



governmentattic.org

"Rummaging in the government's attic"

Description of document: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Title Page and First Page of Multiple DEA Bulletins on gangs and drugs 2015-2017

Requested date: 21-March-2024

Release date: 26-September-2024

Posted date: 18-November -2024

Source of document: Drug Enforcement Administration
Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Unit
Attn: Intake Sub-Unit
8701 Morrissette Drive
Springfield, Virginia 22152
E-mail: DEA.FOIA@dea.gov
[DEA Freedom of Information Act \(FOIA\) Portal \(PAL\)](#)

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is a First Amendment free speech web site and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.



U.S. Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration
FOIA and Privacy Act Unit
8701 Morrissette Drive
Springfield, VA 22152

September 26, 2024

Case Number: 20-00608-F

Subject: Copy of the cover/title page and the first page of multiple DEA BUL Reports

Sent via e-mail

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) appeal and the Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy appeal remand letter dated March 21, 2024, received by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FOIA/PA Unit, seeking access to information regarding the above subject.

After reviewing your request, we conducted a search for responsive records pertaining to the above subject. To search for responsive records, we queried the DEA Intelligence Division. As a result of our query, we were able to identify records pertaining to the subject of your request. Please note that the reports do not contain a title/cover page.

Responsive records identified during the processing of your request will be released to you. The portions withheld are exempt from disclosure pursuant to subsections of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as referenced at the end of this letter. An additional enclosure with this letter explains these exemptions in more detail. Please be advised that for each of the exemptions cited, it is reasonably foreseeable that disclosure of the information withheld would harm the interests protected by these exemptions.

The rules and regulations of the DEA applicable to FOIA/PA requests are contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Part 16, as amended. They are published in the Federal Register available to the public (see <https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-28/chapter-I/part-16>).

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

You may contact our FOIA Public Liaison at (571) 776-2300 for any further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration,

Room 2510, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001; e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at (202) 741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at (202) 741-5769.

If you are not satisfied with DEA's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: <https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." If possible, please provide a copy of your original request and this response letter with your appeal.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, you may contact FOIA/PA Unit representative Djuana C. Lewis at (571) 776-2988 or via e-mail at Djuana.C.Lewis@dea.gov.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA DELO Digitally signed by JOSHUA DELO
Date: 2024.09.26 12:31:57 -04'00'

Joshua L. Delo, Chief
Processing Sub-Unit
Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Unit
Office of Chief Counsel
Drug Enforcement Administration

Number of pages released: 35

APPLICABLE SECTIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND/OR PRIVACY ACT:

**Freedom of Information Act
5 U.S.C. § 552**

**Privacy Act
5 U.S.C. § 552a**

(b)(1) (b)(5) (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(2) (b)(6) (b)(7)(D)
 (b)(3) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(E)
 (b)(4) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(F)

(d)(5) (k)(2)
 (j)(2) (k)(5)
 (k)(1) (k)(6)


Enclosures

(U) Enforcement Action Highlights

Dangerous Activities of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs in Europe



**DEA
BULLETIN**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-EAF-BUL-199-15
JULY 2015

(U) Event

(U) On May 27, 2015, 14 members of the Bandidos Motorcycle Club were arrested in the Netherlands by Dutch Police in an enforcement operation involving over 400 officers. This operation involved law enforcement agencies from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany and resulted in significant arrests and seizures.

(U) Significance

(U) Results from this enforcement action provide evidence of the ongoing involvement of outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) in significant drug trafficking activities and the high levels of violence employed by gangs in Europe.

(U) Details

(U) On May 27, 2014, the National Police of the Netherlands (NPN), in concert with police in Belgium and Germany, conducted an enforcement operation targeting the Bandidos Motorcycle Club in Limburg, the Netherlands. Twenty individuals associated with OMGs in the Netherlands were arrested and officials raided more than 30 sites throughout the day.

(U) This document is the property of the DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) and to U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is pre-approved for U.S. Government Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Methamphetamine in Solution Concealed in Iced Tea Cans



**DEA
BULLETIN**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-HOU-BUL-226-15
SEPTEMBER 2015

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) On August 30, 2015, United States Border Patrol (USBP) agents assigned to the Interstate 35 checkpoint just north of Laredo, Texas seized 10.06 kilograms of methamphetamine in solution. The liquid was concealed in seven iced tea cans, as well as a jug of antifreeze, located in the rear seat area of a passenger vehicle. The driver was reportedly traveling to San Antonio, Texas.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Seizures and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reporting indicate the smuggling of methamphetamine in solution is on the rise via the Interstate 35 corridor between Laredo and San Antonio. The August 30, 2015 seizure occurred just days after authorities in San Antonio seized their second crystal methamphetamine conversion laboratory. The use of aluminum beverage cans as containers for methamphetamine in solution is significant and indicates increased sophistication by drug trafficking organizations.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) On August 30, 2015, USBP agents at the Interstate 35 checkpoint just north of Laredo were conducting an immigration inspection when a service canine alerted to the presence of concealed drugs in a passenger vehicle. The vehicle was referred to secondary inspection, where eight containers—seven iced tea cans and one jug of antifreeze—were found to contain

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación Expands its Operational Prowess to Chihuahua, Mexico*



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-EPD-BUL-016-16
NOVEMBER 2015

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), El Paso Division (EPD), and Ciudad Juárez Resident Office (CJRO) reporting, as well as reporting from open sources, indicates the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) has established a presence in Ciudad Juárez and other municipalities within the State of Chihuahua, Mexico.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The CJNG's ability to rapidly expand its area of influence to the State of Chihuahua and other key drug trafficking territory — which are typically controlled by prominent drug cartels — is perceived as a defining moment marking CJNG's emergence of as one of the fastest growing crime groups in Mexico. Moreover, the recent discovery of a CJNG presence in the State of Chihuahua, particularly in the Ciudad Juárez township of Palomas, could likely impact the CJRO and EPD area of responsibility (AOR). The possibility exists that CJNG operatives may ultimately attempt to seize control of these lucrative corridors; thus, fueling the already existing turf war between the Sinaloa and Juárez Cartel elements.

(U) Details


(U//DSEN) On July 9, 2015, CJRO agents, through information obtained from Mexican authorities, learned of the arrest of a prominent leader of a large

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Methamphetamine Concealment in Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) Pipes Inside Gas Tanks



**DEA
BULLETIN**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-HOU-BUL-033-16
DECEMBER 2015

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) Methamphetamine-laden polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes hidden in vehicle gas tanks have increasingly been seized in the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Houston Division area of responsibility (AOR).

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Throughout calendar year (CY) 2015, methamphetamine seizures in the DEA Houston Division AOR have revealed an emerging concealment method: PVC pipes in vehicle gas tanks. Monitoring and reporting on emerging concealment trends is crucial to the development of an effective interdiction strategy. Traffickers use PVC pipe as an additional layer of concealment. PVC pipes

(b)(7)(E)

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) operating in the DEA Houston Division AOR have often concealed methamphetamine (crystal, powder, and in-solution) in the fuel tanks of vehicles. However, during CY 2015, TCOs added an additional level of concealment by hiding methamphetamine inside PVC pipes secreted inside vehicle gas tanks. DEA reporting has found that from 9 to 15 PVC pipes inside vehicle gas tanks are capable of storing approximately 10 to 17 kilograms of methamphetamine.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Northwest Virginia: The “Winchester Model” Successfully Tackles Heroin Threat



**DEA
BULLETIN**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-WAS-BUL-054-16
FEBRUARY 2016

(U) Event

(U//FOUO) The Northwest Virginia Regional Drug and Gang Task Force (hereafter “Task Force”), which includes participation from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Winchester Resident Office (RO), has developed and implemented a successful, comprehensive strategy to mitigate the local heroin threat. The strategy, hereafter referred to as the “Winchester Model,” includes stakeholders in enforcement, prevention, and the health sector (to include treatment providers). The collective efforts of these stakeholders have resulted in decreases in both lethal and non-lethal overdoses, down 23 and 18 percent, respectively, in the last year. There have also been increases in heroin-related arrests and seizures. One such high-profile arrest—the recent apprehension of a Baltimore heroin supplier—is indicative of the value of the Winchester Model. This bulletin will focus on the law enforcement component of this strategy.

(U) Significance

(U//FOUO) The Winchester Model leverages stakeholders in enforcement, prevention, and the health sector—including treatment providers. From the law enforcement perspective, one major advantage of the Winchester Model is that it facilitates improved communication among all stakeholders. For example, the 911 Call Center implemented procedures to immediately alert law enforcement agencies of local overdoses. Prior to the implementation of the Winchester Model, law enforcement agencies generally only learned of overdoses after the fact; thus, diminishing the chances for investigative success. The DEA Winchester RO, as a federal law enforcement entity, has been instrumental in providing cross-jurisdictional authority. The Winchester Model has the potential for application beyond northwest Virginia.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Mennonite Drug Trafficking Groups Use New Tactics to Smuggle Cannabis

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DAL-BUL-079-16
MARCH 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) In February 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Lubbock Resident Office (LRO) learned that the Pasadena, Texas Police Department had seized approximately 1,140 pounds of cannabis hidden within steel boxes that had been further concealed inside steel support beams. The beams are commonly used in the construction of metal buildings. The beams and cannabis were being transported by a Nebraska-tagged truck equipped with a gooseneck trailer. The driver stated that the steel beams were loaded in Seminole, TX for delivery to Pasadena, TX.

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Vehicle, trailer and cargo containing cannabis.



Source: Pasadena, Texas Police Department

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The LRO is familiar with these types of boxes as they are normally associated with Mexican Mennonite drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating from Cuauhtémoc, Chihuahua, Mexico and West Texas/Panhandle areas. Mennonite DTOs go to extreme and detailed lengths to thwart detection of concealed contraband by border x-ray or canine search operations.

(U//DSEN) The use of a smaller truck with Nebraska registration suggests that DTOs may be using vehicles registered in states located away from the U.S.-Mexico border for long-haul drug transport to minimize the suspicion and scrutiny normally given to large commercial vehicles along the border.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



DEA
BULLETIN



Dallas Field
Division



(U) A Picture is Worth Two Thousand Kilograms of Cocaine

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-EAF-BUL-098-16
APRIL 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) On March 7, 2016, the Belgian Federal Police (BFP) seized 2,858 kilograms of cocaine at the Port of Antwerp, Belgium. The cocaine was smuggled inside a maritime shipping container ostensibly transporting bananas from Colombia. The cocaine was placed inside banana boxes and wrapped in plastic imprinted with pictures of green banana bunches. This special wrapping camouflaged the cocaine to look like real boxed bananas.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The clever use of plastic embossed with a repeated pattern of green banana bunches appears to be a new variance of the frequently encountered banana concealment method. The Port of Antwerp is one of the busiest ports in Europe with over a million containers a year passing through. Customs inspection capacity at the port is already heavily taxed. Cocaine drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exploit this lack of capacity by relying on customs officials to only do cursory inspections of banana shipments. The boxes containing the cocaine bricks wrapped in the plastic look authentic and may pass a brief visual inspection.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) In late February 2016, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reporting indicated that a large cocaine shipment hidden within a maritime

(U//LES) Figure 1. Banana-embossed plastic-covered cocaine bricks.



Source: Belgian Federal Police

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Emerging Threat: Hidden Compartments Under Tractor-Trailers

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-HOU-BUL-104-16

APRIL 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) The Houston Division (HD) of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recently seized 131.5 kilograms of cocaine in Kingsville, TX, which was concealed in compartments attached underneath the entire length of a tractor-trailer.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The construction and use of concealed compartments on tractor-trailers is a common tactic used to smuggle illicit drugs and drug proceeds through the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) area of Texas. However, the placement of these compartments underneath the entire length of a tractor-trailer is a significant new threat.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) On February 8, 2016, the DEA HD McAllen District Office (MDO), with assistance from the Kingsville Police Department Narcotics Task Force, seized 131.5 kilograms of cocaine from concealed compartments underneath the entire length of a tractor-trailer. Kingsville officers observed several physical indicators on the exterior of the trailer that suggested tampering, such as tooling marks and different screw heads. A Kingsville K-9 unit made a positive alert.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Length of one hidden compartment.



Source: DEA



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) Methamphetamine and Cocaine Smuggled Inside Rock Crusher Cylinders



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-SAN-BUL-125-16
MAY 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) In April 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Carlsbad Resident Office (CRO) reported the seizure of approximately 180 pounds of methamphetamine and 7 kilograms of cocaine, subsequent to the execution of a search warrant at a machine shop located in Brea, California. The seized drugs were concealed inside cylindrical drums of rock crushing equipment that was being dismantled at the machine shop. The rock crushing equipment was transported through the Otay Mesa, California, port of entry (POE) from Tijuana en route to the Los Angeles area.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The CRO identified a Southern California-based multi-pound poly-drug distribution organization as responsible for smuggling drug shipments concealed inside heavy equipment from Tijuana into the United States. The equipment was subsequently dismantled in the Brea area where the drugs were readied for distribution. Traffickers used large rock-crushing equipment to conceal the drug shipment. The cylindrical rock crushing part of the equipment was hollowed out to conceal the drug shipments. The agents at the location determined that the hollowed out cylindrical barrels appeared to be lead-lined.

(U//DSEN) Figure 1.
Rock Crusher Apparatus.



Source: DEA

(U//DSEN) Figure 2. Rock
Cylindrical Barrels.



Source: DEA

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Sweet High: Candy Wrapper Cocaine Being Smuggled from Dubai to Europe

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-EAF-BUL-172-16
JULY 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) A sweet new trend in cocaine smuggling via couriers (originating on flights from Dubai to Europe) has emerged in the last year. Customs authorities at major European international airports have documented numerous arrests of couriers arriving from Dubai International Airport carrying sealed and unsealed duty free bags containing cocaine pellets. The drugs are camouflaged as merchandise purchased from the Dubai airport and carried in plastic shopping bags bearing a “Dubai Duty Free Shop” label.

(U) Figure 1. Candy-wrapped cocaine seized in Malaysia.



Source: World Customs Organization

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Cocaine courier drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) appear to be exploiting a security gap at Dubai International Airport in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to smuggle cocaine into European countries. Hundreds of passengers a day bring plastic bags or sealed duty free bags from the airport shops onto flights. These packages contain legitimate purchases made in airport duty free zones that don't have security inspections. As the bags originate in the shops inside the security zones or are sealed in duty free bags at the point of purchase (and remain sealed until passengers reach their destinations), secondary inspections are generally not carried out. This practice creates a security gap ripe for exploitation by drug traffickers.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles Provide Significant Economic Benefits to the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC)

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-MIA-BUL-182-16
AUGUST 2016

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Cocaine seized from FARC-sponsored SPSSs.



Source: DEA

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Operation Panama Express (PANEX) reporting, has identified the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) as the “enabler” providing construction teams, build sites, and protection to other drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) using the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPAC), a main gateway for the maritime flow of illicit drugs via self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSSs).

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Based on PANEX reporting circa 2012-2013, it is estimated that 30 percent of the known maritime flow of illicit drug trafficking involved SPSSs. Tampa DO and PANEX reporting also revealed that approximately one out of every four known SPSSs were actually interdicted. As documented by Tampa DO, in FY 2014 one SPSS was interdicted; in FY 2015 three were interdicted; and in FY 2016, as of September 9, 2016, only two SPSSs have been interdicted. Moreover, limited law enforcement (LE) maritime assets in the PANEX area of responsibility (AOR) reduced the probability of interdicting

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Cannabis Trafficking Going Strong in West Africa



**DEA
BULLETIN**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-EAF-BUL-014-17
OCTOBER 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) On August 22, 2016, more than 2 tons of cannabis was seized by the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority (CEPS) at Kpedze, near Ho in the Volta Region of Ghana.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) This marks the fourth seizure in a 12 month period where 2 or more tons of cannabis has been seized.

Earlier in the year, a high-ranking Ghanaian law enforcement official expressed the challenge his agency faces in trying to destroy cannabis farms across the country. He compared it to "...trying to kill a swarm of flies with one's bare hands."

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) According to host nation reporting, the 2 tons of cannabis were being transported in a truck commingled with slabs of paddy rice. There were 2,090 slabs of compressed cannabis in the vehicle. Three Ghanaian subjects

(U) This document is the property of the DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) and to US intelligence, law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is pre-approved for US government Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to US Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Cargo carrying cannabis slabs.



Source: Host Nation Reporting

(U) Dismantlement of the Perlaza-Orobio Drug Trafficking Organization

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-AND-BUL-030-17
DECEMBER 2016

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) A large-scale drug trafficking organization (DTO) has been effectively dismantled following the arrest of Consolidated Priority Organizational Target (CPOT) Edinson Perlaza-Orobio.

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Arrest photo of CPOT Edinson Perlaza-Orobio.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The dismantlement of the Perlaza-Orobio DTO has resulted in the denial of large amounts of illicit proceeds being repatriated to Colombia. Also, Perlaza-Orobio's arrest will have at least a short-term effect on the amount of cocaine supplied to Central American and Mexican DTOs, who eventually smuggle the drugs to the United States.

Source: DEA

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) In March 2014, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), along with the Colombian National Police (CNP) Dirección de Investigación Criminal (DIJIN) Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), initiated an investigation into a maritime transportation specialist, which eventually led to the identification of Edinson Perlaza-Orobio, the leader of a large-scale DTO. The organization was quite adept at using small panga-style vessels that could be loaded with 500-800 kilograms of cocaine. These small panga-style vessels would conduct a 3-5 day journey across the Eastern Pacific, utilizing several re-fueling points,


(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



DEA
BULLETIN



Bogotá
Country Office






DEA BULLETIN



**Dallas Field
Division**



(U) Framed: Drugs Concealed Inside the Framework of a Box Trailer

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DAL-BUL-104-17
MARCH 2017

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) In November 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Dallas Field Division (DFD), in conjunction with the Dallas Police Department and the Collin County Sheriff's Office, seized 1,246 bundles of marijuana weighing approximately 738 pounds. The drugs had been concealed in a 53-foot enclosed box trailer traveling northbound from Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) to Jackson, Mississippi. A Colima and Jalisco-based drug trafficking organization (DTO) that specializes in the transportation and distribution of multi-hundred kilogram quantities of cocaine and marijuana throughout the United States organized this drug shipment.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Mexico-based DTOs continue to employ a variety of methods to smuggle drugs from Mexico to the United States. One method is concealing drugs inside the vertical, metal channels that serve as structural supports for the walls of a box trailer. The subject trailer containing the marijuana entered the United States at the Santa Teresa, New Mexico, Point of Entry (POE) in late October 2016. It arrived in the DFW area 4 days later, suggesting that the drugs were concealed inside the trailer in Mexico before crossing into the United States. Before the seizure, DFD personnel had noted that this trailer has crossed the U.S. border seven other times at the Santa Teresa and El Paso POEs since October 2015. The width of the marijuana bundles was

(U) This document is the property of the DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is pre-approved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Semi-Tractor Equipped With Vehicle Dash Cam Recorder



**DEA
BULLETIN**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-H●U-BUL-117-17
MARCH 2017

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) The Laredo District Office (DO) of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recently determined that a semi-tractor involved in the smuggling of methamphetamine in the Laredo, Texas, area was equipped with a dash cam recorder to record video and audio.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Although the primary purpose of a dash cam recorder is to limit liability in the event of an accident, in this case it was used to record a criminal transaction. An understanding of this equipment can be critical to the development of effective drug interdiction strategies. Law enforcement personnel should also be aware that these devices may record information of intelligence or investigative value.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) On March 23, 2017, the DEA Laredo DO seized approximately 42.6 kilograms of methamphetamine concealed inside wooden blocks in a tool box under the sleeper area of a semi-tractor. It was subsequently discovered that the semi-tractor was equipped with a dash cam recorder resembling a global positioning system device. The dash cam recorder was attached to the windshield and is capable of recording both audio and video. The video and audio are stored on a memory card. The camera usually faces the road to

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Emergence of the Indian Brotherhood Gang in Oklahoma



**DEA
BULLETIN**



**Dallas Field
Division**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DAL-BUL-140-17
MAY 2017

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Identified tribes in the Indian Brotherhood.

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) The Indian Brotherhood (IBH) was formed in the late 1990s and has since become the largest Native American gang in the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (OK DOC) system, as well as the most violent gang overall. The IBH functions as a five member High Council that oversees 329 current members. The gang is extremely compartmentalized, with each prison being overseen by its own War Chief. Instructions on activities for War Chiefs and members both in and out of OK DOC custody come from a vote by the High Council.



Source: Oklahoma Department of Corrections

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The IBH is known to be extremely violent both inside and outside of prison. They are known to use firearms during drug activities and are quick to threaten violence. The IBH is currently tied to multiple investigations across the

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Low Price/High-Quality Acetic Anhydride: Makes Shift to Heroin Production in the Netherlands Possible

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-EAF-BUL-163-17
JUNE 2017

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) The frequency of acetic anhydride (AA) seizures have increased in Europe, and reporting by the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) The Hague Country Office (THCO) indicates a rise in the number of small companies attempting to purchase wholesale quantities of AA in the Netherlands. DEA reporting from Europe and the Middle East also indicates that drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are leaning toward chemical suppliers based in Europe to acquire AA at a higher quality and cheaper cost.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The Netherlands is an innovation-rich environment for the clandestine production of various drugs. Not only can AA be used in the licit production of pharmaceuticals and perfumes, it can also be used in the production of heroin and phenyl-2-propanone (P2P). P2P is a pre-precursor used in the clandestine manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine, and therefore commonly seized in the Netherlands. The likelihood of AA being used in the production of amphetamine is relatively low in the Netherlands due to the availability of other precursor chemicals.

(U//DSEN) Recent wholesale-size seizures of AA suggest a more direct and intended use of the chemical rather than for the synthesis of P2P. Moreover, the use of AA in the conversion of morphine to heroin, either in the Netherlands or any other geographic region, is of considerable concern given the rise in the cost of illicit AA in the Middle East and its potential ties to terrorism financing. The diversion of AA in the Netherlands indicates two potential trends: a change in the trafficking route of AA to the Middle East and the emergence of heroin conversion laboratories closer to the source of affordable AA.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



DEA
BULLETIN




Brussels
Country Office



(U) Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación Expands its Operational Prowess to Chihuahua, Mexico*



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-EPD-BUL-016-16
NOVEMBER 2015

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), El Paso Division (EPD), and Ciudad Juárez Resident Office (CJRO) reporting, as well as reporting from open sources, indicates the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) has established a presence in Ciudad Juárez and other municipalities within the State of Chihuahua, Mexico.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The CJNG's ability to rapidly expand its area of influence to the State of Chihuahua and other key drug trafficking territory — which are typically controlled by prominent drug cartels — is perceived as a defining moment marking CJNG's emergence of as one of the fastest growing crime groups in Mexico. Moreover, the recent discovery of a CJNG presence in the State of Chihuahua, particularly in the Ciudad Juárez township of Palomas, could likely impact the CJRO and EPD area of responsibility (AOR). The possibility exists that CJNG operatives may ultimately attempt to seize control of these lucrative corridors; thus, fueling the already existing turf war between the Sinaloa and Juárez Cartel elements.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) On July 9, 2015, CJRO agents, through information obtained from Mexican authorities, learned of the arrest of a prominent leader of a large

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Vehicle Batteries Increasingly Used to Smuggle Drug Loads Into and Through the Houston Division



**DEA
BULLETIN**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-HOU-BUL-205-15
AUGUST 2015

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) Vehicle batteries are increasingly used to smuggle illicit drug loads into and through the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Houston Division (HD) area of responsibility (AOR).

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Monitoring and reporting changes in drug trafficking routes and methods are important steps to maintain an effective and informed law enforcement interdiction response.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) Operable and inoperable vehicle batteries are increasingly used to smuggle methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine into and through the DEA HD AOR. Although the first seizure in 2015 didn't occur until February (based on seizures listed) through early July 2015, 11 seizures in DEA HD investigations involved the use of vehicle batteries as a concealment method. Often, these seizures contained combined loads, with methamphetamine and heroin most commonly seized together. DEA reporting indicates that combined heroin and methamphetamine loads tend to be associated with the Sinaloa Cartel.

(U) This document is the property of the DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) and to U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is pre-approved for U.S. Government Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Methamphetamine Concealed Inside Vehicle Gas Tanks

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DAL-BUL-003-16
OCTOBER 2015

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) During the summer of 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Dallas Field Division (DFD) and DEA Laredo District Office (LDO) reported on the use of gas tanks in sports utility vehicles (SUV) to smuggle drugs from Nuevo Laredo, Mexico to the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) metroplex.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) continue to employ a variety of methods to smuggle drugs from Mexico to the DFW area. Two seizures in July and August 2015 highlighted one method currently being employed by the DTOs: concealing methamphetamine inside polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes secreted in the vehicle's gas tank. It was noted that the two drivers arrested during these seizures made numerous trips to the DFW area over the past several years while employing this method. The high frequency with which this method was used attests to both its commonality and success as a smuggling method.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) In July 2015, DFD and LDO agents seized approximately 11.5 kilograms of methamphetamine concealed in an SUV. The gas tank was accessed by removing the rear seats where two entry points for the gas tank were located. After opening the entry points, agents discovered 10 PVC pipes floating in the gas tank.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U//DSEN) Government of Paraguay Negotiating to Purchase New Radar



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-SCO-BUL-020-16
NOVEMBER 2015

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) On September 15, 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Asuncion Country Office (ACO) learned that the Government of Paraguay (GOP) is negotiating to purchase new radar technology to assist in combating drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating throughout Paraguay.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Policing the Southern Cone air bridge, whereby cocaine is smuggled by small aircraft from Peru to Bolivia, then from Bolivia to other countries in the region, is challenging for law enforcement agencies in Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay. DTOs exploit vulnerabilities such as limited radar coverage; legal restrictions on targeting drug flights; and challenging terrain that can limit response by law enforcement authorities and the military in Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.

(U//DSEN) The purchase of new radar technology has the ability to assist the GOP in combating DTOs that use the Southern Cone air bridge. This new radar capability will provide the GOP with the ability to identify and exploit information gained on small aircraft flights throughout the country. It will also help focus on known drug smuggling corridors and assist in conducting intelligence-driven law enforcement operations against international DTOs.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Unique Concealment Method Using Furniture

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-ATL-BUL-050-16
JANUARY 2016

(U) Event

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(U) On November 20, 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Atlanta Field Division's Task Force [redacted], with assistance from the Hall County District Attorney's Office, seized 140 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine and 14 kilograms of cocaine at a warehouse located in Gainesville, GA.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The drugs were concealed in furniture being transported by a tractor trailer from Mexico. In this particular method, the furniture had hidden concealment compartments pressed around a thin packet wrapped in plastic and carbon paper within assorted hanging and standing metal wire-framed racks. This seizure spotlights traffickers' ability to conceal and transship substantial amounts of drugs within furniture to warehouses across the United States.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) DEA Atlanta [redacted] is currently investigating a Mexico-based poly-drug trafficking organization and transportation cell. It is directly linked to individuals in Guadalajara, MX, Chicago, IL, San Antonio, Dallas, McAllen, and Houston, TX, as well as Fort Wayne and Coral Gables, FL. On November 15, 2015, [redacted] began reporting a shipment of drugs was destined for Atlanta, GA.

(U//DSEN) On November 20, 2015, [redacted] located the delivery warehouse in Georgia. A tractor trailer was observed backing into the end of the building

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



(U) Concealment Method in Vehicle Battery



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-ELP-BUL-074-16
MARCH 2016

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Suspect battery being removed from vehicle.

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) On January 11, 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Midland Resident Office, in conjunction with the Ector County, Texas, Sheriff's Office, seized approximately 2.1 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine. The methamphetamine was concealed in a hidden compartment within the battery of a vehicle.



Source: DEA

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The battery containing the hidden compartment was fully operational and was providing electricity to the vehicle. Furthermore, the method of concealment was such that the drug would most likely have been missed during a routine vehicle search.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) Agents observed that the vehicle's battery had been altered. They observed a clear coating and fresh silicone on the battery seal, two traits that are inconsistent with a normal battery. Upon closer inspection it was noted that the battery's weight appeared inconsistent with that of a normal battery and the bottom part of the battery had a different sound than the top portion when

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Bulk Cash Hidden in Truck Bed and Coolers



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-ATL-BUL-086-16
MARCH 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) On January 24, 2016, the Atlanta Field Division's (AFD) Strike Force [redacted] received highly reliable information that a white pick-up truck bearing Texas license plates was scheduled to pick up bulk currency (drug proceeds) in the vicinity of a used car dealership located on Buford Highway in Atlanta, GA. Based on this reporting, [redacted] seized the vehicle as well as \$2,322,779 in U.S. currency (USC). [redacted] also arrested a 56-year-old Caucasian man.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(U) Figure 1. Seized truck bearing a hidden compartment.



Source: DEA Atlanta

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) In recent years, the AFD has seen the size of individual bulk currency seizures decrease as Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) attempted to mitigate losses. Bulk currency has traditionally been transported in commercial vehicles (i.e., passenger busses, tractor trailers, or car haulers). Personal vehicles with hidden traps carrying smaller amounts of currency were often driven by subjects of Hispanic origin. This seizure was unusual because of the amount of money transported, the conveyance and concealment methods used, and the ethnicity of the vehicle's driver. It is possible that this incident is an example of a new smuggling technique designed to thwart detection by law enforcement personnel.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Dallas Field Division Finds “Ice” Hidden in Coolers

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DAL-BUL-100-16
APRIL 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) During 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) Dallas Field Division (DFD) reported on the use of drink/food coolers to smuggle narcotics from the Texas–Mexico border to the Dallas area via Laredo, Texas.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) continue to develop and use a variety of methods to conceal narcotics during transport from Mexico to the United States. DEA reporting indicates that Michoacán-based DTOs involved with the smuggling of narcotics to the Dallas area are increasingly concealing narcotics between the inner and outer shells of family-sized drink/food coolers. At least two Michoacán-based DTOs have employed this concealment method to smuggle multi-kilogram quantities of methamphetamine from Mexico to Dallas, via Laredo, from as early as mid-2013 to as recently as December 2015.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) In September 2013, a traffic stop in Laredo resulted in the seizure of approximately 7 kilograms of methamphetamine that had been concealed inside a family sized drink/food cooler. The courier involved made seven previous trips from Laredo to Dallas, each time transporting about 7 kilograms of methamphetamine hidden inside a cooler. The methamphetamine was transported from Mexico to a hotel in Laredo, where it was placed in the coolers for movement to Dallas. The inner shell of the cooler was removed and bricks of methamphetamine were placed along the bottom and inside walls before the shell was replaced to conceal the narcotics. Drinks and food were


(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



DEA
BULLETIN



Dallas Field
Division



(U) Methamphetamine Hidden in Bookshelves



**DEA
BULLETIN**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-H●U-BUL-120-16

MAY 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) On March 25, 2016, 62 kilograms of methamphetamine were seized from the cargo box of a commercial moving truck at the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) checkpoint in Falfurrias, TX. The methamphetamine was concealed inside bookshelves.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) The use of furniture to conceal illicit drug shipments is fairly common. However, this is the first recent occurrence involving the use of bookshelves within the area of responsibility (AOR) of the Houston Division of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) On March 25, 2016, the DEA Houston Division notified the USBP that a northbound moving truck might contain an illicit cargo. A USBP canine at the Falfurrias, TX checkpoint subsequently alerted to the vehicle, resulting in a secondary inspection. During the secondary inspection, an anomaly was noted in the center of the cargo.

(U//DSEN) Inspection of the cargo bed resulted in the identification of pink and blue bookshelf units where the anomaly was indicated. USBP agents drilled a hole into one of the shelves, revealing cellophane and a white rock substance

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).


(U) Ndrangheta: Cocaine Smuggling Operations in Costa Rica



**DEA
BULLETIN**



**Strategic
Intelligence
Section**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DCT-BUL-143-16
JUNE 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) Ongoing investigations targeting the Ndrangheta Italian organized crime group (cocaine smuggling operations) by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and law enforcement officials from both Costa Rica and Italy have resulted in numerous seizures and arrests in Europe and Central America. These arrests include] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Both men functioned as key coordinators for Ndrangheta's cocaine smuggling operations in Costa Rica.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Ndrangheta relies on compartmentalized networks of local affiliates and Italy-based coordinators traveling to Costa Rica to work directly with local suppliers. DEA reporting indicates that Ndrangheta is using similar methods to manage cocaine smuggling operations in other parts of Latin America. Overall, these individual affiliates and coordinators represent key figures in Ndrangheta's growing trans-Atlantic cocaine smuggling networks.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) Working jointly with DEA, both Costa Rican and Italian law enforcement authorities have provided insight into Ndrangheta's management of cocaine smuggling operations in Costa Rica. Local Ndrangheta affiliates are often Italian nationals responsible for identifying and establishing relationships with local cocaine suppliers. These local affiliates introduce local suppliers to Ndrangheta coordinators based in Italy, thus avoiding direct involvement in smuggling operations.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), dea.onsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Turkey: Military Targets Cannabis Cultivation in Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) Controlled Regions

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DCT-BUL-177-16
AUGUST 2016

(U) Event

(U) On July 6, 2016, Turkish military forces concluded a 13-day operation in Diyarbakir Province in southeastern Turkey, which resulted in the seizure of seven tons of cannabis and the eradication of more than 50 million cannabis plants. This operation took place in territory controlled by the PKK, a U.S. Department of State-designated terrorist organization.

(U) Figure 1. Diyarbakir Province, Turkey



Source: CIA World Factbook

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) According to DEA reporting, the PKK provides protection for cannabis cultivation in much of southern Turkey. Turkish government officials claim the PKK generates from \$170 million to \$500 million U.S. currency (USC) annually from its involvement in drug trafficking activities. By targeting cannabis cultivation in this region, Turkish military forces hope to deny a significant source of funding for the PKK.

(U) Details

(U) During the late 1970s, the PKK was formed in Turkey under Marxist/Leninist ideology to establish an independent Kurdish state. Since 1984, the PKK has waged an armed struggle against the Turkish government. During

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



DEA
BULLETIN



Strategic
Intelligence
Section



(U) Shafted: Drive Shafts Used to Conceal Drug Loads

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DAL-BUL-008-17
OCTOBER 2016

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Methamphetamine concealed in drive shaft

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) In May 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Dallas Field Division—in conjunction with the Fort Worth District Office and the Mesquite Police Department—arrested one U.S. citizen and two Mexican nationals after seizing approximately 10 kilograms of methamphetamine concealed inside the functioning drive shaft of an F-150 pickup truck in Dallas, Texas.



Source: DEA

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Since 2015, drive shafts from F-150 pickup trucks have increasingly been used by Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to transport narcotics from Mexico (via Laredo) and McAllen, Texas to the Dallas/Ft. Worth area. The most recent seizure demonstrates the effectiveness of this smuggling method and how easily the methamphetamine could have been missed during a routine vehicle search had law enforcement officials not been aware of this technique. Methamphetamine was concealed in a metal pipe within the drive shaft of a 2002 F-150 with Texas registration. The drive shaft was secured by only four bolts, allowing for its quick extraction and replacement. During the seizure, a second drive shaft that would have been used to replace the drive shaft containing the narcotics was located at the same location.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



DEA
BULLETIN



Dallas Field
Division



(U//DSEN) Seattle: Kilograms of “Gunmetal” Heroin Actually Fentanyl and Noscapine

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-SEA-BUL-027-17
NOVEMBER 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) In August 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Seattle Division Office (SDO) seized approximately 12 kilograms of suspected heroin in Seattle, Washington. The exhibits were “gunmetal” gray and light brown- or cream-colored bricks.

Based on the unusual appearance of the purported heroin and negative field testing for the presence of opiates, the SDO requested rush analysis of the exhibit. The Western Regional Laboratory (WRL) concluded that rather than heroin, the bricks contained fentanyl and noscapine. (Note: noscapine is an alkaloid of the opium poppy plant and is typically discarded as waste in the morphine extraction process.)

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Kilogram Packages.



Source: DEA

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Fentanyl and fentanyl-related compounds are often mistaken for other drugs and sold as such. This poses a substantial danger to potential users and law enforcement personnel, as the handling of even very small amounts of these substances can be lethal. In this operation, DEA personnel expected high-quality heroin. Furthermore, the distributor was known to sell heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine, and may not have been aware that the bricks contained fentanyl.

(U//DSEN) This seizure represented a significant quantity of fentanyl and would have represented a sizeable amount of gunmetal heroin for the area. In

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



DEA
BULLETIN



Seattle
Field
Division



(U) Mexican Bakery/Manufacturing Company Used for Drug and Bulk Currency Smuggling



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-ATL-BUL-054-17
DECEMBER 2016

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) In September 2016, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Atlanta Field Division (AFD) reporting revealed that a Mexico-based drug trafficking organization (DTO) uses a Mexican bakery/manufacturing company, to facilitate drug trafficking and money laundering between the United States and Mexico.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) DTOs continue to develop and exploit a variety of methods to conceal drugs destined for the United States. Using the bakery's satellite companies in the United States, Mexican DTOs are provided with an alternative method of both importing drugs into the country and repatriating drug proceeds back to Mexico by concealing them inside legitimate commodities.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) In September 2016, DEA reporting revealed that the bakery/manufacturing company was being used to transport bulk drug proceeds from the United States to Mexico. According to DEA reporting, truck drivers transport drug-laden bakery products from Mexico to a satellite company in Pennsylvania. DEA reporting revealed that deliveries are being made to rundown warehouses where workers receive the drug-laden products.

(U//DSEN) DEA reporting further indicates that deliveries containing drug-laden bakery products are also being made to Atlanta, Georgia. DEA reporting

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors) law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Seizure of Methamphetamine in Containers of Herbal Aloe

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-ATL-BUL-108-17
MARCH 2017

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) In February 2017, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Atlanta Field Division (AFD) Task Force [redacted] seized two bottles of liquid methamphetamine that had been packaged as a herbal aloe supplement. Five plastic containers of crystal methamphetamine and approximately \$9,000 in U.S. currency (USC) were also seized from a regionally-based drug trafficking organization (DTO) with Mexico-based suppliers.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) DTOs continue to exploit and develop different methods to conceal and transport illicit drugs into the United States and the AFD area of responsibility (AOR). Mexican DTOs' most commonly used method of transporting methamphetamine to the AFD's AOR is in liquid form concealed in hidden vehicle compartments. The February 2017 seizure of two bottles of liquid methamphetamine packaged as factory-sealed herbal aloe marks the first time the AFD has seen this particular packaging technique.

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Prosa Liquid Dietary Supplement Aloe Vera (*Aloe barbadensis, Mill*) With Vitamin C.



Source: DEA

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Cocaine Concealed Above Vehicle Rear Axle

(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-DAL-BUL-130-17
APRIL 2017

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) In January 2017, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Fort Worth District Office (FWDO) seized approximately 10 kilograms of cocaine that were packaged in 12 bundles and concealed in a hidden compartment above the rear axle of a vehicle. A Ciudad Camargo, Chihuahua, Mexico, drug trafficking organization (DTO) coordinated the transportation and delivery of this drug shipment.

(U) Figure 1. Cocaine concealed inside rear axle.



Source: DEA


(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Mexico-based DTOs continue to employ a variety of methods to smuggle drugs from Mexico into the United States. One method is concealing drugs inside and around the rear axle of vehicles. The subject vehicle containing the cocaine entered the United States at the Presidio Texas Port of Entry (POE) one day before the seizure in Fort Worth, suggesting that the drugs were concealed inside the vehicle in Mexico before crossing the border. Subsequent investigation discovered that the load vehicle crossed into the United States from Mexico numerous times over the past 2 years.

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).



Dallas Field
Division



(U) Seizure of Cocaine Concealed Within Owl Statues



DEA
BULLETIN



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-ATL-BUL-150-17
MAY 2017

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) On March 24, 2017, the Chattanooga Resident Office (CRO) of the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Atlanta Field Division (AFD) seized 1 kilogram of cocaine that had been concealed within two owl statues.

(U//DSEN) Figure 1. Owl statues found inside package wrapped in bubble wrap.



Source: DEA

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.sgov.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).

(U) Dutch Clandestine Laboratory Data 2006-2016



**DEA
BULLETIN**



**Brussels
Country Office**



(U) This DEA Bulletin is based on preliminary reporting and may be subject to updating as additional information becomes available.

DEA-EAF-BUL-182-17
JULY 2017

(U) Event

(U//DSEN) Dutch clandestine laboratory data indicate that synthetic production sites are on the rise. The decrease in the amount of precursor chemicals used in the production of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) and other amphetamines indicates that laboratory operators are no longer reliant on precursor chemicals; however, these laboratory operators are trained to process "pre-precursor" chemicals for use in synthetic drug production.

(U) Significance

(U//DSEN) Dutch clandestine chemists found a solution to the regulation of precursor chemicals in the early 2000s. They have since overcome stagnating production amounts by redefining the pinnacle of MDMA and amphetamine production. The decreased availability of necessary precursor chemicals adversely affected production around 2008, but by 2009, Dutch clandestine chemists created a solution that allowed the conversion of pre-precursor chemicals into precursor chemicals in the same synthesis laboratory. Hence, the identification and proliferation of these type of "conversion" laboratories throughout the Netherlands has steadily increased. Most recently, Dutch law enforcement authorities observed an expansion of the capability of these conversion laboratories to include heroin conversion—a process not previously observed in the Netherlands.

(U) Details

(U//DSEN) Clandestine laboratory seizure data provided by the National Police of the Netherlands (NPN) reported that the number of laboratory sites seized between 2006 and 2016 steadily increased. Beginning in 2009, NPN reported

(U) This document is the property of DEA and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), law enforcement, and public safety or protection officials with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without DEA authorization is strictly prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. The use of information in this report is preapproved for U.S. Intelligence Community products, including finished analytic products distributed to U.S. Executive Branch departments/agencies. Cited portions must carry the same classification and controls, and readers of this report must hold all appropriate clearances. Otherwise, the information in this report may not be used in legal proceedings, for operational or intelligence collection activities, shared with foreign persons or agencies, entered into non-DEA databases for operational purposes, or reproduced in additional formats unless express permission is granted by DEA based on a written request submitted to dea.onsi@gold.ic.gov (Top Secret), deaonsi@dea.usdoj.gov (Secret), or dea.onsi@usdoj.gov (Unclassified).