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October 07, 2024

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Sincerely,

Kris Zadrovitz

Kris Zadrovitz
Government Information Specialist
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

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ARMY SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL

REPORT OF

AD HOC


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FOR

ARMY

PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS



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REPORT
of the
AD HOC COMMITTEE
on
ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (U)

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The official unclassified title of this document is "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Army Psychological Operations."

During the preliminary staffing by the Army Scientific Advisory Panel Secretariat, reference has been made to the Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group Report on Counterinsurgency. Use of this title for this document also is unclassified. However, association of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel with Army Psychological Operations should be handled as a matter ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~.

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PREFACE

(C) In June of 1966 the Honorable Willis M. Hawkins, at that time Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, invited an ad hoc committee to study "a number of problems of great concern to the staff of the United States Army and myself [pertaining] to the matter of Army psychological operations for countering insurgency." The Secretary, in his letter of invitation, noted that "Current and projected cold war Army commitments on a worldwide basis require that recent experience in these operations be studied for effective application . . ."

(U) The members of the Committee responsible for this Report, invited to serve by the Secretary, are:

Dr. Kenneth E. Clark (Chairman)
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
University of Rochester

Dr. W. Phillips Davison
Visiting Professor
Department of Sociology and
Graduate School of Journalism
Columbia University

Mr. Murray Dyer (Executive Secretary)
Consultant
Research Analysis Corporation

Dr. Max F. Millikan
Director, Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dr. George S. Pettee
Chairman, Research Council
Research Analysis Corporation

Dr. Lucian W. Pye
Professor, Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dr. Wilbur Schramm
Director, Institute for Communications Research
Stanford University

Dr. George K. Tanham
Special Assistant to the President
RAND Corporation

(U) The Committee held its first meeting in September of 1966. Since then it has met in full Committee on a number of occasions, in sub-Committee on many more. It has received briefings, access to pertinent

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documents and papers, held a number of small group discussions and undertaken one-by-one interviews in some depth. The Task Outline* for this Committee specifically excluded "new or original research . . . in this preliminary evaluation."

(C) The task assigned was two-fold: first, to take a hard look at the Army's psychological operations in the context of "cold war"; second, to recommend a long-range research program, designed to support cold war or stability operations, on which the Army could embark with some confidence during the immediate years ahead. The Committee was authorized to undertake its task in the context of national, rather than purely Army, aims and objectives and in terms of the influence of other agencies on Army psychological operations. The results of its deliberations, and its findings, are contained in the Report that follows.

(U) There are many acknowledgments the Committee would like to make. To list all who provided assistance in various forms would make this Preface too lengthy. Army support of the Committee has been complete and accompanied by candor and frankness. The Committee gratefully acknowledges also the time made available to members by officers of the Department of State and the United States Information Agency.

(U) In particular the Committee wishes to thank the Commanding General and officers of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Unit Training and Readiness, and members of his Command at CONARC; members of the Special Operations Directorate, DCSOPS; the Chief, Social Science Research Division, OCRD/ARO, and members of his staff for much information and many courtesies too numerous to particularize.

(U) The list of individuals who generously gave time to assist the Committee is a long one. It is the Committee's hope that each will feel his contribution, unidentified but reflected in the pages that follow, was worth the effort.

(U) The Committee is indebted to a number of persons for the assistance they provided. These include Mr. Barry Zorthian, Minister-Counsellor for Information, U.S. Embassy, Saigon; Brigadier General Lester D. Flory, USA (Ret.); and Dr. Theodore R. Vallance, Chief, Office of Planning, National Institute of Mental Health. Special mention must be made of the support given by the Action Officer for the Committee, Lieutenant Colonel William E. Beck, ODCSOPS, and Dr. Rudolph G. Berkhouse, OCRD/ARO, Monitor of the study. The Committee gratefully acknowledges the weekly, sometimes daily, support and assistance they unfailingly provided.

(U) Our thanks are due to the Director and Officers of the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) for their "housekeeping"

* See ANNEX A.

support of this Committee, for giving us a home during our existence, and for the use of their publishing facilities.

(U) Finally, there are the many chores attendant on a project of this nature that devolve on an administrative assistant. The Committee has been fortunate in having the skilled services of Miss Audrey Dixon, of the CRESS staff, whose competence has done much to ease the spade work.

(U) For all this assistance and support, and much more too numerous to be able to mention, the Committee makes grateful acknowledgment.

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SUMMARY

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SUMMARY

(U) The Committee's task was to examine the Army's capabilities for conducting psychological operations, or PSYOP, essentially in the context of stability operations; recommend courses of action; and then to recommend a research program to support and strengthen PSYOP.

(C) In the course of this study it has become increasingly clear that we could not restrict ourselves solely to the military functions of PSYOP, as these are now organized, for the reason that the Army possesses a cluster of activities that are, in fact, closely related to PSYOP. In the new kind of warfare called counterinsurgency, or lower spectrum conflict, or stability operations (we have elected to use the last term most frequently), the political and psychological dimension assumes disproportionate significance: virtually every military act has psychological and political consequences in the contest for the allegiance and support of the population of the host country, which is the central end of the whole activity.

(C) We are impressed with the way the Army is responding to the demands upon it for adapting to these variations in military operations. Our Report suggests ways in which the Army can further adapt its plans, career programs, doctrine, training procedures and research activities to improve its long-term capabilities for waging this sort of war. In this connection it is pertinent to note that where this Report discusses operational and doctrinal deficiencies the Army is already aware of these. In instance after instance it was the Army, in the first place, that drew attention to them.

(C) On the basis of what the Army is doing in stability operations, and on the basis of military requirements in this new kind of warfare, we have concluded that there are two distinct roles to be undertaken. The first of these is a staff role to provide expert advice to military commanders at all levels on the psychological, political, and economic implications of alternative employments of military forces, weapons, and instruments in combat, civic action, pacification and military assistance. The second role is the operational role, which includes

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among other things those activities normally considered under the heading of psychological operations, or PSYOP.

(C) We believe that proposals to strengthen the second of these two roles--psychological operations--would be entirely inadequate without action being taken to deal with the psychological, economic, political and social aspects of military operations.

(C) In any operation in this new kind of warfare the Army's non-military activities need to be brought together and coordinated so that they will deliver the maximum impact in support of the new political and psychological dimension of a commander's military operations. PSYOP, civic action, civil affairs, community relations, aspects of public affairs, and activities possessing propaganda connotations need to be planned and carried out in coordination to produce the desired effects on combatants and non-combatants.

(C) Over and above this there appears to be a requirement for an officer charged with the responsibility of evaluating and advising a commander on the important political and psychological implications of his military operations. While this is a command responsibility and many commanders are keenly aware of it, we believe that a commander is unlikely to be able to perform this function in a detailed and continuing manner any more than this Committee could draw up a specific artillery fire plan.

(C) Accordingly we have recommended the establishment of slots throughout the Army for officers who would be called CAP officers.

(C) The acronym CAP serves as a reminder that such officers are concerned with Civic Action, Civil Affairs, Community Relations, Cultural matters and Counterinsurgency on the one hand, and with Psychological, Political, Public Affairs and Propaganda Aspects of military activities on the other.

(C) With respect to the operational role--PSYOP--it is our impression that the Army has made substantial technical progress but that it has not been as successful in producing more effective

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content in communication nor determined how to generate integrated and articulated programs of civic action, psychological operations, community relations, and the like. These special programs need to become more interrelated, especially since they often involve similar capabilities and have similar objectives. These operational activities can gain great benefits from guidance provided by the CAP officer.

(C) In essence we find that the Army needs CAP officers trained and equipped to give competent professional advice to commanders on how proposed military operations will advance or retard the political and economic objectives of the U.S. Government in stability operations. Personnel concerned with PSYOP and the activities we have found related to PSYOP are not now organized or trained so that they are able to give commanders this overview of the social and political effects of military activities in the context of stability operations, or nation-building. These social and political effects are at the heart of PSYOP in stability operations. If they are not taken into account, and if they are not considered, when operational plans are drawn up, no amount of PSYOP is likely to offset the damaging results that can ensue. Our conclusion that the Army should strengthen its own capabilities in the political and social field, and that this competence should be available at high levels of command, has been reached reluctantly. The major responsibility must be in civilian hands but all of it cannot reside outside the military. At present too little of this civilian competence is available to field commanders at times when they need it most.

(C) In the course of reviewing data presented to us we observed, also, that this new kind of warfare affects the nature of the intelligence requirements as compared with conventional warfare. In our view the intimate interrelation of political, psychological and economic considerations with military ones means that the military intelligence agencies must develop greatly increased political, economic and social intelligence capabilities. The CAP officer should monitor the flow of intelligence on matters of political and psychological significance to the Army and ensure that the requirements for the specialized intelligence needed are correctly stated, including intelligence relating to the socio-political implications of all Army activities.

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(C) Lastly, we have noted the absence of a strong, planned research program to serve officers in what we have designated the CAP area and in support of the activities related. At present there is wholly inadequate research to provide the basis for the kinds of judgments that CAP officers should be responsible for making. For example, in combat areas the problem frequently arises of making a choice between a use of weapons which will be militarily effective but politically and psychologically damaging, and one which has more favorable effects on attitudes but has less direct military value. In the present state of knowledge, these decisions must be made largely on the basis of intuitive judgments about political and psychological consequences. Research could provide solid and objective evidence on both the direction and magnitude of the political effects of weapons use. Such research has not been done on any adequate scale. If our recommendation to greatly strengthen the Army's capability to evaluate the trade-offs between military and psychological-political objectives through the establishment of the CAP officer is accepted, there must go along with it a greatly strengthened social science research program by the Army to back him up. This research program is important not only to help the CAP officer, but as a basis for the evolution of a more flexible and applicable doctrine for Army stability operations.

(C) At present there is no CAP officer, although in terms of what the Army is actually undertaking, his function is clearly discernible as an unfilled need. The activities of PSYOP, combined with those that are related, are diffuse and scattered, instead of coordinated and tailored to specific operational missions. There is no adequate research program in support of this political and psychological dimension in the new kind of warfare. The necessary political, economic and social intelligence capabilities are unprovided.

(C) It has been our endeavor to describe how the CAP officer, the functions and activities that we find bear some relation to each other, and a strong, coordinated research program can be organized

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to give the Army a sound capability for carrying out its tasks in the political and psychological dimension of stability operations.

(C) We believe that the CAP concept should be integral throughout the Army with lodgments in CofS, ODCSOPS, OCRD/ARO, CONARC, CDC, and other major commands down to division level. This will give the concept organizational fiber, link the political and psychological area more securely into the Army family, establish the activities as important and significant, and make clear that military service in this field is a rewarding career. To accomplish this we advocate the immediate establishment of a branch immaterial career program for the CAP officer, and that, in the course of the next five years, this program be reconsidered in terms of possible establishment in the status of a branch career.

(C) With regard to the narrower area known as PSYOP, we are impressed with the technical capabilities of the Army, and we are impressed by the morale, motivation and sense of purpose displayed by those serving in PSYOP assignments. We have suggested a number of changes in PSYOP that we feel are needed. These are related to such things as capabilities for direct communication, propaganda content, intelligence and liaison with USIA.

(C) In the area of research it is our conviction that there is a prime need for a strong Research Center designed to back the CAP officer and the related activities. There is not now in the U.S. Government, nor in the Department of the Army, a satisfactory organizational locus for a highly motivated user demand on research resources in relation to the nation-building function.

(C) This nation-building function is at the core of stability operations. A strong research program is essential to improve the advisory function of the CAP officer and to increase the efficiency of the procedures of CAP and the cluster of related functions, and to advance the understanding of the phenomena involved in the nation-building concept.

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(U) We have been concerned in this Report with describing a concept for a function we believe clearly exists and in part, if Army activities are examined, appears to have won some recognition. This function, however, is not at present reflected in concepts, doctrine, training, career status, organization and research support.

(U) It has been our endeavor to show how it may be organized to take an effective place in the Army structure. This has been our major concern, resulting from a conviction that without attention to developing such a concept, any improvements in the present Army organization for the narrow range of activities designated PSYOP can be marginal only and are not likely to achieve noticeable impact.

FINDINGS

(C) The Army has a fair degree of capability and readiness in the following areas:

- a. Doctrine, TO&Es, materiel, and trained personnel for conduct of conventional PSYOP in conventional war.
- b. The numbers of officers put through a course of training.
- c. Recognition that area-country language knowledge is essential.
- d. Research on the area or country culture.

(C) Among the points on which we find the Army in a less than good degree of capability and readiness, and with less than adequate programs to arrive at such capability and readiness, are the following:

- a. How to channel military power so as to contribute in the most effective way to nation-building.
- b. Recognition of the political and psychological implications of military activities in stability operations.
- c. Officers assigned responsibilities throughout the Army chain of command for these new functions

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that must be considered in stability operations.

- d. Recognition of the combined function represented by the skills now separated under PSYOP, civic action, civil affairs, and related areas.
- e. Programs of instruction and Army doctrine to ensure coping with the psychological and political dimensions of stability operations.
- f. Recognition of and provision for a professional capability to influence target populations and to evaluate such efforts.
- g. A research program strong in capacity to convert for Army purposes the rapidly growing body of relevant knowledge in the behavioral and social sciences, particularly as they deal with the development of communications and social processes in emerging nations.
- h. The Army PSYOP Improvement Program, although well worked out to improve tactical PSYOP for conventional warfare, is designed to improve a program that is assumed to be correct in every major assumption. This program makes little effort to adapt the Army's PSYOP system to the realities of the new insurgency situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(C) It is recommended that the Army:

- a. Establish CAP as a concept, making it a branch immaterial career program. In the Office of the Chief of Staff CAP should be a special staff function, directly responsible to the Chief of Staff. There should also be CAP representation in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations; the Army Research Office of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development; Headquarters, Continental Army Command; and the Combat Developments Command.

Invite, as a "quick-fix" measure in view of the urgent need, applications for the career program immediately, with the understanding that a board will identify a number of officer applicants who

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will forthwith be assigned a CAP MOS and career status. At the same time, develop and operate temporarily a short 12-week course to be given while the full career course is being organized and developed.

This, we believe, will enable the Army to establish for itself a career group within the next six months, in numbers sufficient to meet the primary requirements for assignment of qualified and interested officers to all essential staff and instructor duties in the ZI.

- b. Take the necessary organizational steps required to place operational planning responsibility for the various units and activities we have identified as being related, under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, so that the various elements, when plans are being prepared, can be grouped and tailored for the specific requirements of Commanders in specific operations, in order to deliver maximum impact in support of the political and psychological aspects of stability operations. In operational plans there should be a single Annex for all such activities. In the Theater, and in the field, this responsibility should be lodged within the general staff in the operational area.
- c. Take the necessary steps to ensure that Army Intelligence agencies acquire the capabilities to fulfill the urgent need for increased political, economic, social, as well as military intelligence, demanded by the political and psychological dimension in stability operations.
- d. Establish an expanded Social Science research program, and at least one new Research Center, with specific assignment to work within the areas described in this Report. Such a Center should have a general purview of the military role in nation-building and should be a strong source for the badly needed analytic studies the Army should have as to what research is feasible, and what is most important. There should be the strongest practical relationship between the research program, the development of doctrine and the individual studies of officers taking the career courses. Such a Center should have a powerful interactive feed between the world of research and thinking outside the Army and the faculty and program of the School at Fort Bragg, by, among other things, lectures and professorial appointments. A research program

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developed at such a Center in close cooperation with experienced social scientists is important not only to help the CAP officer, but as a basis for the evolution of a more flexible and applicable doctrine for Army stability operations. An advisory board composed of distinguished military officers and scientists should be appointed to advise and consult with the staff of such a Center.

- e. Strengthen the present PSYOP organization so that PSYOP is prepared to deal with broader political matters that affect the relations of the enemy soldier to a community and is less associated with narrow military concepts of the psychology of an enemy soldier. Current Army organization for PSYOP has shown considerable reliability and flexibility. It should be maintained substantially as it is. When it is able to benefit from an Army environment reflecting CAP principles it will become a far more effective organ.

(C) The Recommendations that follow elaborate in more detail aspects of the five main Recommendations above. These more detailed aspects are intended to be flexible. They should be regarded as guides. They are not rigid. Where numbers are given they suggest an order of emphasis and not a fixed quantity.

(C) With Regard to Establishment of the CAP Concept:

1. The CAP career course should focus on the socio-economic political factors in the developing nation insurgency types of social-political systems. The duration of the course should be 40 weeks. (This number is not rigid; it approximates the customary career course pattern.) The career should include, but need not be limited to, basic MOSs in PSYOP, civil affairs, civic action and counterinsurgency operations. The larger part of the course should be uniform for all; the smaller part varied by previous MOS. Students should be in the appropriate ranks for a career officer course.
2. The basic courses in the area of each MOS within the CAP career field should be retained and revised, where necessary, for company grade officers, in line with the CAP concept.

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3. There should be a standard one-week component on insurgency and social-political relations in all basic courses.
4. There should be a three-weeks component in the course at Leavenworth on the CAP area of nation-building and related Army operational concerns. This should be most carefully developed and should not be simply a restatement of existing courses.
5. At the Army War College the course material for the CAP area should be amalgamated, rather than presented as separate blocks. The time presently allotted appears adequate.
6. Consideration should be given to re-forming the CONARC Special Warfare/Civil Affairs Division as the CAP Division, with direct cognizance for CAP and related functions.
7. Consideration should be given to re-designating the Social Science Research Division in the Army Research Office, OCRD, the CAP Research Division, consolidating in this Division responsibility for all research in the CAP area, and providing this Division with cognizances and interests congruent with those recommended for DCSOPS, CONARC, and CDC in the CAP field.
8. Slots should be established for CAP officers at major commands and down to Division level.
9. Slots should be established for CAP officers at selected Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions.
10. The cooperation of the Office of the Provost Marshal General should be sought in introducing the necessary doctrine, instruction, and training that may be required for the Military Police Corps in accordance with the principles enunciated in the text of this Report, in order that the Corps may be able to act, when required, in support of the CAP concept and the CAP officer.
11. Consideration should be given to establishing a Reserve component for CAP career officers. The existing Reserve structure should be reviewed with intent to determine means for selective recall of qualified officers with political and psychological skills when such are needed.

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(C) With Regard to Army PSYOP and Related Functions:

1. Army PSYOP should direct more attention to the capabilities required for direct communication, including face-to-face techniques.
2. PSYOP specialists should be trained in methods for the selection and use of suitable indigenous personnel in operational capacities.
3. Much greater emphasis should be directed to the content of propaganda and ways in which such content may be created.
4. Each PSYOP battalion should have, and use, a far greater capability for survey research, collection, and analysis of social and psychological information, pre-tests of PSYOP material, and assessment of effects.
5. The capability to establish intelligence requirements, analyze the relevant intelligence produced, and convert it into usable forms is most important. Both CAP and PSYOP officers should be assigned to intelligence collecting agencies that are a principal source of political and psychological information. Whether a CAP officer or a PSYOP officer should be assigned to any given collecting agency will depend on the kind of information to be collected and the officer grade required to do the job adequately.

(C) With Regard to a New Research Center:

There are a number of much needed items which such a Center should be concerned with as one of its first priorities. Among these are:

1. A case studies program.
2. Efforts to develop useful analytic models of insurgency or pre-insurgency situations.
3. Development of political-military gaming of insurgency intervention situations for incorporation in research and instructional programs.
4. Attitude analysis.

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5. Role of the military in nation-building.
6. Field studies.
7. Military sociology.
8. Peacetime military roles.
9. Cooperation with allies.
10. Problems of ethnic minorities.
11. Basic studies on the nature of the transition from a static social-political system to an accelerated development.

On any of the items above preliminary or exploratory studies, including the availability of data, the adequacy of existing methodology, the state of the art and its rate of advance, and the existing research capabilities, might be undertaken in advance at a principal center of Army research in this field with responsibility for a coordinated program of research devolving on the Research Center at its establishment. (See pages 70-74 for elaboration of the research program outlined above.)

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THE NEW NATURE OF WAR

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THE NEW NATURE OF WAR*

(C) Army doctrine currently recognizes three general types of conflict in which U.S. forces may be engaged over the coming years, and with which they must be prepared to deal. These are:

- a. General war between major powers, usually assumed to be nuclear.
- b. Limited war, usually assumed to be conventional, in which enemy and friendly forces contest very clearly defined territory with limited objectives.
- c. Lower spectrum conflict, sometimes described as counter-insurgency and sometimes as stability operations.

(C) The panel has concentrated its attention on the Army's needs for improving its capacity to deal with the psychological and political aspects of the third of these three types of conflict. We have done this in the first place because other Army documents support the panel's own conviction that this third type of lower spectrum conflict, which is partly induced by the process of modernization of the underdeveloped countries, is likely to be most prevalent, at least over the coming decade. Second, we feel that the Army's capabilities for psychological operations in the first two types of conflict are in much better shape than those required in the third. Army organization and doctrine for the psychological and political aspects of lower spectrum conflict have had difficulty in adapting practices designed for general and limited war, where the requirements are quite different from those imposed by stability operations. The psychological and political implications of military operations in the third type of conflict are much more extensive and pervasive than in general and limited war, and much more critical to the attainment of our objectives. We feel they should be given a totally different kind of treatment than that which has historically been accorded these factors by our military establishment.

*Readers of this chapter familiar with WINS II will recognize the extent to which, even in wording, we have drawn on that study.

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(C) It is worthwhile to start by recalling very briefly those characteristics of stability operations, distinguishing them from general and limited war, which are most important in defining the psychological and political dimensions of these operations. In what follows we believe we are merely summarizing what is already accepted national, as well as Army, doctrine on lower level conflict.

(C) In the first place in stability operations, as opposed to both general and limited war, the major geographical areas with which we are concerned are neither clearly enemy territory nor clearly held by friendly forces. Likewise, whereas in conventional warfare the bulk of the populations involved are either clearly and identifiably hostile or equally unambiguously friendly, in stability operations the majority of the people who are important to the outcome are not identifiably in either category. Indeed, the whole purpose of stability operations can frequently be described as winning the allegiance of this third uncommitted group, and increasing the independent effectiveness of the host nation. A corollary of this fact is that, whereas in limited and general war the form and pace of combat are dictated primarily by the engaged forces, in stability operations the entire national environment, including its politics, its economics, and its social system, influences the nature of conflict.

(C) Another distinguishing characteristic of stability operations is that the distinction between military and political objectives is much more difficult to make. In a sense, of course, it is true that in all warfare the objectives are basically political, and military force is a means to a political end. However, in conventional warfare, the primary object of military campaigns is to establish a military result on the basis of which political negotiations can subsequently be undertaken by the appropriate civilian authorities. In this kind of a situation there can be a relatively clear division of function between the soldiers who can devote themselves fairly single-mindedly to winning the war, and the diplomats who on the basis of the outcome can devote

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themselves to negotiating the terms of the peace. By contrast, in stability operations, virtually every military act has psychological and political consequences in the contest for the allegiance and support of the population of the host country, which is the central end of the whole activity.

(C) Since progress toward the political goals of the stability operations may be critically affected by every tactical move made in the field, and not just by the outcome of the whole campaign, the division between military, psychological, and political functions cannot be sharp and unambiguous. Out of the evolving history of conventional warfare has emerged a set of rules and attitudes whose purpose and intent is to assign nearly exclusive responsibility for the conduct of military operations to the military authorities, and to charge civilians with a similarly clear-cut mission to shape the political situation. This division of function is actually mischievous in the spectrum of conflict with which we are here concerned. Military and political considerations are so intimately interconnected, at all levels of command, and in all types of planning from the strategic to the tactical, that civilian officials must learn a great deal about the requirements of military operations and the reasons therefor, and military commanders at all ranks must have the capability to take account of the political and psychological implications of their military operations.

(C) The Committee would have liked to be able to stake out an area with determinable boundaries within which the Army should assume exclusive responsibilities for operational activities of the sort we are discussing. This cannot be done for the reason given above: military and political considerations are too intimately interconnected. There are worldwide psychological consequences attendant on reported bombing of civilian targets in North Vietnam, on aircraft jettisoning ordnance before returning to the home base, and on the decision to clear an area like the Iron Triangle with consequent uprooting of its inhabitants.

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Are such matters as these capable of determination as solely military or solely political decisions, or as a mix of the two? If it must be a mix, what is the nature of the cooperative arrangement? When jurisdiction is determined, what circumstances demand flexibility or alternating jurisdictional control?

(C) The greater complexity of this form of warfare creates problems of coordination between military and civilian agencies much more severe than those confronted in conventional warfare, and we deal with these in a later section of this Report. What we are concerned to emphasize here is that, however effective the coordination machinery, the relation between military and political considerations in stability operations is so intimate that we feel it is essential for the Army to develop within its own ranks much greater capacity than it has at present to evaluate social, economic, political and psychological factors, and to balance these against military ones. As a corollary, the Army must expect the civilian agencies with which it deals to have much more informed and independent judgments about matters traditionally regarded as technically military than is either necessary or desirable in conventional warfare.

(C) The greatly increased significance and relevance to every aspect of military operations of the political, psychological, and economic environment has another consequence recognized in Army thinking but not yet sufficiently embodied in Army practice. Military operational methods, the mix of military and civilian activities, the selection of governmental countermeasures and the relative emphasis among them, and even the details of military organization must all be adapted to the specific environment in which the conflict is taking place. These environments vary enormously in different parts of the world and even at different times within the same country.

(C) Since by and large conventional war establishes its own environment, it can operate under rules which, while they are influenced by geographical features like terrain and the technology of weapons systems,

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can be generalized to apply in almost any society. By contrast, the commander in stability operations cannot assume full control of his sector, and so needs to have at his disposal a much greater degree of expertise about all aspects of the local society in which he is operating, and must regard doctrine as flexible to reflect all these special circumstances. Some of the recommendations which follow arise from a conviction that the Army does not now provide field commanders with the support they require to perform this function effectively.

(C) A complication of such operations which distinguishes many of them from conventional warfare is what has been well termed "the frustrations of proxy." In most of our programs of counterinsurgency we are supporting in one way or another an independent government, and its own military establishment, which are not directly under our own control. This means that all the detailed political considerations which underlie the tactical moves of our own forces are determined partly by U.S. goals and partly by the goals of the host government with which we are cooperating, and these goals may well not be completely congruent. This is another reason why U.S. commanders require sensitivity to, and advice about, the political and psychological implications of proposed military action for local populations, and also the probable views of these matters taken by the allied forces with whom we are cooperating.

(C) In the pre-conflict stages, when our role is predominantly advisory, we will have to operate principally through attempting to improve the capacity of the host government and its military establishment to make the kinds of political and psychological judgments involved in this type of warfare. In situations in which our own troops are actively engaged, there are the added problems of technical assistance and diplomatic negotiation with allies.

(C) This difference affects the nature of the intelligence requirements in stability operations, as compared with conventional warfare. It relates partly to the military dimension of intelligence focused on locating the enemy and estimating his strength, and partly to the

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new political and social dimension introduced by the necessity for each commander to appraise the non-military consequences of his military acts. Both types of intelligence are much more intimately related to psychological operations than in conventional warfare. This is true because both types rely very heavily on extracting information from the population in a non-combatant status which is neither identifiably enemy nor identifiably allied.

(c) With respect to military intelligence, it is widely recognized that guerrillas frequently have an enormous advantage. They are relatively invisible while the regulars are fully visible to guerrilla intelligence in their strength, dispositions, and movements. Air mobile forces have overcome part of the tactical advantage conferred on guerrillas by the fact that they enjoy the initiative against dispersed and isolated units whose positions are known, but the intelligence disparity has not yet been corrected. Great efforts are being applied to technological devices for locating and identifying insurgent units, but we have not yet learned how to exploit fully the intelligence source on which the guerrillas primarily rely, namely the non-combatant population. If people fed even half as much intelligence of the guerrillas to the regulars as they do of the regulars to the guerrillas, this by itself would change the balance of guerrilla warfare substantially. Affecting the attitudes that would permit such a change in the balance should be recognized as a major military mission. In addition to the problem of attitudes there is a need for improved techniques in the gathering of information. Further attention should be given to dealing with the measures taken by insurgents to prevent civilians from providing useful intelligence.

(c) So far as non-military intelligence is concerned, political and economic intelligence is regarded in conventional war situations as the domain of the civilian intelligence agencies. In our view, the intimate interrelation of political, psychological and economic considerations with military ones means that the military intelligence agencies must

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have greatly increased political, economic, and social intelligence capabilities, which can be achieved partly, but only partly, through closer coordination with the civilian intelligence organizations. Since the cooperation of the population must be a major objective of strictly military operations, and since the objectives of the Armed Forces must embody measures to alleviate the political, economic and social discontent from which insurgents draw their popular support, an appraisal of attitudes must be a definite part of military intelligence activities.

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II

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSION

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II

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSION

(C) The implications for the U.S. Army of these differences between stability operations and conventional warfare are far-reaching. The traditional functions of psychological operations are still, of course, very important in this kind of warfare though even these functions have some new characteristics.

(C) It continues to be important to employ a variety of instruments of communication including press, radio, leaflets, loudspeakers, and face-to-face contact to lower the morale and induce the surrender or defection of those clearly defined as enemies, which means mainly enemy soldiers and guerrillas. It also continues to be important to raise the morale and strengthen the will and effectiveness of those clearly on our side, a task that in conventional operations is assigned to quite different units concerned with troop indoctrination or with public affairs.

(C) Effective commanders have always known that these functions could be performed only partly by units specifically designated for the purpose, and that actual military operations had important psychological effects on both enemies and allied troops that had to be taken account of in military planning. But in conventional military operations these psychological effects were conditioned to a lesser degree by the specific economic, cultural, and political environment in which both enemies and allies operated. Allied military successes and demonstrations of increased allied capability could be presumed to weaken enemy morale and strengthen that on our side. Enemy military failures and demonstrations of enemy military weakness could be presumed to have similar consequences. These psychological effects were widely generalizable because they depended upon characteristics of both people and warfare which could be presumed nearly universal.

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(c) By contrast, as we have seen above, in insurgency:

- a. The prime target is often neither enemy nor ally but non-combatant.
- b. The objectives of tactical operations are political and psychological as well as military.
- c. The environment for military action is determined not solely by military forces but by local culture and local economic and political conditions.
- d. These conditions vary both from place to place and from time to time in the same locality.
- e. The mission of the Army is to find, fix, and destroy the enemy, but in such a manner that the nation-building task will be assisted to the maximum practicable extent, and damaged to the minimum practicable extent.

(C) In these circumstances, compared with any previous condition such as the condition in the first year of the war in Korea, the Army's PSYOP program relevant to conventional warfare is in at least fair to good condition in most respects, and better than ever before. We find that the Army has a fair degree of capability and readiness in the following areas:

- a. Doctrine, TO&Es, materiel, and trained personnel for conduct of conventional PSYOP in conventional war.
- b. The numbers of officers put through a course of training.
- c. Recognition that area-country language knowledge is essential.
- d. Research on the area or country culture.

(C) However, among the points on which we find the Army in a less than good degree of capability and readiness, and with less than adequate programs to arrive at such capability and readiness, are the following:

- a. How to channel military power so as to contribute in the most effective way to nation-building.

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- b. Recognition of the political and psychological implications of military activities in stability operations.
- c. Officers assigned responsibilities throughout the Army chain of command for these new functions that must be considered in stability operations.
- d. Recognition of the combined function represented by the skills now separated under PSYOP, civic action, civil affairs, and related areas.
- e. Programs of instruction and Army doctrine to ensure coping with the psychological and political dimensions of stability operations.
- f. Recognition of and provision for a professional capability to influence target populations and to evaluate such efforts.
- g. A research program strong in capacity to convert for Army purposes the rapidly growing body of relevant knowledge in the behavioral and social sciences, particularly as they deal with the development of communications and social processes in emerging nations.
- h. The Army PSYOP Improvement Program, although well worked out to improve tactical PSYOP for conventional warfare, is designed to improve a program that is assumed to be correct in every major assumption. This program makes little effort to adapt the Army's PSYOP system to the realities of the new insurgency situation.

A RECOGNITION OF TWO FUNCTIONS

(C) A natural reaction to the recognition of these Army problems is to propose that the Army's current program of psychological operations be strengthened. We believe such a proposal would be entirely inadequate, for to improve PSYOP without concurrently taking action to deal with the broad psychological, economic, political and social aspects of military operations would not solve the problems.

(C) Wherever Army operations have damaging effects on the host country, whether from weapons use or through the inflationary impact of logistic activities, or where people are displaced from their homes, there must

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be not merely an awareness of such effects, but an Army capability to assess the magnitude of such effects, and to plan to minimize them, lest the achievement of a military objective be fully offset by a loss in support from the community within which the Army must operate. Such a capability cannot merely involve campaigns to explain why certain operations are necessary but also must include the prospect of changing military plans on the basis of their psychological effects.

(c) We see two functions which are related but somewhat independent. The first of these is the provision of expert advice to military commanders at all levels on the psychological, political, and economic implications of alternative employments of military forces, weapons, and instruments in combat, civic action, pacification, and military assistance. The second role is the operational role normally included under the heading of psychological operations, which we believe should be broadened to include the applicable related activities when this is appropriate. This involves the recruitment, training, and deployment of operational units skilled in the use of information media, with the mission of influencing through the employment of these media the attitudes and behavior of three types of target audiences: enemy forces, allied and friendly forces, and the non-combatant population not clearly identified as either but determining the environment in which stability operations take place.

(c) The Army requires two categories of personnel to perform these two functions in connection with stability operations. The first category consists primarily of officers who are able to provide advice on the political and psychological implications of military policy. The second category consists of officers and men especially qualified in any one of the fields of psychological operations, civic action, civil affairs and foreign areas.

(c) We argue that a clear distinction must be maintained between the two categories of personnel. Even though their duties are interrelated, their functions are quite different. The staff officer advisory to the field commander may be drawn from the lists of those persons who have

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been active in the operational programs of PSYOP, civil affairs, civic action, and the like, or in other pertinent areas. But his duties require him to view the effects of Army activities from a broader base than any one or all of these operations, and to generate intelligence and good judgment that relates to all of the issues involved in successful stability operations.

(C) We propose that officers who advise on the political and psychological implications of military policy be given a designation that is reasonably descriptive of their functions and that does not interfere in their relations with any domestic or foreign group outside the Army with which they have to deal. This designation should not explicitly include the word "political"--which would lead to misunderstandings with civilian agencies--or "psychological"--which is strongly identified with conventional PSYOP activities and which would also make relations with some foreign groups more difficult.

(C) No designation that fits the requirements perfectly is currently available. We have generated a designation for convenience in reference, a CAP officer. This acronym CAP serves as a reminder that such officers are concerned with Civil Affairs, Civic Action, Community relations, Cultural matters and Counterinsurgency on the one hand, and with Political, Psychological, Public Affairs, and Propaganda Aspects of military activities on the other.

(C) Such a CAP officer would be responsible for providing sound advice to the commander on the psychological-social-political effects to be sought or avoided during the planning and execution of military operations. He would provide advice to the commander on the non-military implications of his actions. We, therefore, recommend that a slot for an officer to be called a CAP officer be created at all Army units from Division up.

(C) With respect to the operational role, it is our impression that the Army has made substantial progress in developing hardware and

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technology and the skills to use these so that it can produce successful radio programs, manage mammoth leaflet drops, develop water purification projects, build roads, and the like. But the Army has not been as successful in improving its capability to produce more effective content in communication, nor to generate and evaluate integrated and articulated programs of civic action, psychological operations and community development. These special programs need to become more interrelated, especially since they often involve similar capabilities and have similar objectives. These operational activities can gain great benefits from guidance provided by the CAP officer.

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III
THE CAP OFFICER

III

THE CAP OFFICER

DOCTRINE

(C) For the Army to fulfil the CAP functions outlined in this Report, it will be necessary to develop appropriate doctrine. This is particularly true with respect to the need for developing a capability for managing the psychological and political dimensions of warfare that have emerged.

(C) In our estimation the Army is already proceeding in many areas to develop the concepts and thinking that must precede the formulation of an appropriate doctrine. We are impressed with the intellectual planning that went into the WINS II report. The PROVN study, too, reflects the Army's realization of a need for new approaches and a determined effort to secure them. In recent years leading spokesmen for the Army have also made many suggestions which contain ideas and concepts appropriate for doctrine.

(C) It is noteworthy in this connection that the Armed Forces at high levels describe and discuss psychological operations in terms indicating at least as great an advance in their understanding of what such operations encompass as was the advance made by the Army during the Korean conflict in understanding the nature of tactical psychological warfare compared with such warfare in World War II. For instance:

[U.S. military power] must be capable of participating in non-war diplomatic, economic and socio-psychological activities. . .

A viable concept is needed to use the nation's Armed Forces in a positive role in peacetime. . . current civic action and stability operations make inadequate use of Armed Forces. Research and experimentation

* For reasons of classification, the sources for these statements are not identified. They include staff papers at the highest level. They are quoted not as authority but as evidence of thinking in support of the position taken in this Report.

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should find better ways to help indigenous populations help themselves. . . improved methods for influencing beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and behavior of large numbers of people are required.

U.S. armed forces will be prepared to . . . reinforce and support political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural programs for the achievement of U.S. objectives.

Each conflict environment is unique, and is dictated by the particulars of the attacked nation's politics, economy, and social structure, as well as by enemy, weather, and terrain.

[We] need professional soldiers who know the conflict environment--political, economic and social, as well as military.

Experimentation and pragmatic evolution of inter-agency organizations, policies, programs and techniques better serve the counterinsurgent government than doctrinaire approaches to dealing with such conflicts. In fact, a detailed doctrine based on a few conflict experiences can so rigidify the national approach to its next experience that the doctrine adds to the inherent constraints on success.

[Lower spectrum conflicts] must be dealt with by adaptation, not preconceived doctrines.

Perhaps the most profound over-all lesson of the operation [Dominican Republic] is the necessity for the complete integration of the US effort--political, military, psychological, economic-sociological, and public affairs and information.

. . .there must be close civil-military relations at every decision level, as only through the marriage of political possibilities and military realities can there be established a posture of optimum opportunity.

[Cold war, stability operations--whatever the term] involve, by their very nature, the control of people, their land, their resources, their actions, the reactions and even their thoughts. The human factor--man--is by far the dominant one and psychological factors are most important of all.

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(C) Implicit in these citations is a recognition and grasp of the range of all that is compressed into the political and psychological dimension of lower level conflict. Explicit is the acknowledgment that this kind of national approach to foreign policy is inter-departmental and inter-agency, requiring teamwork of a high order. This approach is not a matter of leaflets and broadcasts. It reflects profound understanding of the evolving nature of conflict and the political and psychological dimensions of conflict.

(C) The thinking expressed, however, is not yet securely fastened to an operational concept. It demonstrates an awareness of an evolution. This awareness has not yet succeeded in discovering an effective means for securing the unified approach that is demanded.

(C) With respect to the Army, the thinking expressed "at the top" exemplified by the quotations just given, forms the philosophical base for the CAP officer's approach to his functions and duties.

(C) The problem, therefore, is not one of moving into completely new ground, but rather of accelerating the pace with which the Army can adjust to the demands of change. A central element with regard to the development of doctrine is that the psychological and political dimensions of war cannot by their very nature be rigidly codified. It will, therefore, be impossible to develop doctrine in this area that will be as precise or as rigorous as doctrine usually is within the Army.

(C) The objective should be to help sensitize all commanders to the subtleties of the psychological factors and the need to incorporate an appreciation of them in the making of decisions. The evolution of doctrine goes hand-in-hand with the introduction of the CAP officer, and with the changes in education that are recommended.

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(C) The overriding concern in the evolution of doctrine should be to ensure that military resources will be used to increasingly political effect. The military tradition of regarding the prime, or indeed sole, goal of military resources as in the realm of the application of violence is not appropriate to the new kind of warfare. More imaginative approaches are required to achieve political objectives in the deployment and indoctrination of troops, the selection of targets, and the use of weapons systems.

(C) The Vietnam experience is teaching us that the calculus of kill and destroy is not adequate. The task in the future will be to use violence, or its threat, in such fashions as to promote political stability and the well-being of civilians in threatened areas. To ensure that this is being done systematically there will be a need in all operational plans for something that goes beyond the conventional PSYOP Annex.

DUTIES OF CAP OFFICERS

(C) CAP officers would serve in command or staff positions concerned with the political and psychological considerations affecting military operations. To this end they should be expert both in long-range and short-range terms about the political and psychological implications of Army operations in foreign areas.

(C) Among the specific functions of CAP officers in CAP assignments would be the following:*

- a. Participate in the preparation of major plans to ensure that the political and psychological dimension is taken into account.
- b. Advise the commander on the execution of plans, and their adaptation when necessitated by contingencies arising during military operations.
- c. Ensure that an appropriate annex to each major plan is prepared to take account of political, social and psychological functions.

*These functions vary according to the level of assignment.

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- d. Monitor the flow of intelligence on matters of political and psychological significance to the Army, and ensure that requirements for CAP intelligence are correctly stated, including intelligence relating to the socio-political implications of all Army activities. Where necessary, they should state requirements for collection of information on foreign reactions to major Army policies and operations; on the economic implication of these operations; and on relevant aspects of friendly countries where insurgency is threatened or in progress.
- e. Monitor research oriented to the political and psychological aspects of Army activities. Where additional research is required, CAP officers at appropriate levels should recommend to the appropriate Army agencies that this research be undertaken or contracted for. At present an overview of research relevant to the political and psychological aspects of Army activities is difficult to achieve.
- f. Advise on the political and psychological content of training courses at Army schools, especially schools for senior officers, as well as joint service schools.
- g. Maintain liaison with other military agencies--for example the PMG, Engineers, CID--which possess prime capabilities of value in support of the CAP concept. This appears to be of especial importance in connection with the capabilities of the Military Police Corps whose skills are often directly applicable. While the Committee understands that military agencies are already directed to use their skills in support of stability operations there is not enough evidence of active programs that could be of great assistance in support of CAP. CAP officers should endeavor to win the full cooperation and understanding of such agencies in support of programs concerned with the political and psychological dimension of stability operations.
- h. Maintain liaison with relevant civilian agencies and with staffs concerned with political and psychological matters in other services. In particular, CAP officers should:
 1. Represent the Army in inter-departmental or inter-governmental discussions involving coordination of political or psychological aspects of operations.

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2. Study major plans of other military and civilian agencies, especially the Department of State, USIA, AID, and CIA plans relating to foreign areas, in order to acquaint Army commanders and staffs with the implications these have for Army activities.
3. Request the collection of intelligence related to political and psychological operations that might be needed by civilian agencies in an emergency.
4. Maintain constant liaison with Department of State, AID, and USIA offices abroad in order to be conversant with their policies and activities. CAP officers should also be assigned for tours with the Department of State, USIA, and AID at policy levels in Washington and at foreign posts. The numbers of officers to be assigned should be large enough to ensure that the Army has familiarity with civilian policies and operating procedures. The difficulty of integrating Army and civilian operations has been experienced in many emergencies, including Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam.

The Military Assistance Advisory Group Role of CAP Officers

(C) In countries that are threatened by insurgency it is especially important that a CAP officer be included in the MAAG. He will be in a position to work with other U.S. officials and with officers of the indigenous army during Phase I insurgency. He should, with the knowledge and consent of the host government, establish requirements for research and intelligence to be undertaken through Army channels and for additional Army personnel who may be needed to work in the political and psychological area. The CAP officer should also be qualified to train counterparts in the indigenous army and to advise local military authorities on the importance of CAP and related functions.

(C) During what is termed Phase II of counterinsurgency, CAP officers should be available to coordinate the activities of PSYOP, civic action

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and other specialized personnel who are engaged in training indigenous counterparts and other activities. CAP officers and PSYOP units should be prepared to help train local civilian as well as military personnel in the event that the U.S. Army receives this assignment. U.S. advisors should emphasize to their counterparts the necessity for giving full public explanations of population control measures and building popular support for such measures.

CAP Officers in the Army Organizational Structure

(c) Organizational measures suggested by these recommendations are:

- a. Establishment of a CAP staff position headed by a general officer. In the Office of the Chief of Staff, CAP should be a special staff function directly responsible to the Chief of Staff. There should also be CAP representation in ODCSOPS, OGRD, CDC, and CONARC.
- b. Establishment of slots for CAP officers at other major commands and down to Division.
- c. Establishment of slots for CAP officers at selected Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions.
- d. It is noted that CONARC has a Special Warfare/Civil Affairs Division. We recommend that a New Division be formed, absorbing the functions of the present Division and possessing the additional functions required to make it responsive to the needs of the activities related to CAP, and also responsive to the broader needs and functions encompassed in CAP. It is important, in our judgment, to keep clearly in mind that CAP, and the related cluster of activities, are two separate categories, each possessing different functions concerning which a clear distinction should be maintained. This new CAP Division should also possess a claim of interest in coordination of activities of the Provost Marshal General's Office and Intelligence functions when these bear directly on CAP activities. A similar interlocking interest exists in connection with the military advisory function and the FAST program.

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The Special Warfare/Civil Affairs Division, if reformed, thus would have direct cognizance of the activities of the cluster, and also of the broader, more far-reaching duties and activities of CAP. In time we should expect this Division to be under a CAP-qualified officer. This new Division has an interlocking interest in, but not direct cognizance of, other military functions and programs when aspects of such functions are of direct concern to CAP.

- e. It is recommended that, similarly, in ODCSOPS, the CAP area should be a separate directorate under the acronym CAP, having under its cognizance the same activities and functions suggested for a CAP Division at CONARC.
 - f. In OCRD/ARO we recommend that CAP-related elements of the Social Science Research and Human Factors Divisions be consolidated and designated the CAP Research Division having cognizances and interests congruent with those recommended for CONARC and DCSOPS.
- C) The effect of these re-designations would be to give an organizational fiber to the CAP concept, thus linking CAP more securely into the Army family, establishing the activities as important and significant, and making clear that military service in this field need not be an unrewarding assignment.

Establishment of a Reserve Component

(C) Consideration should be given to establishing a reserve component for CAP career officers. An imaginative Reserve Officer Program for men interested in the political and psychological implications of the Army's activities would offer several advantages and opportunities:

- a. It would enable the Army to draw when necessary on a pool of area and communication specialists who would be challenged by the kinds of problems facing the CAP officer.
- b. It would relieve the strain on the Army's training facilities imposed every time the United States becomes involved on a large scale in a new foreign area.
- c. It would help in maintaining close touch between CAP officers on active duty and relevant civilian institutions.

IV

ARMY PSYOP AND RELATED FUNCTIONS

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IV

ARMY PSYOP AND RELATED FUNCTIONS

(C) With respect to the more narrow and technical problems of PSYOP, which seem to be thought of as "leaflets and broadcasting," we are impressed with the physical capabilities of the Army. However, present PSYOP doctrine clearly is still much influenced by World War II experiences and with an excessive concern with the use of media. The Army's capability for producing leaflets, providing mobile loudspeakers, and even radio broadcasting, all reflect the continuing impact of World War II practices.

(C) In the future, PSYOP will have to be less associated with narrow military concepts of the psychology of an enemy soldier and more prepared to deal with broader political matters which affect the relationship of the enemy soldier to a community. This means that the Army must develop greater capabilities to engage in face-to-face communications and utilize community relationships as a means to affect attitudes.

(C) What this comes down to is that the Army will have to develop greater capabilities for expanding the substantive content of PSYOP. This requires, among other things, a much closer relationship between PSYOP and Intelligence than has existed so far. This places on Intelligence the requirement to broaden its concerns and include the gathering of more political and psychologically relevant information.

(C) In the new dimension of warfare it is also incumbent upon the Army to consider intelligent and imaginative use of the trained, disciplined Military Police Corps. The Committee notes that nowhere in the briefings, discussions, documents and papers it has received is there any reference to or consideration of the role trained police can play in military support of political and psychological objectives. The Provost Marshal General's Office should be included when any consideration is being given to the use of military power and operations to achieve political and psychological results. There are many

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obvious ways in which military police can afford unique support and assistance, and their immediate and wholehearted cooperation in concerted planning should be sought.

(C) The contacts of such police with local authorities, their police intelligence networks, their knowledge of civilian transportation systems, and the arrangements to be made with civil authority whenever military movements are in question all furnish sources of knowledge and degrees of competence of great value.

(C) The Committee has been made aware, also, of the existence among Reserve components of officers with experience and skills peculiarly fitted to support the concept of nation-building that is involved in stability operations. The Committee was informed that among these officers there are men who would be willing to serve in responsible and important positions if existing barriers to selective recall could be modified. In view of the caliber to be found in Reserve components, and the Army's clear need for officers with political and psychological skills, the existing barriers should be reviewed to see if modifications could be achieved, permitting voluntary, selective recall for periods of duty.

(C) We are impressed by the morale, motivation and sense of purpose displayed by those serving in PSYOP assignments. Their physical resources, in the form of technical equipment--for example, loudspeakers, presses, transmitters--appear to be good. The technical capability to utilize these physical resources with skill and efficiency also has impressed us.

(C) However, unless the Army is engaged in hostile operations, or is present because it may be engaged in such operations, PSYOP units have little opportunity for practice. In periods of quiescence such units train and plan. They do not actually operate. And here is, perhaps, one of the major obstacles to understanding between, let us say, the United States Information Agency and the Department of Defense. The resources of USIA are funnelled into day-by-day operations; its planning is concerned with how to improve such operations

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in the midst of having, also, to carry them out. Its training is in terms of being constantly on the firing line.

(c) Army PSYOP operational planning is contingency planning. Its training is by maneuver. More rarely, by comparison, is it in action, conducting propaganda, and assessing the impact of its "messages" against a live target. The concern of the Army with stability operations alters the terms of this difference. For the foreseeable future, it looks very much as though the Army is going constantly to be concerned with PSYOP on terms much more akin to the daily routine of USIA. The need and requirement for team work is evident; in fact, for successful operations to eventuate, a pre-requisite.

(c) Current Army organization for PSYOP has shown considerable reliability and flexibility and should be maintained substantially as it is. When it is able to benefit from an Army environment reflecting CAP principles, it will become a far more effective organ. A number of changes in PSYOP itself are needed:

- a. There has been an unduly rapid turnover in PSYOP personnel with many inexperienced and partially trained officers and men in PSYOP assignments as a result.
- b. As against training in media use, more attention should be given to capabilities for direct communication, including face-to-face. PSYOP specialists should receive some training relative to selection and use of suitable indigenous personnel.
- c. More emphasis should be placed on the content of propaganda. PSYOP energies are currently devoted mainly to production and dissemination. These capabilities should be maintained, but should be supplemented by greatly improved capability for creating propaganda content.
- d. PSYOP personnel should be able to take part in effective liaison with USIA and other civilian agencies in a highly competent manner. In particular, each PSYOP unit should have the capability to accept civilian directives and guidances and

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translate them into terms that will be understandable and usable in the military context. In Vietnam, for instance, JUSPAO guidances apparently have been frequently received in forms that require translation into Army terms. Army PSYOP units should be able to interpret these in terms of the requirements of the situation they face.

- e. Army CAP and PSYOP officers and men should be temporarily assigned to operating positions with USIA posts throughout the world to ensure a larger proportion of experienced personnel and also to assist in the liaison function. The number should be large enough to provide the Army at all times with a pool of personnel who have had this kind of experience.
- f. Each Army PSYOP battalion that is sent out for field operations should have and use a far greater capability for survey research, collection and analysis of social and psychological information, pre-tests of PSYOP material, and assessment of effects.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

(C) Intelligence support for PSYOP, civic action, civil affairs, and for the broader activities of CAP officers should come primarily from established intelligence agencies, as is now the case. CAP officers and PSYOP units should, however, have the capability to establish intelligence requirements, to analyze the relevant intelligence produced, and to convert it into usable forms. In addition, the following measures to improve intelligence support for Army activities relating to political and psychological matters should be considered:

- a. PSYOP and CAP officers should be assigned to intelligence collecting agencies that are a principal source of political and psychological information. Whether a CAP officer or a PSYOP officer should be assigned to any given collecting agency will depend on the kind of information to be collected and the officer grade that is necessary to do the job adequately.

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- b. Intelligence training schools should give greater emphasis to collecting information for use by CAP and related functional units.
- c. In any area where political and psychological factors are of particular importance to the Army a special pool of indigenous personnel should be established to provide information for the use of CAP and related officers, for use in pre-testing propaganda materials, suggesting themes, and providing advice on local reactions to alternative policies. During both World War II and the Korean conflict, centers of this kind were established and proved of great value. In critical areas where there is no active insurgency, consideration should be given to setting up an indigenous advisory group, drawn from the local armed forces and from informed members of the local community. All such groups should be established through U.S. Mission authorities and coordinated with the host government.

In sum, the specialized skills of PSYOP are not broad enough to encompass all the support command requires in assessing the political and psychological dimension of modern conflict. Furthermore, these skills and the nature of PSYOP overlap, in important respects, skills and capabilities also to be found in aspects of civil affairs, civic action and other specialized activities. What appears needed is, not a further fragmentation under command, outside the main stream of primary Army training and responsibilities, but adequate provision for officers who are generalists to obtain particular competence in the area of the political and psychological dimension of stability operations.

(C) There is a strong temptation to state requirements for intensive country, culture and language knowledge in all sorts of connections. It is easy to see how important such knowledge is to civil affairs, civic action, psychological operations, counterinsurgency, special forces, intelligence and the like. It is almost equally true that in a no-front, insurgency type of conflict, such knowledge is needed with combat and service units.

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(C) It remains that country knowledge, such as the FAST program is designed to provide, is feasible only on a rather small scale. The FAST program requires, by the book, up to four years of specialist training. It must vary if not by country at least by larger areas, and the foreign area specialist cannot be the same for Latin America as for North Africa, or for Kenya, or Ethiopia, or Iran. It is simply impossible to provide foreign area specialists who are also specialists in every other branch and service required, although they may also have a branch attachment. We note that although there are cases where one language will do for several countries, there are also cases where one country has several languages.

(C) Considering the problem of the number of countries or larger areas to be covered, and the number of Army branches to be filled on career basis, we believe it essential to treat the foreign area knowledge as one package (FAST), and the social-political specialty as another (CAP).

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V

TRAINING AND CAREER PATTERN

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TRAINING AND CAREER PATTERN

THE CAPABILITIES FOR WHICH TRAINING IS NEEDED

(C) It appears that the Army needs officers with adequate training, education, and experience related to psychological operations or CAP assignments in insurgency-type wars, of at least four types, as follows:

- a. Commanders of psychological operations units from platoon to group in size, in grades from lieutenant to colonel. These officers must have training in the operations required in support of combat and other activities of the Army.
- b. Staff officers, including general officers where appropriate, able to give advice on an expert basis to commanders of Army units, up to theater level, in the field, to fill staff positions up to the level of the Joint Staff, and for liaison and coordination assignments. These staff officers must have an understanding of the CAP area.
- c. Instructors, with a level of knowledge and understanding adequate for conducting relevant courses in the Army school system with a full understanding of the subject area, cognizant of the advancing level of thought and learning in this field, and capable of working with lecturers and consultants representing the best civilian talent.
- d. Commanders of troop units, well indoctrinated in the nature of insurgency, and of nation-building, to appreciate and utilize effectively the advice of excellent advisors. This will extend to advice concerning the impact of military operations on indigenous populations, relations with local leaders, the need for coordination of PSYOP per se with civic action and other programs, and the essential intelligence functions to provide collateral support on all such considerations. They must especially understand the degree of dependence of tactical intelligence in the insurgency-type situation upon the success of all programs directed toward nation-building, or toward influencing the people.

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(C) The present training situation exhibits numerous and serious inadequacies. The initial training for company level duties is reasonably good for the first class of assignments, in command of small psychological operations units. The rest of the training or instruction is not well suited to provide the knowledge required at higher command and staff levels. The graduates of the courses do not regard them as career courses, nor do they see PSYOP as a career to be favored. They are lost in the shuffle of the officer corps of the Army, many without even a prefix to their MOS by which to make them available for assignment in PSYOP. Members of this Committee have met numerous officers in the field grades, and a few at higher grades, who expressed an intense feeling for the importance and intellectual interest of the general function of psychological operations or CAP in insurgent situations, as a field of knowledge and study, but who did not consider PSYOP, under present circumstances, a specialty in which an officer could expect to have any sort of career satisfaction.¹

(C) One of our most basic findings is that the Army, though probably expending enough effort and money, as measured by courses and student time, is not providing itself with any reasonable approximation to the special capabilities that it needs in this area.

SCOPE REQUIRED: IN SUBJECT AREA, IN COORDINATION OF RELATED FUNCTIONS,
AND IN EDUCATION

(C) In terms of subject area, we find much emphasis in the recent studies of Army courses and training in psychological operations, on the need for a strong basis in social and behavioral science, including psychology, sociology, and political science. We endorse this as a

¹Army Research Office, Durham. Report on the Psychological Operations Department of the Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, prepared by a Study Team from Duke University under the auspices of ARO, Durham. (The "Holley Report"), 1 July 1966, p. 5.

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general idea. There is also some emphasis on the need to link PSYOP training to foreign area training, and to civil affairs training. These ideas we also endorse.²

(U) However, we feel that the subject area requires sharpening. One may observe that it would be easy to find a Ph.D. of distinguished attainments in psychology, who would have little or no suitability in knowledge or understanding for a role in relation to a backward, emerging, and insurgency-torn society. The same could be true for a sociologist or a political scientist, or an anthropologist, or an economist.

(C) The important focus is the general structural characteristics of the "underdeveloped" societies. This relates to observations concerning the pre-socialized condition of people who have not entered a civic political culture, and lack understanding of a rationalized bureaucracy, for instance, as made in the recent works of Almond and Coleman, or Pye and Verba, and many other recent works.³

(C) Also, the subject area has a very large core of common substance that is needed for PSYOP, but once again not only for PSYOP, being equally essential for the related functions. For effective performance of any of these functions the social science base, oriented specifically to the emergent society and the insurgency situation, and the foreign area knowledge base, have to be brought into combination or close relation.

² Ibid.; Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. An Evaluation of the Psychological Operations Officer Training Program at the United States Army Special Warfare School (Project 24), 7 December 1965; and Department of the Army. Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools (The "Haines Board Report"), Three Volumes, February 1965.

³ The Princeton University Press has published a number of books in recent years on the problems of political development. Representative titles include: Almond, G.A. and J.S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (1960); Pye, L.W. (ed.), Communications and Political Development (1963); Pye, L.W. and S. Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (1965). These are illustrative of a very rapidly expanding literature issued by this and other publishers.

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(c) Training for PSYOP remains an essential element. What has to be added is a strong educational element that cannot be mistaken for training. This again is a point emphasized in recent studies, and which we endorse.⁴

CAREER PATTERN

(c) To provide officers with the knowledge, understanding, and expert qualifications required to serve well in the assignments outlined at the beginning of this section, and to cover the scope implied above, clearly demands a career status of some sort. The competence required is simply not to be provided by a training episode of some weeks or months on a one-time basis early in an officer's career.

(c) The Army now has no recognized career program in psychological operations. It does have several types of career programs, and some specific cases that are related in one way or another to psychological operations. The existing Army career programs provide a basis for consideration.

(u) The Army has a career program in each of its five arms and fourteen services. Since two of these, Signal and Engineer, are both arms and services, this makes a total of seventeen cases. It also has a class of branch immaterial specialist officer career programs, which include:⁵

- Army Aviation
- Atomic Energy
- Civil Affairs
- Foreign Areas
- Information
- Logistics
- Research and Development

⁴Army Research Office, Report on the Psychological Operations, op. cit.; Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, An Evaluation of the Psychological Operations Officer Training Program, op. cit.; and Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the Army Board, op. cit.

⁵Headquarters, Department of the Army. Career Planning for Army Officers (Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 600-3), June 1964. D/A Memorandum No. 614-5, 11 January 1967, increases the specialist careers by five as follows: Intelligence Sub-Specialist, Procurement, Comptroller, Automatic Data Processing, and Operations Research/Systems Analysis.

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(U) In any of these careers it is possible for an officer to take a career course in addition to a basic course, and then to look forward to renewed assignments to positions related to the career, and to expect promotion related to years of service and performance.

(U) The Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) program has some particular features. It allows for approximately four years of education or training, including a year of foreign language training, a year at a civilian university at post-graduate level in social sciences, and six months to two years of tutelage under a military attache. It is indicated that officers in this career are "trained to the maximum extent in the total culture of a people, including their language, and in the physical aspects of the area studied."

(U) The career most closely related to PSYOP is that in civil affairs. This career is ". . . in recognition of the importance of having available a group of officers with detailed knowledge of the sociological and civic action aspects of defense plans. The program is designed to provide the Army with selected officers who maintain branch qualification and receive specialized training and assignments in the politico-military-economic phases of military operations."⁶

(U) The questions arise, if there should be a recognized career program related to psychological operations, should it be a branch career or a branch immaterial specialist career? And should it be specifically for PSYOP? Should it be a broader one? And with a training base primarily in the career courses, on the model of the Foreign Area Specialist Training program?

(U) The considerations bearing on the identification of a proper field for a career program are easy to recognize, for example, in such cases as infantry, signal, chemical, and medical. They are not so easy to specify in the case we are concerned with. An illustration of the controversial nature of the issue, in an otherwise irrelevant case, may be found in the article on the artillery, in Army,

⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army. Career Planning for Army Officers. op. cit.

for January 1967, arguing that field artillery and air defense should be separated.⁷ The point is to combine things that belong together, and separate things that ought to be differentiated. Also, not to demand in one career a span of knowledge too broad for a first class man to master.

(U) Here we are led to conclude that the Army should provide a single career in the CAP area, designed to develop knowledge and understanding of the sociological-economic-political aspects of developing foreign cultures and systems. This should be given a single career course of instruction and study. It could include in that course a fraction of separated work related to separate MOSs. It could be the career course for several separate basic courses. The basic courses, and the MOSs could be in civil affairs, psychological operations, civic action, and counterinsurgency. The career structure is indicated in the diagram.

BASIC COURSES	Civil Affairs	PSYOP	Civic Action	Counterinsurgency
Mos Produced	"	"	"	"
Students	Company Officers			
Assignments	Units of Same Type			
CAREER COURSES	CAP Officer			
MOS Required	Normally One of the Above			
Assignments	Command of Major Units Possessing Specialized Functions. Staff Positions at All Higher Levels.			

⁷ Hauser, Major William L. "Grounds for Divorce," Army (January 1967), pp. 65-68.

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(C) There should be close intermeshing with the career of the Foreign Area Specialist. We do not, however, consider that the two could be merged. Rather, both will be needed, the sociologist and the country specialist on, for instance, Ecuador or Burma or Ethiopia, in any specific situation. But there should be some common elements in the curricula and some parallelism in assignments and status and place in staff organizations.

(U) We propose that the nomenclature, psychological operations, be retained at the basic course level, and for an MOS. We propose that at the career course level the term CAP be introduced as more representative of the nature of the domain.

(U) It remains to offer an answer to the first question: should a career be in the status of a branch, or in that of a branch immaterial specialist program?

(U) We feel that the quantity and quality of knowledge required of an officer in this field can only with difficulty be taken by him as a field secondary to a branch field regarded as more important and more demanding. On this ground we feel that this should be given branch status. However, we also recognize the difficulty for the Army in adding to its already sizable cluster of branches. And we recognize that for some time to come, an important process of transition must be undergone before both specialists who give advice, and commanders who use such advice, will be well indoctrinated in their respective roles. For the time being, a branch immaterial specialist program might be better than it would be in a later period of more advanced development.

(U) At the same time, a single career program would go far to capture for the Army the real benefit that is lost in the present dissipation of several non-career special fields of training.

(U) It would also provide a larger single pool of talent. It would greatly facilitate the development of knowledge and appreciation on the part of commanders for a single strong area specialty as against

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three or four smaller specialties of overlapping and indeterminate character.

(U) We urge that the Army establish promptly a CAP career program on a branch immaterial basis. We feel this would accomplish substantial immediate gains. The question of establishing CAP in the status of service branch should come up for consideration within five years, and a decision at that time should rest on the experience gained with CAP as a branch immaterial career.

COURSES AND CURRICULA

(U) The Army now has one established MOS-producing course in psychological operations for officers. This course has an input of 90 officer students each time it is given. Its term is 9 weeks and 5 days. It is given four times a year. The single course is given to junior officers, to fit them for small unit command in PSYOP units, and to field grade officers as a basis for staff assignments. It is attended by a number of foreign officers. It is given at Fort Bragg in the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare. Related courses, with data based upon the current program, include:

Course	Enrolment	Term
Counterinsurgency Operations	123	7 weeks 5 days
Civil Affairs	17	8 weeks
Civic Action	39	5 weeks 4½ days
Special Forces	184	11 weeks 5 days
Civil Affairs Advisor, VN	150	18 weeks

(U) Altogether, the Army also has career courses in all branches, and associate officer courses in many of them. As of the third quarter of FY 1967, there were 22 such courses active, including "associate" courses and one USAR career course. Just ten were regular

branch career courses. These varied in term length from 21 to 35 weeks with an average of 27 weeks.⁸

(U) The single PSYOP course has a program which includes 514 hours of instruction as follows:⁹

Orientation on the World Arena	4
Essential Propaganda Background	18
Intelligence Research and Analysis	42
Propaganda Development	12
Propaganda Media	34
Operations	30
Counterinsurgency Operations	24
Organization & Employment of Special Forces	13
Psychological Operations Planning	10
Communism and Communist Propaganda	16
Training Exercises	272
Graded Exercise	39
	<hr/>
<u>Total</u>	<u>514</u>

(U) Other groups have examined the curriculum in PSYOP and have offered comments upon it. Among these:

(U) The Duke University group spoke of the "disjointed incrementalism" which seemed to be evident.¹⁰ It noted the fact that the course was given to quite disparate types of students, and that it was not completely satisfactory for either the company or the field grade officer student. They found no evidence of specific criteria for assigning officers to the school. They found that the students leave with interest in the subject but without motivation to attempt a career in it. They cited an example of impractical perfectionism in the required qualifications of an instructor. And they urged increased emphasis on sociological theory.

⁸Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC). Schedule of Courses, US Army Schools, Third Quarter Fiscal 1967.

⁹United States Army Special Warfare School. Program of Instruction for Course 3A-9305, Psychological Operations Officer MOS 9305, 11 May 1966

¹⁰Army Research Office; Report on the Psychological Operations, op. cit.

(U)The "Evaluation" of the training program arrived at similar comments.¹¹ The single course for two purposes is not very good for either purpose. Higher staff officers need substantial knowledge in general psychology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology to an extent that requires formal education at the graduate level. A selected graduate program is needed to provide the cross-discipline academic requirements. There is no progressive career program. And officers qualified in all the relevant fields of social and behavioral science are not available at Fort Bragg. Three levels of instruction are needed: basic, staff officer, and graduate civil schooling, the "Evaluation" says. And a career program is necessary.

(U) The Haines Board commented on the schools and courses in general, and not only upon the psychological operations course.¹² It found occasion to say that officers attending career courses are generally highly motivated, and that they expected to be "challenged, not spoon-fed."¹³ It found career courses too varied in length and too cluttered with common subjects.¹⁴ It urged that assignments to schools concentrate more on career officers as against short term men. It suggested closer linkage of foreign area studies with studies at Fort Bragg, and a revision of the name of the school there.¹⁵ It found the time given to psychological operations at other schools

¹¹Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, An Evaluation of the Psychological Operations Officer Training Program, op. cit.

¹²Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the Army Board, op. cit.

¹³Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 50.

inadequate, and the same for civil affairs.¹⁶ It quoted some cogent remarks by General Adams on the tendency to retain obsolete elements and to resist newer subject matter.¹⁷ It urged strong emphasis on language training relative to all counterinsurgency operations. It also noted the thinness of attention to stability operations in all schools, with the single exception of The Infantry School, and gave similar data on the attenuated place of civil affairs and PSYOP.¹⁸

(U) It stated finally: "The Board is led to the conclusion that a consolidated program including the aforementioned specialties, broadened to establish a climate of intellectual challenge and career opportunity would be desirable." It stated that this should be a modified and enlarged Foreign Area Specialist Program. We agree that the FAST career meshes with the CAP concept, but we do not think an enlarged FAST is the most effective solution. We consider foreign area knowledge, and the social-political specialty we have called CAP, should be treated as two packages; not combined into one.

(U) Turning to instruction, we feel that the three studies we have cited earlier are in general agreement on the deficiencies of the present courses; and that their divergence as to what should be done is partly a result of their differences in point of view due to difference of mission or task.

(U) We propose that the Army provide itself as soon as possible with a well designed set of basic officer courses in psychological operations, civil affairs, civic action, and counterinsurgency operations. These basic courses should be for company grade officers. They should be well coordinated to the extent of having perhaps three weeks of identical general indoctrination material. They should each lead to a specific MOS.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 447.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 449.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 636.

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(C) There should then be a single CAP officer career course in social-political relations. The backbone of this course should be on the general structural characteristics of underdeveloped societies and stabilization or insurgency situations, with solid elements of attention to the cultural, psychological, sociological, economic and political aspects of a society engaged in "nation-building." The course should have as a prerequisite an MOS derived from one of the previous basic courses. It would be for the appropriate levels of rank of a career officer course. Its term, in consideration of the breadth and difficulty of the content, should parallel the customary career course pattern. In terms of the subject matter to be covered we do not believe this can be done in less than 40 weeks. A carefully developed politico-military war game should be included in the POI. The course need not be required for foreign area specialists, but should have close relations with, and some common elements of instruction with, the Foreign Area Specialist career program.

(U) Opportunity for a year of graduate work at a civilian university, ordinarily in the period after the career course, and before C&GSC, should be allowed in many cases. But such a program should be arranged with some care.

(U) There should be a standard one week component on insurgency and social-political relations in all Army basic branch courses.

(U) There should be a three weeks component in the course at Leavenworth on the CAP area with emphasis on nation-building and related Army operational concerns. This should be most carefully developed, and not be a rehash only.

(U) According to the Haines Board Report, there is now a total of 74 hours for counterinsurgency, 33 hours for civil affairs, and 19 hours for PSYOP in the course at C&GSC.¹⁹ The Army War College gives 249 hours to the same set of subjects. We urge that the hours for

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 638.

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the three subjects at Leavenworth be extended to 150 hours or more for the group, that they be given a subject core of social-political system theory, and an emphasis on the combined roles of the several specific Army functions in the stability or nation-building operation. At the AWC, the time allotted appears to be adequate. Here also, however, the area should be amalgamated rather than presented as separate blocks.

CONSIDERATION OF LEAD TIME, AND A QUICK-FIX PROPOSAL

(U) The enthusiasm of many officers in all grades for the importance and intellectual interest of the social-political problems of insurgent situations, and for psychological operations and related functions, has been mentioned earlier. We believe that there are at least some hundreds of officers in the grades from captain to general officers who share this interest and concern to some considerable extent. We believe also that, between the formal courses and the element of self-education through reading and discussion, there is some solid competence.

(U) Thus far we have discussed the problem without reference to results in the immediate time frame, and by the same token, without reference to any benefit for the Army in the Vietnam situation. It is obvious that the proposals made above will yield for the Army a strong capability in the CAP and PSYOP area only in about a decade or more.

(U) To attain as much as possible of the same benefit in a much shorter time, we suggest that the Army open a formal branch immaterial career program immediately. We suggest that it invite application, with the understanding that a selection board will identify a number of officer applicants who will forthwith be assigned a CAP MOS and career status. It is realized that the number of applicants may be insufficient to provide a full pool at the start. Selectivity should be maintained, however, even if the pool is thereby started at a low level.

(U) We suggest also that the Army develop and operate temporarily a short version of the CAP career course in social-political relations. Officers assigned should be drawn from any officers admitted to the MOS and career as above, plus any company grade officers who have passed an appropriate basic course, or the PSYOP course (9305). The course should be for approximately a 12-week period, and should be given either once a year with a larger class, or twice a year with a small class, as may be found most suitable. All officers selected for the career, from the rank of lieutenant colonel down, should be required to take the short course.

(U) The present course should be closed to all but company officers and converted to a solid basic course in PSYOP.

(U) The Army could, we believe, establish for itself a career group in the ranks from captain to colonel or higher, within the next six months, in numbers sufficient to meet the primary requirements for assignment of qualified and interested officers to all essential posts in Vietnam, plus enough for essential staff and instructor duties in the United States.

(U) Officers in the ranks of colonel or general, who apply for and are selected for the MOS and career in social-political relations, should not be required to take the short course just described. However, we suggest that a special four-weeks course might be established, to be taken by them at such times as may be determined when a sizable group would be available. Such a course should concentrate on intensive reading and discussion of the more important books on the social-political-economic problems of the underdeveloped-type nations, with intensive participation by leading scholars and experts.

(U) The quick-fix measures proposed are temporary in nature. After approximately the first year, inputs to the career and MOS should be by normal channels only. The proposed interim short course should be terminated when the full CAP career course can be established.

RESEARCH NEEDS

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RESEARCH NEEDS

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RESEARCH NEEDS

(U) The Army functions which we have described in the previous sections require a continuing research program. Such a program is essential to improve the advisory function of the CAP officer and to increase the efficiency of the procedures of CAP and the group of related functions--psychological operations, civil affairs, civic action, special operations, community relations and the like. More fundamental research is required to advance the understanding of the phenomena involved.

(C) At present there is wholly inadequate research to provide the basis for the kinds of judgements that CAP officers will be responsible for making. For example, in combat areas the problem frequently arises of making a choice between a use of weapons which will be militarily effective but politically and psychologically damaging, and one which has more favorable effects on attitudes but has less military value. In the present state of knowledge these decisions must be made largely on the basis of intuitive judgments about political and psychological consequences which at best are unsystematic and in many cases may be wrong. Research could provide solid and objective evidence on both the direction and magnitude of the political effects of weapons use. Such research has not been done on any adequate scale, partly because it does not now fall in the central mission of either the military or the civilian agencies. If our recommendation greatly to strengthen the Army's capability to evaluate the trade-offs between military and psychological-political objectives through the establishment of the CAP officer is accepted, there must go along with it a greatly strengthened social science research program by the Army to back him up. This research program is important not only to help the CAP officer, but as a basis for the evolution of a more flexible and applicable doctrine for Army stability operations.

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(C) The federal government has provided substantial support for the behavioral and social sciences. Much of this basic research so supported has relevance to the problems of the Army in its stability operations. However, the relevance is often not obvious, and further work to develop procedures based on new understanding is required. Thus the Army needs to have its own capability for applied research and developmental work. It also needs to have a staff able to monitor the literature in the social sciences.

(C) Beyond this, the Army must have the capability to generate studies of direct relevance to its immediate and long-term needs. The research community could not be expected at this time to originate many of the studies outlined in this report; conduct of such research must often occur within the military establishment, or in sensitive areas. We believe that the most appropriate action would be the establishment of at least one new Center fully supported by the Army, with the specific assignment to work within the areas described in this Report.

RESEARCH PROBLEMS

(C) There is an area of definite problems on which research should be done, which should not, however, be reduced to single project status. It may be appropriate to do some of these through standing commitments to a single research center, or through a series of selected projects on specific targets. On any of these, preliminary or exploratory studies, including the availability of data, the adequacy of existing methodology, the state of the art and its rate of advance, and the existing research capabilities, might be undertaken in advance at a principal center of Army research in this field. A brief indication of the nature of some of the most needed items in this category follows.

- a. A case studies program. In the CAP area, broad generalizations are very difficult, since conditions and circumstances will vary. We believe the CAP officer will gain from a study of

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past instances where military and political trade-offs have been important. It is suggested that a program for the development of good case studies, and for the collection of case files, should be established at the principal center. It should aim at the production of a casebook or casebooks as appropriate for instruction purposes, but should maintain a continuous small-scale program and not stop when a book full of cases has been completed. Cases should include operational incidents of significance to any aspect of CAP, and larger cases related to the initiation of a progressive regime in an under-developed country, and to the later critical events determining the further stability or failure of such regimes. There should also be specific attention to instances illustrating every variation on how the Army can help or hinder the nation-building process.

- b. Efforts should be maintained towards the development of useful analytic models of an insurgency or pre-insurgency situation. Some efforts have been made in this respect. The Army has an obligation to stimulate such work, to provide continuing support, and to keep well informed about all efforts of this kind. The Army should make it an objective to select, develop, and apply whatever seem to be the most promising techniques.
- c. The political-military gaming of an insurgency-intervention situation should be developed and incorporated in research and instructional programs. Several such political-strategic war games have been developed. Such games might take either of two forms: a major research game to be used as a tool of serious investigation, and a related training game which might be an important element in the curriculum in the career course. The training game would also provide valuable research results. The Army must become increasingly knowledgeable on the application of this class of techniques to insurgency problems.
- d. Attitude analysis. There is a very important area of attitude analysis illustrated by studies of prisoners of war in Korea and by studies of the attitudes of VC defectors in Vietnam. Such studies cannot be done when there are no subjects to interview or interrogate. It is very important that the occasional opportunities afforded by real situations be effectively exploited. This requires an on-going capability and comparative analysis of techniques and objectives, if opportunities are not to be partially lost.

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- e. Role of the military in nation-building. There is need for far more research on the potentially constructive roles that both the U.S. Army and host-country armies can play in facilitating nation-building, and in reducing the dangers of destructive violence in developing countries. Such research will be necessary to inform the development of Army doctrine for its foreign advisory roles ranging from Mobile Training Teams to MAAG missions. Research in the field should also be of value in strengthening and illuminating the inter-relationships among PSYOP, civil affairs, civic action, and so forth, in contributing to effective nation-building. Such research should not, however, be limited solely to the contemporary scene nor to U.S. experience but should also include historical analyses of examples whereby earlier armies, our own and others, have contributed to, or impeded, national development.

- f. Field studies. Whenever there is an actual laboratory case available, as now in Vietnam, there should be a most vigorous effort to capitalize on the opportunity to study the relation of military operations to nation-building. For example, studies should now be under way to analyze such matters as the psychological impact of various weapons systems, the impact of the presence of American troops, the role of the Sector Advisor, the problems related to the Army performing political functions, and so forth. There should also be intensive study of the effectiveness of the organization and instruments provided for the various activities we have identified as related to the CAP area.* In the new conflict environment the Army needs to be able to consider alternative military plans in terms of the degrees to which these retard or advance the political and economic objectives in nation-building. In determining such trade-offs, operations research and the tools of operations analysts are capable of providing CAP officers with significant and necessary support.

- g. Basic studies are needed on the nature of the transition from a static social-political system to an accelerated development, and its psychological-social-political basis, and with particular attention to the extent to which the attitudes of, and role of, the people as an element in the

*The Committee means by this, for example, the kind of study General William C. Westmoreland has requested ARPA to undertake in Vietnam.

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state have to be changed and the means by which this can be accomplished with, of course, final outputs relevant to stability and to the military role.

- h. Military sociology. The Army should gain an intimate understanding of the social and psychological characteristics of all military establishments with which it is likely to have contact—either as an ally or as an opponent. What are the motivating forces in officers and men? What are the relationships between the armed forces and the government? What are the attitudes of the civilian population toward the armed forces, and of members of the armed forces toward the civilian population? Are there differences in outlook between younger and older officers on either military or political matters? Are there differences in outlook between younger and older officers and the rank and file? An understanding of these questions is particularly necessary if the United States is to work with other military establishments on a friendly basis, but it is equally desirable in the event of hostile relationships.
- i. Peacetime military roles. Continuing research is desirable to explore the ways in which armed forces can engage in constructive, peaceful activities. This involves exploration of military-civilian relations under a variety of political conditions. What kinds of military roles are likely to arouse civilian opposition at home and nationalistic reactions abroad? In countries where the armed forces have been used as instruments of oppression, how can changes be brought about so that they will be used as instruments of nation-building?
- j. Cooperation with allies. How can cooperation between the U.S. Armed Forces and allied military and civilian authorities be made more fruitful? New avenues should be explored. One place to start is with research itself. Some joint research programs with friendly armed forces have already been conducted (e.g., Operation Amigos); systematic consideration should be given to establishing many more. For instance, it is probable that a great deal could be learned by both sides if there were a cooperative research program on cross-cultural face-to-face persuasion conducted jointly with the armed forces of the Philippines or India.
- k. Problems of ethnic minorities. The military and political situation in many parts of the world is affected by the presence of large ethnic minorities. Attention should be given to ways in which the armed forces of the countries in question

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can help to integrate these minorities into the body politic and reduce friction between the minorities and the majority.

(C) A strong element in the whole program should be concerned with the wide area of basic psychological research on such matters as persuasibility, attitude change, community characteristics, group dynamics, cross-cultural differences, cultural and social processes, social change, social influence, communications processes, and the like.

(C) Without undertaking the ordinary type of cultural study required in bulk by FAST, the CAP research program should in the course of events have a very strong influence on the criteria of selection and logical treatment in such studies.

(C) There are some definite packages of research needed which are more nearly of single project character and less of continuing program character; among them, only to illustrate, are the following:

- a. An analysis of the limits or restraints that apply to propaganda output from a democratic system including ethical restraints on data collection, use of foreign nationals for U.S. purposes, misapplied secrecy, the difficulty of expressing a national position in the absence of a "party line," etc.
- b. A study of the discounts to be applied to weapons valuations, for all weapons subject to inaccuracy in delivery (large CEPs) or to errors in procedure or aiming, when used in a battle area containing non-combat population and facilities.

(U) Many more would emerge from the eleven broader areas dealt with earlier.

RESEARCH SUPPORT PROBLEMS

(U) The research base that is needed to back up the CAP function must be of a scale that would be a large multiple of the research that has been done in the past for PSYOP. Over the last 10 years, there has not been a serious assessment of the combined needs, no serious organization of scientific and scholarly resources, and no very serious funding.

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The conduct of research in this area is not reflective of a sustained and vigorous impulse to accomplish important results. Fundamentally, there is not now in the U.S. Government, nor in the Department of the Army, a satisfactory organizational locus for a highly motivated user demand on research resources in relation to the nation-building function.

(U) For sources of research there are now very large scale potentials in the universities and elsewhere, and there have been widespread and important advances in scientific and scholarly work within the past decade. However, the resources are not presently organized in a way to serve the purpose.

(U) Illustrative of the pool of talent on which to draw is the report on Privacy and Behavioral Research prepared for the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President.¹ This report states:

. . . Today there are over 35,000 behavioral scientists in the United States--anthropologists, economists, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists. In 1965, 2,100 new Ph.D.'s joined their ranks. In the same year more than 40,000 graduate students were preparing themselves for teaching, research, and service in the behavioral sciences. More than 100 journals publish articles reporting on the work of these scientists. About 5 percent of Federal funds for the support of research is used to support this segment of science.²

(U) The findings of this report should be considered in connection with the study proposed above on an analysis of restraints applying to propaganda output by a democratic system and the ethical restraints on data collection in the field of the behavioral sciences.

(C) One of the matters the report above makes clear is that the sort of research program which this Committee believes the Army should undertake in the CAP area will not be easy to establish. By the same token, not to establish it is to remain weak in one of our major areas of ignorance.

¹Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Privacy and Behavioral Research, February 1967. (For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)

²Ibid., p. 13.

(C) In establishing a new Center, the Army will need to work in closest cooperation with experienced members of the pool described above, who possess understanding and knowledge of the problems the Army faces in developing a strong research program in the CAP area. A "blueprint" for such a program is urgently needed. The task is beyond the terms of reference of this Committee, and beyond the time at its disposal. It is within the terms of reference to note that, on the basis of our findings, the establishment of such a research program should receive priority treatment.

(C) A strong research program for the CAP area would have criteria to satisfy on several different dimensions. It should serve users as discussed elsewhere in this Report--that is, operators, staff advice functions, and training requirements. It should support the development of theory, the organization of substantive knowledge, and the development of operational practice. It should examine the interactions between military considerations (tactical, logistic, and strategic) and psychological, social, and political factors. It should carry through to practical results of significance not only for CAP as a whole, but also for the specific segments of the related activities--e.g., PSYOP, civic action, counterinsurgency--and for the contiguous related concerns of the PMG, Intelligence, and FAST.

(U) There are some basic considerations about a strong research program in this field that need to be brought into view.

(U) First, where there is found a strong and well organized military research program, with a record of positive accomplishment, one finds also:

A recognized claimant agency with a motivation to accomplish something.

A research management office allotting funds in the light of strong representation by claimants for, and by suppliers of, research work.

A group of research organizations strongly staffed and highly motivated, public or private or both, oriented to the need.

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A community of science, including elements in the universities, major research organizations, and in government service, aware of the national needs related to their scientific pursuits.

(U) In the area of PSYOP, or of the broader function of CAP, as we have named it, we find none of the above conditions.

THE NEED FOR A RESEARCH CENTER

(C) A first important consideration is organizational. We have recommended that the Army establish a set of offices, each having the CAP field within its responsibility, in ODCSOPS as a primary planner and claimant, in OCRD/ARO, for the management of the research program, in CDC as a user, in CONARC as a related user in relation to training, and in Fort Bragg as a training, teaching, and thinking organization. We feel that there is also needed at least one strong institute or center, as we have stated at the beginning of this chapter. This should have a general purview of the military role in nation-building, and should be a strong source for the Army for the badly needed analytic studies as to what research is feasible, what is most important, the prerequisite basic research to support required applied research, and related matters. This Center should, in particular, have a strong library facility of its own. This also is badly needed. Even in Washington, there is at present no adequate place for serious library based research in this area, in which the literature is voluminous but not well concentrated. We also feel there is an important need and opportunity in this area to provide a much more intimate relationship between research, on the one hand, and training and teaching on the other, and especially in connection with the Army schools at Fort Bragg.*

*The selection of a university for the establishment of a Research Center should not be overlooked. Proximity to Fort Bragg is a major consideration. The "Research Triangle" in North Carolina appeals as a possible site. The Center would not do all the research. Much could and should be contracted to especially competent organizations. But the Center, to respond quickly to immediate research needs of the Army and to provide coherent and skilled management of the research program, is essential.

(U) There should be the strongest practical relationship between a research program, the development of doctrine, the individual studies of officers taking the courses, and political gaming exercises. There should be a very strong interactive feel between the world of research and thinking outside the Army, and the faculty and program of the school, not only through lectures but through professorial appointments, and possibly by an arrangement where a university would undertake to present a whole section of the career course. For example, a year of graduate work for selected CAP officers, in some such number as 40 each year, as part of the career training program, could provide a strong link between the Army and the best university centers of related work.

(U) Finally we believe any such Research Center should have an advisory board to which distinguished military officers and scientists would be appointed for the purpose of consulting with the Center from time to time and advising it. Such an advisory board should also take an active part in the affairs of the Center ensuring that the Center is responsive to the needs of the Army regarding research into the problems of stability operations. It should be alert to any opportunity that may present itself to broaden and expand the scope of the Center to serve not only the Army but the Armed Forces, and the political and economic branches of government. The Research Center we have proposed for the Army might well become much more than a Center for military research, and serve the needs of the government for a coordinated program of research and instruction in the whole area involving the political and psychological dimension of the new warfare. Accordingly, as soon as feasible, consideration should be given to appointing military members of the board from all the services and not just from the Army.

FUNDING

(U) We feel that the Army must provide substantial and continuing support for at least one center for studies in this area. An augmented program of research should be entered into promptly. We would anticipate that the Army could build itself a strong base if it commenced by allotting

\$500,000 additional funding for a Center itself for the first year with considerably more thereafter.

(U) Some increments should also be added for CRFSS and HumRRO which are doing essential work that should not be interrupted by any consideration of expanding their present scope in order to fulfill the requirements for the kind of Research Center this Report advocates. Such a Center has a role to create and fulfill in terms of assisting both the Army and the research community to develop the knowledge the CAP officer needs on which doctrine will rest.

VII
A NATIONAL PROBLEM

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VII

A NATIONAL PROBLEM

(C) We have found it necessary to consider the problems of the Army in the general context of the problems of the whole government. It is not our task to write a Report for the government, and we have not done so. However, at many points we have had to write our Report for the Army with broader considerations in mind, as if our aim were to project an Army role and capability that would fit and make sense as part of a role for the whole set of U.S. agencies engaged.

(C) Two aspects appear pertinent in any discussion of the Army's role, although action lies outside the Army's domain. For this reason they are discussed at the end of our Report, and no recommendations for action may properly be made. One of these aspects is concerned with a basic change in the historical character of an insurgent situation. The other is concerned with the problem of inter-departmental relations. One relates to the changing political premises in intervention; the other to administrative difficulties within our own government.

THE EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY

(U) The importance of the type of situation involving insurgency in a colonial, former colonial or other underdeveloped country or nation, and the open contest presented by subversive communism in such countries, has been recognized since the period after Korea when the old French War in Vietnam was still on, when the Algerian insurgency was in full swing, when Malaya was threatened and when Kenya was torn by the Mau Mau. Since 1961, when President Kennedy gave it reinforced emphasis, it has had a firm place in official U.S. doctrine, policy, and programs.

(U) A systematic review of the conditions exhibited in the Vietnam case since 1964 shows that there are some fundamentally new factors

in the situation. This, we feel, can be made evident by a summary recapitulation, which follows. It is in four groupings:

- a. The general characteristics of insurgency situations.
- b. The characteristics attached to intervention in an insurgency situation in the traditional or historical pattern.
- c. The conditions, many of them quite different, which attach to intervention in an insurgency situation of the Vietnam type.
- d. The new resources or potentials which deserve notice.

(U) The first two groupings stand as familiar and accepted, so far as pertinent. Parts of the latter two groupings still lack recognition, or if recognized still lack implementation.

(U) GENERAL CONDITIONS

The country confronted with insurgency has an unstable and generally immature political system.

The established regime, up to the time of insurgency, was based on vested interests, and in more-or-less degree hidebound, non-progressive in economic, social, and political terms; it is an "old regime."

If a new political form is present (new constitution), it is still based on the old social-political "establishment."

Economic and political progress are very slow.

Large elements of the population feel no association with the regime.

Insurgency is generated with some elements of popular support.

The outcome will either maintain or disturb the balance of world power politics.

An external power or bloc aids the insurgency with doctrine, cadres, material aid, and perhaps military aid.

An opposed external power intervenes to oppose the insurgency and assist the established and legitimate regime.

The military aspect of the war of intervention is limited, not an all-out power test between intervening powers; only the forces committed are involved in victory or defeat.

The military war is a political squeeze, open to negotiated settlement at any time, so far as the interveners are concerned. Only for the internal sides within the country is defeat complete for one or the other.

A satisfactory outcome in the host country, for either intervener, must have some quality of stability or calculability about it; if not, the cessation of hostilities is only an unstable truce.

So far the characteristics are those of a wide range of historical cases. The characteristics mentioned stand unchanged.

(U) ADDITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OLD PATTERN NO LONGER APPLICABLE

International power politics was ideologically indifferent. (Note the intervention of Catholic France on the Protestant side in Germany (1640-), and of Monarchist France to assist the American Republic (1780-).)

Either, the existing regime is acceptable to the intervener that supports it,

Or, colonialism is a satisfactory solution to be maintained or established.

The winning of allegiance or consent of the population can be consent to colonial rule by the intervener.

In such a case the personnel of the intervening power, military and other, are intimately acquainted with the system to which consent is sought.

The people, in their existing cultural and political condition, are acceptable, including internal divergencies of culture and allegiance (tribal, etc.).

Given that colonial status is an acceptable outcome, the military task can have its conventional right-of-way,

largely indifferent to political considerations. Stability can be guaranteed after military success.

Political development can be regarded as a very long term problem.

(U) THE NEW CONDITIONS

The impacts of modernism ("population explosion," economic development, for example) make accelerated political development a necessity.

Accelerated development demands either the communist, or the less well defined free-world progressive model for such development.

Communism is the natural sponsor or intervener on the side of insurgency.

This threat is not clearly removed by the split between Soviet and Chinese communism; it appears that they can either cooperate or compete in subversion.

Insurgency completely free of communist elements appears less and less likely since the whole world has been well seeded.

The alternative to U.S. intervention is communist success.

The issues, and the roles of intervening powers, are not indifferent to ideology or doctrine.

A lethargic old regime or "establishment" of the common type is unacceptable for either side.

A long term for transition to a stable and progressive and political system is not acceptable.

Colonial status is excluded as a solution, by conditions in the host country, in the United States, and in the world at large.

Internal warfare starts as populists, radicals, and communists versus the old regime.

The problem for the power which intervenes against the insurgency is to induce conversion from a conflict of old regime against populists, to progressive regime against extremists.

Consent or allegiance has to be won for a native regime.

The people, in their existing cultural, social condition have to be carried into at least a primary stage of civic attitudes, including a single allegiance as against previous divided loyalties.

The personnel put in by the counterinsurgency intervener are not experts in the rationale and structure of the new regime.

The political transition has to be conducted during the war. It is prerequisite to a stable settlement and must have primacy of attention.

The political process toward the political goals is not postponed until after military pacification.

All military operations, including weapons effects, are subject to more complex evaluation than in conventional warfare. They are subject to negative effects which may be significant in raising the cost, or degrading the success, of the political enterprise.

The role of Army forces, both native and those of the intervening power, must be subject to political considerations in every aspect.

The difficulties imposed by the new characteristics are all too evident. They would be substantially insolvable if it were not for some additional favorable factors.

(U) NEW RESOURCES

Prototypes of a progressive political regime, in advance of necessarily slower political development, have occurred. Magsaysay of the Philippines was an outstanding instance. It requires not only exceptional and dedicated talent, it has also to gain the basic consent of the mass of the people. It appears to be an essential--that is, without it there is no possibility of a calculable outcome representing U.S. stabilization without colonialism. Such a progressive regime should not be confused with a mature political system, but it can be a progressive and stable regime, aimed at accelerating the development of the country.

There is also what appears to be a very promising new analytic breakthrough in American political science. The last decade has seen the emergence of considerable literature on political development and the emergence of a rather sizable community of scholars concerned with it.

A major condition not present until the last decade or two is the capability for economic aid to underdeveloped nations by advanced nations. Insofar as there were sizable capital transfers previously, these were institutionally interwoven with the colonial system. Although economic progress requires a progressive political regime, and does not by itself create such a regime, economic aid is nevertheless an important factor in accelerated development.

The United States has demonstrated in Vietnam a system of "air mobile" warfare which is of great importance in all counterinsurgency calculations. As against the extreme difficulty affecting warfare by regular forces against guerrillas in the previous decades, this promises to go far towards redressing the balance. If so, it makes it much easier for intervention of regular forces against insurgents to succeed.

(U) The new conditions and new resources affecting the insurgent intervention equation amount to a really basic mutation. The fundamental novelty is the combination of intervention without intent to subjugate, and the short time allowance for the establishing of a stable, progressive system. There is no way at all to accomplish this except to press all measures conducive to the formation of a highly progressive and dedicated regime. This has to be accomplished in the same time period in which the military task has to be accomplished, and therefore, as is recognized, the military task cannot be granted primacy against all other considerations until it is completed. The conditions which make it difficult, however, are matched by the new conditions which make it feasible.

(U) Given the emphatic recognition that insurgency is important, and the lag in adapting to its important new features, there is something to be explained. The explanation is that there are factors of bias and inhibitions built into the system, that accept the increased probability of insurgency situations, but do not so readily accept or

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understand the novel characteristics. Several factors in the system of bias and inhibition can be noted.

(U) There is a special inhibition related to political development. According to diplomatic tradition and international law, any effort by representatives of one country to influence political development in another is improper. This was entirely practical in the age when colonial status was an accepted commonplace. If in any situation major political influence had to be exerted from outside, this was done as colonialism and not as diplomacy. The elimination of colonialism either makes political aid and influence impossible, or demands a new manner of accomplishing it. The American role in political development in another country was conducted under colonial status in the Philippines and in Puerto Rico. Even the most recent British cases, in Malaya and Kenya, were conducted as the last phase of colonialism before independence. Vietnam is the first case in which political development has been a necessary concept in the absence of colonialism.*

(C) The U.S. Army has not been engaged in a colonial situation since the Philippine pacification 60 years ago. In the meantime, it has been deeply engaged in two great European wars, plus the war in Korea. In each case the war was of regular type with a front, and with the assumption that military necessity took rightful precedence over almost all other considerations. The Army could in each case assume that its task was to win the war.

* Vietnam is the first case in which:

- a. The intervening power cannot assume colonial authority, as the United States could in the Philippines at the beginning of the century.
- b. The intervening power does not enjoy the legal status of a colonial power as did the British in Malaya.
- c. The immediate threat of communism is present, as it was not in Nicaragua in the 1920's.
- d. The United Nations does not provide the auspices to back the United States as in Korea, nor as the OAS in DOMREP.
- e. Swift attainment of a progressive political system for the host country is imperative.

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(C) The lack of a clear analytic picture of the Vietnam case is due in part also to the way in which that situation has evolved. The premises were not made clear all at once and taken under study all at once. Hence the inevitable tendency to construct policy positions from time to time without reflecting all factors, or to organize positions that grouped those factors admitted to cognition in what seemed a logical arrangement, when the arrangement soon would become dated.

(C) However, a large ingredient of empiricism in the U.S. approach limits the ill effects of the partial obscurity of policy. The obscurity remains costly with a regard to all the results that would benefit from a clear rationale. These costs are evident when the wrong village is shelled or bombed, or the wrong people are shot, and in dissent and opposition expressed in the world at large, in the United States, among U.S. allies, and in some sectors of domestic opinion, especially among college students. All this, however, does not mean that the U.S. enterprise in Vietnam will fail. The U.S. effort bids fair to succeed in an enterprise which will have to be analyzed and explained after the fact and which then can become a clear basis for doctrine. In this respect, it is of course far from unique. However, every element of clarification on the new nature of the insurgent situation would contribute markedly to the results.

(C) The scale of work to be done for the Army to be well adapted to its role in the new type of insurgency war should not be underestimated. In this Report we can only indicate the first simple elements. The Army has in this century adapted to some very big changes, such as the advance of firepower since 1900, the introduction of armor, or air mobility. Each such adaptation takes years of:

- research and studies
- doctrine development
- plans
- training
- organizational changes.

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(C) Finally, and in some ways most important of all, we have said that there has been ample recognition of the increased probability of insurgency type situations, and a partial failure to appreciate the novelty or the mutation in the characteristics of these situations. The high probability and frequency of such occasions will remain true if the United States fails to appreciate the novelty, but not if the United States does appreciate the novelty and develops an effective system to meet it. A complete system for the United States in the premises demands two things:

- a. An effective method for suppressing an insurgency.
- b. An effective method of promoting the development of a progressive and stable regime.

(C) Of these, the first, which however difficult is the easier, must be so conducted as to serve the second.

(C) These are not solely Army problems. They are, first, national problems involving consideration by other major branches of government--political and economic, as well as military. Until there is a concept of insurgency to which assent is yielded throughout government, no single branch or department can be fully effective in undertaking its part in situations of insurgency.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL RELATIONS

(C) Effectiveness requires also satisfactory interdepartmental working relations. Before these can be established for activities within the scope of this Report, some concept of the new nature of warfare and its political and psychological dimension will need to win general acceptance. The greater the degree of common assent accorded by all who are involved in such activities, the greater the opportunity for effective operations. So far neither the Army nor any other agency in government has determined how to achieve high level inter-agency coordination in dealing with the new insurgencies.

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(C) There are, at present, a number of branches or agencies of government possessing significant responsibilities in the field of concern to the Committee--the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Army, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency. There are others, but these have direct and major interests.

(C) They have been directed to work together, harmoniously. There is no agreed position among them on the nature of their roles, their functions, or their concepts of what constitutes a national program in the area with which this Report is concerned. Such impact as their various activities and concerns possess does not result from unity of understanding, common assent, agreement on division of labor springing from common awareness of each other's unique capabilities and resources.

[What is objected to and what] needs some basic re-thinking and revision is the mutual exclusiveness that has grown up over the years between the military and civilian establishments in the matter of psychological operations. Sub-surface frictions have evolved in consequence. The core of the problem is that USIS measures its skills against real communications problems in a real world--with an inconsistent batting average. . . but never short on bustle and activity--Army psyops, on the other hand, appears to be submerged to a junior level to plan, train, and farm out motivational research to a bevy of Ph.D.'s; it evolves "doctrine" and generally works in a vacuum of theory, or spends its time ruminating over critiques of past wars, derided by senior officers and line commanders and regarded at best with perfunctory indulgence by civilian colleagues. It is small wonder that patience gets stretched both ways and psyops has not received the attention it deserves in the U.S. arsenal.

The logical division between the general and less than general war roles assigned the military and the civilian parts of the government must not in the future as they have in the past inhibit full cooperation between the two establishments nor lessen the high level attention it needs. Preventing insurgency or countering it, is too important to be left wholly either to the generals,

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or to civilians. Constant psyops teamwork is needed. We have much to learn from each other. We have to contribute to each other's operational capabilities, and it is in the direct interest to the missions assigned to each of our organizations that our experience, skills, and specialized personnel are made available to one another.¹

(C) The last of many attempts to bring about a common attack on the problems of psychological activities took place in March of 1966 when the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and the Inter-Regional Groups (IRGs) were established by executive direction. The members of these groups are senior officials in the executive branch of the government. The directive establishing these groups draws attention to the fact that there is no national program for conflict situations short of hot war. Means for the coordination of such a program is the task assigned. For 25 years such means have been elusive.

(C) Following U.S. involvement in the affairs of the Dominican Republic, an Interdepartmental Working Group for Psychological Operations in Critical Areas (IWGPOCA) was established. Early in 1967 this Group is expected to present reports covering such matters as a doctrine for psychological operations; intelligence for such operations; inter-agency capabilities and responsibilities for the planning and conduct of psychological operations; training; and a satisfactory method for continuing reviews of psychological operations in critical areas.

(C) These attempts to hammer out harmonious working relations among agencies of government are the last of a long succession of such attempts, all but the last of which, so far, have failed.

(C) The first attempt was the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), in existence at the end of World War II.

¹Communication, in response to an invitation by the Committee, from the Minister-Counselor for Information, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, "prepared by my staff and has my full endorsement." This staff is a joint staff composed of civilians and military officers.

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After the war, SWNCC continued as the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). Next came the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization (IFIO), which was the policy-making arm of the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS).

(C) In June of 1951 an Executive Order created the Psychological Strategy Board. The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Overseas Information Program of the United States," noted:

The Psychological Strategy Board was established to coordinate the psychological policies of the United States. . . Observations of members of the Committee abroad and other evidence moreover suggest that the component agencies of the Board (CIA, Defense, State) are continuing to go their separate ways in matters of psychological policy.²

(C) The findings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations were made public in the summer of 1953. In January of that year the President appointed a committee titled "The President's Committee on International Information Activities," known as the Jackson Committee from its chairman, William H. Jackson. Repeatedly, in its report, the Jackson Committee noted:

There is no "strategic concept for psychological operations" separate and distinct from a strategic concept for gaining national aims without war. . . We find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is not separable from the policy, but is inherent in every diplomatic, economic or military action. There is a "psychological" implication in every act but this does not have life apart from the act.

(C) In accordance with recommendations in the Jackson Committee Report, the President abolished the Psychological Strategy Board in September of 1953 and replaced it with the Operations Coordinating Board. President Kennedy, in turn, abolished OCB, replacing it with the Special Group, CI (Counterinsurgency). President Johnson abolished the Special Group, CI, replacing it with SIG and IRGs.

²Senate Report No. 406, 83rd Congress, First Session, 1953, p. 6.

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(C) The SIG and IRGs are lineal descendants of SWNCC. The names of the members of this long line of committees have changed over the course of the years; the titles of the positions held by these men have consistently reappeared from committee to committee.

(C) It is too soon to conclude whether the last of these committees also will fail. It is not too soon to note that the last of them has been in existence for almost a year and that, at the time of writing, indications of success even now are still sparse.

(C) The Army has suffered from the failure of these committees to establish harmonious interdepartmental working relations. Because of the existence of such committees, and of the assignment to other governmental agencies of policy direction, the Army has failed to develop its own capabilities for dealing with the major social, economic, and political problems associated with warfare of the sort now waged in Vietnam.

(C) The Committee has, not without some reluctance, concluded that the Army must strengthen its own capabilities in these areas, and that it must do this in particular at the highest levels of command. While the major portion of this effort must be in civilian hands, we are convinced that all of it cannot reside outside the military, and that at present too little of the competence outside of the military is available to the field commanders at the times when they need it most.

(C) Having made our recommendations as we have, the Committee expresses the hope that some efforts can be generated at the highest levels of government, and that procedures can be established to provide for the Army the necessary interdepartmental working relations for psychological, social, and economic programs, not only for general countrywide objectives, but also for the many week-by-week decisions that must be made as the field commander develops his program of military and civic operations.

ANNEX A
TASK OUTLINE

ANNEX A

TASK OUTLINE

SCOPE:

(C) a. Objectives of Research: To evaluate the U.S. Army role in the psychological operations effort in the cold war environment with emphasis on Vietnam. The study will include analysis of past and current U.S. Army PSYOP efforts, noting evolvement of PSYOP doctrine in response to changing national objectives. The nature of the U.S. Army response to specific PSYOP requirements in counterinsurgency situations will be highlighted. Particular attention will be paid to pre-insurgency PSYOP planning and preparation which is a requirement as a part of the effort designed to offset the need for massive involvement. The study will emphasize inter-agency considerations and suggest techniques for insuring conclusive results from inter-agency action. U.S. Army psychological operations in RVN will be especially examined in an attempt to identify problem areas in terms of plans and programming and use of resources. The study will recommend, where warranted, immediate solutions applicable to similar U.S. Army effort in other critical areas in SEA.

(C) b. Background: A major PSYOP deficiency in the cold war environment has often been the erratic and inconclusive response by U.S. Army resources to cold war PSYOP requirements. Although due in part to inter-agency doctrinal deficiency and lack of full accord, this matter is also partially the result of some inadequate in-house evaluation of PSYOP needs in the cold war (with its "non-military" emphasis on economic, social, and political reform and population security); these matters need review to include PSYOP objectives, U.S. Army relations with other agencies, and the validity of the national propaganda product.

(C) Current U.S. Army doctrine provides a basic guidance framework for employment of U.S. Army PSYOP resources in cold war and counterinsurgency. It is noted that responsibility for such operations

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abroad is given to USIA as supported by DOD and other agencies. In RVN, all PSYOP is under the direction of JUSPAO, a field function of USIA with participation by MACV, which coordinates such matters with VNG. PSYOP experience in RVN clearly reveals many problems in the planning for, and direction of, a nation-wide PSYOP effort as a part of counterinsurgency operations.

(U) The expansion of the conflict in RVN, with influences on and by other contiguous SEA nations, some of whom are beginning to experience similar insurgency problems, makes it necessary that recent Army experience in RVN be reviewed and that results of such evaluation be applied, as appropriate, in these other critical regions.

(U) c. Method of Approach: Because of a critical time factor in view of pending U.S. commitments in SEA, the study will make maximum use of briefings, existing studies, trip reports and data compiled in the civilian and military agencies of government. No new or original research will be undertaken in this preliminary evaluation. The study will concentrate on matters within the framework of broad doctrine as presently conceived, and seek to make recommendations of immediate value to military commanders. The study will recommend, as a follow-up, a program of research on the basis of which the Army may proceed, with as much assurance as possible, to organize its world-wide psychological operations effort to meet cold war demands likely to be placed upon them for the foreseeable future.

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ANNEX B

PSYOP RESOURCES IN MEN AND EQUIPMENT
(As of February 1967)

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ANNEX B
PSYOP RESOURCES IN MEN AND EQUIPMENT
(As of February 1967)

Part (1): PSYOP Manpower

Unit	Strength					Location
	OFF	WO	EM	CIV	TOTAL	
<u>7th PSYOP Group</u>						
GP HW (USARYIS)	10	3	39	24	76	Okinawa
15th PO Det (STRAT)	16		95	54	165	Okinawa
14th PO BN (TAC)	23		90		113	Okinawa
Japan Det	1		4	13	18	Japan
Korea Det	2		28	30	60	Korea
Taiwan LNO	1		2		3	Taiwan
Vietnam LNO Det	2		4		6	RVN
	<u>55</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>262</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>441</u>	
<u>6th PSYOP BN (RVN)</u>						
BN HQ (MACV)	21		96		117	RVN
244th	15		45		60	RVN
245th	15		45		60	RVN
246th	15		45		60	RVN
247th	15		45		60	RVN
	<u>81</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>276</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>357</u>	
<u>2d PSYOP Group</u>						
GP HQ (SPWAR Ctr)	6		9		15	Ft Bragg, NC
1st BN (STRAT)	38	2	132		172	Ft Bragg, NC
13th BN (STRAT)	36	2	140		178	Ft Bragg, NC
15th BN (TAC)	24	2	142		168	Ft Bragg, NC
12th Co	14		29		43	Ft Bragg, NC
25th Det	3		8		11	Ft Bragg, NC
26th Det	1		3		4	Ft Bragg, NC
91st Co (TAC)	22	122			144	Ft Bragg, NC
	<u>144</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>463</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>735</u>	
<u>9th PSYOP Co (SOUTHCOM)</u>						
	24		44		68	Panama
	<u>24</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>68</u>	
<u>5th PSYOP BN (EUROM)</u>						
	7		57		64	Europe
	<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>64</u>	
TOTALS	311	131	1102	121	1665	

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Part (2): PSYOP Equipment

UNIT	7th PSYOP Gp		6th PSYOP Gp (RVN)	2nd PSYOP Gp (Ft. Bragg)					9th PSYOP Co (SOUTHCOM)	5th PSYOP BN (EUCOM)
	14th Det (OKIN)	Korea Det		1st BN	13th BN	15th BN	12th Co	91st Co		
TYPES OF EQUIPMENT										
<u>Printing:</u>										
Lightweight, mobile printing press (transportable)			8			0 (4*)	0 (1*)	0 (3*)		1
Heavy, semi-trailer mounted, high speed, mobile printing press			2			1		1		1
17x22 duplicator offset press (MGD)									2	
17x22 sheet-fed Harris offset press		2		2	2					
3-color, roll-fed offset press	3	2	0 (1*)	0 (1*)	0 (1*)					
Cameras, stitchers, and auxiliary equipment	x	x								
<u>Radio:</u>										
5 kilowatt, medium wave transmitter/receiver set	1	2		1	1					
10 kilowatt, short wave transmitter/receiver set	2									
50 kilowatt, medium wave transmitter/receiver set	0 (1*)	1	0 (1*)							
<u>Other:</u>										
Audio-Visual Units			16				4		2	
Loudspeaker Units			16			9		12		19
Tape Recorders						8		12		19

*On Order.

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ANNEX C
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