy of recruiting of Japanese-American volunteers, many believed the school would never meet its projected goals.⁷⁴

RECRUITMENT OF NISEI LINGUISTS

The military's need to recruit personnel proficient in the Japanese language for use as translators and interrogators had reached a critical stage. Japanese was arguably one of the most difficult languages in the world and very few Caucasian-Americans were proficient. Moreover, almost no one was qualified to translate the language.

Based on experience gained in the training and utilization of *Nisei* interpreter, translator, and interrogation teams in the school's first year, along with reports and observations from the Pacific Theaters, the Army estimated that unfilled future demands would reach about 650 Caucasian officers and 2,850 enlisted. The enlisted estimates were based primarily on *Nisei* personnel, and included expected casualties and necessary replacements.⁷⁵ The total suggested a coming shift of U.S. strength toward Japan and away from Europe. It included the need for a source of qualified personnel who could

⁷⁴ "The Military Intelligence Service Language School," NARA, 6.

⁷⁵ Kai E. Rasmussen, Colonel, Commandant, MISLS, memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, subject: "Future Requirements of Language Specialists (Japanese)," 20 March 1944; Office of the Director of Intelligence Correspondence and Reports; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD.

support additional establishments within the United States that were vital to the war effort.

By early 1943, the Army had furnished Japanese linguists to Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the U.S. Marine Corps, and others who lacked qualified personnel. The War Department conservatively projected that specially selected Caucasian-Americans required at least two years to learn the language well enough to meet military requirements.⁷⁶ However, the U.S. Navy would prove that qualified linguists could be trained in 12 months; see Chapter 5.

Nisei living in the United States and Hawaii formed the only pool from which future linguists could be drawn without the unacceptable, long-term training delay. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, approximately 126,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were living in the continental United States and 157,000 in Hawaii. In early 1944 the War Department estimated there were about 900 male Japanese-Americans suitable for intelligence training from all untapped sources.⁷⁷ They also believed Japanese-American soldiers would find genuine acceptance as translators, interpreters, and interrogators in combat areas overseas, as well as in offices within the United States.

Given these statistics, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence urged the senior staff to exercise great care so that the small fraction of personnel qualified for development as interrogators and translators be reserved for this purpose. There were no

⁷⁶ Clayton Bissell, Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, memorandum to the Chief of Staff, subject: "Procurement of Personnel Proficient in Japanese Language for Employment as Translators, Interpreters and Interrogators," MID 350.03 (Japanese), 22 March 1944; Office of the Director of Intelligence Correspondence and Reports; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Records Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD. Cited hereafter as Bissell, "Procurement of Personnel Proficient in Japanese Language for Employment as Translators, Interpreters and Interrogators," MID 350.03 (Japanese), NARA.

⁷⁷ Bissell, "Procurement of Personnel Proficient in Japanese Language for Employment as Translators, Interpreters and Interrogators," MID 350.03 (Japanese), NARA.

other practical solutions for meeting the U.S. Army's requirement for such specialists. However, the War Department did propose the use of Japanese-American women to replace male translators in the United States and theater rear areas.⁷⁸ The Army estimated that they could obtain 300 qualified Japanese-American women for this purpose and on 10 April 1944 the Secretary of War approved the recommendation.⁷⁹ Shortly thereafter, the Army recruited the first *Nisei* women into the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and assigned them to the MISLS at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, where the school relocated in August 1944, after outgrowing its space at Camp Savage. Following graduation, several remained at the school as instructors; others were assigned to Camp Ritchie, Maryland, at the Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section (PACMIRS), and later, to a document translation center in Washington, D.C., where they worked with translators from allied countries deciphering Japanese diaries, journals, manuals, and books. After the war ended, 11 *Nisei* WAACs served in Japan at the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS), a joint U.S. and Australian intelligence function under the command of General MacArthur.⁸⁰

Eventually, between the male and female *Nisei*, the Army had enough volunteers to meet its requirements. The loyal *Nisei* who did volunteer confronted both emotional and physical hardships: in many cases, their *Issei* (first-generation) parents disowned them and pro-Japanese elements within the relocation centers physically attacked them because of their decision. Regardless, they reported by the hundreds. Many of the early

⁷⁸ Bissell, "Procurement of Personnel Proficient in Japanese Language for Employment as Translators, Interpreters and Interrogators," MID 350.03 (Japanese), NARA.

⁷⁹ Bissell, "Procurement of Personnel Proficient in Japanese Language for Employment as Translators, Interpreters and Interrogators," MID 350.03 (Japanese), NARA.

⁸⁰ Brenda L. Moore, *Serving our Country: Japanese American Women in the Military During World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 93 – 123.

volunteers were well over the age of 30, fluent in Japanese, and had an intense desire to clear themselves of any suspicions of disloyalty to America.⁸¹

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE LANGUAGE SCHOOL: FORT SNELLING

By the time the MISLS moved from Camp Savage to Fort Snelling, Minnesota, the Army's recruiting efforts had paid off and the school had nearly 3,000 students: primarily *Nisei*, although there were Caucasian officer candidates and a few enlisted men of Chinese and Korean descent. The teaching staff included 162 civilian and military members and was composed entirely of *Nisei* born in the United States or the Hawaiian Islands.⁸² The campus consisted of 125 classrooms along with the usual administrative support facilities and barracks. In addition to the language training section, the school had translation, research, and liaison sections.



Figure 4-2. Japanese-American Language Students at Fort Snelling

Source: Minnesota Historical Society, *Loyal Linguists*, URL: <www.mnhs.org/market/mhspress/MinnesotaHistory/FeaturedArticles/4507273-287/index.htm>, accessed 20 May 2007.

⁸¹ "The Military Intelligence Service Language School," NARA, 6.

⁸² "The Military Intelligence Service Language School," NARA, 7.

The MISLS routine and classroom studies were extremely demanding and constituted total immersion in the Japanese language. When students arrived at the school, they were immediately given language aptitude tests and then divided into 22 different class levels. The curriculum consisted of translation of textbooks from Japanese to English; learning military terminology; interrogating POWs (role-playing); translating intercepted radio communications and captured documents; and learning about Japanese culture, customs, and national characteristics (see Figure 4-3).⁸³

<i>Course Title</i>	<i>Content</i>
Naganuma reader	Reading and translation
<i>Heigo</i> (Japanese military terms) readers	Introductory course
Sakuson Yomurei (field service regulations)	Reading and translation
Cyo Senjutso (applied tactics)	Reading and translation
Interrogation and interpretation	Military procedures
Captured documents	Military procedures
Grammar, Japanese	Colloquial
Grammar, Japanese	Literary
Grammar, English	Basic course for those requiring it
<i>Sosho</i> (Japanese fluid grass writing)	A form of shorthand
<i>Kanji</i>	Characters and dictation
Japanese geography	Basic geography
<i>Heigo</i>	Lectures in English and Japanese
American military terms	Reading and interpretation
Conversation, Japanese	Basic course for those requiring it
Japanese-English and English-Japanese translation	Reading and translation
Radio Monitoring	Military procedures
Interception of messages	Military procedures
Lectures on Japanese society	History, politics, military, etc.

Figure 4-3. Military Intelligence Service Language School Courses

Source: Moore, 120.

⁸³ Grant Hirabayashi, graduate of the Military Intelligence Service Language School and Military Intelligence Service interrogator during World War II, interview by the author, 27 January 2007. Cited hereafter as Hirabayashi, interview by the author, 27 January 2007.

Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., were devoted to classroom instruction. The staff reserved Saturdays for examinations and the “school of the soldier” – traditional military-related training.⁸⁴ In preparation for examinations, many students stayed up well past their 10:00 p.m. “lights out” curfew to resume their studies in the latrine. “At one time, they had to place a guard [at the latrine], to accommodate those who went there for legitimate reasons,” recalled Sergeant Grant Hirabayashi, a veteran World War II interrogator and a 1942 graduate of the school.⁸⁵ Sunday was a day of rest.

By the end of the war, nearly 6,000 interpreters and interrogators had completed advanced military intelligence and language training at the MISLS. Most of the students were Japanese-American, including a number of female *Nisei* volunteers who served in the WAAC. Upon graduation, these linguists were ordered to various assignments within the Military Intelligence Service, the predecessor of the current U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Their duties consisted of interrogation, translation, radio intercept, radio monitoring, and psychological warfare. Graduates worked quietly with American combat teams at Guadalcanal, Attu, New Georgia, New Britain, the Philippines, Okinawa, Burma, India, China, and Tokyo itself during the occupation (see Figure 4-4). Their efforts saved countless lives and accelerated the U.S. victory in the Pacific.

⁸⁴ Nakasone, 58.

⁸⁵ Hirabayashi, interview by the author, 27 January 2007.




Figure 4-4. South-West Pacific Area During World War II

Source: Australia @ War, *South West Pacific Area During WWII*,
 URL: <home.st.net.au/~dunn/swpa.htm>, accessed 20 May 2007.

In July 1946, the school returned to what would be its final home at the Presidio of Monterey, the current home of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. During a graduation ceremony, Major General Clayton Bissell, Chief of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, after reviewing the exploits of MISLS graduates, said, “If you Japanese-Americans are ever questioned as to your loyalty, don’t even bother to reply. The magnificent work of the graduates of the Military Intelligence Service Language School in the field has been seen by your fellow Americans of many racial extractions. Their testimony to your gallant deeds under fire will speak so loudly that you need not answer.”⁸⁶

⁸⁶ “The Military Intelligence Service Language School,” NARA, 7.

**SERGEANT GRANT JIRO HIRABAYASHI:
MISLS, CLASS NO. SAV '42-12**



Figure 4-5. Grant Jiro Hirabayashi, Chungking, China, 1945

Source: Library of Congress, *Experiencing War: Grant Jiro Hirabayashi*,
URL: <lcweb2.loc.gov/cocoon/vhp-stories/loc.natlib.afc2001001.28498/>,
accessed 20 May 2007.

One distinguished MISLS alumnus, Sergeant Grant Hirabayashi, a top graduate of the class of 1942 at Camp Savage, shared his experiences as an American of Japanese ancestry serving the Army as a Military Intelligence Service interrogator during World War II. Hirabayashi, a native of Kent, Washington, enlisted in the U.S. Army Air Corps three days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with hopes of becoming an airplane mechanic.⁸⁷ When he reported to Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis, Missouri, the Army placed him in protective custody and confined him along with 22 other Japanese-American soldiers. This was necessary since Caucasian service members harassed the *Nisei*, forcing the Army to segregate them into separate examination rooms. It also provided the FBI an opportunity to conduct background investigations to determine if the

⁸⁷ Hirabayashi interview by the author, 27 January 2007. This section was derived entirely, unless otherwise noted, from the aforementioned interview with Mr. Hirabayashi.

Nisei posed a threat to national security. At the time, the U.S. government had discharged numerous Japanese-American service members and reclassified them as enemy aliens. The Army stripped those who remained, like Hirabayashi, of their weapons and relegated them to menial jobs until the background investigations were complete.

After 40 days, the Army released Hirabayashi and assigned him to his unit, where he worked as a flight clerk and a plans and training technician. In mid-1942, Hirabayashi was released from the Air Corps and reassigned to Fort Leavenworth Station Hospital, Kansas, where he served as a sick and wounded clerk. Unfortunately, he was never able to attend airplane mechanic school. Shortly after beginning his new job, Hirabayashi received a letter from Colonel Kai Rasmussen, Commandant of the MISLS at Camp Savage, Minnesota, asking for his resume with an emphasis on his Japanese language education.

Hirabayashi was a *Kibei* (an American citizen of Japanese ancestry who received his primary education in Japan before returning to the United States). When he was a young boy living in Washington State, he had a conversation with two of his closest friends about their experiences visiting Japan during summer vacation. They talked about how the Japanese drove on the wrong side of the street, slept on the floor, took off their shoes when they entered their houses and used an abacus to perform mathematical operations. This discussion aroused his curiosity and inspired him to travel to Japan himself to have the same experience his friends had. After much determination, he finally convinced his father to send him to *chugakko* (Japanese middle school) with the understanding he would study for two years in Japan. When young Grant entered

chugakko, his father told him his return ticket would be forthcoming after he finished school. In 1940, after eight years of education in Japan, he graduated. At the time, his brother, who was attending Kyoto Imperial University, warned him relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and that Grant should return home, which he did.

Shortly after receiving the request from Colonel Rasmussen, Hirabayashi mailed off his resume and was subsequently reassigned to the MISLS at Camp Savage. After six months of intense language, culture, and intelligence-related training he applied for leave to visit his family. Regrettably, his parents and siblings were no longer living at home in Washington State. Soon after the war broke out on 7 December 1941, they had been forcibly evacuated to the Tule Lake internment camp in the desert of northern California – the largest and most controversial of the ten War Relocation Authority camps used to carry out the U.S. government’s system of exclusion and detention of persons of Japanese descent.

When Hirabayashi arrived at the camp, he was shocked to see rows and rows of tarpaper barracks behind a perimeter of barbed wire. The feature that troubled him most was that the armed sentries who were guarding the compound were wearing the same uniform he was and facing inward instead of out. Although his visit was brief, he described this event as one of the most unpleasant experiences of his life.

Understandably, he was very confused to find himself, an American soldier who had taken an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and fight for liberty and justice, agonizing over the treatment of his family. Remarkably, his parents encouraged him to serve honorably and do his part as an American citizen in defending the nation. It

was after this visit, that Hirabayashi said he understood the true meaning of freedom and completely realized the challenge ahead.

After returning from leave, Hirabayashi relocated to Fort Snelling along with several other recent MISLS graduates awaiting overseas assignment. Shortly after his arrival, he learned about a call for volunteers for what President Franklin D. Roosevelt described as “a dangerous and hazardous mission.” Over 200 graduates stepped forward to answer the call and the Army selected Hirabayashi, along with 13 other Japanese-Americans, based on their physical stamina and command of the Japanese language. These men were selected to serve in the Burma Campaign under the command of Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill. The unit was christened “Merrill’s Marauders” and officially designated the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) – code named *Galahad*.

Merrill’s Marauders were an elite commando unit responsible for clearing North Burma of Japanese military forces and capturing the town of Myitkyina and its strategic airfield. Control of the town ensured the free flow of war materials by air and surface to Chinese nationalist forces. Over seven months, the Marauders fought their way through 700 miles of Burmese jungle and achieved their mission. They defeated the Japanese 18th Division, the conquerors of Malaya and Singapore, in five decisive battles and over 30 smaller engagements.

Armed with his firsthand knowledge of the Japanese language and culture, along with the intense training he received at MISLS, Hirabayashi served General Merrill as a Military Intelligence Service interrogator responsible for collecting enemy information crucial to the successful prosecution of the Burma campaign. Surprisingly, he was nearly disqualified from combat duty after discovering that he was allergic to K-rations, the

primary source of sustenance for an Army soldier, and he fractured his arm during jungle warfare training in India. When the unit declared he was unfit for combat duty, Hirabayashi pleaded with his commanding officer to be allowed to stay on, a request that eventually was granted.



Figure 4-6. China-Burma-India Theater During World War II

Source: World War II CBI Theater Maps, *China-Burma-India*,
 URL: <cbi-theater-7.home.comcast.net/maps/_Map_Main.html>, accessed 20 May 2007.

Throughout the campaign, Hirabayashi interrogated dozens of enemy prisoners. His approach was simple; he always treated POWs with kindness and dignity. First, he made sure prisoners received the proper medical care. He frequently offered them cigarettes and asked if they had heard from their families and been able to communicate with them. Many wept because of this unexpected treatment. Hirabayashi explained that

prisoners truly believed that American soldiers were going to kill them and noted that the POWs were completely unaware of the rights afforded to them under the rules of international law, codified in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929 (the Geneva Convention of 1929). The convention set guidelines on how POWs were to be treated by their captors. The United States ratified this convention and recognized the rights of all prisoners. The Japanese, however, decided not to ratify the treaty because, “according to the Imperial soldier’s belief, it was contrary to all expectations that he might become a prisoner” – a belief codified in Japanese *Bushido*.⁸⁸ The Japanese believed that while the international treaty was technically reciprocal, in practice only Japan would have to assume obligations under the treaty. Japan would have to provide food and housing for prisoners, while other countries were spared this obligation since there would be no Japanese prisoners. In their eyes, this made the Geneva Convention a unilateral agreement.⁸⁹

Hirabayashi explained that throughout his time as a student in the Japanese school system he had never once heard about the Geneva Convention and explained, “[Students] were always told to destroy themselves before they were captured, so they didn’t know how to act as a POW.” Prisoners were genuinely ashamed concerning their status as an enemy prisoners and this was at the forefront of their minds. “Knowing how the Japanese POWs felt, I was able to empathize with them by treating them as equals,” said Hirabayashi.

In 2007 Hirabayashi called to mind one interrogation from nearly 65 years ago. Late one evening during the Battle of Myitkyina, U.S. soldiers delivered a Japanese

⁸⁸ Straus, 21.

⁸⁹ Straus, 21.

lieutenant on a stretcher for interrogation. The Gurkhas, a highly respected group of elite Indian soldiers, had captured the Japanese officer, and when he attempted to escape they stabbed him with a bayonet three different times in his buttocks, arm, and thigh. Consequently, the prisoner was severely wounded and covered in blood. It was late and the prisoner required medical attention, so Hirabayashi instructed the military policemen (MPs) to take the prisoner to the first aid station and bring him back the next morning for questioning.

The following morning, the MPs returned the POW for interrogation. Hirabayashi sat him down and began the interview. When Hirabayashi asked him if he had received the proper medical care, the Japanese officer responded, "You're a traitor." The prisoner's response stunned Hirabayashi and he countered, "If we were to cut our veins, the same blood would flow." He told the prisoner, "I am an American soldier. I'm an American fighting for my country and you are fighting for your country." He continued with the interrogation, but the Japanese lieutenant refused to respond. At one point, Hirabayashi raised his voice, and again, the prisoner responded, "You're a traitor." Seeing the interview was going nowhere, Hirabayashi had a guard remove the POW and place him in the center of the enlisted man's stockade.

Some time later, Hirabayashi approached the prisoner inside the stockade and the officer tugged at his trousers and pleaded, "Mr. Interpreter, I want to die." Hirabayashi asked him how he wished to die and he responded, "I want to be shot." He told the officer he did not have any bullets to waste on him, but that they had captured a sword from another Japanese officer and he could use it to demonstrate how to commit *hara-kari*. He then left. Hirabayashi returned half an hour later and the prisoner admitted he

had experienced a change of heart. He asked Hirabayashi to release him from the stockade and promised that, in return, he would cooperate during the interview. From that point forward, the Japanese officer answered all the questions he was asked.

The next day, Hirabayashi ran into his officer-in-charge (OIC), who told him, “Grant, that’s what the old man was looking for.” He was referring to the intelligence information Hirabayashi developed the day prior during the interrogation of the Japanese lieutenant. Hirabayashi said he never followed up on the comment, but recalled this was the first time he had received any feedback following a prisoner interrogation. “Normally...they interrogate, they write a report, they submit it, and that’s it. You seldom received feedback.”

On 10 August 1944, following victory in the battle of Myitkyina, the Marauders’ mission was complete and the unit disbanded. Brigadier General Merrill concluded, “As for the value of the *Nisei*, I couldn’t have gotten along without them.”⁹⁰ Hirabayashi returned to India and was reassigned to the Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center (SEATIC) in New Delhi. At SEATIC, he was assigned to the British Royal Air Force, where he provided translation and interrogation services. Later, the Army reassigned him to the Sino Translation and Interrogation Center (SINTIC) in Chunking, China, as the senior interrogator in charge of Japanese Air Force POWs.

Hirabayashi recalled that during his tour at SINTIC, he interrogated another POW: a scientist who had reported that Japan had been researching and developing an atomic weapon. During the interrogation, the scientist pushed a small Chinese matchbox in front of Hirabayashi and told him the bomb was that small and capable of destroying

⁹⁰ “Campaigns of the Pacific” collection, *National Japanese American Historical Society* website, URL: <www.nikkeiheritage.org/misnorcal/campaigns/campaigns_cbi.htm#merrill>, accessed 7 May 2007.

an entire city. The prisoner explained the research was being conducted at both Imperial Universities in Tokyo and Kyoto, and at Osaka University. He continued to describe the technical aspects of the bomb, but Hirabayashi soon found the discussion beyond his level of technical comprehension. After reporting the interrogation to his superiors in hopes of obtaining assistance in developing further details, they dismissed the report as ludicrous.

World War II ended while Hirabayashi was stationed in Chungking. Five days before the official surrender that took place aboard the USS *Missouri* on 13 September 1945, the Army ordered him to Nanking, China, to serve as personal interpreter to Brigadier General McClure, the U.S. observer to the Japanese surrender ceremony in China. Hirabayashi stated, "It was a short, simple and dignified ceremony. It ended with General Ho Ying-chin's radio announcement to the Chinese people of a successful conclusion of the surrender ceremony and of a dawn of peace on earth."

Upon his discharge from the Army on 8 November 1945, Hirabayashi returned to Minneapolis, Minnesota, and took a position as an instructor at the MISLS at Fort Snelling and later in Monterey, California. Following his service at the schoolhouse, he transferred to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power (SCAP) Legal Section, Tokyo, Japan, in November 1947 and worked with the War Crimes Tribunal located in Yokohama. He functioned as an interpreter, translator, interrogator, court interpreter, and court monitor. Upon completion of the war crimes trials, he served with the War Crimes Parole Board. In essence, his career had come full circle: he functioned first as an interrogator of war crimes suspects, was then responsible for apprehending them, and finally performed as an officer with the parole board.

After his lengthy deployment in the Pacific, Hirabayashi decided it was time to return to the United States to take advantage of the GI Bill. After earning a Bachelor and Master of Arts in International Relations from University of Southern California, he served with the Department of State, Cultural Exchange Program, Library of Congress and retired from the National Security Agency in 1979. Today, Mr. Hirabayashi is an active member of the Japanese American Veterans Association, which promotes the spirit of patriotism and national pride among the younger generation, particularly those of Japanese ancestry.

CHAPTER 5

SHARPER THAN THE SWORD: U.S. NAVY INTERROGATORS IN THE PACIFIC DURING WORLD WAR II

Knowledge of Japanese will be not only a weapon in wartime, but also a powerful means of establishing international relations again when peace returns.

- - Florence Walne, Director of the Oriental Language Department,
University of Colorado at Boulder

SCARCITY OF JAPANESE LINGUISTS

The Navy's language program was much smaller than the Army's and, as noted earlier, employed an entirely different strategy in recruiting and training Japanese linguists. The Navy focused its recruitment efforts on male Caucasians who had previously lived and studied in Japan, were college graduates, and were between the ages of 20 and 30. Additionally, the Navy targeted university students with a distinct aptitude for linguistics and individuals of high intelligence.⁹¹ Unlike the Army, the Navy refused to consider Japanese-Americans for its program, presumably because of the attitude of the Navy's senior leaders following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

⁹¹ Lieutenant Albert E. Hindmarsh, the architect of the Navy's Japanese language program, commonly referred to the school's recruits as "Phi Beta Kappa caliber." Phi Beta Kappa is an academic honor society founded at the College of William and Mary on 5 December 1776. Because of its rich history and selectivity, Phi Beta Kappa is generally considered the most prestigious American college honor society and membership is one of the highest honors that can be conferred on undergraduate liberal arts and science students.

In essence, the Navy streamlined a three-year language course offered to U.S. military attachés in Tokyo since the early 1920s into 12 months of intense class work in the United States. The school was of incalculable value to the nation during World War II and the occupation of Japan that followed. Graduates also played a crucial role in gathering vital intelligence regarding Japanese intentions and military operations through interrogation of enemy POWs.

By December 1940 the U.S. Navy had realized that, although the United States was on the verge of war with Japan, the number of naval officers competent in the Japanese language was woefully inadequate. The Navy had been sending its officers to a three-year language program in Tokyo since 1922, but only 65 officers had completed the course by the end of 1940, and of those only a dozen were regarded as “fully proficient” in written and spoken Japanese. It was discouraging that only 12 out of the over 200,000 sailors serving at the time were qualified to speak and write Japanese. Equally disappointing was that the Navy had no system to identify or track its civilian employees who were proficient in the Japanese language. At the time, six American universities were offering Japanese language courses; however, the Navy believed they were impractical for the military’s purposes due to their length and focus on the arts.⁹²

A REVOLUTIONARY VISION

In early December 1940, Lieutenant Albert E. Hindmarsh, a U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR) officer, brought this situation to the attention of the Office of Naval Intelligence

⁹² Albert E. Hindmarsh, Commander, U.S.N.R., “Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration,” n.d.; Historical Files of Navy Training Activities; Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Records Group 24; NARA, College Park, MD. Cited hereafter as Hindmarsh, “Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration,” NARA.

(ONI). Hindmarsh suggested the Navy conduct a nation-wide survey of Japanese linguists, with a short-term goal of developing a new Japanese language program within the Department of the Navy. He envisioned a program designed to produce junior Naval Reserve officers capable of reading, writing, and speaking Japanese at a level sufficient to meet the Navy's potential wartime needs.

Between March and June 1941, Hindmarsh identified 600 men in the United States who "allegedly" possessed knowledge of the Chinese or Japanese languages. After initial testing, half of those identified were found to be unqualified. Of the remaining 300, only 65 were recognized as having the necessary background and required level of proficiency to form the framework of the Navy's Japanese language program. Each civilian selected was a white, male, native-born U.S. citizen, who volunteered, once identified, to serve in the U.S. Navy. Most of those selected had previously resided and studied in Japan or China, had college degrees, and were between 20 and 30 years old.⁹³

In July 1941, Hindmarsh attended a conference at Cornell University of all Japanese language teachers in the United States along with representatives from the Army, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Council of Learned Societies, and the Rockefeller Foundation. The conference discussed the various methods and techniques for teaching Japanese at the seven universities represented. At the conclusion of the conference, it was obvious that the universities were confused about how to develop an effective Japanese language program. Teachers complained about the scarcity of teaching materials, the lack of students, and alleged disinterest on the part of the

⁹³ Hindmarsh, "Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration," NARA, 2.

government. At the time, only 60 Caucasian students were studying Japanese in the United States and nearly all were studying the language from a literary, artistic, or philosophical point of view. This approach fell short of meeting the government's need for students with a practical working knowledge of the language. Consequently, Hindmarsh outlined a 12-month course designed to produce competent interrogators and translators. His plan specified the necessary teaching materials as well as a detailed day-by-day curriculum. Although the comprehensive plan impressed the teachers, they were skeptical that such a course could be taught outside Japan.⁹⁴

NAVY SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES

On 26 August 1941, the U.S. Navy approved a plan to establish two training centers, one at Harvard University, the other at the University of California, Berkeley. Professor Serge Elisseeff, Chairman of the Oriental Languages Department and a recognized scholar in oriental languages, led the program at Harvard. At Berkeley, Miss Florence Walne, head of the Department of Oriental Languages, a Radcliffe graduate and longtime resident of Japan, directed the studies. By late September 1941, both universities signed contracts that governed relations between them and the Navy.

Initially, the Navy invited 56 students to take the intensive language program, which would qualify them as Japanese interpreters and translators. During the 12-month program, students were classified first as "naval agents," under a civilian contract and as soon as it became feasible (typically after the first month), they were inducted as yeomen,

⁹⁴ Hindmarsh, "Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration," NARA, 3.

second-class, V-4, USNR, and placed on active duty.⁹⁵ In either status, the Navy paid students approximately \$125 per month throughout the duration of the language program. When the students completed the course successfully, the Navy commissioned them as ensigns I-V(S), USNR.⁹⁶

THE NAGANUMA JAPANESE LANGUAGE COURSE

Because of inadequate teaching materials at the universities, the Navy provided textbooks prepared by Naoe Naganuma, a Japanese professor who had trained language officers in Tokyo since the early 1920s. These readers served as the foundation for the Navy's intensive set of courses.⁹⁷

The Navy had been sending its prospective Japanese Language Officers to Japan and had provided them a special "allowance" to locate a teacher and fund their education. By circa 1925, several students had clustered around one teacher, Naoe Naganuma; eventually, all the Navy officers became his students. Naganuma made teaching Japanese a profession, and in 1929 he published the first three volumes of a carefully planned curriculum. He later published another four volumes, which comprised an entire three-year course. He called the course "Hyojun Nihongo Tokuhon," or "Standard

⁹⁵ Navy Department, Bureau of Navigation, subject: "Establishment of Japanese Language Course of Instruction at Harvard University and the University of California at Berkley," 26 August 1941; Historical Files of Navy Training Activities; Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Records Group 24; NARA, College Park, MD.

⁹⁶ Hindmarsh, "Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration," NARA, 3 - 4.

⁹⁷ Hindmarsh, "Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration," NARA, 3.

Japanese Readers.”⁹⁸ The U.S. Naval Attaché in Tokyo sent 50 complete sets of the course to the United States. The Navy immediately reproduced the materials and provided them to the universities for the beginning of class on 1 October 1941.⁹⁹

The Naganuma course normally required three years in Tokyo, but the Navy streamlined the program into 12 months of intense class work in the United States. The nature of the new version was quite different from any academic language program offered at the time. Students worked 14 hours a day, six days a week, 50 weeks per year. After the first few lessons, professors eliminated all classroom discussions in English. The program required students to use Japanese outside the classroom as well. At least one meal a day had to be Japanese and be served by a Japanese waiter. In addition, the universities required students to watch Japanese movies for entertainment. Finally, the student newspaper, school song, and daily radio broadcasts were all presented in Japanese.¹⁰⁰ The two universities limited their class sizes to four or five students per teacher, largely recruited from the *Nisei* population.

During the last two weeks of the program, the college introduced the students to special materials designed to familiarize them with Japanese military and naval terms. In addition to the Naganuma language readers, the Navy provided supplementary material to compensate for the lack of military instruction given during the program. Where one or two dictionaries were sufficient for most Western languages, Japanese presented additional problems. Instead of one or two dictionaries, the Navy provided each student

⁹⁸ Hindmarsh, “Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration,” NARA, 5.

⁹⁹ Hindmarsh, “Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration,” NARA, 3.

¹⁰⁰ Hindmarsh, “Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration,” NARA, 6 - 8.

an entire reference library with approximately 20 volumes of material. In addition to normal dictionaries, these texts included special dictionaries containing military and naval terms, scientific, engineering and other specialized vocabularies, books of Japanese surnames and given names, and reading material on the Japanese Navy, Japanese geography, and *sosho*, the Japanese cursive style of writing.

As one might imagine, the process for recruiting students was very selective. The Navy focused its efforts on the brightest college-educated men with a distinct proclivity for language. Others had backgrounds in Japan as newspapermen, missionaries, diplomatic staff members, and students. Nearly all had bachelor's degrees, some had master's degrees, and a few had even earned doctorates.¹⁰¹

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The course at Harvard proved unsuccessful because Professor Elisseeff did not follow the Navy's proposed plan. From the beginning, he was reluctant to use the Navy's materials, as he had just published a Japanese language text of his own and was eager to advance its use. In February 1942, after conducting an inspection of the entire program, the Navy decided to let the Harvard contract expire. The Navy concluded, "there was at Harvard a continuing reluctance to recognize the practical needs of the Naval Service and constant underhanded criticism of the whole idea of intensified training because it did not

¹⁰¹ "Colorful Commencement Held For Naval Japanese Language Students," *Boulder Camera*, 16 January 1943, 1. Original newspaper clipping obtained from: Historical Files of Navy Training Activities; Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Records Group 24; NARA, College Park, MD.

conform to the usual academic set-up as exemplified in the leisurely and highly theoretical teaching of Professor Elisseeff.”¹⁰²

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

On balance, the Berkeley program proved an enormous success for the Navy. The same inspection team that visited Harvard reported that the Berkeley teachers and program administrators had “given so whole heartedly of their time and effort that the students, although in general not so well prepared initially as those sent to Harvard, were making greater progress toward the objective set for the course by the Navy.”¹⁰³ Unfortunately, Berkeley’s success did not lack difficult challenges of its own. When the Berkeley school opened, the Navy decided to make the existence of the program a military secret. Very few people outside the classroom knew the school was teaching these students until after President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, evacuating all persons of Japanese ancestry from western military combat zones, including the entire state of California.¹⁰⁴ Anticipating problems with the California-based program, the Navy began to look for an alternate location. On 23 June 1942, the school was forced to relocate since, at the time, the faculty included 11 professors of Japanese origin who were essential to the program’s success.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Hindmarsh, “Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration,” NARA, 13.

¹⁰³ Hindmarsh, “Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration,” NARA, 13.

¹⁰⁴ Bert Bemis, “U.S. Navy Men Learn Japanese at School in Rockies,” *Christian Science Monitor (1908-Current file)*, 21 August 1942, 13, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 3 May 2007.

¹⁰⁵ Hindmarsh, “Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration,” NARA, 14.

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER

After an exhaustive search effort, the Navy selected the University of Colorado at Boulder as the new site for the program. The Navy drafted a contract for signature by the university president, which guaranteed the employment of Miss Walne and her entire teaching staff from Berkeley. Gradually, the school overcame administrative difficulties associated with the transition and the University of Colorado program flourished.¹⁰⁶ Boulder ultimately accepted students from the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, as well as a select number of British and Canadian Naval students.¹⁰⁷

By the spring of 1943, like the Army, the Navy initiated a program to recruit women in the language school for eventual commissioning in the WAVES (the Navy's organization for women).¹⁰⁸ From June to July 1943, the Navy interviewed over 600 applicants, many of whom enrolled and later graduated from the Boulder school. These officers went on to serve in a variety of jobs in intelligence, communications, supply, medicine and administration.

By late 1943, the Navy had received 6,500 applications and interviewed over 3,000 candidates for the Japanese language school. The majority of students selected were of college age, 25 being the average age for all students enrolled. A third of the students had graduate-level college degrees, nearly half had college degrees, and a third

¹⁰⁶ Hindmarsh, "Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration," NARA, 14.

¹⁰⁷ Hindmarsh, "Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration," NARA, 21 - 22.

¹⁰⁸ Beginning in 1942, the U.S. Navy recruited women into its Navy Women's Reserve, called Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) and by the end of World War II, more than 80,000 WAVES filled shore billets in a large variety of jobs in communications, intelligence, supply, medicine and administration.

were also members of Phi Beta Kappa. It is interesting to note, however, that just over 20 percent of the students had no college degrees. Of these, most had acquired knowledge of Japanese or had been born in Japan.¹⁰⁹

One of the most intriguing dynamics observed in the Navy's language program was the diversity of its students. The Navy recruited personnel from a wide variety of backgrounds and a broad range of life experiences. Moreover, the diversity went well beyond the traditional creativity, insight, and experiences of people of different race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. With regard to previous occupations, 38 percent were students and the remainder came from all ranges of business and government experience. Interestingly enough, 13 percent were formerly teachers. Twelve percent of the students enrolled were foreign-born and 17 percent were either born in or had lived in the Far East. Many of the students had unusual backgrounds, which illustrates the unique composition of the school's student body. For example, one student was secretary to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Another was a former cab driver. One was a missionary in China; another was a radio commentator. One student managed a nightclub, and another was an orchestra leader. Others chosen included a ship fitter, an actor, a miner, an artist who spent 19 years in France, a former liquor store proprietor, a banker, and a newsreel camera operator.¹¹⁰

The history of the Japanese Language School illustrates a significant problem the Navy faced regarding language training: the delicate nature of public relations. With feelings running high against the Japanese following the attack on Pearl Harbor, it took

¹⁰⁹ Hindmarsh, "Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration," NARA, Appendix 42, 6-7.

¹¹⁰ Hindmarsh, "Navy School of Oriental Languages: History, Organization and Administration," NARA, Appendix 42, 7.

all the tact and persuasive powers of the senior administrative staff at Boulder to sell the necessity of the program to local citizens. In the end, the reception accorded the school by the Boulder community was quite different from that in California. In a special article published in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Bert Bemis wrote, "It is obvious that these Japanese are welcome; their presence occasions no surprise, no challenges as enemy aliens. Boulder citizens have for them only the friendliest greetings, for they know them to be loyal subjects of Uncle Sam, doing a difficult and very important work for him and doing it well."¹¹¹

In April 1945, the Navy established an additional Naval School of Oriental Language in Oklahoma A&M College (now Oklahoma State University), Stillwater, Oklahoma. This school received approximately 700 students between April and August of 1945. Because of his long experience and particular success in dealing with Japanese language students, Dr. Glenn Shaw, Director at the Boulder school, assumed responsibility as the general advisor to both schools.

The Navy's Japanese Language School proved its value to the nation during the Second World War and the occupation of Japan that followed. During World War II, employing interrogators and translators with command of the enemy's language had obvious advantages. By the time they graduated from the school, students were able to read and write approximately 1,800 Japanese characters and maintain a vocabulary of nearly 7,000 words. Graduates played a critical role in gathering valuable intelligence information about Japanese military operations and intentions.

¹¹¹ Bemis, "U.S. Navy Men Learn Japanese at School in Rockies," 13.

LIEUTENANT OTIS CARY: NSOL CLASS OF 1942

When Otis Carey interrogated Japanese prisoners during World War II, he softened them with gifts of magazines, cigarettes, and chocolates. He broke through their reserve with humor. And he spoke to them in flawless Japanese – shocking from a blond-haired American.

- - Otis Cary's Obituary, *Honolulu Advertiser*, 24 April 2006

The experience of one Boulder graduate, Lieutenant Otis Cary, illustrates the success of the Navy program and its contributions. His deep understanding of the Japanese culture and command of the language enabled him to elude intelligence information vital to the war effort. Cary was born on 20 October 1921 in the city of Otaru on Hokkaido, Japan. As a son and grandson of New England missionaries, he was raised in Japan, which supplied the foundation for his remarkable cultural and linguistic expertise. Cary attended a Japanese school through the fourth grade before returning to the United States, where he finished grade school and continued his education at Amherst College in Massachusetts. War between the United States and Japan broke out while Cary was attending college, and following graduation, he enlisted in the Navy. After he completed the Japanese language school at Boulder, the Navy commissioned Cary as an ensign and sent him to the Hawaii to serve in Admiral Chester Nimitz's Central Pacific Command. Otis Cary went on to become one of the most highly successful and well-respected interrogators in the U.S. Navy during the Second World War.

Like most Boulder graduates, Cary was assigned to the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA), which was responsible for POW interrogation as well as document translation, radio interception, code work, and other intelligence-related activities. While many alumni performed in-garrison work at JICPOA, several of the

naval officers were routinely embedded with U.S. Marine Corps units throughout the Pacific. These officers typically landed in the third assault wave to interrogate enemy prisoners and write summaries of captured documents.¹¹²

In May 1943, Cary accompanied U.S. naval forces in the first offensive operation of the Pacific Theater, the recapture of Attu in the Aleutian Islands.¹¹³ American planners believed a successful assault on Attu would isolate the Japanese on Kiska, Attu's eastern neighbor, and make its strategically significant capture much easier. Bad weather postponed the initial U.S. landing until 11 May and after three weeks of fierce fighting, the 1,000 surviving Japanese soldiers launched a final *banzai* attack toward American positions, killing hundreds on both sides. On 30 May, Japan announced the loss of Attu; each side sustained heavy casualties. Of the 15,000 U.S. troops involved in the operation, 550 died and nearly 1,500 were wounded. On the Japanese side, of a force of nearly 2,500 soldiers, fewer than 30 survived and were taken prisoner; the rest were killed in action or committed *hara-kari*.¹¹⁴


Ironically, the first prisoner Cary interrogated had grown up in Otaru, the city where Cary was raised as a child, which offered an ideal opportunity to establish instant and sincere rapport. As it turned out, the prisoner had returned from nearby Kiska, the focal point of the next American assault, just days before his capture. Consequently, Cary was able to elicit detailed information from the prisoner regarding the status of

¹¹² Straus, 111.

¹¹³ Straus, 112.

¹¹⁴ Erwin N. Thompson, *Attu Battlefield and U.S. Army and Navy Airfields on Attu: Aleutian Islands*, 1984, URL: <www.cr.nps.gov/nr/TwHP/wwwlps/lessons/7attu/7facts1.htm>, accessed 11 May 2007.

Japanese military forces on the island.¹¹⁵ This detailed order of battle was extremely valuable to field commanders preparing to invade Kiska.



5-1. Pacific Theater During World War II

Source: Hyperwar, *World War II: The Against Japan*,
 URL: <www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/AMH/AMH-23.html>, accessed 20 May 2007

Cary's next combat operation took place in June 1944, when American troops invaded Saipan.¹¹⁶ As mentioned in Chapter 3, this was the first time that U.S. forces secured a relatively large number of enemy prisoners in the Pacific Theater; between 15

¹¹⁵ Straus, 112.

¹¹⁶ Straus, 112.

June and 16 July, U.S. forces captured 3,076 native civilians and 79 military POWs.¹¹⁷

Although efforts by U.S. troops to persuade the Japanese to surrender were mostly futile, Cary did manage to persuade one prisoner to return to a particular cave and convince several civilians hiding there that American soldiers would not kill them if they capitulated.

Cary's success was due, in large part, to his ability to communicate with the natives using Japanese slang as opposed to the more formal dialect traditionally taught in Japanese schools. One prisoner wanted to make sure his motivation to cooperate was clear. He told Cary, "We are doing this for ourselves. It's not for your side and we are not going to become your pawns. Don't misunderstand us." It was evident from Cary's success in interrogating prisoners throughout the war, that he clearly understood the subtext of what this prisoner was saying.¹¹⁸

Cary always dealt with enemy prisoners in a decent, humane manner and treated them not as enemies, but as human beings, who he believed deserved to have a future in a post-war Japan. He pointed out that the Japanese were accustomed to resisting the coercive techniques they had witnessed in China; however, they could not resist the humane treatment offered by U.S. interrogators. A review of former Japanese prisoner autobiographies by Ulrich Straus makes no reference to U.S. employment of coercive interrogation techniques and his comprehensive assessment of interrogation records on file at the U.S. National Archives indicated such threats were not made.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Tracy, "Intelligence Extracts of Special Action Reports - Saipan," 319.1/172, NARA, 3.

¹¹⁸ Straus, 113.

¹¹⁹ Straus, 120.

In early 1945, the impact of Cary's kind treatment reached a pinnacle when he influenced a small group of Japanese prisoners held at a POW camp near Pearl Harbor to consider cooperating in America's war efforts. After convincing his immediate superiors that he had the right group of men who could work together, Cary proposed an experiment designed to engage the Japanese prisoners directly in winning the war against their native country, and perhaps provide a foundation for the future "democratization" of Japan. Navy leadership approved the proposed plan and the select group of prisoners were relocated to an isolated site away from other Japanese POWs so they could perform their "mission" in secrecy.¹²⁰

As a first task, the prisoners drafted a constitution articulating the purpose of their newly formed group. They claimed, "We have decided to manifest our unceasing patriotism in a small way by helping the American military campaigns and propaganda wars. When the war ends and Japan resumes its path towards a bright future, we will be in our homeland, and we swear to do our utmost for its reconstruction." In essence, they were about to embark on a mission their fellow soldiers and nation would classify as treasonous. Regardless, these men trusted Cary and were willing to risk their lives for the future of their country.¹²¹

The first project the group participated in was improving the effectiveness of an American propaganda newsletter, the *Mariana Jiho* (*Mariana Bulletin*). This particular publication was designed to undermine the morale of Japanese forces at the front. In the past, the U.S. military considered this tool relatively ineffective because of poor

¹²⁰ Straus, 215.

¹²¹ Straus, 216.

translation and limited content. Cary's group added instant credibility and reality by offering a document written by native linguists as opposed to a Japanese translation of a Western-style article. In addition, they made up "advertisements" of well-known Japanese department stores to add further credibility to the façade.¹²²

While the newsletter was a worthy endeavor, the most significant project the group accepted was the rapid translation of the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945.¹²³ After Allied leaders defined the terms by which Japan could surrender, the Japanese government prohibited the media from publishing the details in full. When the group completed their Japanese translation, the document was sent to Saipan, printed in leaflet form, and loaded aboard B-29 aircraft for wide-spread distribution across Japan to inform the public of its lenient terms. Ulrich Straus, author of *Anguish of Surrender*, believed, "the leaflet campaign, by informing the war-weary Japanese public of the Allies' terms, considered lenient and fair compared to what they had feared, contributed to their government's decision, finally, to accept the declaration."¹²⁴

On reflection, Cary's "democratization experiment," as labeled by Straus, planted the seeds for a stable and prosperous government and provided a foundation for the future "democratization" of postwar Japan. Six decades after this devastating war, the Japanese constitution, promulgated in 1946 during the occupation by the Allied powers, remains in place today. The remarkable efforts of Otis Cary and a few patriotic (although some

¹²² Straus, 216 – 217.

¹²³ The Potsdam Declaration was a statement issued on 26 July 1945 by President Harry S. Truman, Winston Churchill, and Chaing Kai-shek, which outlined the terms of Japanese surrender as agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference.

¹²⁴ Straus, 217 – 218.

might argue otherwise) Japanese prisoners serves as their lasting legacy to the people and nation of Japan.

Cary had a distinguished record of treating his prisoners with humanity and respect. His superior Japanese skills and deep understanding of Japanese culture enabled him to get past the psychological barriers that stymied other U.S. military interrogators. Despite strict conditioning, Cary helped many Japanese POWs overcome the shame of surrender and offered them hope for a better Japan. After Cary completed his military service, he returned to Japan, assumed a position as visiting professor at Kyoto's prestigious Doshisha University, and lived in Kyoto until he retired. On 14 April 2006, Cary died of pneumonia at the age of 84. He will be remembered as one of the finest and most compassionate wartime interrogators in U.S. history.

CHAPTER 6

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: LESSONS FROM WORLD WAR II

We can learn from history how past generations thought and acted, how they responded to the demands of their time and how they solved their problems. We can learn by analogy, not by example, for our circumstances will always be different than theirs were. The main thing history can teach us is that human actions have consequences and that certain choices, once made, cannot be undone. They foreclose the possibility of making other choices and thus they determine future events.

- - Gerda Lerner, Historian

INTRODUCTION

Following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. military interrogators found themselves face-to-face with an implacable enemy in the brutal, merciless battlefield of the Second World War – the Pacific Theater. The American public reacted to the attack and reports of Japanese atrocities against American prisoners that followed with fear and anger – promptly branding the enemy as subhuman. On the heels of public outrage, U.S. interrogators faced the extraordinary challenge of collecting human intelligence from this seemingly ruthless foe. They encountered an enemy who spoke an impenetrable language and whose culture and psychology were incomprehensible to the Western mind.

The study of this chaotic period in our nation’s history provides a unique and practical look at similar challenges faced by U.S. military interrogators operating around the globe today. This thesis documents how the U.S. Army and Navy overcame these

obstacles and illuminates the U.S. military's remarkable accomplishments in conducting wartime interrogations. *What can we learn from the U.S. experience during World War II of recruiting and preparing interrogators and conducting interrogations of Japanese POWs that will inform current and future doctrine and practices related to educating information?* The answer to this question can be drawn from a comparative analysis of the U.S. Army and Navy case studies reviewed previously. This chapter documents numerous lessons learned and highlights basic principles of effective interrogation that still apply today. Additionally, it offers recommendations for further research.

THE U.S. ARMY'S RECRUITMENT EFFORTS

Most experienced interrogators agree that successful interrogation of POWs requires command of enemy languages and a genuine appreciation for enemy cultural sensitivities. As such, recruitment efforts must first concentrate on personnel with required language capabilities and a thorough understanding of each enemy's country, folklore and myths, customs, manners, and psychology. During the Second World War, the Army directed its recruitment efforts toward "heritage speakers," a term used by Dr. Clifford Porter, Command Historian at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), in Monterey, California, the U.S. government's premier institution for foreign language education today. Dr. Porter describes these unique individuals as "U.S. military personnel whose first language is not English or who have acquired foreign language skills outside of the military."¹²⁵

¹²⁵ Clifford Porter, *Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Foreign Language Capability* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, March 2002), 10, URL: <www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/porter.pdf>, accessed 29 May 2007. Cited hereafter as Porter, *Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Foreign Language Capability*.

Faced with few options, the U.S. Army turned to *Nisei* (second-generation Japanese-Americans) to solve its language problem. Initially, American suspicion of *Nisei* loyalty hindered the Army's recruitment efforts and limited the *Nisei*'s overseas assignments. However, following the *Nisei*'s early success on the battlefield, the Army expanded the program and ultimately had trained and employed nearly 6,000 *Nisei* (men and women) by the end of the war.

Strengths of the Army's Recruitment Efforts

The recruitment of *Nisei* presented the Army distinct advantages to alternative options considered in addressing its Japanese language deficiency. The *Nisei*'s greatest benefit was their existing Japanese language capability. Since all *Nisei* recruits spoke some Japanese (although their language skills varied greatly), the required training period for employment was much shorter. This enabled the Army to train new recruits and send them into battle quickly.

The cultural knowledge of the *Nisei* interrogators proved invaluable in dealing with Japanese POWs. In addition to their language skills, most *Nisei* had an understanding of Japanese values and psychology that could not be achieved in a classroom. Many absorbed the Japanese culture in their homes and in after-school Japanese programs, while others experienced it firsthand spending part of their childhood living and attending school in Japan. The later, known as *Kibei* (a *Nisei* sent by his parents at a young age to be educated in Japan), were treasured recruits.

Weaknesses of the Army's Recruitment Efforts

Despite the benefit of recruiting *Nisei* heritage speakers during World War II, there were some drawbacks. First, many Americans considered the *Nisei* a national

security risk. Since *Nisei*, like other Americans were subject to the draft, many were serving in the Army when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Following the hysteria on the West Coast of the United States, many *Nisei* soldiers were discharged and reclassified, along with their parents and siblings, as enemy aliens. Those who remained, like Grant Hirabayashi, were stripped of their weapons and relegated to menial jobs until the Army could complete extensive background investigations.

Many Americans also refused to believe the *Nisei* could stand the decisive test of battle against their own race and kindred. Because some *Nisei* family members were trapped in Japan and required to serve in the Japanese armed forces, *Nisei* soldiers might, in essence, be asked to take up arms against their brothers.

Finally, ethnic heritage does not equate to language skill. Many *Nisei* were not sufficiently literate in English or Japanese to translate accurately for the Army's military intelligence program. As indicated by Dr. Porter, "of the 1,400 *Nisei* interviewed in 1941, the Army only found 60 capable of learning Japanese beyond 'kitchen-heritage speaking,' and only two were sufficiently proficient in both Japanese and English to translate accurately, and they were used as instructors." This remains a common problem with Spanish-heritage soldiers today.¹²⁶

U.S. NAVY'S RECRUITMENT EFFORTS

The question of loyalty was the most significant factor contributing to the Navy's decision to solely recruit Caucasian interrogators. While the Navy had been sending language specialists to Japan for language immersion since 1922, fewer than 56 officers trained using this method were available at the outset of World War II.

¹²⁶ Porter, *Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Foreign Language Capability*, 10.

The Navy's recruitment goals were much lower than the Army's, but even these were difficult to achieve. Although the Navy interviewed thousands of potential applicants, very few met its high academic standards. Of the select number of Caucasian-Americans who could speak and understand Japanese, only a small percentage were also proficient at reading and writing Japanese, a critical skill required at the time.

Strengths of the Navy's Recruitment Efforts

Like the Army's *Nisei*, a large percentage of the Caucasians recruited by the Navy had experienced Japanese culture and had at least limited exposure to the Japanese language. Of the Navy's initial 56 recruits, the majority had lived and studied in Japan. As such, they shared, to a degree, the *Nisei's* benefit of cultural understanding, which proved very useful when dealing with Japanese POWs. Many interrogators, like Otis Cary, were able to develop close relationships with the Japanese soldiers and earn their respect and cooperation in providing U.S. naval intelligence with information vital to the war effort.

In addition to possessing language skills and cultural knowledge, most Caucasians, unlike the *Nisei*, were seen to pose little or no security risk and were able to obtain the necessary security clearance with minor difficulty. Most Caucasian recruits, as well as their immediate family members, were native-born, which enabled U.S. government officials to conduct background investigations quickly and easily, whereas the *Nisei's* foreign roots were difficult to verify.

Since most Americans living in the United States during World War II were Caucasian, the Navy had a much larger pool of potential applicants than the Army. The Navy could therefore be far more selective in its recruitment efforts and thus targeted

potential applicants with college-level educations, prior exposure to Far Eastern culture, and those with a proclivity for learning a foreign language.

Weaknesses of the Navy's Recruitment Efforts

On balance, because several of the Navy's applicants had limited or no Japanese language proficiency, the time required to bring them to the necessary skill level was much longer than that needed by the Army. In fact, the Navy's language school took twice as long as the Army's training program, although remarkably, the Navy was still able to educate recruits in less than 12 months. This extra time was necessary to develop the students' skills and build a level of confidence necessary to accommodate effective employment in the field.

With exception of the Caucasian recruits who had spent a considerable amount of time in Japan, most had no more than 12 months of Japanese cultural exposure in an academic setting, while the *Nisei* had experienced Japanese culture on a daily basis. No classroom-based education system can substitute for true cultural immersion. However, the Navy went to great lengths to make the students' experience as realistic as possible and was remarkably successful.

THE U.S. ARMY'S JAPANESE LANGUAGE PROGRAM

The Army established its intense, six-month long training program to educate soldiers, primarily *Nisei*, in a broad range of topics, ranging from Japanese language and culture to interrogation and translation of Japanese military documents. During the course of the war, the MISLS graduated nearly 6,000 soldiers, enabling the Army to penetrate the enemy's psyche and obtain information vital to the war effort. In essence,

the Japanese soldier was no longer able to barricade himself behind the intricate characters and syntax of his complex language.

Strengths of the Army's Language Program

The greatest strength of the Army's Japanese language program rested on the deep heritage and cultural experience of its *Kibei* instructors, who had spent a good portion of their childhoods in Japan. While many *Nisei* students learned Japanese from their families and in after-school programs, few had had the opportunity to travel abroad and experience the culture firsthand. This rich, direct exposure was critical to understanding the culture and psychology of the enemy.

Since all students attending the Army's language school spoke at least some Japanese, the Army could focus its instruction on the Japanese military and offer specialized training in topics such as POW interrogation. While the interrogation training was largely limited to role-playing and general interrogation principles, it offered graduates an introduction to the type of work expected by field commanders and exposure to techniques that would prove beneficial to the war effort.

Weaknesses of the Army's Language Program

Despite the remarkable staff and broad range of training topics, the Army's approach had its weaknesses. The compressed six-month training regimen stressed the students to the absolute limit in order to meet the school's rigorous academic requirements and the service's growing need for qualified linguists on the battlefield. Classes ran from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday, and many students were forced to stay up well past their 10:00 p.m. curfew to complete their required homework and prepare for the next day's lessons. Saturday's "school of the soldier"

training and frequent military-type inspections placed additional burdens on the already over-strained students.

Additionally, the broad range of language proficiency among the student population made it difficult for students to receive focused instruction at the appropriate speed. For some, the pace of instruction was too slow, for many, they had all they could do to keep up with their classmates.

THE U.S. NAVY'S JAPANESE LANGUAGE PROGRAM

The Navy's Oriental Language School offered, in reality, what amounted to a "fellowship-type" program to educate Caucasians with limited Japanese language capabilities at American universities. Following a rocky start, the Navy developed a revolutionary language school that produced officers who were thoroughly competent in reading and writing Japanese. Unlike the Army's program, the curriculum focused almost exclusively on mastering the basic Japanese language and postponed any specialized training until students graduated and moved on to their next assignments. The exemplary performance of its graduates testified to the success of the Navy's Japanese language program.

Strengths of the Navy's Language Program

The Naganuma language course, which served as the foundation for the Navy's intensive set of courses, proved invaluable to the academic curriculum. Although the program typically required three years of instruction in Japan, the Navy streamlined the program into 12 months of intense class work in the United States. In addition to the effective course of instruction, culture and language immersion offered throughout the

program played a significant role in the school's overall success. Finally, the Navy attributed much of the school's accomplishment to the program's concentration on the basic Japanese language (as opposed to military and technical terminology). By offering this academic approach, the faculty was able to provide intense language instruction without distracting students with military inspections or training that interfered with the primary educational goal. Ultimately, the Navy accomplished what many had believed to be an impossible task – training relatively competent Japanese language experts in less than a year's time. Graduates, many of whom started with no Japanese language experience, were able to read and write approximately 1,800 Japanese characters and maintain a vocabulary of nearly 7,000 words.

Weaknesses of the Navy's Language Program

Postponing any specialized or military training until students graduated and moved on to their next assignments did have some drawbacks. The Navy (with the exception of its Marine Corps students) did not anticipate interrogating Japanese prisoners, but instead expected they would employ their graduates at regional intelligence centers translating enemy documents. Although the graduates required these skills, the assumption they would not act as interrogators proved false, as many students, such as Lieutenant Otis Cary, ended up operating in combat zones within Marine units and interrogating Japanese POWs.

In addition, since the Navy's program placed only limited emphasis on military-related education (such as military terminology and general Japanese military instruction), naval officers deployed to the field were forced to transport trunks full of reference materials to meet the needs of the intelligence service. Much of the tactical

intelligence developed through prisoner interrogation included order of battle information such as military unit strength, location, tactics, and equipment condition. Moreover, many graduates deployed into combat zones without receiving any formal instruction in interrogation.

To remedy this apparent shortcoming, Major Sherwood F. Moran, a senior Marine interrogator who spent 40 years in Japan as a missionary prior to World War II and who supervised numerous Boulder graduates in combat, authored a treatise titled “Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field,” and distributed it throughout the Pacific Theater. The essay laid out the criteria for an effective interrogator. It concentrated on the attitude of interrogators toward the enemy prisoners and knowledge and use of the enemy’s language. Moran opposed stern interviewing tactics and favored talking to prisoners *ningen to shite* (human to human). In essence, it provided novice interrogators a series of guiding principles with which to carry out their interviews (see Appendix C for a complete copy of the essay).¹²⁷

WARTIME INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS

U.S. military interrogators overcame numerous challenges during the Second World War, not only in developing an effective wartime interrogation system, but also in persuading fellow soldiers and field commanders of the intelligence value of enemy prisoners. In early campaigns, Americans captured very few Japanese soldiers, primarily because of the “The only good Jap is a dead Jap” attitude of the combat forces, both

¹²⁷ Sherwood F. Moran, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, “Suggestions For Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field,” 17 July 1943; Training Records of MITC, Camp Ritchie; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD, 1.

enlisted and officer.¹²⁸ Hatred of the enemy was so fierce that many field commanders believed taking prisoners would expose their troops to unnecessary risk. Moreover, military leaders were certain the Japanese would never disclose valuable intelligence information. To overcome this challenge, *Nisei* and Caucasian interrogators personally indoctrinated members of their own units about the enemy's worth to ensure that POWs were available for questioning. Eventually, U.S. military leaders came to realize that it was not only ethically and legally right (as defined by Geneva Convention) to take prisoners, but that the work of U.S. interrogators was one of the keys to American success in the Pacific intelligence campaign.

Wartime experiences in the Pacific Theater revealed that captured Japanese POWs in fact seldom resisted interrogation. My research highlighted several factors that contributed to this phenomenon. The following reasons illustrate why, in my estimate, Japanese prisoners cooperated with American interrogators and provided valuable intelligence information that assisted the war effort.

Reciprocity for Kind and Respectful Treatment

The most successful interrogators during the war treated Japanese prisoners as individual human beings, rather than animals or fanatical enemy soldiers. These interrogators offered sincere kindness and understanding and ensured timely access to food, clothing, and medical care. Japanese prisoners were truly shocked to learn they were receiving the same food and medical care as their captors and recognition of this common humanity left a lasting impression. Moreover, Japanese society customarily valued reciprocal giving and receiving.

¹²⁸ Burden, "Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners in the Southwest Pacific: Intelligence Memo No. 4," NARA, 2.

Employment of *Nisei* Interrogators

The U.S. Army's use of *Nisei* as combat interrogators greatly improved the Allied intelligence collection effort. Their linguistic skills were far superior to those of their Caucasian counterparts, and most *Nisei* had a profound appreciation for Japanese culture and psychology. These skills, coupled with their physical resemblance to the enemy, put the Japanese prisoners at ease, which enabled effective interrogation. Major General Charles Willoughby, the top intelligence officer in the Pacific Theater under the command of General MacArthur summed up the *Nisei* contributions best by stating, "The 6000 *Nisei* shortened the Pacific War by two years."¹²⁹

Reciprocal Curiosity of the Caucasian Linguists

Once Caucasian interrogators established a dialogue with the Japanese prisoners, the prisoners were often just as curious to learn about the white Americans who spoke their native tongue as the Caucasian interrogators were to learn about their Japanese captives. The unique ability to carry on informal discussions generally put the POWs at ease. This style of elicitation was not as effective for *Nisei* interrogators. Often times the *Nisei* were regarded with suspicion by the prisoners, as illustrated by Sergeant Hirabayashi's exchange with the Japanese officer who repeatedly called him a traitor.

Learning They Were Not Alone

Many Japanese POWs felt isolated when facing American interrogators. Compared to POWs captured in the European Theater, the number of Japanese prisoners captured was extremely small. After being cut off from their fellow soldiers, Japanese POWs experienced an overwhelming sense of loneliness and were shocked to learn that other Japanese soldiers had been taken prisoner too. Once they discovered they were not

¹²⁹ Nakasone, 54.

alone they experienced a sense of relief, which facilitated a sort of “relaxed” state. Being put at ease, coupled with the good treatment and medical care, encouraged the POWs to talk freely.

Fear of Dishonoring their Families

The Japanese had a strong sense of national unity and its soldiers were very loyal to their country and their Emperor. They lived by the *Bushido* code; they believed death in battle was an honor and that capture and surrender were akin to treason, renunciation of religion, and eternal disgrace to the soul, family, and country. Once captured, Japanese POWs felt abandoned by their country and feared their families would learn of their detainment and be disgraced. American interrogators exploited this fear by promising not to send a prisoner’s name back to Japan if he cooperated. This technique, coupled with kind treatment, proved extremely effective as well.

Lack of Security Indoctrination

The Japanese belief that capture and surrender were a disgrace to family and country meant that military leaders considered it unnecessary to give their soldiers security training to ensure that POWs knew how to safeguard classified and sensitive information. Moreover, many Japanese officers were not concerned about the security of their sensitive military communications because they believed Westerners would never learn to read and write Japanese. The lack of security indoctrination, particularly in the earlier campaigns, was very apparent to U.S. interrogators.

Fear of Torture

Many Japanese prisoners told their interrogators they had expected to be killed or tortured if taken prisoner. Evidence obtained through POW interrogation suggested this

fear did not result from Japanese propaganda, but from the soldiers' firsthand experience in China. After training and serving under these conditions for years, as many Japanese soldiers had, it is hardly surprising that these troops expected any opponent to treat them brutally.

Hope for a Better Tomorrow

Many Japanese POWs felt that the kind and respectful treatment offered by U.S. military interrogators like Otis Cary and Grant Hirabayashi contributed to their realization of their self-worth in the reconstruction of Japan. Ulrich Straus, a former Consul General of Okinawa and former U.S. Army language officer who served in Japan during the occupation, highlighted this recurring theme after he interviewed dozens of former Japanese POWs and studied numerous memoirs that reflected this feeling.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

Over four months of research at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, revealed a treasure trove of information pertaining to World War II interrogation efforts in the Pacific Theater. The volume of materials available surpasses that which could be reasonably addressed by a lone investigator and documented in a single graduate-level thesis. This unique source of research material offers numerous opportunities to conduct further examination and develop additional case studies that might inform current and future doctrine and practices related to educating information – an effort currently underway by the Director of National Intelligence chartered Intelligence Science Board Study on Educating

Information chaired by Dr. Robert A. Fein and supported by the National Defense Intelligence College.

One area of research that would offer significant historic value would be an examination of the model of interrogation employed by the British during World War II. In the summer of 1941, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence instructed the head of the Special Activities Branch responsible for interrogation to examine and develop an organization for the interrogation of naval POWs.¹³⁰ In response, the Navy dispatched a reserve officer to the British Admiralty in London to study and receive training in British methods of interrogation. An examination of this study may reveal differences, advantages, and disadvantages between the American and British interrogation programs.

Another promising area of research would be a comprehensive study of Camp Tracy, the U.S. West Coast secret interrogation facility located in Byron Springs, California, which was used to interrogate Japanese prisoners during World War II. Initial research indicates the facility was less effective than the East Coast facility located at Fort Hunt, Virginia, which was used to educe information from high-level German POWs during the same period. The interrogation activities at Fort Hunt are well documented by a former graduate of the Joint Military Intelligence College Colonel (then Major) Steven Kleinman, U.S. Air Force Reserves. The Camp Tracy study could reveal additional factors that may influence effective interrogation practices.

A final area worth consideration would be to compare and contrast the operational environments present in the Pacific during World War II and the current Global War on Terrorism to determine what parallels might be drawn. Such a study could examine

¹³⁰ The Office of Naval Intelligence unit responsible for developing the Navy's POW interrogation section was called the Special Intelligence Section, Foreign Intelligence Branch, OP-16-F-9, and was established in June 1940.

whether prisoners in these setting were similarly influenced by the nature of their delivery into detention (capture or surrender) – an examination that could produce additional lessons learned.

APPENDIX A

BUSHIDO AND THE JAPANESE P.W.: AN ESSAY WRITTEN BY A SGT MAJ P.W.¹³¹

In the days of the turbulent feudal age, wars were continuously fought between rival clans for the protection of their domains and to secure their livelihood. It was then that the “Samurai” came into being. There were then, however, no set qualifications for the “Samurai.” Later with the “Samurai” as the central figure, there came an age of military ascendancy in Japan. It was then that the development of the “*Bushido*” class and the standardization of the qualifications and teachings of the “Samurai” became inevitable.

This “*Bushido*,” which was developed in an age when contact with foreign nations was not even thought of, arose out of necessity in fighting against small forces whose weapons were limited to the simple sword. It was therefore, possible to regard death on the field of battle as a thing worthy of merit, even more honorable than we can imagine today. But does this apply today?

Japan, which had developed into a world power, declared war against the United States and Great Britain. Will Japan, still clinging to the age-old “*Bushido*,” be able to win this great war in which scientific weapons are used? Of course, this is incredible. Moreover, even in Japan, “*Bushido*” is not considered to that extent. Let me elaborate.

War was declared on December 8, 1941, but hadn't Japan already attacked Pearly Harbor on the 7th? Well, can this be called “*Bushido*?” Then why was such an act committed when “*Bushido*,” with all its noble qualities, had been instilled in the people? That, maybe, was strategy; but we must not dream victory without first considering these all-important facts.

We all left Japan with the assurance of our dear parents, sisters, and brothers that they would constantly pray for us never to do anything that would bring disgrace upon our country. We have been taught and we have believed that “*Bushido* is Death.” If “*Bushido* is Death,” and vice versa, this code will be perpetuated but can the nation long endure? The answer is obviously, “No.”

Death is significant both from the standpoint of the individual concerned and of the nation as a whole. Dying for a false ideal is to die in vain. I wonder how many have

¹³¹ South-East Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, “Interrogation Bulletin No. 1,” NARA, 1
- 3.

cried and died for this false ideal, even though backed by victories. Can the nation and the people understand the true feeling of all the poor wives and children who have lost their loved ones? And even if they could, what can be done to relieve these people of their sorrow?

On the Burma front and on the islands of the South Pacific, today, many have died and many have become prisoners of war. According to "*Bushido*," to become a prisoner of war is a great disgrace. But is it logical to die, simply because it is a disgrace? Of course to Japanese, one who becomes a prisoner of war when he returns to his native land cannot hide the fact that it is a disgrace to his country and society. This is an important fact, but one must never forget his devotion to his country even though he is in disgrace individually.

It is, indeed, wrong to believe simply that death is honorable and that becoming a prisoner of war is a disgrace. Of course, it is only fitting that those of us who die in the line of duty be honored, but foolish, individual sacrifice is needless death. How can anyone with such a narrow mind do our country any good? The nation's future can never be assured with this kind of thinking.

The nation and its people must consider the position of a prisoner of war, who as a Japanese soldier, fought valiantly, even down to the last man, and who, on becoming prisoner, lost all freedom. The nation and her people are faced with this problem today. We, on the other hand, must hold the idea that whether Japan wins or loses this war we are the ones whose duty it will be to rebuild our country. We are the backbone of our nation, and as such, we shall be indispensable in the reconstruction of Japan after the war.

Victory in the present conflict cannot be attained by relying on courage alone. The side using scientific weapons, superior tactics, and having greater manpower will win. We cannot say that a person, who finds self-satisfaction in dying needlessly, being absorbed in the fanatical ideas of "*Bushido*," truly dies for his country. Indeed, this is dying in vain. The "*Bushido*" practiced till today has been that of a feudal age. The time has come for the "*Bushido*" of old to give way to a modern "*Bushido*." Arms, equipment, and manpower are first needed before "*Bushido*" can be displayed in present-day warfare. Just as there is truth in saying, "One cannot fight with an empty stomach," we cannot attain victory without arms and equipment.

Considering all the above facts, then, should suicide be considered by one on becoming a prisoner of war? Isn't one's true significance as a human being and as a citizen shown by returning to one's native land and enduring what little disgrace there is for a while and by devoting one's life in the reconstruction of Japan?

APPENDIX B

**A SCRAP OF PAPER:
MITC VISUAL DEMONSTRATION SECTION PRODUCTION¹³²**

¹³² “A Scrap of Paper,” M14.1, NARA.

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CAST OF CHARACTERS

(In the Order of Their Appearance)

Two Jap Guards	
General Saito	Japanese Commander of Formosan Army
Lt Col Sakuramachi	Japanese Intelligence Officer
Lt Yamane	Japanese Officer - Messenger
A Corporal	American Sniper
A Sergeant	CIC Man
"Speed"	PI Captain
"Professor"	Language Team Captain
"Caruse"	QB Captain
The Nisei	Language Team Sergeant

SCENE: Central Formosa

TIME: The Future

NOTE: Technical data contained in this manuscript is based on information supplied by the following:

Section V
 Section X
 MITC Library
 Sgt Yamane, Japanese Research Dept

M14.2
(30 May 45)

MITC - Ritchie
IX

DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>MND 750122</u> By <u>SA</u> NARA Date <u>11/20/06</u>

RESTRICTED

PROLOGUE

((The lights in the theatre dim out.))

Announcer

Gentlemen! At Ease!

((A spot-light center-stage, front of curtain, reveals a Japanese soldier standing at attention.))

This is a Jap! This is the enemy! Perhaps the chief weapon a soldier can have against his enemy is knowledge of him. This demonstration penetrates into some aspects of his thinking and behavior. The Jap as a person! The Jap as a soldier!

((The spot-light fades and the Jap soldier disappears.))

This is the story of a scrap of paper ... a Japanese attack order, from the moment it was written to the time when information obtained from it aided our forces in reducing a vital enemy strong-point. Observe the Japanese military behavior, his relationship to people, both his own and others. Watch how a Language Team handles a Japanese prisoner. Notice how the various Intelligence agencies operate in close liaison to make more effective their individual jobs. Observe all this ... and remember!

((The music grows louder and fades.))

In 1894, 40 years after Commodore Perry shook hands with a savage potentate on the island of Japan, the Japanese, victors in a war with China, by the treaty of Shimonoseki, extended their sovereignty to include the island of Taiwan ... as it is known to westerners, Formosa. The action takes place on this island ... sometime in the future. Taiwan -- Japan's vast storehouse of military supplies. The first scene, a Japanese Headquarters, at sundown.

((The music grows to full pitch and fades as the curtain opens.))

SCENE I

((The curtain opens on a section of a hut which is serving as the headquarters of the remaining Japanese forces on Formosa. The back-drop and legs of jungle against the sky remain throughout the play as background for all scenes. The front stage pieces will be movable to create the impression of new scenes. The hut is stage left set at an angle so that it reveals a wall of the exterior with part of its grass roof and a corner of the opposite wall showing the interior. A door at far left is the only entrance to the hut. From center stage to stage right there runs a fence of bamboo which forms a barrier around the house

M4.3
(30 May 45)

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... meant to keep animals from the mountains away and also natives who often come down from the mountains on foraging parties. There is a guard at the entrance to the hut and as the curtain rises another guard has stepped aside from his post in front of the house and is at the well drinking from a coconut half.)

Sakuramachi

(Lt Col, Japanese Chief of Staff, appears at the right.)

To your post!

(The soldier drops the dipper and runs to his post standing at rigid attention. Sakuramachi crosses towards the hut and then turns calling ...)

Guarda!

(Both guards hurry from their posts to the side of the officer and stand at attention.)

General Saito is dying. You will allow no noise around here and no one ... understand, no one is to interrupt General and myself. Remove yourselves.

(They respond immediately. Sakuramachi moves to the door of the hut, arranging his uniform.)

Colonel Sakuramachi, Chief of Staff, awaits to enter!

Saito

(Unnoticed until now, having sat almost immobile behind his desk, composing a military order, raises his head from his work and with his right arm, the only one that is free, his left being tied in a sling bound to his waist, waves the paper through the air to dry it.)

Enter!

(Sakuramachi enters, removes his helmet.)

Advances!


(Sakuramachi bows, proceeds to the front of the desk and salutes, bowing at the same time. The salute is returned by the general.)

Yasumei.

(Sakuramachi relaxes.)

This will be last order of my military career.
M14.4
(30 May 45)

MITO - Ritchie
IX



RESTRICTED

Sakuramachi

Permit me, Haka, to warn you against exerting yourself further. If Doctor Yoshinaga would have been allowed, he would have ordered you to remain in hospital tent. He tells me with every move loss of blood is increased ... you are in constant pain.

Saito

I remember early days of training at Imperial Military Academy. On forced march we were not allowed to fall out of ranks unless we became unconscious. One would have been ashamed to fall out for any ordinary illness. And always when we returned to garrison, all last half mile, no matter how exhausted, we would run it to show younger classmen and our leaders that we were always equal to our tasks. I recalled incident this morning as sun rose. Doctor Yoshinaga gave me this day to live. Shall I spend these hours in comfort shunning my duty? I felt ordered to return here to my desk by Emperor; yes, if you can sense my meaning, by Sun-Goddess herself. All day I have meditated on choosing wisest of two roads ahead. I have been divinely guided in decision. It is here ...! (He holds up the document.) Last command I shall make in this life. I grieve only that I shall not be allowed to witness its execution and partake of experience of glorious victory celebration.

Sakuramachi

May I read, Haka?

(Saito walks around his desk to bring the document to the intelligence officer. In the effort to walk he has a fainting spell. He goes to help him.)

Do be seated, Haka.

Saito

Stay where you are. I will not be shamed in these last hours by insincere nursing of underlings. Here! (He hands Sakuramachi the document.) Taiwan! For ten years I have commanded Royal Taiwan Army and guarded Taiwan from attack. Taiwan! Shaped like elm leaf, from whose center, like light-house, rises fourteen thousand feet into our heavens, great Mount Niitakayama. Taiwan! Garden of Japan! Named by foreigners with envy in their eyes ... Ille de Formosa ... beautiful island! Taiwan! Southern anchor of Japan's defense line. An unsinkable aircraft carrier pointing towards expansion southward.

Sakuramachi

Then we attack?

Saito

You advise otherwise?

Sakuramachi

May I speak?

Saito

Speak!

M14.5
(30 May 45)

-3-

MITC - Ritchie
IX

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 750122
By SA NARA Date 11/20/04

RESTRICTED

Sakuramachi

American's bold attack on Taiwan was ingeniously planned and no less ingeniously carried out. In three months the Formosan fortresses of Keelung, Takao, and Boku have been destroyed, and we have been driven hundred and fifty miles out of our chief headquarters at Taihoku. Taiwan Army of six divisions has been reduced to disorganized, dispersed, routed band of hungry, tired, ill-equipped men which, if it could be reassembled, I estimate to comprise only one division. We have no reserves, we are cut off from all further supplies, our backs are against the central mountain barrier through which we cannot pass; it is my work to know these facts and thus evaluate our situation. Forgive pessimism, Haka, but Americans have succeeded in turning Japan's unsinkable aircraft carrier, Taiwan, northward pointing towards Tokyo.

Saito

You are weaker now, Sakuramachi, with all your youth and health, than I, old and dying. Would you have us cower here and starve to death? I too, Sakuramachi, deal in facts. Loss of Taiwan to Allies would isolate any Japanese troops remaining in Philippines, Southwest Asia and Netherland's Indies. It would cut off supplies of raw materials essential to Japan's continued successful prosecution of war. It would also expose southern flank of Japanese Inner Zone to naval penetration into China Seas and to air attack over China coast. For sake of Empire, we must strike back; for sake of Emperor, American ogre must be destroyed. Having lost freedom of maneuverability, there is only one road left open ... final, all out attack to our deaths if need be. If you are Japanese soldier, you will believe as I do. If you dissent, paper you hold will not be my last order. I have strength enough for one other ... to notify high command and Sakuramachi family of your cowardice.

Sakuramachi

I am no coward and my loyalty as soldier of His Imperial Majesty will be shown in battle tomorrow when your orders go into effect. (He bows.)

Saito

I have little time now. Messenger ... officer-messenger ... Yamane Shoi ... send for him at once.

(Sakuramachi salutes and goes to door.)

Sakuramachi

(To the guard outside) Yamane Shoi to Shosho immediately.

Guard

(To the guard in front of the hut) Yamane Shoi to Shosho immediately.

2d Guard

(Running off right) Yamane Shoi to Shosho immediately.

Saito

You may have draft copy of order to study through night. Any

M14.6
(30 May 45)

MURE - RITUNIA
IX

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NOV 75 ON 22
By: NAVA DMC 11/11/2014

RESTRICTED

Saito (contd)
particulars you do not understand?

Sakuramachi
Only one. Who is to assume command?

Saito
Your subtlety overwhelms me, Shosa.

Sakuramachi
At this late hour, Haka, subtlety, costly in time, would seem to me to be virtue become vain ... traitorous to Emperor.

Saito
Raw ambition becomes neither you nor Emperor.

Sakuramachi
I merely thought it best that I know.

Saito
You have presumed in your thinking. I shall command.

Sakuramachi
I do not understand. Doctor Yoshinaga, though he may be mistaken, said you could not live through day.

Saito
If you did not interrupt so often, understanding might be possible. At sundown, in tradition of Samurai, I shall sacrifice my life, but my will and plan for last all out attack, as described in this "scrap of paper", will only have just been dispatched to various unit commanders. In this "scrap of paper" my command lives on, and will live on until attack is made and our objectives obtained. Until that moment you remain under orders, my orders, chief of which is that my death shall be kept secret.

Sakuramachi
You are afraid name of Sakuramachi will outshine name of Saito. At this late moment of your earthly life ... raw ambition ...

Saito
Silence! (This exertion brings on another fainting spell and he drops over his desk. Sakuramachi makes no move to help him. By will alone the General revives himself and continues ...) You waste valuable time, Sakuramachi, your motives offend Emperor. You have your orders ... enough! (Having controlled his anger) You will assist as my aide in what ceremony I may be equal to. (He reaches inside his blouse and draws out from it a small dagger. Handling it carefully, he lays it on a folded cloth in front of him.)

(A young Jap lieutenant, an officer-messenger, runs across the stage. At the door of the hut he reports: "Yamane Shai waits to enter.")

M14.7
(30 May 45)

MITC - Ritchie
IX

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 750122
By NARA Date 11/20/86

~~RESTRICTED~~

Saito
You will give him his instructions. I wish to meditate.

Sakuramachi
Enter!

(The Lieutenant enters and stands inside the door at attention. Meanwhile the General has left his desk and is kneeling in a corner of the room, bowing low in meditation. Sakuramachi plants himself in the General's seat.)

Advance!

Yamane
(He crosses to the desk and salutes, bowing low.) YAMANE SHAI.

Sakuramachi
(Returning the salute) Yasumei

(The Lieutenant takes his weight off one foot planting it forward in the position of At Ease.)

You have rested well in last twelve hours?

Yamane
Yes, Haka!

Sakuramachi
You have eaten?

Yamane
Yes, Haka.

Sakuramachi
This document with accompanying map sketch is of extreme military importance and secrecy. During this night with greatest speed, it must reach seven remaining commanders. Here is list. Their units spread out in a wide area covering approximately twelve miles. Daylight movement being dangerous, before sunrise tomorrow morning your mission must be accomplished. That will leave twenty-four hours for consolidation of troops. You know commanders by appearance?

Yamane
Yes, Haka.

Sakuramachi
You will deliver personally this document into each of their hands, wait while it is read, and observe that document is then recalled with individual commander's impression on seal side. Understand?

Yamane
Yes, Haka.

M14.8
(30 May 45)

MIIC - Britaince
IX

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MANU 750122
By: SP4 / MAJ Date: 11/11/2014

RESTRICTED

Sakuramachi

During following night, on eve of attack, you will make your way back to this headquarters and return document and original folder with seals. You know this area? Difficulties of terrain?

Yamane

I know it well.

Sakuramachi

This identification card will see you through all lines of guard and take you directly to various commanders you are expected to contact. (The Lieutenant takes the card and inserts it in his cap.) Prepare yourself. Leave immediately. Travel by dark will necessitate caution, but mind you, at no loss of speed. Dismissed!

(The Lieutenant salutes, but his eye catches sight of the dagger on the desk. He stares at it a moment, guessing what is to take place. He looks to Sakuramachi, who looks to the General. The General, as if having sensed what has taken place, rises ... Sakuramachi with the word "Out" motions to the Lieutenant to leave quickly. The Lieutenant bows and hurries towards the door.)

Saito

Yamane Shoji

(The Lieutenant halts and does an about-face.)

It is likely that few men in Japanese Empire are entrusted with greater task than has been given you. You will regard your mission not alone as military assignment but more in nature of holy mission. Emperor's messenger unto death. You have comprehended me?

Yamane

Yes, Haka.

Saito

(He is now beside the desk. He picks up cloth with dagger on it.) Anything you may have deduced by observing presence of certain articles in this room you will have to regard as matter of absolute confidence between yourself and Shinto Gods. Face towards homeland. (The Lieutenant does so.) In name of Emperor I dedicate your mission. Emperor's messenger unto death! Dismissed!


(The Lieutenant leaves. Picking an easy runner's pace, crossing the stage, he exits off right. The General removes his pistol, laying it beside him, and then proceeds to remove his blouse.)

Aide!

(Sakuramachi accepts this insult without betraying his feelings and then advances to the side of the General. The General undresses naked to the waist, handing each garment to Sakuramachi.

M14.9
(30 May 45)

MIME - Ritchie
IX



RESTRICTED

Once he removes the sling, his arm falls motionless to his side. The upper arm is bandaged and a great patch-dressing covers the left side of his chest. Through the patch a large blood stain appears and from underneath it, running down his side are thin streams of blood. He shows no signs of suffering. When he has handed over the last piece of clothing, he picks up his revolver.)

Incapacitated as I am at hands of bloodnering enemy, I may perform with less art than I would wish. In event it occurs so ... (He hands Sakuramachi his revolver.) You will assist me. Later, when it is possible, after battle, after Taiwan has been returned into hands of Emperor, order examination of this body and send some share of ashes to my native soil in Japan. (He bows very low. Sakuramachi takes a position at the General's side ... the revolver ready to fire. The General picks up the dagger handling it only with the cloth. He holds it for a moment with the blade upwards. He seems completely oblivious of his surroundings now. Very simply he turns the blade towards himself, and with a thrust upwards, digs the blade deep into his abdomen.)

Blackout

SCENE II

(The music rises and after a brief interlude fades.)

Announcer

Under cover of dark, Yamane Shoi, Emperor's messenger unto death, carried the attack order to the various unit commanders. Early the next morning as the sun rises, Yamane, late in completing his mission, speeds through the jungle, close to an American outpost.

(The scene is another clearing in the jungle in the foothills of the central mountain range. It is early morning just after sunrise. The curtain opens and for a moment there is silence. The officer-messenger is seen running along a trail from the rear of the stage, across it. As he reaches center stage, a shot is fired from off-stage right. The Jap messenger stumbles and falls from a rise in the trail and tumbles against a rock. Stunned, he rolls over and is still. An American corporal, a sniper in this outpost area, runs onto the scene carrying a rifle. He stops about ten feet from the Jap and then creeps up on him. As he gets close by, he removes the pistol from the Jap.)

Corporal

(To himself, satisfied the Jap is dead) I gotcha; that evens things up a little.

(Off stage comes the voice of another American soldier.)

RM4-10
(30 May 45)

M176 - Ritchie
IX

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority ANND 750122
By SA/NARA DAE 11/20/04

RESTRICTED

Sergeant
(A CIC man) Hey, soldier! (The corporal drops to the ground holding his gun ready to fire.) American ... here! Over here! I'm American! (He enters.) For Christ sake hold your fire.

Corporal
Yeah, you'd better be careful around here, Buddy. This area's lousy with our snipers ... and all itchin' to kill Japs.

Sergeant
(Looking at the Jap) You got one, I see.

Corporal
Yeah! That makes eight, I know I got. May have got more, I don't know, but it ain't less. Eight of 'em and I'll get a lot more 'fore I'm satisfied.

Sergeant
You sure hate 'em, don'tcha?

Corporal
They got my buddy three weeks ago ... right here on their goddam island of Formosa. I'd like t' kill 'em all. All of 'em ... the yellow bastards ...!

Sergeant
Hey, kid, hang onto yourself. I know how you feel, you don't have t' tell me. Forget it.

Corporal
Oh, hell ... I'm all right ... Christ, I could kill a hundred Japs and I wouldn't feel a thing. I'm usin' my gun for what it was meant for. I gotta get even with 'em, see?

Sergeant
Yeah!

Corporal
What're you doin' out here front of the lines? Better be careful. We've got snipers all around here.

Sergeant
I'm CIC. Civilians were reported around here trying to get into our lines. I'm out to pick up a few ... get some dope about what's ahead I guess is what they want.

Corporal
No fun ...

Sergeant
Let's just take a look at you? Jap ... he might have something on him.

Corporal
Wait a minute, Sarge. He's mine. I got him. I got first pickin's for souvenirs.
M14.11
(30 May 45)

MITC - Ritchie
EX

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 75 01 22
By NARA Date 11/20/04

RESTRICTED

(The sergeant laughs. The corporal picks up the Jap's hat spotting the identification card inside it.)

Corporal
Here ... this ain't nothin! You c'n have this. (He hands it to the sergeant and then bends over and starts going through the Jap's pockets. He pulls out the document.) Hey ... what's this? (The two look at the folder.) It's sealed.

Sergeant
Looks like a message ... and official ... let's see ...

Corporal
Uhn Uhn ... this is mine.

Sergeant
Wait a minute, kid ... that's not a datebook with addresses -- it may be important.

Corporal
Yeah ... important to me ...

Sergeant
Don't tear it ...

Corporal
Dam it, Sarge. I got this guy. You just happened to come along. Let me alone, will y'?

Sergeant
(Seeing the "Top Military Secret" seal in Japanese, which he recognizes; that map -- that may cover this area right here. Hey, this is important. See that seal ... highest secret rating ... I think this has gotta go back to Regiment.

Corporal
Oh, what the hell! A scrap of paper, that's all it is ... and all in Japanese ... What the hell good is it?

Sergeant
Hand it over. If you've gotta have a souvenir, take the cap or something like that.

Corporal
A Jap cap! You c'n get 'em by the hundreds ... I wanted something special ...

Sergeant
(Spotting the Jap's pistol) This pistol ... is it the Jap's?

Corporal
Yeah ...

M14.12
(30 May 45)

M14 - Ritchie
IX

-10-
DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 750122
By NARA Date 11/20/04

RESTRICTED

Sergeant
Give me the document and you c'n keep the gun. OK?

Ok.

Corporal

(They swap. The Jap groans suddenly and rolls over.)

Sergeant
Look out! (The two jump back away from him, the corporal raising his gun, about to fire.) No ... hold it a minute. (He shoves the corporal's gun aside.) Do you see any wounds on him?

Corporal

Yeah ... there on his head.

Sergeant
Looks like only a bruise. No bullet hole. Must've hit his head on that rock when he fell.

Corporal

Let me give it to him ...

Sergeant
Wait a minute. If this guy's only unconscious, he may be useful as a prisoner.

Corporal

Prisoner? Are you nutty? Why take chances? I know these bastards. He may have a grenade hid on him somewhere and blow us all to hell. Let's ...

Sergeant

No! Give me that gun.

Corporal

(Hanging onto the gun) You feel they're tricky ... I know 'em, I tell y' ...

Sergeant

So do I. If this Jap's alive, I'm goin' to take him prisoner.

Corporal

Kill 'em ... that's what! Kill 'em ...

Sergeant

Listen, kid, I know what I'm doin'. Gimme that gun now ...

Corporal

Like hell I will. They got my baddy, I told y' ... they ain't goin' t' get me ...

Sergeant

(He wrenches the gun from the corporal.) Let go! Now get this
M14.15
(30 May 45) Mike - Ritchie
EX

-11-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AND 750122
By: NARA DMC 11/20/04

~~RESTRICTED~~

Sergeant (cont'd)

straight. I don't know whether you know it or not, but I can put you under arrest ...

Corporal

Oh, for Christ's sake ...

Sergeant

Shut up ... You say you killed eight Japs you're sure of, Ok. That's good ... but there are millions more. What the hell do eight amount to?

Corporal

If every one of us gets eight of 'em, it'll mean a hell of a lot ...!

Sergeant

Maybe, if this Jap's still alive ... through information he o'n spill, we o'n get a hundred or a thousand, even more, maybe. Ever think of that?

Corporal

Yeah, an' maybe if he's still alive, he o'n get two more of us ... you an' me ...

Sergeant

I don't say take chances like that. If it comes down to a Jap or an American getting killed ... kill him first. But this guy ... we o'n kill him or take him ... either way ... get it?

Corporal

Says you ...

Sergeant

I'm sick of arguing with you.

Corporal

Hey ... he's comin' to.

Sergeant

Step back ... over here! I'll keep him covered. Get me straight, kid. If we can, we've got to take him prisoner. (The Jap makes several moves and slowly rouses himself. Suddenly noticing the Americans, he crouches rigidly.) Lift up your arms so he'll know what to do. (The Jap begins to mumble with fear in Japanese, but he raises his hands.) Beckon to him to come towards you. (The corporal does so. The Jap begins to back away.) No, the other way ... palm down ... you're telling him to back up ... (The corporal changes and the Jap approaches.)

Yanane

(In broken English, terror stricken) Cut off ears! Cut off ears! Cut off ears!

M14.14
(30 May 45)

MIC - Ritchie
IX.

10
DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MINI TSON 22
By: ANWARA DOR 11/20/04

RESTRICTED

Sergeant

He thinks we're going to torture him. They all do. Tell him to turn around ... I'll keep him covered from the rear. (The temporal motions, the Jap turns, still jabbering half in English and half in Japanese.) Search him. Tell him to take his clothes off. (The corporal opens up his shirt ... in pantomime ... the Jap doesn't understand at first but soon gets the idea. He undresses down to his loincloth.) Go through his clothes. Do you know where Regiment is?

Corporal

Yeah ... course.

Sergeant

I gotta get goin' on my job so I want you to take this guy back to Regiment for me. Turn him in. Hand in the document and this card and anything else you find on him. And listen ... I'm turning in a report about this so you and the Jap had better get there. And I've had a good look at this document too. I'll identify it later. Finished?

Corporal

Yeah.

Sergeant

C'mere. Keep him covered. Let's have a look at your dog tags. (The sergeant makes a couple of notes ... the name of the corporal and his serial number.) Ok, Ed. Get that Jap back to Regiment. And remember ... no souvenirs.

Corporal

Next time I run into you I hope we're both civilians ...

Sergeant

I hope so too, Ed.

Curtain

SCENE III

(There is a short interlude of Japanese music which is interrupted by the voice of the Announcer.)

Announcer

Japan's Tokyo Rose would have made a nice propaganda story out of that for her radio program. It's No. 1 on the GI's hit parade in the Pacific. Listen and then you'll know why ... (swing music up) ... yep, that's the reason ... but our boys don't fall for that propaganda stuff. They're a little too smart. Like that corporal for instance ... he finally came around, and right now he's marching the Jap prisoner, Yamane, back to an American OP where for the first time since their landing on Iwojima, the Americans are enjoying a brief breathing spell.

M14-15
(30 May 45)

MITC = Ritchie
ix

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ANID 750122
By SP1 NARA DAW 111 20706

RESTRICTED

(The curtain rises on a clearing in the foothills. On the edge of the clearing, circling it, are tents. In front of one tent is a PI captain, eating chow out of a mess kit. From him we get a feeling of the place. It is hot, it is wet, there are many flies and mosquitoes. In between bites of food he fans himself with a fern leaf. From off-stage left can be heard the singing of the Order of Battle captain who is showering. The interrogator, also a captain, ducks out of a tent stage right with a letter he's just finished writing. He is rereading the last few lines of it before sealing it in an envelope.)

Capt. Ingalls

((Called "Professor" because he was one before the war) Well, Brother Worthington, enjoying yourself in true southern style? On your tail ... eating?

Capt Worthington

("Speed" for short, because he is very slow) No photos today ...

Professor

G-2 doesn't take excuses.

Speed

Sides ... a man has to eat. It's the first law of nature ... everything's gotta eat. The bees do it, the birds in the trees do it, and even over-educated fleas do it.

Professor

Speaking of birds in the trees, can't something be done about Caruso out there? I begin to suspect he's got a secret musical code and is informing the enemy of our positions. You've got to watch these OB men.

Speed

Hey, you refugee from Major Bowes, out the racket! You'll start another earthquake like you did yesterday. Caruso!

Caruso

((Entering) "Somebody call me?

Speed

Yeah ... me.

Caruso

What d'ya want?

Speed

We'd like you to shut up!

Caruso

The southern gentleman is so cultured! (To the professor) What's that, professor? Another letter to your wife?

M/4.16
(30 May 45)

MITC - Ritchie
IX

-14-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 750122
By NARA Date 11/20/06

RESTRICTED

Professor

No ... it's to my son Jack.

Caruso

Speed told me he's in the Philippines ... Is he an officer?

Professor

No, just a plain GI.

Speed

Wonder if I got any sons in the service?

(From off-stage ... a call ... "Captain Ingalls! Captain Ingalls!")

Professor

That may be the G-2. You fellows better get busy. Comin' up! (He exits right.)

Caruso

(Looking about him) Formosa ... the beautiful! Nutz! There's too much of everything. Too much weather ... look ... you e'n grab it. Too many trees ... Too many trees (echo)! Too much echo! (echo) Aw ... shut up! (no echo) And everywhere you look there's something crawling. I've got nightmares. The cities! So dusty you can't see where you're going ... crowded with shouting peddlers and beggars. Everybody infested with vermin ... and, Speed, did you notice the strange smells? On every corner down every alley some new and unpleasant smell. And what a boiled up people. Here's the worst! What do you think I was told, huh? They use human excrement in the fields for fertilizer. Just plain old common ordinary ... (Speed pales and holds his mess-kit away from him.) Oh, excuse me, Mister Worthington ... I forgot I was in the company of a southern gentleman. Go ahead, now ... crush me with breeding.

Speed

Caruso ... you like New York a lot, den'tcha?

Caruso

Yeah ... that's right.

Speed

Well ... after the war ... stay there ... just leave me with my nice big piece of the old south!

Caruso

That's good ... Speed ... that's very funny ... a nice piece of the old south, huh? A big piece of Formosa fertilizer!

(They laugh. The corporal and Jap prisoner hike on up-stage right.)

Corporal

(Reporting to Caruso) Corporal Miller, Sir: (He salutes. The salute

MF 4.17

(30 May 45)

-15-

MIRC

EX

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND 750122
By SP1 NARA Date 11/20/04

RESTRICTED

Corporal (contd)
is returned.) Here's a prisoner I got ... I was told to bring him to the rear for questioning or something.

Caruso
Ok, this is the place.

Corporal
Get him down by B Company, Sir, see? I'm in the 3d Reconnaissance, see ... Sir. Out sniping in front of our lines ... see?

Caruso
I see. You've searched him ... find anything on him?

Corporal
Yes, Sir ... this stuff. (He hands Caruso the document and the identification card.) Anything you don't want ... I'd like, Sir ... if I may ...

Speed
Something for over the fireplace after the war, Corporal?

Corporal
Yeah ... see ... I got him myself ... he's my eighth. This slant-eye comes running along, see ... I spot 'im ... and let him have a couple ... see, and ...

Caruso
Hey, this looks important. Top military secret rating. Looks like an attack order. I've got to get this translated right away. Speed ... get the professor ... (He exits left.)

Speed
Stick around, Corporal. I'll send the language team over. (Speed exits right.)

Corporal
Yes, Sir. Language team? What the hell is that? (He has said it to the prisoner who naturally doesn't understand.) Ah ... sit down! (He gives the prisoner a shove. Then when he takes a drink from his canteen, the Jap extends a hand asking for water.) Oh, you want a drink, huh? Nothin' doin' ... not out of my canteen. What the hell do you think this is ... a tea party? You're a prisoner. Get it? A prisoner! And if it were up to me I'd fill you full of lead.

(From off-stage we hear Speed calling "Captain Ingalls!")

Speed
(Entering) Where the hell did he go?

Caruso
(Entering) Don't know ... just heard the Nissi call him ... that's all. (With a look towards the prisoner) Well, I think I'd better interrogate this prisoner for the professor.

M14.16
(30 May 45)

MITE = Ritchie
EX

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND 750122
By SA/NARA Date 11/20/06

RESTRICTED

You?

Speed

Caruso
Hell, I was an interrogator in Sicily ... interrogated hundreds of
Italians. Get the Nisei to come over and interpret for me, will you?

Speed

Ok! Your funeral ... (He leaves stage right.)

Caruso

Corporal, bring the prisoner over here. (He slings an empty box in
front of a field desk and then ducks into his tent.)

Corporal

Get up! (The Jap cowers.) Get up! (He grabs the prisoner by the
arm and yanks him to his feet, and shoves him towards the table. Be-
cause of his wound the prisoner stumbles. The Nisei appears right.)
Quit fakin', you stinkin' yellow bellied ... (He goes to pull the
prisoner to his feet. The prisoner, as a last resort, pretends to
faint and lies immobile on the ground. The corporal grabs his arm
and starts to drag him to his feet.)

Nisei

Soldier ... don't do that!

Corporal

Who the hell are you?

Nisei

You can't treat the prisoner like that.

Corporal

You look like a Jap yourself.

Nisei

I'm Nisei.

Corporal

Ni... what?

Nisei

Ni ... self

Corporal

Say it again ...

Nisei

Nisei ... American born Japanese,

Corporal

Oh ... Japanese... Don't like to see your own kind treated rough,
 huh?

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(30 May 45)

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RES

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I'm American.

Nisei

Corporal
You're a Jap so far as I'm concerned ... (He starts to yank the Jap again.)

Nisei
(He shoves the corporal aside and kneels beside the Jap.) Let him alone!

Professor
(Entering right) What's going on here?

Caruso
(Having just returned) Prisoner, professor. Couldn't find you ... I was going to take over 'till you got back.

Nisei
In my opinion the prisoner is in no condition for interrogation, Sir. He's been wounded.

Professor
Talk to him a moment. I think he's faking this fainting spell.

Nisei
(As if in Japanese, leaning over the prisoner) Soldier of Japanese Army, I apologize for way American has treated you. See I speak your language. You can hear me, I know. Listen now and believe. You have nothing more to fear, Officer here by my side gives promise no harm will come to you.

Yamane
(Cautiously, quietly) I am in pain.

Nisei
He was faking, Sir. (To the corporal) Though I don't blame him.

Professor
Take him over to the medics ... have his wound taken care of.

Nisei
If you will stand now and follow me, I will direct you to medical man who will dress your wound,

Yamane
Not cut off ears?

Nisei
No!

Yamane
Not break arm?

M14.20
(30 May 45)

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Nisei
No! No harm of any sort will come to you. (The Jap prisoner nisesa slowly. The Nisei draws his pistol from its holster.) I draw gun for our mutual protection. Come now ... this is way ... along path ... See cross in red? Head towards tent with red cross. (They exit up left.)

Professor
Did he have any documents on him?

Caruso
Yes ... looks like an attack order. It was sealed. I've taken it over to the language team for translation.

Professor
Where'd you pick him up, soldier?

Corporal
Down by B Company, Sir.

Professor
Where are his clothes?

Corporal
We made him undress when we captured him, Sir. Left 'em behind.

Professor
The uniform could have been useful for identification purposes.

Corporal
I didn't know, Sir.

Professor
I see you were all set to interrogate, Caruso?

Caruso
Well, I couldn't locate you, professor.

Professor
Damn it! I've got to say this, Caruso. I wish to hell you'd attend to your job and let me attend to mine. This prisoner may be complete spoiled for interrogation. You know we can't spare them.

Caruso
I was setting up the table, I didn't notice the Corporal here shevin him around.

Professor
You've gotta notice,

Caruso
Well, hell ... it's not my responsibility. I'm an OB MAN ... you're the prisoner specialist.

ML4,21
(30 May 45)

MITG - Ritchie
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Professor

Damn it, man, that's what I'm saying, that it's my job. But at the drop of a hat you horn in. This is the second time it's happened.

Caruso

If you're talking about the time, the day after we landed here, I helped out interrogate because you were swamped with prisoners.

Professor

Exactly. That's exactly what I'm talking about. You can't interrogate a Jap as you would an Italian or a German.

Caruso

Hell, I knew that.

Professor

The exact opposite's what's needed here. There you impressed a prisoner with our military strictness and efficiency. That was most effective. Intimidation worked like magic in breaking down tough prisoners. But here, our humaneness must be shown. Kindness ... just ... just simple kindness ... that's how you get a Jap to talk.

Caruso

Ok, Ok, Professor. Let's drop it.

Professor

No ... let me finish. I want to have this out once and for all. I hate the Japs as much as you do ... but what good is hating them going to do here in my job? I've got to talk to them ... not shoot them. Listen! I was a school teacher in Japan for years before the war. Japan is a land of tragedy. There are terrific floods and volcanic eruptions every year. The great earthquake took more than a hundred thousand lives and cost the Japanese government as much as the whole 1st World War cost the United States. The Japs are accustomed to hardship and misfortune; war doesn't mean a damned thing to them ... they're used to it. And the ambitious war lords of Japan have been systematically preparing the people for world conquest for the past fifty years. The average Japanese mind has been encased in a smaller-than-human skull, criminally dwarfed, never prompted to grow into the inquiring intelligence which we recognize as mental maturity. Remember that! He has been led around by the nose by his leaders from infancy through the dark alleyways of Shinto mysticism. He's not a citizen of his country, but a serf ... a slave with a fanatic devotion to his owners. You can't measure Japanese thinking on a western yardstick. (He crosses to the side of Caruso.) Excuse the speech, Caruso ... the G-2 just gave me a eating. We get so few Jap prisoners ... we can't waste 'em. They've got to count ... each one of them.

Caruso

I get you, professor. Hope this one isn't messed up.

Professor

We'll see.

ND4-22
(30 May 45)

MITG = Ritchie
EX

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Authority AND 750122
By SA/NARA Date 11/20/04

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(Speed exits left.)

Sergeant
(Entering right) Excuse me, Captain. I sent a soldier back with a prisoner. Did he get here?

Professor
The corporal over there?

Sergeant
(Looks to corporal) Oh, yeah, that's him. Hi! (The corporal turns away.)

Professor
Prisoners over at the medics.

Sergeant
Good, Sir. Thought I just ought to check. The corporal's got an itch on his trigger finger.

(The professor laughs and exits into his tent. The Nisei enters left and crosses towards the captain's tent.)

Corporal
(Crossing in front of him, standing in his path) Hey ... wait a minute ...!

Nisei
Yes?

Corporal
What was the idea of shoving me around before?

Nisei
I'm sorry but you wouldn't listen.

Corporal
Yeah? Well, I don't take that from nobody, see ... 'specially a stinkin' squint-eyed Jap!

(The Nisei reacts as if he'd been slapped in the face. He stands for a moment composing himself and then very quietly crosses to the tent and enters.)

Sergeant
(Who has been standing up right ... unnoticed) Feel pretty good, corporal, how you get that off your chest?

Corporal
(For a moment having forgotten there was anyone around) Huh? ... Oh, it's you buttin' in again, huh?

Sergeant
Did you see the uniform he was wearing?
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(Not getting him) Who?

Corporal

(Indicating towards the tent) What was it you called him ...? That stinkin' squint-eyed Jap?

Sergeant

Sure I saw his uniform ...

Corporal

Same as yours ... do you respect it?

Sergeant

It's the American Army's, ain't it? 'Course I respect it ...

Corporal

Do you respect the stinkin' squint-eyed soldier in it? No answer, huh? What's your last name again, Ed?

Sergeant

What for ...?

Corporal

Oh nothin' special ... don't worry, I'm not makin' a report or anything like that. It's just that you look German to me, that's all .. I mean your parents ... right?

Sergeant

My name's Ed Miller and my ol' man was born in Germany ... so what ...?

Corporal

So your parents were German and his parents were Japanese ...! Both were citizens of enemy countries. You and he are in the same boat, aren't you? Now I've got a hunch he respects you as an American soldier ... why not you ... him?

Sergeant

Ok ... here it is ... a Jap can't be trusted ...!

Corporal

Are you sure?

Sergeant

Look at what happened at Pearl Harbor. While his own ambassadors were sitting in Washington with smiling faces.

Corporal

Now wait a minute ... they weren't his ambassadors ... they were Japanese ... he's American ... don't forget that.

Sergeant

Ok, ok ... still I wouldn't trust any Jap.

Corporal

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IX

RE **DECLASSIFIED**
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Sergeant

AW ... you're more like the Japanese than he is.

Corporal

Hey ... where do you get that stuff?

Sergeant

You're prejudiced like they are. I don't know so much about them, but this much I do know ... they're prejudiced in almost everything. Over there in Japan all men who don't believe in the Shinto religion are dirt; all men who don't bow to the Emperor are put out of the way like stray dogs; all men who don't happen to be born Japanese are inferior. Now over here ... you know it as well as I do ... we believe in giving everybody a square deal, to size up people one by one, and not to judge a group, a nation or a race by the acts of one guy, that is, if you're an American ... if you believe in democracy. 'Course, in Germany when your parents come from ...

Corporal

Leave my parents out of it ... I'm an American through and through ... I'm fightin' for the good ol' US, ain't I?

Sergeant

So's the Nisei ... and damned glad to fight. And there are others like him ... American-born Japanese ... glad to fight too! Did you ever think of the chance they take fighting with us? Double chance. First they've got the Japs for an enemy, same as us, and if they're caught, taken prisoner, they're considered traitors to the Emperor and shot on the spot. And second, they take the chance of being shot by their American buddies ... mistaken for Japs ... it's happened many times. You know, I saw one Nisei when we landed here stand alongside an American commander and translate Japanese attack commands overheard by him as they were being given over a small rise beyond the beach. The commander spotted fire in the exact direction just as each thrust was made, and in short order hundreds of Japs were killed and the Americans succeeded in establishing a beachhead. Did you ever hear of the 100th Bn and 442d Combat Team, Nisei outfits who fought with the 5th Army in Italy? Did you know that 90 percent of the 100th got the combat infantryman's badge, 1200 got purple hearts, that the whole outfit got a presidential citation?

Corporal

That the truth?

Sergeant

Straight goods ... listen ... get wise ... talk to some of 'em. Get to know 'em a little before you go around calling 'em stinkin' squat-eyed Japs. They're Americans ... judge 'em by what they do and not because they have different shaped eyes and a different colored skin. Trust 'em as men as you trust yourself as a man, or, if you're going to be fair about it ... if you distrust them because their parents were born in Japan, you've got to distrust yourself too ... because your parents were born in Germany.

MM4-25
(30 May 45)

MHG = Ritchie
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Authority: ANND 750122
By: [signature] NARA Date: 11/20/04

Professor
(Coming from his tent followed by the Nisei) Better get the table over here out of the sun. (The Nisei does so.) Pick up the prisoner. The medics ought to have him patched up by now.

Nisei
Yes, Sir. (He starts to go.)

Corporal
(Stepping in his path) Ah ... want me t' get him for ya, Sarg?

Nisei
(Puzzled) Ah ... yes ... thanks ...

Corporal
Oki (He goes ... sergeant slaps him on the back and joins him off left.)

Caruso
(Entering down left) Professor, this is hot stuff ... just as I suspected. It's an attack order dated yesterday. With complete identification of the remaining enemy units and description of their deployment in the planned attack. It's the works.

Professor
What time is the attack to take place?

Caruso
They maneuver into position, consolidating forces through the early part of the night. The first phase of the attack starts at 0300 tomorrow morning. Here's the translation. There's a map sketch attached.

Professor
Thanks, Caruso.

Caruso
Call me when you want me. (He exits left.)

Professor
(To the Nisei, who has been standing watching the corporal in the distance) Come on, sergeant. This isn't the time for nature worship.

Nisei
(He laughs shyly.) Yes, Sir.


Professor
Here, take a look at this map sketch. The terrain symbols are confusing. Knew what they mean?

Nisei
(Studying them) No, Sir. But they're obviously the key to match it up to our map. Here comes the prisoner, Sir.

(The prisoner appears still watchful and tentative in his movements and still tense. The corporal has apparently

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learned his lesson ... he stops when the Jap stops and then gently urges him on.)

Professor
Let me study these a while. Talk to the prisoner until I'm ready.

Nisei
Yes, Sir. (He crosses towards the corporal.) Ok, corporal ... I'll take over. Thanks again. (He bows deeply before the prisoner.) Sit down! (The prisoner bows and sits.) You look much better. Did medical man cause you pain?

Yamane
Yes, but only little ... Doctor is gentle man. Here is bullet he give to me. Shape of bullet indicate it ricochet off stone before hit me ... not go in very far.

Nisei
Did Doctor give you water or some other liquid?

Yamane
I am thirsty!

Nisei
Here ... take of mine ... there is not much, but I can get more. (The prisoner grabs up the canteen and gulps down most of the water.)

Yamane
(After drinking he bows gratefully and returns the canteen) You speak my language!

Nisei
I lived in Japan several years. I was student in one of your world famous universities.

Professor
All right, sergeant ... bring him over.

Nisei
American officer would talk with you. Come--follow me.

Yamane
(He cringes close to the ground.) Soldier ... do not take me to ... pale-skin ... American officer. What will he do? Must go?

Nisei
Must go. But you have nothing to fear. Officer is fine man and civilized. (Reporting) The prisoner, Sir.

Yamane
(He approaches the officer cautiously. Suddenly he drops to the ground on his knees and in an awkward picturization of the western conventional mode of prayer, begs ...) Do not kill me ... American officer! Do not kill ... I beg ...

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Nisei

Stand at attention immediately. Officer in Japanese Army would spit upon you, whip you mercilessly, for such behavior. If you are soldier ... behave so. Report!

Yamane

(Trembling with fear, controlling himself, he draws in his breath through his teeth indicating extreme respect in accordance with Japanese custom. He salutes.) Yamane, Shoit

Professor

(He returns the salute indifferently and leaves the prisoner remain at attention for the moment. He removes his pistol belt and hangs it on the back of his seat.) Sergeant, take notes for the report ... (The Nisei assumes a position behind the prisoner with a pad and pencil.) Yasumei (The prisoner relaxes into the position of "at ease." Then, without looking at the prisoner, the professor continues casual indicating a pair of fatigues which he has brought with him from his tent.) You may have these if you wish them. (The prisoner hesitates, then bows, and grabs up the coveralls slipping into them quickly and binding them about his waist.) It appears you expected to be tortured by Americans. Observe ... I am unarmed. I offer you my word as American officer you are safe here from all harm. American arms from now on protect you as well as me. Understand? (The prisoner bows.) What is name of unit to which you belong? (The prisoner drops his head.) I would ask you certain routine questions now. You are accustomed to filling out similar records under Japanese government, I know. I too became accustomed to it through long years spent as teacher at America colony in Tokyo. It became joke to all civilians, you remember? How long have you served Emperor as Lieutenant in Japanese Army? (The prisoner draws away from the interrogator.) Make yourself comfortable ... there is seat for you ... (The Jap bows slightly and then starts to sit down.) How did you come to be captured?

Yamane

(He starts and then seems for a moment to faint, catching himself) I was not captured; do not say so.

Professor

You weren't captured? I do not understand ... speak further ...

Yamane

(He drops onto the seat.) I fell, hitting head on rock and did not realize what was happening. I would not allow myself to be captured. I would much rather take my own life.

Professor

(Tossing a cigarette into the lap of the prisoner) You may smoke ...

Yamane

(He bows a couple of times.) Shoit thanks American captain.

Professor

(He places matches at the front of the desk before the prisoner.)

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(30 May 45)

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Professor (contd)

Shoi ... while unconscious, you were searched and certain papers were found on you. These are now in our possession. Among them was official document. I would know what was your mission when ... shot by American soldier? (The prisoner returns the cigarette to the field desk.) Do you know what information document contains?

Yamane

(Detached) My words are not mine to speak?

Professor

(With a shrug of his shoulders) As you wish ... (Crossing behind the prisoner) Yamane, Shoi, you are familiar with International Red Cross?

Yamane

(He becomes immediately tense, almost hysterical.) Do not inform Red Cross of capture ... do not give name ... do not send name to Japanese Government.

Professor

You were not to blame for being captured. You said you were unconscious when taken prisoner ... this can be reported to your government.

Yamane

(He drops to his knees, begging) No ... please, American captain! I beg ... report nothing to government! Report nothing to Red Cross. Great consideration ... please ...!

Professor

As you wish, as it will be. We will withhold your name from all reports to Red Cross.

Yamane

(With enormous relief) I am grateful. You understand ... it would be great shame not only for me but for all family and friends.

Professor

In return for this consideration, I would ask you questions now.

Yamane

(He forces upon himself the position of attention.) I have not license to speak.

Professor

I do not understand you, Shoi. Listen now. I have given my word and I will not take back my word. Regardless of your undeserving manner towards me, your name will be withheld from all reports. Your capture is my secret.

Yamane

I am grateful ...

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Professor

Your gratitude has hollow sound. (After a moment's thought) Here ... here is document found in your clothes ... and here is attached map-sketch ... read for yourself ... your Commander's own words ...! (He passes the document to the prisoner. Yamane reads. The professor steps to the side of the Nisei, and speaks in English.) I don't get it, sergeant ... He's one of the few prisoners I've seen who was security minded.

Nisei

He must have been impressed with the nature of his mission by his officers. And that shoving around he took didn't help any.

Professor

No ...!

Caruso

(Entering left) Professor, the language team has checked the style of the characters in the document with old papers written by Saito captured at his headquarters in the north. They're the same.

Professor

So the document's authentic,

Caruso

Undoubtedly. The map-sketch, professor, the land-marks chosen for the start of the attacking position are very confusing. Try to get him to identify them.

Professor

He's more stubborn than any prisoner I've ever talked to. Get the 1st report of this document to Headquarters, Caruso, and call Speed ... He might have some obliques of the area to check with the map-sketch. (Caruso leaves stage left.) Now -- Shoi -- you are intelligent soldier. You can see from what you read that your words are not necessary; document tells all we need to know. (The prisoner returns the document to the desk.) You try my patience, soldier ... Listen to me now ... listen carefully ... Japan will lose war. (The prisoner caught off guard holds in his breath with the shock of the thought.) Yes. I have lived in Japan and I have lived in America and I know Japan will lose war. And I think you know it. And your leaders, in some dark recess of their minds, know it too. Else why do they fear to tell truth about your losses? You are soldier ... you know of Japanese losses, but does your family at home know? (Hitting hard but controlled) Why does Japanese government keep use of short wave radio away from people? Why do they fear news from outside world will reach ears of people?

Yamane

(In wild defense) We cannot afford luxury of radios ...

Professor

Is that only reason? There is something suspicious about Japanese incessant propaganda ... Japanese victories reported day after day.

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Professor (contd.)

This over-emphasis indicates hysteria that belies confidence they wish to establish. What will happen when what has been promised unquestionably does not come about? What is happening now that major bombings take place over Tokyo day after day in increasing numbers? Newspapers cannot deny bombs which lie in middle of one's own garden.

Yamane

It is true then, these bombings of Homeland?

Professor

I can show you pictures. A third of your cities lie in ruins. Camera print like mirror does not lie.

Yamane

We have heard of homeland bombings ... it was rumored among troops.

Professor

(Realizing that he has the prisoner going now) Yamane Shol, I have interest in your further welfare and would like to know what you will do when war is over?

Yamane

War will never be over!

Professor

Excuse, please, but for you, war is already over. You are prisoner now ... out of war. You can never fight again for Emperor. What will you do?

Yamane

I can never go back to Japan ... never ... there is nothing ... may as well be dead.

Professor

May I suggest to you this possibility. Perhaps you could start life over again ... on island somewhere in Pacific Ocean.

Yamane

American island?

Professor

Yes ... along with other Japanese prisoners ... soldiers like yourself.

Yamane

((Astounded)) There are others? Captured Japanese soldiers?

Professor

You thought you were only captured soldier?

Yamane

But ... yes! You tell truth, captain ... there are others?

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EX

RE
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Professor

You will meet many ... even this day ... after interview!

Yamane

But we have not heard of this.

Professor

Certainly you have not heard. In interest of Japanese prisoners' well-being, we do not report captures ... as with you ...

Yamane

This I would see ... Japanese prisoners ...

Professor

Be assured, Yamane Shoi, that America will study problem of what is to be done with Japanese prisoners ... and that it will be solved intelligently ... humanely. Emperor's spirit ... Yamane Shoi, is held captive by Japanese war lords ...! (The idea appeals to the prisoner.) It is our hope one day with final victory to release Emperor from this criminal bondage. I do not know whether you have wife, mother, father, brother ... whom you would like to see again ... some day ... somehow; if this is case, let me tell you that it is our wish for that day to come about for you ... that day when Emperor will absolve you of guilt and shame and welcome home all its brave soldiers. This provides you with purpose ... does it not ... Yamane ... for living? (For the first time the interrogator has used the familiar mode of address. The prisoner is deeply moved by the honor.) I add only this ... record of your behavior begins with this interview ... If you are cooperative you are in position to benefit ...!

Yamane

(There is a long pause, the prisoner has been deeply persuaded.) I ... will ... speak ...! (With the words, released of the rigidity he has maintained throughout the interview, he breaks down, tears flooding down his cheeks.) American officer is kind man ... wise man ...! You have respect for Emperor! What would you ask ... what is it you want to know ... I would speak now!

Professor

Who gave document to you?

Yamane

General Saito bade me carry it to all commanders.

Professor

How far had you gone on your mission?

Yamane

Only Yamazaki mounted battalion delivery was not made ... I was on my way there.

Professor

Where is Yamazaki battalion headquarters?

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Yamane
Three kilometers southeast of Tsuiteliau.

Speed
(Entering right) You asked for obliques on the Hokhieng area, professor?

Professor
Be with you in a minute, Speed. (To the prisoner) I am fascinated by artistry of terrain symbols on map-sketch. What is their meaning? (He lays the map-sketch out on the desk for the prisoner to study.) Got a photo of this region, Speed?

Yamane
Symbol here indicate hill. It is only one in area northeast of river ... other symbol is ... (He is suddenly cautious.)

Professor
In our experience Japanese soldier is master of map-sketching and reading. You have envy of every American soldier.

Yamane
(Pleased) Oil tank is other symbol.

Professor
(To Speed) I have the hill located on my map, but the oil tank, of course, isn't on it. It's between these two points that the spear-head of the attack will be made,

Speed
(Pulling a photo out of the pile.) Think this has it, professor.

Professor
(Handing it to the prisoner) Here is camera print ... can you find landmarks on it?

Yamane
We have camera prints in Japanese Army, too. It is most ingenious method of identification. American Army borrow our method?

Professor
(Quickly) Yes!


Yamane
This is hill, certainly ... but oil tank was camouflaged ... should be here around.

Professor
Japanese have masterful camouflage technique. I admire your success in this particular incident. How was it accomplished on oil tank?

Yamane
(Proudly) A canvas cover painted to match terrain.

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Professor
Got any color photos of the area, Speed?

Speed
Some dropped by parachute last night ... may be among them. I'll take a look. (He leaves.)

Caruso
(Entering left) Professor! A report came in saying that General Saito committed suicide. Check on it for me, will you?

Professor
Yamane, Shoi ... you say General Saito assigned you to messenger mission?

Yamane
Yes ... captain!

Professor
In person?

Yamane
(Proudly) Yes ...

Professor
When ...?

Yamane
At sundown, yester-ever ...

Professor
You lie ... General Saito is dead!

Yamane
I do not lie, American officer. General Saito lived yester-eve. It was only after I was dismissed from Headquarters tent that General's sacrifice to Shinto Gods was ... (Realizing that he has told secret ...) I have told that which General himself sealed within me ... (He sits rigid in awe of Shinto God's vengeance.)

(Speed returns.)

Speed
Professor ... it's there ... on this color film. Natural green shows up as reddish brown ... this paint sticks out like a sore thumb.

Professor
Write a statement, I'll include it in my report. Look here ... I've got the Jap's sketch oriented on my map.

Nisei
Which means we have the exact location of front line units.

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Professor

That's right. Caruso: Have you identified all the coded units?

Caruso

Without a doubt, professor. Comprises approximately a strengthened triangular division: three infantry regiments ... an artillery group ... one engineer regiment ... one reconnaissance unit and some tanks:

Speed

Terrific! It's like a football game with us knowing where they're coming through ...!

Yamane

(Staring abstractedly into space) Emperor's messenger unto death! Emperor's messenger unto ... (His head drops. His body withers.)

Professor

Yamane Shoi! (There is no response from the prisoner.) Yamane! (There is still no response.) (To Speed) That's all we'll get out of him for the time being. (To the prisoner) You have earned a good meal and a visit with your comrades. You may go now.

Yamane

(Rising slowly) I am rewarded by enemy for betraying Emperor. (He bows.)

Nisei

If you will follow me, we shall give you food.

Yamane

The dead require no food. (Then to himself ... reverently) Emperor's messenger unto death!

(There is silence for a moment ... everyone's eyes are on the prisoner. He stands dazed with misery. The Nisei then proceeds to lead the way; the prisoner following slowly; utterly dejected.)

Caruso

I'll bet we occupy Formosa completely by tomorrow noon.

Corporal

I don't see how you do it, Sir. I mean; pretending to like 'em. And to think I wanted to keep that document for a souvenir ... huh! I thought it was just a scrap of paper.

Professor

Such scraps of paper win wars! (The Nisei and prisoner are leaving the stage, Yamane literally dragging himself along behind the Nisei. The professor, Speed, and the corporal watch them off ... thoughtfully.) There's the Jap soldier for you; corporal. Strange-guy, huh? There's the Jap mind for you, Caruso: Figure it out!

CURTAIN

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APPENDIX C

TRANSCRIBED ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW OF MR. GRANT HIRABAYASHI¹³³

Introduction by Capt James Stone:

This is an oral history interview on the U.S. military service of Mr. Grant Hirabayashi of Silver Spring, Maryland. It is being conducted on January 27, 2007 by Captain James Stone, United States Air Force Office of Special Investigations, a graduate student at the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC).

Approximately 12 years ago, Mr. Hirabayashi provided a very thorough oral history to the "Go For Broke Education Foundation," a partner of the Library of Congress. The interview covered all aspects of his life including pre-military and post-military periods. In 2005, Mr. Hirabayashi was interviewed by the Japanese American Veteran's Association (JAVA) and provided additional details about his military service. This interview will treat previously covered details only generally and focus on Mr. Hirabayashi's role and experiences as a Military Intelligence Service (MIS) interrogator as well as the training he received, thereby complementing the previously mentioned interviews.

Mr. Hirabayashi was one of 14 Japanese-American MIS soldiers who fought in the Burma Campaign in World War II under the command of Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill. His unit was christened Merrill's Marauders and officially designated the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) -- code name *Galahad*.

The Marauders were an elite commando unit responsible for clearing North Burma of Japanese troops and capturing the town of Myitkyina and its strategic airstrip. Control of this town ensured the free flow of war materials by air and surface to Chinese Nationalist forces. For over seven months, they fought their way through 700 miles of Burmese jungle. The Marauders achieved their mission. They defeated the Japanese 18th Division, the conquerors of Malaya and Singapore, in five decisive battles.

With their mission complete, Merrill's Marauders disbanded and Mr. Hirabayashi was subsequently assigned to India and then to China, where he saw the end of war.

¹³³ Hirabayashi, interview by the author, 27 January 2007.

On 8 July 2004, Mr. Hirabayashi became the third Japanese-American Marauder to be inducted into the U.S. Ranger's Hall of Fame at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Let us begin our interview with Mr. Hirabayashi.

Captain Stone

Could you state your name, your date and place of birth please?

Grant Hirabayashi

My name is Grant Hirabayashi. I was born on November 9, 1919 in a place called Kent, Washington.

Captain Stone

Mr. Hirabayashi, could you tell me a little about your childhood and your family growing up?

Grant Hirabayashi

There were eight of us. There were six boys and two girls. I was the second in line. I grew up on a farm and at the age of 13, I was associated with two close friends, Tom Horiuchi and Kenji Nomura. We were the same age, same height, same grade, and we chummed around quite frequently. One summer we were fishing, and the fish did not bite, and the conversation turned to Japan. Now Tom and Kenji both had visited Japan during summer vacation and they talked about the Japanese driving on the wrong side of the street, sleeping on the floors, taking off shoes when they entered the house, using abacus for addition and it aroused my curiosity. So I went home and I said, "Dad, I would like to go to Japan too and have the same experience as my friends had." My father said, "Son, there are eight of you and I can't afford to send you to Japan on a summer vacation." But I was quite persistent and finally he suggested that if you would study two years, study the language, he said it might be worth the trip to which I agreed and I went to Japan. After eight years, after finishing *chugakko*, which is almost comparable to our high school, I returned to the United States. As a matter of fact, my brother Martin was a graduate from the University of Washington had a grant at Kyoto Imperial University and when I graduated he said, "Grant, the situation between the two countries did not look good." He suggested that I return. So when I finished school, I had a diploma in one hand and a return ticket in the other.

Captain Stone

So when you returned back to the United States, at some point you were drafted I understand, but later enlisted? Could you tell me a little bit about that?

Grant Hirabayashi

After I came back, I did go back to high school. I went to Kent High School. The reason I went to Kent High School was that there was a precedent for they accepted all the credits, which I took in Japan, thereby enabling me to finish in one year. And after I finished high school, I was quite perplexed because my education was such that I was not prepared for college, but Uncle Sam solved the problem and sent me a draft notice. After being drafted, I was able to enlist in the Army Air Corps and the reason I enlisted in the Army Air Corps was that I thought to myself that if I were to serve, I might as well learn a skill and I said I would like to become an airplane mechanic. So, that is how I got into the Army Air Corps.

Captain Stone

When did your service begin?

Grant Hirabayashi

Three days before Pearl Harbor.

Captain Stone

After you enlisted, where did you go?

Grant Hirabayashi

Of course, the war broke out shortly after my enlistment. I was sent to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. And there when I arrived, to my surprise, I was taken to a barracks where there were 22 others and it was called the protective custody and the reason for this was that during a physical, a *Nisei* was harassed and the situation was such that they had to place them in a separate building to complete his physical. We were confined for 40 days or we were under protective custody for 40 days and then released and assigned to various flights. While waiting for the airplane mechanic school, I did serve as a flight clerk and as well a plans and training clerk. But as a matter of fact, I asked my flight commander to send me to flight school because I had waited a couple months and my notice for reporting to airplane mechanic school did not come through. He said Grant, even if you went to... I said the fact that they have not called me for the mechanics school, I would like to go to a clerical school, which was in Denver. He said, even if you go to Denver and complete your course, all they'll do is give you corporal. He said, you stick with me and I'll give you corporal. So I did stick with him and I did get my rank which made me a non-com (non-commissioned officer) in charge of a barracks, and of course Jefferson Barracks being a recruiting station, being a non-commissioned officer was a big deal and it was one of the best lives in the Army for me.

Captain Stone

If I might, going back to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, do you recall where you were and what your reaction was when you learned that the Japanese had attacked?

Grant Hirabayashi

As I recall, I was returning from church when I heard over the loudspeaker Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor. I was not aware where Pearl Harbor was, but what came to my mind was that "My gosh, my parents became enemy aliens because they were not able to become citizens." And that was my first concern, I said "What would happen to my parents?" Also, it was that Sunday that my parents were scheduled to come to see me and when I heard about the attack, I immediately went to the public telephone to advise my parents not to make the trip. But when I picked up the receiver, the line was dead. So I immediately went to the main gate and I looked and fortunately we were able to make eye contact at a distance and we waved and we parted.

Captain Stone

You mentioned that during your in-processing you experienced harassment from some of the others. Could you maybe speak a little more about how you were treated differently after the attack and did that change over time in relation to not just your peers, but maybe also your supervisors?

Grant Hirabayashi

As I said, when I reported to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, I was placed under protective custody and the only contact I had was this sergeant who was a World War I sergeant who served as our guard. We were marched to the mess hall. We were trained in the morning. After noon, we did go on the base military drills. We were marched to the PX. There were no recreational facilities available, so we spent most of the time reading, playing cards, or whatever physical exercise. So the only contact I had was with the guard, so I can't say.

Captain Stone

After you were released from that environment?

Grant Hirabayashi

After I was released, I had no problems.

Captain Stone

Now I understand you were shortly thereafter assigned to the Military Intelligence School at Camp Savage in Minnesota. How did you get that assignment?

Grant Hirabayashi

I think it was around the middle of 1942 that all the *Nisei* assigned to the Army Air Corp at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, were reassigned and I was reassigned to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Station Hospital. While serving as the sick and wounded clerk, I received a letter from Colonel Rasmussen, who was the commandant of Camp Savage, Military Intelligence School. He asked for my résumé and when I responded, I soon received orders to report to Camp Savage.

Captain Stone

Can you describe the six-month training program at Camp Savage? And, what was your training schedule and environment like?

Grant Hirabayashi

I initially went there as a special student. There were five of us, all who had previous Japanese education. We were there for a couple months when there was a flow a students coming from various camps – relocation camps – and were all given aptitude tests or language tests and as a result, they were divided into about 22 different classes – in sections one through 22 I believe. They were divided according to their ability. The course, I think they had a general standard, but it did differ according to the ability of the students. For instance, I happened to be in the class, section one, that consisted mainly of *Kibei*. So, we did have the language capability. Perhaps we needed more English training than Japanese. The subject matter was translation from English to Japanese, Japanese to English, we had calligraphy, military terminology, interrogation, we did talk about the culture and the Japanese tradition, etc. The classes started at eight o'clock – from eight to five – and from seven to nine we had classes again. And on Saturday, we had examinations in the morning. There were many students who in order to keep up with the class and were very enthusiastic they were hard working even when lights went out at ten, many went to the latrine to study. As I recall, at one time they had to place a guard, because in order to accommodate those who went there for legitimate reasons. There were some people who even used flashlights under blankets to study.

Captain Stone

You mentioned you were one of a handful of *Kibei*. I understand the *Kibei* are Japanese-Americans born in the United States but went back to Japan at some point?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, there's a *Kibei* and a *Kibei* (laugh). *Kibei* just means to return to the United States. There were those who went when they were small and who were almost like Japanese because they did not have any training in the United States. In my case, I was 13 when I went to Japan, so I did have some basic culture influence and enough

background to be an American. So as far as 'this' *Kibei* is concerned, I mean he's a *Kibei* with a very strong American emphasis.

Captain Stone

So you could be a *Kibei* and a *Nisei*, is that correct?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes, I'm a *Nisei*.

Captain Stone

Now you had mentioned some of the different types of training that you received. You had mentioned the interrogation and the translation and such. What type of training materials were you provided as students while you were at Camp Savage?

Grant Hirabayashi

The text we used was called Naganuma and just like Colonel Rasmussen our Commandant was a student in Japan and I think he brought back all the language attachés used as textbook, so we also used the Naganuma textbook.

Captain Stone

Was Naganuma the name of the professor?

Grant Hirabayashi

That was the name of the instructor.

Captain Stone

For the attachés in Japan...and you said Colonel Rasmussen was trained so he returned with his materials and he able to use those to train students at Savage?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes.

Captain Stone

At the school at Camp Savage, can you tell me what role the *Nisei* played in the training program itself?

Grant Hirabayashi

All the instructors I recall were *Nisei*. The original *Nisei* who were instructors at Presidio of San Francisco were those who were *Kibei*, who had studied in Japan, like Judge Aiso (John F. Aiso). There were instructors such as Shigeya Kihara, Akira Oshida, and Tadasi Yamada. They had all attended Meiji University in Tokyo and did have the language background. Subsequently, many of the enlisted men who had graduated from the school in turn became instructors.

Captain Stone

Now you were, I think you mentioned before the interview that you were actually in the second class at Savage, so this group would have been the first graduating class that stayed on to teach at the school?

Grant Hirabayashi

Right, so it was somewhat on-the-job training, but I think they did a beautiful job.

Captain Stone

How did the language school at Camp Savage determine who would be interrogators, interpreters, translators, radio announcers, propaganda writers, etc., or were all students trained in each of the disciplines?

Grant Hirabayashi

Each student was trained in the various disciplines.

Captain Stone

And so a combination of all?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes.

Captain Stone

Can you describe for me, if you would, the interrogation training that you received while at Camp Savage?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, the training I received was the instructor would act as the POW and the students would take turns interrogating the instructor. After each interrogation, we had a critique and we would make comments and learn from each individual's technique.

Captain Stone

Did the instructors try to make it difficult for you; did they resist and make it hard?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes.

Captain Stone

Do you recall if interrogators received additional instruction in Japanese culture and psychology? If so, who presented that? Was it also from the instructors, the *Nisei*?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, I'm sure in certain classes such training was provided, but in our particular section, we were all familiar with the Japanese psychology, culture, tradition, so, I think that was perhaps mentioned.

Captain Stone

So, for instance if you were in the lower level of proficiency class, I think 22 was the lowest you mentioned, if you were in class 22 you would have received additional training?

Grant Hirabayashi

Certainly.

Captain Stone

During your training, you answered President Roosevelt's call for volunteers to take part in a 'dangerous and hazardous mission.' How did that notice come to you and did you have any idea what mission you were about to undertake?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, after graduation, we were assigned to Fort Snelling – that is where the graduates were stationed waiting for overseas assignment. And while there, I did notice

there was quite a commotion. Here were high-ranking officers visiting. I was subsequently approached by Eddie Mitsukado who became the team leader and also my foxhole buddy. He approached me and asked about my language capability, my marital status, etc.

Captain Stone

So you basically thought that he was just coming to talk to you as a friend or he was trying to figure out who you were as a potential candidate for this mission?

Grant Hirabayashi

I guess he thought I was a potential candidate.

Captain Stone

At some point you were selected I am assuming, or did you volunteer?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes.

Captain Stone

How many volunteered for the mission?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, there were about 200 volunteers and they selected fourteen. I might add there's also 14 *Nisei* and one Captain Laffin (well, he was a lieutenant then), but his mother was Japanese and Captain Laffin had worked as an executive for the Ford Motor Company in Japan and I think he was born in Japan. He came back on the exchange ship, Gripsholm.¹³⁴

Captain Stone

How were the 14, plus Lieutenant Laffin, selected for this mission?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, those who had the language capability as well as the rugged physical fitness – stamina.

¹³⁴ The Gripsholm was chartered to the U.S. State Department during World War II, from 1942 to 1946, as an exchange and repatriation ship, under the protection of the Red Cross. It was also called the "mercy ship."

Captain Stone

At what point were you given some idea as to the nature and location of the mission?

Grant Hirabayashi

I think that was after we got to India.

Captain Stone

So you had already arrived in India when you learned of the mission?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes.

Captain Stone

Did you get an opportunity to see your family before you left?

Grant Hirabayashi

After I graduated from Camp Savage, I did ask for leave and I was granted it. My parents were no longer at home. They, along with 120,000 others, were evacuated under President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066. There were in internment, so when I arrived, I was taken back to see barbed wire and saw tarpaper barracks. And when I looked up, I saw this soldier with a machine gun facing inward. He wore the same uniform as mine and that really hit me hard. When I entered the camp, there was a soldier that came and guided me halfway to the barracks where my parents were living. And when I met my parents we greeted each other with a smile, but inside we were crying. It was very difficult. My stay at the camp was short and when I left, I knew for the first time what liberty was. I knew what the challenge was. But I was at the same time quite confused here as in school every morning we pledged allegiance to the flag and here I find my siblings behind barbed wire. The only crime is that they look like the enemy. And as I left camp, I knew I had a mission ahead of me. And when I returned to the camp and when they asked for volunteers I had to volunteer.

Captain Stone

Were your parents supportive of your service?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes. Well, as I recall when I was inducted, my father took me to the camp train station, and as I left, he said, "These are very difficult times, I want you to take care of yourself, you do your best."

Captain Stone

When did you depart Camp Savage and how did you make your way overseas?

Grant Hirabayashi

I think it was the month of September that we received orders to proceed to Angel Island. We went to a train station at Savage and we boarded a train. The shades were down and we left and arrived at Angel Island to join the unit, code-named *Galahad*. We met people who had trained in Panama and other areas who had specialized in jungle training. We left Angel Island late in September. We first went to New Caledonia and there, we took on troops that had already fought in the South Pacific. And from New Caledonia, we went to Australia (Brisbane) where we again took on other jungle trained soldiers. Now these people made up the 3rd Battalion. These are jungle trained and those who had actually fought in South East Pacific. From Brisbane, we went to Perth and from Perth to Bombay. I think we arrived in Bombay around the 30th of October after 40 days on the high seas. I might mention that we boarded a luxury liner, Lurline.¹³⁵ So the ship was, I can't recall the knot, but it was faster than the submarine so we zigzagged and went without escort, until we left Perth – we did have escort.

Captain Stone

After you arrived in India, did the unit you were with receive additional training?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes. Initially we were at Deolali and then to Deogarh, which was more suitable for jungle training.

Captain Stone

Who were the instructors?

Grant Hirabayashi

Both American and British.

¹³⁵ The U.S.S. Lurline was a luxury liner owned by the Matson Line. During WWII, it was converted into a U.S. troop transport ship.

Captain Stone

And your training at that point was more jungle warfare training?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes.

Captain Stone

Can you tell me about the unit you served with in the CBI Theater?

Grant Hirabayashi

Are you talking about the 5307th Composite Unit? A total of, to be exact, 2,997 men. It was divided into three battalions and each battalion was divided into two combat teams or columns identified by color. The 1st Battalion, to which I was assigned to, was red and white combat team. The 2nd Battalion was divided into green and blue combat team. The 3rd Battalion was designated khaki and orange. Two *Nisei* were attached to each combat team. There were two assigned to the HQ that were with General Merrill and Colonel Hunter.

Captain Stone

Can you describe the unit's mission and your role in the campaign?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, the mission of the Merrill's Marauders was to make a deep, what they called, a long-range penetration behind enemy lines and disrupt enemy communications, supply lines, and strongholds and to capture the Myitkyina airfield that had an all-weather airstrip.

Captain Stone

What was your role? You said the *Nisei* were assigned to each of these units.

Grant Hirabayashi

Our mission was to interrogate, translate captured documents, tap into enemy telephone lines, creep up and listen to the enemy conversations, etc.

Captain Stone

Did you have contact with the enemy?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, on several occasions, I crawled up where I could hear the enemy but I did not see the enemy. The jungle was so thick. I could hear them, but I couldn't see them.

Captain Stone

Do you recall any particular interrogations at this point that are maybe still on your mind today and that you might describe to me?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, one in particular that comes to mind is during the battle of Myitkyina. One evening, late one evening, a Japanese lieutenant was brought in on a stretcher. I understand he had been captured by the Gurkhas, the highly respected Indian fighters. And when he attempted to escape, he was bayoneted three different times on the buttock, arm, and thigh and when I saw him he was covered with blood. So, and it was late that night so I instructed the MP to take the POW to the first aid and give him first aid treatment. I further instructed him to bring him back early in the morning so I could interview him. The following morning, the POW was brought to me and I asked him how was the treatment, how was the medical treatment, and he looked me in the eyes and he said, "You're a traitor." I said "Traitor," I said "Wait a minute." I said, "If we were to cut our veins, I'm sure the same blood would flow." But I said, "I'm an American soldier, I'm an American fighting for my country and you are fighting for your country, don't you dare call me a traitor." And then I proceeded with my interrogation and he refuse to respond. So at one point, I did raise my voice and then he responded, "You're a traitor," and that really hit me hard. So I told the MP to take the POW and place him in the enlisted stockade. Of course, we didn't have a stockade for the officers. My instructions were to place him in the middle of the stockade. Shortly thereafter, I walked by, and the POW pulled my trousers and said, "Mr. Interpreter, I want to die." So I asked him, "How do you want to die?" He said, "I want to be shot." "Shot," I said, "I don't have any bullets to waste on you. But, I do have a sword that we captured, and you can demonstrate how to commit *hara-kari*." And with that, I left him. After about a half an hour, I again approached him. He pulled my trousers again and said, "Mr. Interpreter, I have a change of heart, but please get me out of here." So, I had the MP take him out and I interrogated him and he responded to every question I asked. The following day I met Captain Chang (his supervisor) and he said, "Grant, that's what the old man was looking for." And I didn't follow up on his comment, but that was the first time I had received any feedback. Normally, what an investigator or interrogators regiment is that they interrogate, they write a report, they submit it, and that's it. You seldom received feedback.

Captain Stone

With this particular Japanese prisoner that called you a traitor, was that a common occurrence?

Grant Hirabayashi

I think that was rare.

Captain Stone

What techniques did you use that were successful in getting Japanese prisoners to talk? Are you aware of other interrogators, other *Nisei* interrogators, that used a similar approach possibly?

Grant Hirabayashi

I think in general, we didn't talk too much about our methods of interrogation, but I think the approach was something comparable to mine. Now what I would do is after the prisoner is brought in, I would ask him, "Do you need medical attention?" and of course the eyes would pop. I said, "Have you heard from your family; have you had communication?" And then I would break a cigarette, and you know, have him light a cigarette and start puffing. By then, you could see the tears are coming down and they say, "Aren't you going to shoot me?" I said, "No. You're a soldier, I'm a soldier. I respect you're fighting for your country, I'm fighting for mine. But I do have a duty to interrogate you." And they would bawl and with the exception of the lieutenant that gave me a hard time, others were all cooperative. For one, the Japanese were never, were not aware of the Geneva Convention. I went through school in Japan and I never heard about the Geneva Convention. And they were always told to destroy themselves before they were captured so they didn't know how to act as a POW. All they knew was they were ashamed that they were POWs and I think that was the utmost in their minds. And knowing how the Japanese POWs felt, I was able to empathize with them by treating them as equals, a soldier. I think I commanded a respect and they cooperated. I do on one occasion, he was a sergeant and I thought it was a pretty good report, and I submitted it and I came back to him and I gave him a cigarette but he was looking down and I said, "What's your problem?" He said, "What I said was true except I gave the wrong unit number" (laugh) and he said that was bothering him so when he gave me the unit number I went back and corrected it and came back and he had a smile on his face. What I saw was they were cooperative.

Captain Stone

And that one particular prisoner even felt compelled to correct himself?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yeah (laugh).

Captain Stone

My next question dealt with your success and you've pretty much covered that, that feedback was somewhat limited, but in your mind, did you feel you were able to get information from the prisoners and what type of information were you writing in your reports?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, the average soldier didn't have much information, I have to admit. Sergeants, they did better. Take your regular foot soldier – they didn't have too much information except for their feelings of course we were able to get some feedback as far as how they felt, how their morale was, etc. But the sergeants did have information that was beneficial.

Captain Stone

Generally what type of information were you gathering from the prisoners?

Grant Hirabayashi

One thing, when we were at Myitkyina, I got the strength of the enemy and I reported it, but there was some other, I forget, British officer or something, that came through the line and he gave another conflicting report. And I guess of course they took the British officer's (laugh) number and assumed mine out. But, as it turned out, my number was closer to the actual figure. The fact that they waited because the figure the British officer gave, they failed to make the attack, they held back, and at that time I said to myself if they had listened to me. (laugh) Those things were very rare.

Captain Stone

Do you recall, and I think we may have discussed this already, as far as discussion among the interrogators, was there ever or do you recall ever any discussion concerning the techniques that were considered, "humane" and those considered more "inhumane" or was there ever a consensus or different approaches?

Grant Hirabayashi

As I said before, we didn't talk too much about our interrogation method, but from what I gather, it was all humane. I think that's the method the *Nisei* used.

Captain Stone

Mr. Hirabayashi, how did your Japanese heritage and your culture contribute to or detract from your effectiveness as an interrogator?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, the fact that I was aware of their psychology, their customs, their tradition, I was able to empathize with the POW and I think I was able to approach them with a feeling that knowing their feelings I was able to extract information from them.

Captain Stone

Could you possibly try for me to describe the mindset of the Japanese prisoner?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, they're human just like we are and of course to become POW was a shame, not to himself, but to the family and the country and they were very conscious of that. I could recall during one occasion when I snuck up to the Japanese and overheard their conversation. Their conversation went something like this: "My dad is over 70 years old and I'm sure he's having trouble managing the farm without me. I wonder how my mother is?" The other person responded, "I'm having trouble with my shoe and have a sore foot." There was no intelligence, but it did give to me the feeling of the Japanese who was in the battlefield, deeply concerned about his family.

Captain Stone

And once they were captured, I understand, they didn't want...it was the American responsibility under the Geneva Convention to provide information back to Japan that they had been taken prisoner and they, as I understand, these prisoners didn't want that.

Grant Hirabayashi

Right. The only thing I could assure them was that we worked with them, the POW, under the Geneva Convention and that when the war ended that they would be sent back and I did encourage them that they do their best for the reconstruction of their homeland.

Captain Stone

How did they respond to that?

Grant Hirabayashi

Of course it did give them a different outlook. Up to that point, they were thinking about how to destroy themselves or they didn't want to go back because of the shame. But when I did explain to them that it was their responsibility once they returned to Japan that they would have to contribute and do their share for the reconstruction of the country, they did seem to have a different outlook.

Captain Stone

Your approach was very honorable – the ‘human-to-human’ treatment. How did your fellow soldiers, maybe the non-*Nisei*, what were their feelings and attitudes about the treatment and such?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, usually I was on my own, so the only occasion I had some bystander was when the Lieutenant came in on a stretcher and people started kicking him. I said, “Wait a minute, he’s a POW and it’s my responsibility to get information from him. I don’t want to mistreat him.” I had the MP clear the scene. Of course a lot of GIs were surrounding as a curiosity. But of course, as I recall, the one fellow said, “It was these bastards that killed my brother,” or something to that effect. So I knew how the GIs felt, but at the same time, I had my job to accomplish.

Captain Stone

One area I’m most interested in is if you could tell me about the *Nisei* contribution during the Burma campaign.

Grant Hirabayashi

It was during the Battle of Walawbum that was our first battle. Hank Goshu, he was with the 3rd Battalion, was assigned as an I&R – intelligence and reconnaissance – and they were surrounded so to speak, they had the enemy to their back. The Japanese thought that their language was so complex no Americans could understand the Japanese language. They gave out oral commands and Hank Goshu was there and he intercepted the oral command, which he immediately translated and passed it back to his platoon leader, who in turn shifted his troops and automatic weapon in the direction of the attack, and by doing so, they were able to destroy the enemy. Hank was caught between the friendly fire as well as the enemy fire because the I&R is on the front line. And they found him on his stomach so many times he earned the nickname ‘Horizontal Hank.’ It was during the same battle that the 2nd Battalion had consisted of Roy Matsumoto, Bob Honda, Roy Nakada, and one more, Ben Sugeta. When they established a perimeter, they noticed there was a telephone line going through the trees and Roy had Phil Piazza, an officer who had the telephone so he could use the telephone to intercept the enemy communications. During Roy Matsumoto’s watch, he heard the sergeant asking his superior for instructions and help. He said he had only so many men guarding the ammunition dump and he in turn mentioned where the Merrill’s Marauders, the enemy, were located. By giving the Merrill’s Marauders direction, he in turn compromised his own position. And with that information, they passed it along to the Air Corps and they destroyed a large ammunition dump. It was that same evening; he (Roy) again intercepted a message that the enemy was to attack at 1100 hours. While the 2nd Battalion that had been fighting for 30 hours without food and low on ammunition it was ordered to withdraw rather than face the opposition which was much superior.

At the Battle of Nhpum-Ga (Hill), they were surrounded, under siege for about 15 days. This is the 2nd Battalion again. They took turns listening at night. One night Roy Matsumoto crawled way beyond the perimeter into 'no man's land' and he heard the enemy talk about the plans for the dawn attack. With that information, he passed it along to Lieutenant McLogan who in turn withdrew his men, built protective foxholes, and then established a new perimeter and concentrated all the automatic weapons in the direction of the attack. They waited, and at dawn, and the Japanese struck with a 'Banzai attack' and they were abandoning the empty foxholes and throwing hand grenades but they were taken aback to find no GIs. So, the officer, drawing his saber, charged up the hill. Lieutenant McLogan held fire until they were 15 yards and then they opened up all the automatic weapons and annihilated the enemy. The second wave that was coming up saw what happened and they all hit the ground and there were signs they were retreating so Roy Matsumoto was in a foxhole, he rose from the foxhole and gave command in Japanese, "charge, charge," and they charged and of course met the same fate as the first wave. When the battle was over, they counted 54 bodies including two officers and this was on Sunday, Easter Sunday.

Captain Stone

I also understand during the Burma campaign, you had some challenges of your own that went all the way back to your time back in India and on through the campaign?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, during the first maneuver, this was during our training during the first maneuver, I was exposed to K-rations for the first time and of course, after I ate the K-rations, I broke out in hives. So the following morning, I did report to the British 'sick-call' and was immediately told I was allergic to K-rations. Also, during the same maneuver, I jumped and when I jumped, the butt of my rifle hit my elbow and I had a chipped elbow. So I was sent to the British hospital to have it x-rayed and I came back with my arm in a sling. So with two strikes against me, General Merrill said I was not qualified for combat duty. He wanted to relieve me, but I did talk my way out, I told him that I had trained for this, I had gone to school, I had trained for this and that I was not about to stay back. Furthermore, we were in pairs – one strong in Japanese and one strong in English – and my teammate was Eddie Mitsukado and I didn't want to let him down so I did talk my way out.

Captain Stone

So how did you work it through the Burma campaign if you were allergic to the K-rations?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, it was very difficult because I would trade my (rations), it was the preservative that I was allergic to, like the scrambled eggs and cheese and others...hash.

They had preservatives and I was allergic to that. So I was not able to eat the canned food so would trade for crackers and chocolate bars. (laugh) But during the Battle of Walawbum, the Japanese were taken by surprise and they retreated. When they retreated, they scattered their rice on the ground and so I picked up the rice and then I tried to cook it a helmet, but I wouldn't recommend it. Also, as Japanese, I noticed there was an empty bag that said Shinshu Miso. Shishu is an old name for Nagano Prefecture that's where my parents come from and that is where I had studied. That reinforced my prayer that I be spared of confronting my classmates or cousin. But fortunately, the enemy we encountered was from Kyushu, so I did not encounter any classmates, although I heard after the war that a classmate was in Imphal, he was in India or in Burma, but different campaign.

Captain Stone

Before we leave the Burma campaign, were there any other interrogations you could share with me?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes. After the Battle of Myitkyina, I think the battle ended around the 3rd of August, when Gen. Mizukami committed suicide and shortly thereafter I was called by my friend – he was motioning me to come. So when I approached him, I was taken by surprise that there was a British stockade and inside there were some girls and he said they were "Comfort Girls." That was the first time I heard about comfort girls. I said to myself, "This is not my line," so I went and asked Captain Chang for help and I mentioned that "We do have Comfort Girls and I would like to have your help." Capt. Chang called Howard Furumoto and Bob Honda and myself and the three of us, the four of us, went to the stockade. And as we entered, I think there were about twenty Comfort Girls. These girls were Korean and the 'Mama san' was Japanese.

Captain Stone

So you and the others were responsible for these interrogations?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, as it turned out, Capt. Chang asked me to serve as an interpreter and he asked numerous questions, but of course, the girls didn't have the information which Capt. Chang was asking. He did show photos, which he carried with him and the girls did identify one commander, his name was Colonel Moriyama. And then, we noticed that the Mama san looked like she was pregnant and she was too old for that, to be pregnant. So I did inquire if she had something hidden. She responded, but responded saying that she's responsible for the girls and also responsible for the earnings. So I said if that's what it is, I'd like to see it and she unrolled and showed me the rupees. It was a ten-yen rupee, which she had in bundles and put it in front of me and as I picked it up, it was like off the press because it was warm. And the girls were all anxiously looking

thinking that I would take the money. But I did tell her the Japanese were losing the war in Burma and these were occupation money which was no longer valid. And of course, she was taken aback. But I did say if you give me a couple bundles, I would try to exchange it for cigarettes or maybe K-rations for souvenir hunters. She gave me two bundles and then as she started wrapping the remaining rupees, there was a relief on the part of the girls knowing I had taken only two bundles. I was able to exchange for cigarettes and K-rations and I did bring it back and of course those who smoke did appreciate it and of course I think K-rations came in handy too. But as far as information or intelligence, there was none.

Captain Stone

What did the Comfort Girls, what type of information did they talk about? What did they tell you?

Grant Hirabayashi

Actually, I personally did not ask any questions except about the rupees. I mainly served as an interpreter. But there was no information that Capt. Chang was able to satisfy himself. But, they did inquire, they were shaking, they said well they wanted to know what their fate was and when I asked Capt. Chang he said as soon as transportation was made available, they would be sent back to India and they would be under the supervision of the British and after the war, they would be returned to Korea, and I do know that they went back to India because when I drove by the dispenser, I saw one of the girls go in. Going back to the Comfort Girls, the night before they left for India, Howard Furumoto had a golden voice and also carried a ukulele throughout Burma. So we went and we sang Hawaiian songs, sang Japanese songs and American songs and the Comfort Girls sang "Arirang," which is a love song. But, as I left it was a full moon as I recall, as I left the stockade and my eyes were wet. Of course I was thinking about my parents and my siblings.

Captain Stone

After the 5307th disbanded, where did you go next?

Grant Hirabayashi

As I recall, it was August the 10th that Merrill's Marauders disbanded. Shortly thereafter, I think around the 15th of August, I was assigned to New Delhi. Before that, I did have R&R (rest and relaxation). And then I was assigned to New Delhi as an interpreter for the British Royal Air Force.

Captain Stone

That was the South East Asia Translation and Interrogation Center?

Grant Hirabayashi

That is correct. And I served with them until the 24th of December when we were transferred to Kunming. But there's a little story behind that. One day we were in New Delhi and a British General came up and said "Soldier, what do you do when you see an officer?" and we said "Yes sir," and we saluted. It was too late. He took our names and he reported us to Colonel Swift, our Commandant, and we were called on the carpet. And he was very sympathetic. He said, "I know you just got back from Burma and your instructions were not to salute an officer because you would identify the officer and the snipers would shoot the officers. But now you're in the rear echelon, you have to salute." Well, just then Roy says "Oh, damn," and he kept on bitching and the Colonel said, "Well Roy, what do you want?" He said, "I want to get the 'H' out of here." He said, "Your wish is granted" and he said "You report to the airstrip on the 24th of December." And I said, "The 24th of December! We're going to miss Christmas." So I asked, "Colonel, is it possible for us to spend Christmas in New Delhi?" He said, "Your wish is not granted." So on the 24th we did report to the airstrip, but the plane we got on was a C-46 loaded with ammunition boxes. We got on the cargo ship, no place to sit, so we got on the ammunition boxes and we looked through the window. Well, it seemed it took so long, it took the full length of the airstrip for the plane to take off. It seemed like it would never take off. But once it took off, you could hear the motor that was quite stressful. As we went over the hump, you could see the hump and the planes flying. We were thinking, "Gee, are we going to make it?" And we made the first one, then the second and we sweated out each hump and then we arrived in Kunming. And I recall the ground crew say, "I see you made it." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "The one before didn't make it." He said they were all anxiously waiting for the plane because it had some PX supplies, but we made it safely.

Captain Stone

So you were in China now?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes. And while assigned to duties at Kunming, there wasn't much to do and one day Colonel Dickie came to inspect to see how the *Nisei* were performing—the MIS graduates were performing. And I happen to know him so I asked – I was bored at Kunming – that I would like to go to Chunking, and he said "I'll see about that," and whether it was a coincidence or not, I was assigned to Chunking about a month later. And in Chunking I was assigned to SINTIC, the Sino Translation and Interrogation Center. The person in command was Lieutenant Colonel John Burden. And the fact that I had spent a little time with the Air Force, I was in charge of the Japanese Air Corps POWs. One interrogation that comes to mind is the lieutenant; a first lieutenant was brought in for interrogation. And during the course of the interrogation, he pushed a Chinese matchbox in front of me and said, "We are doing research of a bomb that could destroy a city, a bomb this size that could destroy a city." I said, "You're kidding." He said, "No." He recomposed himself and added that the study that is being made at, the

research was being conducted, at two Imperial Universities, in Tokyo and Kyoto. The third University was Osaka University. I said, "Well, what's the name of the bomb?" He said, "atomic bomb or atom bomb." Well, I knew when he said atom, it was something small. And then he went on to explain the makings of the bomb which was beyond my comprehension. He used the words like uranium 235, 238, thermal fusion, etc. etc. Each time I heard a word I that was not familiar, I would excuse myself and look it up in the dictionary, and it wasn't there. Well, the schedule was to spend one week at the POW camp. Actually, I stayed at a place called Nanonchen. That translates to South Hot Spring, where I stayed and would come to the POW camp. And after one week of interrogation I would return and then spend the next week writing up the report. When I returned to Chungking, I was introduced to Lieutenant Berg and there was one person I forget. They had just graduated from OCS and were assigned to SINTIC. When I was introduced, I said I had just come back from the POW camp and I told the Lieutenant the Japanese are conducting research on a bomb the size of a matchbox that could destroy a city. They each looked at each other and rolled their eyes and said "Grant, "We just graduated OCS and we have the latest information. There is no such thing – such bomb." Well, I just excused myself and the following week I started on my report. I did get the introduction written up, but I said to myself, in order to give some meat to the report, I should add the technical aspect, but in order to do that, I needed help. So I did make arrangement with Colonel Burden to at least make a verbal report and what I wanted was for him to follow up and give me some support. As I walked in, he was standing next to the window and he had a document in his hand with a very serious look. So I start reporting and when I said a bomb the size of a matchbox he looked up and gave me a strange look and then his eyes went back to the report again and after I finished no response. I said "That's strange," and I said "He must have very important work. What can I do," so I saluted and excused myself. And of course when the atom bomb fell, I wanted to say something, but I said no. But he didn't say anything and the two lieutenants saw each other but they're an officer, I'm enlisted. So whatever I wrote ended up in the wastepaper basket.

Captain Stone

So your time at SINTIC you also had a role as a personal translator as well – for one of the leaders?

Grant Hirabayashi

No. I was just in charge of the Air Force POWs.

Captain Stone

And you were involved in the interrogations of the Japanese Air Force?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes.

Captain Stone

Are there any other interrogations that you recall of interest other than the scientist?

Grant Hirabayashi

That's the one that stands out.

Captain Stone

What did you do next?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, the war ended while I was assigned to SINTIC and shortly after the war I was called by Colonel Burden and I was told that I would report to Nanking as General McClure's personal interpreter. The day we left, he pinned a bar on me and I was sworn in as a Second Lieutenant. And then we went to the airport; General Ho Ying-chin, representing Chiang Kai-shek, Colonel Burden and myself, the three of us took a C-47 and flew to Nanking. And when I arrived in Nanking, I was taken by surprise because we were surrounded by Japanese soldiers and of course there was some Chinese and some GIs but these were not really Japanese soldiers working. We immediately went to the vehicle that was waiting for us. As I recall, it was a 1937 or '38 Chevrolet. We got on and as we turned the corner, I was surprised to see a very strange scene unfold with Japanese soldiers and squads marching up and down. I saw an officer with a saber dangling on his side. At the major intersections, they had machine guns. But we arrived at the hotel without any incident. After we settled down, Colonel Burden said, "Grant, let's go for a walk." So, we got out and as we turned the corner, here comes three Japanese soldiers coming down the street and the Colonel said, "What are we going to do?" I pushed the Colonel off the sidewalk and my thinking at that time was we had not signed the treaty yet. We haven't surrendered yet. I didn't want any confrontation and so that was it. The following day was the surrender and the same Chevrolet came I think when we came from the airport there were two of us, but now there were four of us. So I ended up on Colonel Burden's lap. We made it to the surrender, at the building where the (pause) (Captain Stone – Now this was the surrender ceremony at this point?) Yes.

Captain Stone

So, on the 15th of August of 1945, the Japanese actually or the Emperor actually surrendered, but I understand there were different ceremonies that followed for many weeks after the actual surrender and you participated in one of their ceremonies?

Grant Hirabayashi

The one I participated in was held in Nanking. This was General Okamoto, Commander in Chief in the China Theater, representing the...attended the surrender. General McClure was the U.S. representative who served as the observer. The actual surrender was held between the Japanese and the Chinese.

Captain Stone

Okay, so that concluded your service overseas and you returned to the United States.

Grant Hirabayashi

I might add that after the surrender ceremony in Nanking, General McClure said, "Grant, we're going to Manchuria. I said, "General, this is September." All I had was my khaki uniform and I said, "Manchuria...I'm not prepared for it." The General said, "Take my plane, go back to Chungking and get your belongings and we'll go to Manchuria." I said, "Yes, sir" and took his plane and returned to Chungking. Major Snyder, who I reported to, he said, "Grant you're the third man on the list for the rotation. I said "Major, I have the General's plane waiting for me." He said, "I can hear you; I'm telling you you're the third man on the list for rotation." I said, "How soon can I leave." He said, "There is a plane leaving for Calcutta at 6 o'clock this evening." So when I went to the airport, you know which plane I got on. So I went to the Suez Canal and I made a trip around the world on the Government's expense.

Captain Stone

Do you recall what it felt like when you returned to the United States after your extended combat experience?

Grant Hirabayashi

Well, I wish I had known that I had a round trip ticket. It would have made things much easier but it was such a delight to see the Statue of Liberty. We all got on the right side of the ship that it tilted (laugh) and we got orders to stand back. But it was a tremendous feeling I can't describe. I was very proud, very happy to see the Statue of Liberty and when we docked, there was a band waiting for us and struck up the Sentimental Journey. It was a trip that I went on my own volition and I was very proud to be back, happy to be back, and happy to be an American.

Captain Stone

Where did you go when you returned to the U.S.?

Grant Hirabayashi

I was discharged at Camp McCoy and then my parents had relocated to Minneapolis so I did go to Minneapolis. I wanted to take advantage of the GI Bill, so I did apply to the University of Minnesota. I was told it was very crowded and they recommended that I wait a semester. During that period, I did visit the Military Language School which was then located at Fort Snelling. I was told they were short of instructors and they could use my service so I did join the faculty. In the meantime, the school moved to the Presidio of Monterey in California. While serving there, I was transferred to SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Power) Legal Section, in November of 1947 and I was assigned to the prosecution. In the War Crimes, there were three categories: Class A, B and C. 'A' dealt with those who planned, initiated or waged war in violation of international treaty. Class 'B' were those who actually violated the laws of war and these are the people who actually committed the war crimes. 'C' was genocide. As you know, Class 'A' was held in Tokyo. It was known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. 'B' was held at Yokohama under the jurisdiction of Eighth Army and I did commute to Yokohama each day and the two cases I was involved was...one was the Kyoto Imperial University vivisection case and the other, the Western Army case. Of course after the war crimes trials were over, I was assigned to the Parole Board and that was the full circle and it was time for me to come back and take advantage of the GI Bill.

Capt Stone

And you were able to take advantage of that?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes. I did get my degree and I served with the Department of State, Library of Congress and I retired from the National Security Agency.

Captain Stone

Well, Mr. Hirabayashi, before we close this oral interview, is there anything you wish to add that was not covered in the interview?

Grant Hirabayashi

Yes. Well, in each interview, I conclude with the same tone, but I'm glad that I did have the opportunity to serve my country and perform my duties as a citizen. I like to think we're able to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with soldiers of many different cultures and I think we proved that being American is not a matter of race or color of the skin, but it has to do with one's spirit, determination, and love of freedom.

Closing Remarks by Captain Stone:

This concludes the oral history interview of Mr. Hirabayashi. Mr. Hirabayashi, on behalf of the National Defense Intelligence College, I truly appreciate this opportunity to interview you today. Your oral history will be archived at the college library and will be available to historians, researchers, scholars, and military professionals for many generations to come. Thank you.

APPENDIX D

**SUGGESTIONS FOR JAPANESE INTERPRETERS
BASED ON WORK IN THE FIELD
BY SHERWOOD F. MORAN¹³⁶**

The following formerly restricted document was retyped from its original form by Mitchell P. Paradis, Master Gunnery Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired), Marine Corps Interrogator Translator Teams Association, on 7 July 2003. In addition, it was proofread by David R. Moran, Sherwood F. Moran's grandson, et al, on 25 June 2005.

¹³⁶ Moran, "Suggestions For Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field," NARA.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR JAPANESE INTERPRETERS
BASED ON WORK IN THE FIELD

(Being selections from a letter to an interpreter just entering upon his work.)

First of all I wish to say that every interpreter (I like the word "interviewer" better, for any really efficient interpreter is first and last an inter- viewer) must be himself. He should not and cannot try to copy or imitate some- body else, or, in the words of the Japanese proverb, he will be like the crow trying to imitate the cormorant catching fish and drowning in the attempt ("U no mane suru karasu mizu ni oboreru"). But of course it goes without saying that the interpreter should be open to suggestions and should be a student of best methods. But his work will be based primarily upon his own character, his own experience, and his own temperament. These three things are of prime importance; strange as it may seem to say so, I think the first and the last are the most important of the three. Based on these three things, he will gradually work out a technique of his own, - his very own, just as a man does in making love to a woman! The comparison is not merely a flip bon mot; the interviewer should be a real wooer!

What I have to say concretely is divided into two sections: (1) The attitude of the interpreter towards his prisoner; (2) His knowledge and use of the language.

Let us take the first one, - his ATTITUDE. This is of prime importance, in many ways more important than his knowledge of the language. (Many people, I suppose, would on first thought think "attitude" had nothing to do with it; that all one needs is a knowledge of the language, then shoot out questions, and expect and demand a reply. Of course that is a very unthinking and naive point of view.)

I can simply tell you what my attitude is; I often tell a prisoner right at the start what my attitude is! I consider a prisoner (i.e. a man who has been captured and disarmed and in a perfectly safe place) as out of the war, out of the picture, and thus, in a way, not an enemy. (This is doubly so, psychologically and physically speaking, if he is wounded or starving.) Some self-appointed critics, self-styled "hard-boiled" people, will sneer that this is a sentimental attitude, and say, "Don't you know he will try to escape at first opportunity?" I reply, "Of course I do; wouldn't you?" But that is not the point. Notice that in the first part of this paragraph I used the word "safe". That is the point; get the prisoner to a safe place, where even he knows there is no hope of escape, that it is all over. Then forget, as it were, the "enemy" stuff, and the "prisoner" stuff. I tell them to forget it, telling them I am talking as a human being to a human being, (ningen to shite). And they respond to this.

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When it comes to the wounded, the sick, the tired, the sleepy, the starving, I consider that since they are out of the combat for good, they are simply needy human beings, needing our help, physical and spiritual. This is the standpoint of one human being thinking of another human being. But in addition, it is hard business common sense, and yields rich dividends from the Intelligence standpoint.

I consider that the Japanese soldier is a person to be pitied rather than hated. I consider (and I often tell them so) that they have been led around by the nose by their leaders; that they do not know, and have not been allowed to know for over 10 years what has really been going on in the world, etc. etc. The proverb "Ido no naka no kawazu taikai o shirazu" (The frog in the bottom of the well is not acquainted with the ocean) is sometimes a telling phrase to emphasize your point. But one must be careful not to antagonize them by such statements, by giving them the idea that you have a "superiority" stand- point, etc. etc.

But in relation to all the above, this is where "character" comes in, that I mentioned on the preceding page. One must be absolutely sincere. I mean that one must not just assume the above attitudes in order to gain the prisoner's confidence and get him to talk. He will know the difference. You must get him to know by the expression on your face, the glance of your eye, the tone of your voice, that you do think that "the men of the four seas are brothers," to quote a Japanese (and Chinese) proverb. (Shikai keitei.) One Japanese prisoner re- marked to me that he thought I was a fine gentleman ("rippana shinshi"). I think that what he was meaning to convey was that he instinctively sensed that I was sincere, was trying to be fair, did not have it in for the Japanese as such. (My general attitude has already been brought out in the article "The Psychology of the Japanese.")

In regard to all the above, a person who has lived in Japan for a number of years has a big advantage. One can tell the prisoner how pleasant his life in Japan was; how many fine Japanese he knew, even mentioning names and places, students and their schools, how he had Japanese in his home, and vice versa, etc. etc. That alone will make a Japanese homesick. This line has infinite possibilities. If you know anything about Japanese history, art, politics, athletics, famous places, department stores, eating places, etc. etc. a conversation may be relatively interminable. I could write two or three pages on this alone. (I personally have had to break off conversations with Japanese prisoners, so willing were they to talk on and on.) I remember how I had quite a talk with one of our prisoners whom I had asked what his hobbies (shumi) etc. were. He mentioned swimming. (He had swum four miles to shore before we captured him.) We talked about the crawl stroke and about the Olympics. Right here all this goes to prove that being an "interpreter" is not simply being a Cook's tourist type of interpreter. He should be a man of culture, insight, resourcefulness, and with real conversational ability. He must have "gags"; he must have a "line". He must be alive; he must be warm; he must be vivid. But above all he must have integrity, sympathy; yet he must be firm, wise ("Wise as serpents but harmless as doves".) He must have dignity and a proper sense of values, but withal friendly, open and frank. Two characteristics I have not specifically mentioned: patience and tact.

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From the above, you will realize that most of these ideas are based on common sense. I might sum it all up by saying that a man should have sympathetic common sense. There may be some who read the above paragraphs (or rather just glance through them) who say it is just sentiment. But careful reading will show it is enlightened hard-boiledness.

Now in regard to the second point I have mentioned (on p 1), the knowledge and the use of the language. Notice that I say "knowledge" and "use". They are different. A man may have a perfect knowledge, as a linguist, of a language, and yet not be skillful and resourceful in its use. Questioning people, even in one's own language, is an art in itself, just as is selling goods. In fact, the good interpreter must, in essence, be a salesman, and a good one.

But first in regard to the knowledge of the language itself. Technical terms are important, but I do not feel they are nearly as important as a large general vocabulary, and freedom in the real idiomatic language of the Japanese. Even a person who knows little Japanese can memorize lists of technical phrases. After all, the first and most important victory for the interviewer to try to achieve is to get into the mind and into the heart of the person being interviewed. This is particularly so in the kind of work so typical of our Marine Corps, such as we experienced at Guadalcanal, - slam-bang methods, where, right in the midst of things we had what might be called "battle-field interpretation", where we snatched prisoners right off the battlefield while still bleeding, and the snipers were still sniping, and interviewed them as soon as they were able to talk. But even in the interviewing of prisoners later on, after they were removed from Guadalcanal, first at the advanced bases, and then at some central base far back. The fundamental thing would be to get an intellectual and spiritual en rapport with the prisoner. At the back bases you will doubtless have a specific assignment to question a prisoner (who has been questioned a number of times before) on some particular and highly technical problem; something about his submarine equipment, something about radar, range finders, bombsights, etc. etc. Of course at such a time, a man who does not know technical terms will be almost out of it. But he must have both: a large general vocabulary, with idiomatic phrases, compact and pithy phrases; and also technical words and phrases.

Now in regard to the use of the language. Often it is not advisable to get right down to business with the prisoner at the start. I seldom do. To begin right away in a business-like and statistical way to ask him his name, age, etc., and then pump him for military information, is neither good psychology nor very interesting for him or for you. Begin by asking him things about himself. Make him and his troubles the center of the stage, not you and your questions of war problems. If he is not wounded or tired out, you can ask him if he has been getting enough to eat; if he likes Western-style food. You can go on to say, musingly, as it were, "This war is a mess, isn't it! It's too bad we had to go to war, isn't it! Aren't people funny, scrapping the way they do! The world seems like a pack of dogs scrapping at each other." And so on. (Notice there is yet no word of condemnation or praise towards his or his country's attitude, simply a broad human approach.) You can ask if he has had cigarettes, if he is being treated all right, etc. If he is wounded you have a rare chance. Begin to talk about his wounds. Ask if the doctor or

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corpsman has attended to him. Have him show you his wounds or burns. (They will like to do this!) The bombardier of one of the Japanese bombing planes shot down over Guadalcanal had his whole backside burned and had difficulty in sitting down. He appreciated my genuine sympathy and desire to have him fundamentally made comfortable. He was most affable and friendly, though very sad at having been taken prisoner. We had a number of interviews with him. There was nothing he was not willing to talk about. And this was a man who had been dropping bombs on us just the day before! On another occasion a soldier was brought in. A considerable chunk of his shinbone had been shot away. In such bad shape was he that we broke off in the middle of the interview to have his leg redressed. We were all interested in the redressing, in his leg, it was almost a social affair! And the point to note is that we really were interested, and not pretending to be interested in order to get information out of him. This was the prisoner who called out to me when I was leaving after that first interview, "Won't you please come and talk to me every day". (And yet people are continually asking us, "Are the Japanese prisoners really willing to talk?")

A score of illustrations such as the preceding could be cited. However, all this is of course preliminary. But even later on when you have started on questioning him for strictly war information, it is well not to be too systematic. Wander off into delightful channels of things of interest to him and to you. But when I say it is well not to be too systematic, I mean in the outward approach and presentation from a conversational standpoint. But in the workings of your mind you must be a model of system. You must know exactly what information you want, and come back to it repeatedly. Don't let your warm human interest, your genuine interest in the prisoner, cause you to be side-tracked by him! You should be hard-boiled but not half-baked. Deep human sympathy can go with a business-like, systematic and ruthlessly persistent approach.

I now wish to take up an important matter concerning which there is some difference of opinion. At certain bases where prisoners are kept, when some visitor comes to look over the equipment and general layout, as he comes to each individual cell where a prisoner is kept, the prisoner is required to jump up and stand at attention; even if he is asleep, they prod him and make him stand stiffly at attention. Again, when a prisoner is being interviewed, as the interpreter or interpreters come into the room used for that purpose, the prisoner must stand at attention, and for the first part of the questioning he is not asked to sit down. Later on he is allowed to sit down as a gracious concession. He is treated well, and no attempt is made to threaten him or mistreat him, but the whole attitude, the whole emphasis, is that he is a prisoner and we are his to-be-respected and august enemies and conquerors.

Now for my own standpoint. I think all this is not only unnecessary, but that it acts exactly against what we are trying to do. To emphasize that we are enemies, to emphasize that he is in the presence of his conqueror, etc., puts him psychologically in the position of being on the defensive, and that because he is talking to a most-patient enemy and conqueror he has no right and desire to tell anything. That is most certainly the attitude I should take under similar circumstances, even if I had no especially patriotic scruples against giving information. Let me give a concrete illustration. One of our

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interpreters at a certain base was told that, when a prisoner is to be interviewed, he should be marched in, with military personnel on either side of him; the national flag of the conqueror should be on display, to give the prisoner a sense of the dignity and majesty of the conqueror's country, and that he should stand at attention, etc. In this atmosphere the interpreter, according to instructions, attempted to interrogate the prisoner. The prisoner replied courteously but firmly, "I am a citizen of Japan. As such I will tell you anything you wish to know about my own personal life and the like, but I cannot tell you anything about military matters." In other words, he was made so conscious of his present position and that he was a captured soldier vs. enemy Intelligence, that they played right into his hands! Well, that was zero in results. But later this same interpreter took this prisoner and talked with him in a friendly and informal manner, giving him cigarettes and some tea or coffee, with the result that he opened up perfectly naturally and told everything that was wanted, so far as his intelligence and knowledge made information available.

Of course all this dignity emphasis is based on the fear that the prisoner will take advantage of you and your friendship; the same idea as that a foreman must swear at his construction gang in order to get work out of them. Of course there always is the danger that some types will take advantage of your friendliness. This is true in any phase of life, whether you are a teacher, a judge, an athletic trainer, a parent. But there is some risk in any method. But this is where the interpreter's character comes in, that I have so emphasized earlier in this article. You can't fool with a man of real character without eventually getting your fingers burned.

The concrete question comes up, What is one to do with a prisoner who recognizes your friendliness and really appreciates it, yet won't give military information, through conscientious scruples? On Guadalcanal we had a very few like that. One prisoner said to me, "You have been in Japan a long time. You know the Japanese point of view. Therefore you know that I cannot give you any information of military value". (Inwardly I admired him for it, for he said what he should have said, and in the last analysis you cannot do anything about it; that is, if we are pretending to abide by the international regulations regarding prisoners of war, or even the dictates of human decency. I reported this conversation to the head of our MP, a man about as sentimental as a bulldozer machine. He said, much to my surprise, with admiration, "He gave just the right answer. He knows his stuff!")

But even granting all the above, there is something that can be done about this. In the case of a salesman selling goods from door to door, the emphatic "No" of the lady to whom he is trying to sell stockings, aluminum ware, or what-not, should not be the end of the conversation but the beginning ("I have not yet begun to fight!" as it were). As for myself, in such a situation with prisoners, I try to shame them, and have succeeded quite well. I tell them something like this, "You know, you are an interesting kind of person. I've lived in Japan many years. I like the Japanese very much. I have many good friends among the Japanese, men, women, boys, girls. Somehow or other the Japanese always open up to me. I have had most intimate conversations with them about all kinds of problems. I never quite met a person like you, so offish and on your guard." etc. etc. One prisoner seemed hurt. He said, with surprise and a little pain, "Do you really think I am offish?" Again,

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I sometimes say, "That is funny, you are not willing to talk to me about these things. Practically all the other prisoners, and we have hundreds of them, do talk. You seem different. I extend to you my friendship; we have treated you well, far better probably than we would be treated, and you don't respond." etc. etc. I tell him that we purposely try to be human. I say to him, "You know perfectly well that if I were a prisoner of the Japanese they wouldn't treat me the way I am treating you" (meaning my general attitude and approach). I then say, "I will show you the way they would act to me," and I stand up and imitate the stern, severe attitude of a Japanese military officer toward an inferior, and the prisoner smiles and even bursts out laughing at the "show" I am putting on, and agrees that that is actually the situation, and what I describe is the truth. Now in all this the interpreter back at one of the bases has a big advantage in one respect: He will have plenty of time for interrogations, and can interview them time and time again, while in many cases, we out at the front must interview them more or less rapidly, and often- times only once. But on the other hand, those of us right out at the front have what is sometimes a great advantage: we get absolutely first whack at them, and talk to them when they have not had time to develop a technique of "sales resistance" talk, as it were.

It may be advisable to give one illustration of how, concretely, to question, according to my point of view. Take a question such as this, "Why did you lose this battle?" (a question we asked on more than one occasion regarding some definite battle on Guadalcanal). A question presented in this bare way is a most wooden and uninteresting affair. The interpreter should be given leeway to phrase his own questions, and to elaborate them as he sees fit, as he sizes up the situation and the particular prisoner he may be interviewing. His superior officer should merely give him a statement of the information he wants. A man who is simply a word for word interpreter (in the literal sense) of a superior officer's questions, is, after all, nothing but a verbal cuspidor; the whole proceeding is a rather dreary affair for all concerned, including the prisoner. The conversation, the phrasing of the questions, should be interesting and should capture the prisoner's imagination. To come back to the question above, "Why did you lose this battle?" That was the question put to me to interpret (in the broad sense) to a prisoner who had been captured the day after one of the terrific defeats of the Japanese in the earlier days of the fighting on Guadalcanal. Here is the way I put the question: "We all know how brave the Japanese soldier is. All the world knows and has been startled at the remarkable progress of the Japanese armies in the Far East. Their fortitude, their skill, their bravery are famous all over the world. You captured the Philippines; you captured Hong Kong, you ran right through Malaya and captured the so-called impregnable Singapore; you took Java, and many other places. The success of the Imperial armies has been stupendous and remarkable. But you come to Guadalcanal and run into a stone wall, and are not only defeated but practically annihilated. Why is it?" You see that this is a really built-up question. I wish you could see the interest on the prisoner's face as I am dramatically asking such a question as that. It's like telling a story, and at the end he is interested in telling his part of it.

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There is a problem of what questions to ask a prisoner. What kinds of questions? Of course there are many questions one would like to ask if he had the time, simply for curiosity, such as, What do you think of the war? Do you want to go back to Japan? Can you ever go back to Japan? I have asked these questions more than once when we had time, and discoursed at great length on the philosophy of the Japanese soldier; also on the sneak-punch at Pearl Harbor, getting their point of view of this and that. But of course questions such as these are not often asked by us, for they are more or less what I might term curiosity questions, i.e. questions the answers to which we should like to know just to satisfy our own curiosity, as it were. But usually we do not have time for such questions. A prisoner may be too tired or wounded to question him long, and only vital information is dealt with. Then, too, you can only question a prisoner for so long before he, and you, get stale and more or less tired, and you lose your brilliance and ingenuity. In the case of our own Marine Corps front line Intelligence, with which this particular discussion primarily deals, where we often had our interviews with prisoners out in the open under palm trees interrupted by a bombing raid and such side-shows, we must usually stick to questions dealing with imperative information. In our particular situation on Guadalcanal, here are some questions we nearly always asked, after getting the name, age, rank, and unit, where from in Japan, and previous occupation before entering the armed forces. (The six items mentioned above are more or less statistical. But by rank we can judge the value of the man's replies in many instances. The last question is of value in order to judge how much of a background the man has, which helps one to evaluate his answers. But of course though these questions are routine questions, each one is of value in its own particular way.)

After these six questions are disposed of (and often I do not ask them right away but amble along discussing other things, so that things won't be too stiff) we asked questions such as these: When did you arrive at Guadalcanal? Where did you land? (Very important) How many landed with you? What kind of a ship did you come in? (Don't ask leading questions; don't say, "Did you come on a warship?" Let him say.) Ask the name of the ship. How many troops were on the ship? If, for instance, he says he came on a destroyer, ask how many troops usually travel on a destroyer. (Of course you have many opportunities to check on such a question with other prisoners.) At this point you might ask him if he was sea-sick while on the destroyer. "Did you throw up?" "I've been terribly sea-sick myself a number of times; it's a rotten feeling isn't it?" you can add with deep feeling! (Be sure that you distinguish between crew and troops when you ask him how many troops the destroyer carried. Don't be "fuzzy" in your questions; be clear-cut.) How many other ships were with yours? What kind of ships? Where did you sail from and when? Were there many ships in that harbor? When did you leave Japan? Where were you between the time you left Japan and the time you landed on Guadalcanal? When you landed were any munitions landed? Artillery? Food supplies, medical supplies? After you landed where did you go? Where were you between the time you landed and the time you were captured? What experience in actual combat warfare have you had; your company, battalion or regiment? How is the present food supply in your unit? Sickness? What was the objective of your attack last night? How do you keep in contact with one another in the jungle at night? Of all our methods

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and weapons used against you, what has been the most efficient, the most terrific and deadly? (i.e. We want to know the effectiveness, for example, of our artillery, mortars, trench mortars, machine guns, airplane bombing, airplane strafing, shell fire from the sea, etc. etc. We found out that what we had thought was probably the most devastating and most feared was not what they thought, in some instances.) Of course we always asked about numbers of troops, and in our particular situation we always asked most eagerly about number of artillery pieces and their caliber. We had personal reasons!

Well, many more such questions could be cited, but these are enough to illustrate the immediate nature of the questions and the information desired in the case of our Marine Corps amphibious forces. If the prisoner is an aviator, and we had many such, of course the questions would be quite different. If the prisoner is one of the destroyer crew, for example, the questions would be still different. Our experience was that soldiers seemed far more ready to talk than sailors; aviators talked very readily.

/s/ Sherwood F. Moran,
SHERWOOD F. MORAN,
Major, U.S.M.C.R.,
Japanese Interpreter

OFFICIAL:

/s/ E. J. Buckley
E. J. BUCKLEY
Lt. Col., USMCR,
D-2.

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GLOSSARY

AJA	Americans of Japanese ancestry
ATIS	Allied Translator and Interpreter Service
<i>Bushido</i>	The “Way of the Samurai;” a unique set of laws used during the 11th and 13th centuries involving blind loyalty to superiors, disregard of death in carrying out duty, and continuous attack climaxed by annihilating the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.
<i>Chugakko</i>	Japanese middle school
DLIFLC	Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, located in Monterey, California.
E.O. 9066	The presidential executive order issued during World War II by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 19 February 1942, using his authority as Commander-in-Chief to exercise war powers to authorize the expulsion of all ethnic Japanese from the West Coast of the United States.
<i>Galahad</i>	Code name for the elite commando unit responsible for clearing North Burma of Japanese military forces during World War II; the unit was officially designated the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), nicknamed Merrill’s Marauders after Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill.
<i>Gaijin</i>	The Japanese term for outside people
<i>Hara-Kari</i>	A vulgar term meaning “to slice the abdomen,” which refers to a ritualized form of suicide carried out by Japanese samurai beginning in the Tokugawa period.
<i>Heigo</i>	Japanese military and technical terms
<i>Hoko</i>	Communal “spy-hostage” system; the structure in which all members of every group of ten neighboring houses were punishable for a crime or the failure to report any wrongdoing.

INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command, the successor to the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence Service
<i>Issei</i>	The first generation of Japanese immigrants, having immigrated to the United States
<i>Issen gorin</i>	“One yen, five rin,” the cost of mailing a draft-notice – less than a penny.
JICPOA	Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area
<i>Kami</i>	Gods
<i>Kamikaze</i>	When Genghis Khan's invading fleet threatened the Japanese homeland in the thirteenth century, a “divine wind” or “ <i>Kamikaze</i> ” drove him back and overturned his ships. This term referred to the Japanese contrived Special Attack Corps.
<i>Kibei</i>	A <i>Nisei</i> sent by his or her parents at a young age to be educated in Japan
<i>Kodo</i>	The “Imperial Way”
<i>Kojiki</i>	The <i>Record of Ancient Matters</i> , the oldest surviving book in Japan.
Meiji Era	The period of time from 1868 to 1912 when Emperor Meiji ruled Japan. This period designates the end of the feudal era and the beginning of the modern era of Japan.
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MISLS	Military Intelligence Service Language School
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
<i>Nisei</i>	A child of <i>Issei</i> , born in the United States; a second-generation Japanese-American
NSOL	Navy School of Oriental Languages
Occidental	of, relating to, or situated in the Occident; Western
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OWI	Office of War Information

PACMIRS	Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section AT Camp Ritchie, Maryland
POW	Prisoner of War
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, Tokyo, Japan
SEATIC	Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, New Delhi, India
<i>Senninbari</i>	A belt of a thousand stitches, which conferred invulnerability
<i>Seppuku</i>	Seppuku was the more elegant term for suicide according to the samurai code. Warriors would kill them themselves by piercing their abdomen. In feudal times, this was the exclusive privilege of the nobles and samurai.
<i>Shinto</i>	Native religion of Japan and the official state religion until the end of World War II.
SINTIC	Sino Translation and Interrogation Center, Chunking, China
<i>Sosho</i>	Japanese fluid grass (cursive) style of writing
<i>Taihai</i>	The “Great Peace”
<i>Tennō</i>	The Emperor
USNR	U.S. Naval Reserves
WAAC	Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, the Army organization for women
WAVES	Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service, the Navy organization for women

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