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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH
875 NORTH RANDOLPH STREET
ARLINGTON VA 22203-1995

IN REPLY REFER TO
5720
22-35
November 18, 2022

Subj: FOIA REQUEST DON-NAVY-2022-005299

This is a final release to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request received by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) on March 4, 2022 and given the number DON-NAVY-2022-005299. You requested the following Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) reports:

1. Level of Research (1957)
2. War in the Nuclear Age (1958)
3. Basic Research in the Navy (June 1959)
4. BUWEPS study (1960)
5. Center for Naval Analysis (1963)
6. Comparison of Operating Philosophies of Science Boards (1969)
7. Comparison of Operating Philosophies of Science Boards (1969)
8. Use of DoD Facilities by University Investigations (1971)
9. VSTOL Ad Hoc Committee (1973)
10. Reflex (1973)
11. Laboratory Committee on Utilization of Computers (1973)
12. History of Navy R&D 1946-72 (1974)
13. Committee on Laboratory Utilization (1975)
14. Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy (Sept 1980)
15. S&T Community in Crisis (May 2002)

Some reports were referred to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) FOIA Office for release determination. There is nothing further you need to do at this time. If you need to contact the SECNAV FOIA Office you can reach them at: usn.ncr.dns.mbx.don-foia-pa@us.navy.mil. The following reports were referred:

1. Level of Research (1957)
2. Basic Research in the Navy (June 1959)
3. BUWEPS study (1960)
4. Center for Naval Analysis (1963)
5. Use of DoD Facilities by University Investigations (1971)
6. VSTOL Ad Hoc Committee (1973)
7. Laboratory Committee on Utilization of Computers (1973)
8. Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy (Sept 1980)

Your request is granted in part and denied in part. We have located 393 pages that are responsive to your request. We are releasing 393 pages in their entirety. A search was conducted for the following reports and no records were found:

1. Comparison of Operating Philosophies of Science Boards (1969)
2. History of Navy R&D 1946-72 (1974)

You have the right to an appeal. Your appeal must be received within 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. You may file an appeal in one of two ways-through FOIAOnline or by mail.

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Department of the Navy
Office of the General Counsel
1000 Navy Pentagon, Room 5A532
Washington, DC 20350-1000

Please also provide a copy of your appeal letter to ONR at:

Office of Naval Research

ATTN: FOIA Officer Room 617
875 North Randolph St.
Arlington, VA 22203

I, the undersigned, have been delegated Initial Denial Authority for the purpose of this letter. If you have questions, please contact the ONR FOIA Officer at (703) 588-2968 or Melissa.a.mills43.civ@us.navy.mil or. Please reference DON-NAVY-2022-005299 in any correspondence discussing this case. You may also contact the DON FOIA Public Liaison, Christopher Julka, at christopher.a.julka@navy.mil, or (703)697-0031.

Sincerely,

MELISSA MILLS
FOIA Officer

Y DEPARTMENT—NAVAL RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE SYMPOSIUM

9 - 11 June 1958

WAR in the NUCLEAR AGE

U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Silver Spring, Md.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CNO file

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WAR
in the NUCLEAR AGE

U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Silver Spring, Md.

Rear Admiral JOHN T. HAYWARD, USN
Symposium Chairman

Introduction

The Naval Research Advisory Committee—Navy Department Symposium, "War in the Nuclear Age," was conducted at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak, Maryland 9-11 June 1958. The enthusiasm and spirited participation with the Navy of this large group of distinguished leaders in the fields of Science, Education, Industry, Public Relations and Government proved to be a stimulating and productive experience. The Symposium provided reassuring evidence of the determination of Americans, on the highest level, to come to grips with vital but perplexing problem of achieving adequate security in a nuclear missile age.

The Symposium afforded an opportunity to obtain a full appreciation of the total threat posed to the United States by dynamic policies and aggressive actions of the Soviet Union. The opportunity was afforded to examine the balanced military strength to meet effectively these varied threats. National strategy was examined to determine whether or not disproportionate emphasis had been placed upon the single, but somewhat improbable, threat of an all-out nuclear war. The cross-fertilization of ideas based upon varied experience during symposium discussions provided perspective toward attainment of a realistic appreciation of the policy problems confronting our nation in its monumental task of insuring the future security and well-being of our great republic.

The fact that these leaders were willing to sacrifice their valuable time to attend this symposium is a tribute to the seriousness with which they search for solutions in the light of the challenging threat confronting us. Their participation in this search for a more integrated approach to the solution of national problems impressively demonstrates the sincerity, vitality, and determination with which the American people address themselves to the problem of security.

Much of the talk gravitated around an analysis of the adequacy of measures taken to date in the fields of defense, government, and industry to provide modern effective versatile forces to meet the global security responsibilities of the nation in an exercise of its world leadership; the responsiveness imperative to the preservation of a vital and progressive free world.

No specific formal conclusions were deduced at the Symposium. This was not the purpose for which it was held. However, a tacit acceptance by the majority of participants was evidenced in areas wherein future coordinated action must be exhaustively explored in our continuing quest for adequate and positive security in the nuclear-missile-space age. Also, there seemed to be general acceptance that greater emphasis is required on versatile conventional forces to meet the limited situations which confront our government almost continuously in the current bipolar struggle of the free world with the dynamic policies of communism. There was a feeling that our past strategic doctrine of nuclear retaliatory forces serving as a sword and conventional ground and naval forces as the shield to the free world has not been entirely responsive to the realistic threats, since the sword has been too powerful to use, and the shield not sufficiently strong to meet the varied threats. It was felt that this trend must be reversed with the deterrent strength of a nuclear shield being supplemented by the sword of conventional armaments as the precise power needed to meet the limited threats of Soviet aggression. A more positive cold war apparatus for the coordination of psychological, economic and political warfare appears to be needed within our democracy in order to achieve appropriate timing and effectiveness.

The results of the "War in the Nuclear Age" Symposium are a source of great personal satisfaction for me; this feeling is shared by the Naval Research Advisory Committee and the Department of the Navy. It is a profound source of pride to have had such vital participation at the first Symposium held under the auspices of the Navy.

The results attest to the desirability for conducting similar Symposiums in the future. The desirability and essential need exist for this type of get-together to explore potentials for more effective personal coordination and cooperation within the segments of our society which have an important role and stake in the achievement of national security.

Contents

*Address not available at publication date.

Dr. A. E. Sokol Dr. Edward Teller RAdm. J. T. Hayward
Brig. Gen. R. W. Hayward Adm. J. Wright

Gen. G.B. Erskine, Brig.Gen. V.H. Krulak

Dr. Edward Teller, RAdm. Louis de Florez

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Right:

J. E. Henderson,

Dr. W. B. McLean

Dr. L. V. Berkner
E. H. Heinemann

Captain T. F. Caldwell, E. H. Heinemann,
Vice Adm. R. B. Pirie

Left:

Gordon Dean,

Paul Nitze



Captain W.W. Wilbourne, General Randolph McC. Pate



RAdms. L. R. Daspit, John Quinn, W. F. Raborn,
and I. E. Hobbs

[redacted]

Admiral Burke states that our national strategy must be founded upon our awareness that freedom is being threatened openly and positively, not alone by military action, but by every means, foul and fair. Our problem is to create and maintain a stable international environment, within which the forces of truth, justice, decency, and law and order may flourish.

He points out that we are at war now-not peace. The weapons of this war are political and psychological pressures, treaties, negotiations, economic pacts, as well as limited military operations.

The issues extend across the entire gamut of human activity, political social, moral, ehtical, cultural, economic, psychological, and military.

There are no functional limits to this conflict, so neither can our strategy be confined by limited vision. The problem is not exclusively a military one; but even within the military sphere, we cannot run the risk of fixation upon any rigid strategy which denies us freedom to act in response to a wide range of possible communist actions.

The power of the enemy does not reside solely in his armaments and hardware. On the contrary, his greatest gains in the past decade have been made by means other than military action.

He predicts that the Soviet threat of nuclear destruction will keep U. S. attention focussed on preparation for general nuclear war rather than limited war, and that Russia will attempt to develop world opinion that the U. S. might set off the nuclear war by accident or by inappropriate response to a small aggression.

[redacted]

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

It is with genuine personal pleasure that I welcome each of you to this symposium on War in the Nuclear Age, and it is with great respect that I address you who represent the best minds of our Nation.

This is the first time that a group of civilian scientists representing the physical sciences, the Naval Research Advisory Committee, has joined with the Department of the Navy to sponsor a meeting of this nature, one in which Navy representatives can discuss our nation's politico-military problems with you distinguished gentlemen representing the physical and social sciences, industry and public affairs.

Our purpose is to benefit from the wisdom which will flow here from the application of the rational intellects of brilliant men, the very essence of whose life is trained and disciplined thinking, to the complex problems of national security in our times.

We do not expect to solve those problems this week and to send nicely wrapped solutions marked Q.E.D. to all who need to have them. But I am confident that we of the Navy will come away intellectually richer on Wednesday than we are this Monday morning.

Each of you was invited because you, as an individual, have something special to offer to this enrichment. We hope that you in turn will leave with a deeper understanding of your Navy and the part it ought to play in modern war.

We are all well aware that this era of the second half of the twentieth century may be the most decisive in the history of human events. It is safe to predict that it will give history its most convincing test of the validity of the philosophy that progress is inevitable.

It is safe also to predict that if progress is made, history will not be able to attribute it solely to man's grasp of the physical laws of nature and his control of matter, or solely to man's ability to reason and his control of mind and men.

If progress is made it will result from the combination of these and not from either one alone.

There are some thinkers who believe that history is the product of certain inexorable laws which control the destiny of the world independent of the efforts of man. This positivist philosophy I cannot accept. It is my belief that man possessed of free will and reason can alter the course of human events. Whether we will alter it for better or for worse remains to be seen.

I have faith that it can be for the better. It is because of this faith and because of a long standing belief in the value of solutions which result from the application of a diversity of viewpoints that I believe a group of men like you, gathered together for a purpose, can be an important source of national wisdom and strength.

Much has happened in the world during this past year. Earth satellites have been launched both by the Russians and by ourselves. Missile programs have been accelerated. The question of defense organization has become a vital issue of the day. Serious troubles have erupted in a number of places around the world.

We are living in an age of great transition, an age of great change in which people everywhere are striving to reconcile past values with present facts and future potentialities.

Some of the things we have witnessed in the past few months may be only forerunners of things yet to come.

Earth satellites, for example, hold much promise for the long term future, but they do not have many practical military applications right now.

Yet from the very moment the Russians launched their first space vehicle, they began using it effectively as a weapon, a cold war weapon with very telling effect upon the world.

This is a fundamental point which forms the central issue of our times. The point is that we are at war now, not peace.

The weapons of this war are political and psychological pressures, treaties, negotiations, economic pacts, as well as limited military operations.

The foundations of our national strategy must rest upon our awareness that freedom is being threatened openly and positively, not alone by the might of military action, but by every means, foul and fair, that the minds of the Kremlin leaders can devise.

The power of the enemy does not reside solely in his armaments and hardware. On the contrary, his greatest gains in the past decade have been made by means other than military action.

National Objectives

This conflict in which we are engaged today is a classic one in which the central issue is whether freedom, individual liberty, the right of self-determination, national independence, free enterprise, and the secret ballot shall prevail; or whether men shall live as wards of the state, as vassals in bondage to some central authority, and ruled with iron discipline. It is the classic conflict between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood, between justice and injustice, between freedom and slavery.

Our problem, therefore, is to create and maintain a stable international environment within which the forces of truth, of justice, of decency, and of law and order may flourish in the world.

The issues extend across the entire gamut of human activity, political, social, moral, ethical, cultural, economic, psychological, and military.

There are no functional limits to this conflict, so neither can our strategy be confined by limited vision. The problem is not exclusively a military one; but even within the military sphere we cannot run the risk of fixation upon any rigid strategy which denies us freedom to act in response to a wide range of possible communist actions.

The Current Situation

Let's look at the situation confronting us in the world today as it affects our current strategy.

The United States has had for some years the assured nuclear retaliatory capability to destroy Russia. The Soviets are probably convinced that they will be destroyed if they attack the United States in a general war, or if they attack any of our allies in open armed aggression.

At the same time, Russia is probably also convinced she cannot destroy the United States retaliatory power in a surprise attack, or by any other means.

The demonstrations in Peru against our Vice President, and later in Venezuela, the strife in Lebanon, the battles in Algeria, the war in Indonesia—all of these activities have contributed to world instability, rather than the stability to which American policies are dedicated.

The Soviets and other communist countries have been well aware of American nuclear capabilities for a long time, yet they have continued to expand their control over more territory and more people.

Coupled with the turmoil existing in many places in the world has been the rapid advance of Russian technological capability.

This has punctuated the fact that the United States itself can now be damaged severely by the USSR with several weapons systems.

This in turn raises a number of questions in the minds of our allies concerning the impact of those new Soviet capabilities on American policies and intentions.

For instance, will the United States in fact launch a nuclear retaliatory attack on the USSR in response to Russian aggression against any of our allies? We will, but not all people among our allies are convinced, in spite of what we say.

Another question is, will the United States support its allies if they are attacked by non-Russian communist aggression?

The answer again is an unqualified "yes." We will respond to such aggression with whatever it takes to defeat the attack, and this includes the use of atomic weapons if circumstances warrant.

These questions are double-edged questions. There are those on the one hand who raise them in doubt that we in the United States will do as we say we intend to.

On the other hand, there are those who raise the questions as an objection to the use of massive retaliation as the sole response to every communist transgression. They conclude that something more needs to be done to stop communist expansion.

Possible Future Situations

The questions raised are serious questions. They will become more serious as time goes by. It is probable that the Soviets will continue their

program of gradual expansion, always being careful not to provoke the United States to use its heavy retaliatory forces.

The Soviets will probably also expose the United States continuously to the threat of severe nuclear destruction as a means of keeping American attention focussed on preparing for general nuclear war rather than the means for waging limited wars successfully.

Also, Russia will surely continue to exploit the United States' general nuclear war posture by attempting to develop world opinion that the United States itself might set off the nuclear war either as an inappropriate response to a small aggression - or by accident.

In the meantime the Communists may be expected to continue their practices of intrigue, subversion, political warfare, propaganda, blackmail, sabotage, espionage, guerilla warfare, economic warfare, local civil insurrection; and all the other devices they use to undermine free world confidence, split free-world alliances, and wield more influence over more nations.

Future Policy

These are very powerful factors to consider in determining what policies we need to achieve our own national objectives.

First of all, the Soviet Union must remain convinced that if the USSR overtly attacks any one of our allies, directly - we will launch those retaliatory forces against the USSR. This is the requirement for our nuclear deterrent forces.

A prime requirement in this connection is the determination of what specific amount of destruction the USSR would be unwilling to accept. In short, what does it take to deter them from launching general war, or destroy them if they start it?

This is not an easy question to answer, of course. It takes more than a military estimate. It requires careful political, economic, and psychological, as well as military analysis. We should strive for optimum retaliatory forces - reasonably diversified. We should have what we need, no more and no less.

These forces also should be reasonably immune to a Soviet long-range missile build up.

Furthermore, we must reorient our thinking to put the massive nuclear striking capability in proper perspective relative to all the other types of military action which we are continually called upon to take.

We must convince the USSR, and particularly our allies, that we will use sufficient and appropriate force promptly to quell communist expansion efforts, including overt attacks by non-Russian communist forces. The world must become convinced that we do not rely solely on massive retaliation for our response in every instance.

This means that we must keep strong and ready the forces which give us these capabilities for actions short of all-out war.

The world must also realize that we intend to use atomic weapons when the situation may call for them in any action. At the same time, people must have confidence that we can and will use atomic weapons with discrimination in limited war because we recognize that excessive amounts of force would unnecessarily destroy people and property.

In addition to the performance of their combatant functions, the United States must have military forces capable of performing other functions which will permit diplomatic maneuvering in support of the United States' cold war offensive.

This means, of course, highly flexible forces, mobile forces which can get where they are needed quickly, forces which generate respect and confidence throughout the world. U.S. military forces, together with those of our allies, should be able to deal effectively with a wide range of situations in a wide variety of places without spreading us too thin, or leaving voids in critical places.

Consider the difficulty of dealing effectively and simultaneously with trouble in Lebanon, Algeria, Venezuela, and Indonesia.

The United States must be able to recognize and act quickly on small problems as they occur in the world - and before those problems grow into big problems calling for big action.

Implicit in all our world-wide commitments is the basic need for friends, for staunch allies who are willing to stand on their own and fight for the same general principles of freedom and national self-determination which we support.

Our allies must have military forces under their own control sufficient to enable them to contribute significantly to their own defense.

Free nations must be encouraged to greater participation in their own defense, to share responsibility, to draw closer together in full partnership against a common enemy regardless of lesser differences in our individual national policies and aspirations.

These are the elements of a national policy and a global strategy which point the way to a considerably more stable world environment within which the normal forces of diplomacy and international relations may work.

Now - I have not mentioned the Navy in particular - or naval forces, or seapower, or naval plans for the future. This was deliberate for the reason that the problems we are considering here are total problems and require national solution. They are basic problems of national and international interest, problems to which the best thinking of all the services and our highest officials of government must contribute.

It is important - however - that we do not approach our responsibilities by developing rigid concepts of precisely what kind of a war will be fought in the future.

We must plan on war, big ones, little ones; all sizes, all kinds, in all locations; wherever aggressors, in their own time and at their own initiative, decide to resort to force.

We must develop our weapons and forces with the aim of being able to do our jobs in whatever situation arises.

We in the Navy think in these terms, not because we expect to do the whole job—we know we can't—but because we expect to exploit the full potential of the sea for our country in any kind of emergency.

Whatever a force can do, it does because its government asks for and expects effective action. It is the job of each service to keep its capabilities constantly under review as it enhances its ability to wage war.

Military men have a profound responsibility to the nation, not only for the plans which they formulate or for their readiness to defend the United States in all forms of warfare, but more significantly for the fostering of a better understanding among our people concerning the capabilities and limitations of military power. We in the services know that military capabilities do not hold the final and ultimate answers to our national problems.

It is part of our duty to the American public to keep the military factor always in its proper perspective and always in its proper role as the servant of our national policy—not its master.

We must recognize above all that the real strength of our nation rests upon moral and spiritual values, rather than the raw power of guns, and missiles, and bombs.

The collective will of all our people and their concepts of life are the standards for the conduct of the nation. What our people think, what they know, what they believe, and what they do about these things will determine the direction our nation shall take in the days ahead of us.

Our military problems are not ours alone; they are yours as well. And your problems are not yours alone; they are ours to share with you in our common progress together.

As the various speakers make their contributions and as you sit in your discussion groups I would ask that you listen and speak with this optimistic hope in mind—

that out of a deeper understanding of those forces which are the final arbiters of history, through the application of the spiritual gift of intellect rational human beings can learn to control the use of force to achieve a community of nations in which justice will prevail—and man may retain his inalienable dignity to strive for his own perfection.

I believe this to be a valid purpose of science when that word is understood in its broad meaning.

The Navy is pleased to welcome you - and honored to have this opportunity to share in your wisdom. I look forward to a stimulating and fruitful conference and sincerely thank you for coming here to participate in this purposeful intellectual exercise.

DECLASSIFIED Unclassified

[redacted]

General Lemnitzer states that while we have created an effective deterrent to general war, we are not equally prepared to deter or deal with limited conflicts--which appear now to be the more likely threat. The past few decades indicate that we have a clear requirement to develop a limited war capability. Our deterrent forces, while wholly necessary, are not always effective for limited war, as exemplified by the continental air defense system, and by the conflicts in Korea, Viet Nam, Suez, and Hungary. We must improve our strategic and logistical mobility. The four principles whose application serve to keep war limited are: (1) limited objective, (2) proportioned military strength, (3) measured military force, and (4) coordinated military and political effort. The "Small War" requirements vital to U. S. security are: (1) limited war capability given high priority, (2) limited war forces kept alert and ready, (3) advance military planning, (4) effective military aid to allies, (5) pre-stockage of supplies in forward areas, and (6) flexibility of sea transport and airlift.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF

I consider it a privilege to join with you and to take part in this symposium on such a vital subject as "War in the Nuclear Age." Today's scientific research and technological development have provided us with weapons and equipment whose capabilities far surpass anything known in the past. Even more significantly, these new capabilities are exercising a notable influence upon the organization of military forces, upon our tactics and techniques -- indeed, on the very conduct of war itself. With that in mind, I shall direct my remarks today toward some of the questions which these new capabilities have raised with regard to strategic considerations. Specifically, I shall speak about "Preparation for Limited War."

Limited war, as a term, is the subject of a wide divergence of opinion. At the outset, therefore, let me define limited war as the Army views it and as I shall speak of it in my remarks today. Limited war is an armed conflict in which the political, economic, and military objectives are limited and in which less than the total of our military potential is employed. It is warfare in which national survival is not at stake and the homelands of the United States and the USSR are not military targets.

In focussing upon limited war, I do not minimize the grave consequences of a general war or the absolute necessity for us to take all measures feasible to deter such a war. However, I believe that the sheer massiveness of the destructiveness of general war has a hypnotic effect which can lead to dangerous oversights in our strategic preparations. I shall discuss limited war, in short, because I believe that it is the more likely threat; that we have in fact created an effective deterrent to general war; and that our capability for deterring limited conflicts, or dealing with them in case deterrence fails, is not comparable in its effectiveness.

During our own lifetime the United States has taken part in two wars which were global in scope. By comparison, since the end of World War I, various nations of the world have been subjected to some

38 small wars, revolutions, and armed conflicts of a limited nature. Just since the end of World War II there have been no less than 15 of these conflicts.

Of these 15, it is significant that nations of the Communist bloc have been involved in 8. Given this record, together with Communism's clear persistence in the pursuit of expansion by any feasible means — including military aggression — we have a clear requirement to include in our own military effort the development of a capability to deal with limited wars.

There is another fact, however, which emphasizes this requirement. Quite properly, I believe, during the past decade the United States has concentrated on building up its air-atomic retaliatory forces and bolstering the ground shield in Europe with the object of deterring general nuclear war. Unfortunately, to a large extent the strength which constitutes effectiveness for general war does not always entail, as a by-product, effectiveness for limited war.

For example, our continental air defense system is an essential part of our general war capability, but it is of no direct combat use in a limited war.

It is also true that the weapons of massive destruction associated with general war do not appear suitable for small wars. Certainly, in the fighting around Suez in 1956 the employment of megaton-yield weapons was not feasible lest the damage done far exceed the military benefits gained. Further, the types of targets existing in limited wars often cannot be effectively attacked with large-yield weapons. Where, for example, could massive atomic retaliatory weapons have been applied against the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines, or the guerrillas in Malaya, Greece, or Indochina?

The limitations of a general war capability for coping with limited aggression appear to be clearly recognized by the Communists. Our superiority in nuclear weapons did not deter the North Koreans from attacking in 1950, or the Red Chinese from enlarging the Korean War, threatening Taiwan, and aiding the forces of Viet Minh. Our strategic nuclear weapons were of no use to the freedom fighters during the Hungarian Suppression of 1956, nor did they prevent armed conflict in the Middle East during that same year.

At the same time, because general war is the most ominous threat, we must maintain the air-atomic striking force which provides the deterrent for such a conflict. I do not mean, however, that we can rest on our laurels and merely maintain our existing deterrent capability. We must continue to develop the new weapons required to maintain the present level of effectiveness

with respect to the Communist capability. The level to which I refer is the capability to counter aggression in the form of general war with such certain destruction as to make the adoption of such a course by the Communists tantamount to their own suicide.

I believe that such a level of effectiveness has been achieved. As I have said, we must continue to maintain it; and we must also rely upon it. We could hedge against its failure by concentrating our remaining military resources on such purely defensive measures as continental air defense, early warning, dispersal of industry, construction of shelters, and the like. But such a course would leave us without a balanced capability for dealing with the various types of threat which could be expected to materialize.

Granting, therefore, the importance of maintaining our general war deterrent forces, in my judgment we should place the development of limited war capabilities ahead of the development of facilities and systems designed merely to hedge against the failure of the general war deterrent.

Indeed, in view of the Communists' continued aggressiveness, of the effectiveness of our general war deterrent, and of the demonstrated fact that the forces which make up this capability do not constitute an effective deterrent to limited aggression, I believe that the planning for and funding of the forces required to deter and fight limited wars should be accorded a high priority.

One of the prime requirements for a limited war deterrent capability is that degree of military readiness which will permit prompt response to any local military aggression threatening our interests or involving our international commitments. It is axiomatic that the sooner we can get into action the less chance there will be for a small war to spiral into one of larger proportions. Looking back on our speed of response to aggression in Korea, our 2d Infantry Division moved from the United States to the combat zone in what has been considered record time. Even so, 29 days were required for the entire division to complete preparations and sail, and it was 34 days from the time the first ship sailed from Tacoma until the last tactical unit arrived in Korea. Obviously, our future reaction time must be much more rapid.

The degree of military readiness to which I refer demands ultramobile strategic forces which are ready to move on a moment's notice. To this end, the Army today contributes its Strategic Army Corps, which contains several top-priority divisions and supporting troops. Additionally, the Army has created missile commands designed to reinforce allied armies in the event

of war. Within present budgetary and manpower limitations, we keep these combat forces constantly ready to move. However, it is the need to give mobility to this force which causes us to be so vocal in our insistence upon the requirements of strategic movement. The Army does not control the means necessary for such strategic movement and must look to the Air Force and Navy to maintain in readiness the means of transportation which it would require.

In addition to strategic mobility, our military forces require "logistical mobility" or, phrased another way, armament and supplies prestocked overseas at selected logistical bases so as to improve our speed of military response to local aggression. Now, it may appear that the logistical requirements and tonnages for a limited war are relatively small. However, I must dispel that concept. Although the Korean War was a limited conflict, it involved one of the greatest military logistical undertakings in American history. The total tonnage of supplies shipped from the United States to the Far East in the three years of the war was more than twice that which we shipped in support of the AEF during World War I. It was 82 percent greater than that which we sent to General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area during the 36 months from August 1942 to August 1945. So, both in view of the quantities of material required and of the many demands which would be made simultaneously upon transportation facilities, it is vital to have quantities of materiel prestocked overseas in or near the areas where they would be needed.

I should now like to turn to the problem of limiting a small war. In my judgment, the first step in limiting war is to delineate and declare openly in peace those few conditions under which we would without hesitation initiate or take part in general atomic war. We could not, of course, cover every possible general war contingency, but we could draw a firm line over which the Communists could not step without certain knowledge that it would mean their destruction.

I do not advocate that we carry this delineation further and establish conditions under which we would participate in limited war. Not only would it be most difficult to predict our response to certain provocations, but by establishing limits for limited war we entice the Communists to minor aggressions not covered by our delineation and even to initiating brush fires which we have declared we will attempt to extinguish by means of limited warfare. This latter action would serve to permit the Soviets to instigate small wars, costly in American manpower and resources, with the relatively sure knowledge that general war would not ensue. A wiser course is

to keep the Communists in suspense as to our response to a provocation less than that guaranteed to result in general atomic war.

Given the outbreak of a limited war, there remains the problem of keeping it limited. It seems to me that there are four principles whose application would serve to confine such a war.

The first of these is the limited objective. The three principal limitations are the area of conflict, targets, and the weapons employed. Additional limitations are in terms of the manpower involved, the number of belligerents, the duration of the war, and the intensity of the conflict. But these latter limitations are essentially matters of degree and do not determine the essential character of the war. The more basic limitations involve geography, targets, and weapons. The heart of the problem in developing a strategy of limited war lies in devising methods of conducting military operations that are compatible with these three limitations and yet militarily effective in terms of supporting America's security objectives.

The next principle is proportioned military strength — that is, an interrelation of forces designed to accomplish varying military tasks. The United States, for example, must have a certain portion of its active military forces ready and reserved for peripheral wars. With respect to the other nations of the Free World, each must possess, as a minimum, military forces sufficiently well organized, trained, and equipped to maintain internal security. In specific countries, such as the Republic of Korea, it is necessary that these forces also be capable of initially defending themselves against external aggression. Finally, in a restricted group of nations such as those embraced by NATO and SEATO, there should be sufficient combat-ready forces which can contribute to the over-all security of the specific region. Thus, because the Communists resort to a variety of aggressive means to obtain their ends, there must exist proportioned military strength to counter or deter these threats.

Now, the third principle is one which I term measured military force. The force we apply in a limited war must be carefully tailored not only to "make the punishment fit the crime," but also to avoid the crime of overkilling and over-destruction; for example, we must be careful not to obliterate the nation we seek to liberate. Consequently, I am convinced that we must retain an adequate arsenal of conventional weapons. Furthermore, even if we do employ atomic weapons, there will be circumstances wherein our ultimate objectives can best be served by discrimination, and even by operational restraint.

Last, I would refer you to the principle of coordinated military and political effort, which is vital to both the prevention and the cure of these small wars. When the Communists wage armed conflict, they conduct both military and political war on a coordinated basis. Any nation or combination of countries fighting Communism must do likewise to be successful. Free World successes in Greece, the Philippines, and Malaya appeared to rest upon a substantial degree of integration of both military and political action, as well as on economic measures. Conversely, the Free World's failure in Indochina was paralleled by political weakness. The small war presents both a military and a political problem; Military means or military superiority do not in themselves offer the final solution. A study of the 15 limited conflicts since 1945 will reveal that quick military conquest was transitory except when the military gains were consolidated by other than military means.

Up to this point I have alluded to vital factors and principles pertinent to wars of limited nature. Now let me outline a summary of small war requirements vital to the posture and protection of the United States. This national security blueprint may be divided into six segments.

The first precept, stemming from the likelihood of the threat, is that limited war must be given a national defense priority sufficiently high to provide us with a balanced capability to deal with both the limited and general war threat.

Secondly, our national military alertness and the combat readiness of the forces earmarked for employment in limited war must be on a par with the Strategic Air Command's readiness to retaliate in general war. This is a big order, calling for enthusiastic joint military effort.

My third point concerns the necessity for advance military planning.

If small wars are to be prevented or restricted from expanding, extensive joint planning must be carried out, not only here in the United States but also within our various overseas commands. Our joint planning here at home must obviously be on a global basis, aimed at framing the strategy and forming the joint strategic forces necessary to cope with this form of warfare. The planning by our overseas commands would be regional in nature and designed to implement the broad strategic plans. These regional contingency plans would be made in more detail; and would consider both the employment of forces within the respective overseas commands as well as those expeditionary forces which may be dispatched from the United States.

My next major point stems from the fact, underscored by history, that military weakness invites aggression. Thus, it is vital to the interests of peace that we continue to maintain an effective Military Aid Program. Toward this end the Army, for example, has military missions and advisory groups engaged in assisting directly or indirectly in the training and modernization of over 200 foreign divisions in 44 countries. However, beyond the assistance we are now rendering there is a need to maintain earmarked reinforcements of American military personnel in order to expand our military missions and advisory groups in the event war breaks out. You may recall that when Greece was plagued with Red guerrillas our officers moved in to help strengthen the Greek Army. In 1950 the entire South Korean Army had to be recreated; in the course of conflict American military advisors helped rebuild that force. But over and beyond the support of indigenous forces with additional military advisors, we must also provide them with modern firepower support. I refer to the Army's modern missile commands, which are designed to provide selected allies with atomic firepower to support their military operations.

The fifth element of the program is the pre-stockage of military supplies in overseas forward areas, to meet the requirements for prompt reaction to aggression as I mentioned earlier. The Army Staff has already studied the possibility of pre-stockpiling unit equipment and supplies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, specifically at Adana, Turkey, and in the Philippine Islands. If bases could be established and stocked, we would have the capability of placing one airborne division from the United States in combat within 15 days. This division, less all but individual equipment, could be flown in two days to its bases, where it would spend ten days "marrying up" with its major weapons and equipment, thus leaving three days for its tactical deployment. Such pre-stocked forward bases would surely improve our strategic mobility, especially for employment of Army units in critical areas where our units are not already deployed.

As a final point in our suggested program for small war preparedness, I would cite the strong need for the study and elimination of the obstacles to strategic or global mobility. There is, of course, a variety of such obstacles which need to be examined. In respect to sea transport, I believe the Navy and the related Army technical services have anticipated and eliminated many of these, thereby achieving a considerable degree of flexibility. We are not, for example, completely dependent on foreign ports and we are capable of off-beach operations. However, we do not appear to have as much flexibility in respect to strategic airlift. I refer specifically to the continued dependence upon airfields capable of handling large aircraft. I believe we all recognize that limited war can occur in regions where there

will be limited landing and maintenance facilities for our strategic transport aircraft. Therefore, this problem must be studied not only from an immediate operational point of view, but also from the long-range standpoint of increasing the number of airhead staging areas and of influencing airplane design to permit transport aircraft to operate successfully without over-reliance on prepared airfields.

In brief, what is required is a balanced military capability, in existence, with plans for its employment, and an organizational structure for its direction. Future aggressions could catch us woefully off-balance unless we predetermine and establish our political and military posture beforehand. What, for example, must be our attitude and readiness if so-called Communist volunteers are projected into a future limited war? Has this Nation the correct balance of military forces to carry out effectively the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East? Should the United States intervene in strife-torn countries, such as Indonesia; and if so, to what extent? Answers to these and other vital questions must be determined — in advance — if our actual posture is to fit our national policies and international commitments.

As we saw demonstrated during the Suez and Hungarian crises of 1956, a limited war can raise international temperatures to a high point and build up tensions and pressures elsewhere. Inherent in a limited war is a "powder train" or "trigger" potential for setting off general war. If the United States becomes engaged in another limited war, it is vital that we keep our guard up against the possible flare-up of the big war. Our Strategic Air Command, for example, would continue its alert operations. SAC must continue to be protected by strong air defenses. Additionally, if we are engaged in a limited war we must undertake a partial mobilization, at least to the extent of reconstituting the Strategic Army Forces with reserve component units.

In summary, I think we can agree that, the Communists' propaganda pleadings to the contrary, limited wars have a marked appeal to them. Today, the Soviet Union gives every appearance of combining the threat of nuclear war with a systematic strategy of conflict by attrition; in short, its actions are consistent with the concepts of protracted strategy. From a Communist viewpoint, small wars are merely installments within a long-range strategic plan of conquest.

That being the case, I regard it as vital to our national security to adopt a limited war program such as I have outlined. The end result of such preparation would be a capability for balanced deterrence against both limited and general war. Such a capability, together with our clear determination to use it when our security interests are threatened — a determination evident

to friends and enemies alike -- would make the maximum contribution toward the attainment of the national strategy objectives for which we all strive.

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General Gerhart states that our primary problem, which we must keep clearly in mind, is that there is a direct threat to our national survival in the form of general war. Deterrence is our first obligation. We must recognize that the cold war has involved the United States for several years and is the only aspect of warfare in which we are likely to be involved for some years to come. We cannot fight alone in the cold war. Meanwhile, we must maintain the strength that will guarantee that the general war will never be fought. Riots and civil disorders may be minimized if we show better results in the political, economic, and psychological campaigns. In limited war situations such as Palestine and Suez, the important fact was that the United States and the USSR were both interested in assuring termination rather than expansion of the conflicts. Korea is an example of a situation where he believes a repetition would be met with a response more commensurate with the challenge. The United States must maintain within the forces designed to meet the national survival threat, suitable balanced capability to cope with lesser situations.

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Lt. General John K. Gerhart, U.S. Air Force

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

Let me begin by expressing to you the regrets of General White, the Air Force Chief of Staff, that he was prevented from being with you today. General White at this moment is at Bucknell University, where he is taking part in graduation exercises.

While General White participates in this launching of a new increment of young Americans, it is at the very least desirable that we here think constructively about the tremendous issue that overshadows their future—the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

These young men and women are of the nuclear age. They cannot escape from living in and with it. They may reap its vast benefits; but to do so they must know it; they must learn to live—not exist—with this vast power; they must respect—not fear—what it can do. If they are to succeed in this critical effort, they must be realistic and progressive in their outlook. They cannot permit passion, panic, or short-sightedness to come between them and what must be for them the facts of life.

To talk of what they—the new graduates—must do, is of course not sufficient. Those of us who were graduated some years ago still bear our responsibilities, not only to ourselves but to the future of the new graduate.

Meetings such as this one are signs of concern with this responsibility. As long as this concern results in balanced, objective and dispassionate evaluation of the great issues involved, the effort, more than being useful, is in fact essential.

Concern which leads to this sort of evaluation is healthy. Ultimately, it must result in improved public understanding of an area which is perhaps as confused and controversial in the public mind as it is vital. Given better public understanding, there is every reason why our country and the free world will be in a stronger position to

do the things that must be done and to walk firmly and decisively the fine line which means peace, and not war, in the nuclear age.

When we talk about a subject as broad as this one, and when time is necessarily limited, it is appropriate to limit the scope of my remarks by undertaking only the establishment of what I think to be a proper perspective of war in the nuclear age.

I propose to establish some limits on the problem by assuring, first of all, that we have a common understanding of "War."

War, if we accept a common dictionary meaning, would include a wide variety of forceful and violent actions by one political body against another. Today there is a ring of obsolescence in that definition. War in the nuclear age certainly—in fact, pre-eminently—includes this category of action; but war in the nuclear age also includes a great deal more.

It is this circumstance which is basic to the establishment of the perspective I just mentioned. As we survey the broad horizon of war in the nuclear age, we must do so against a back-drop of the new problem, the great and the new danger to us which war constitutes. We must keep clearly in mind that there is a direct threat to our national survival in the form of general war. This is the primary problem. There is no room for wishful thinking on this score. Deterrence of war, through effective preparation to fight that war, is our first obligation. Within the umbrella of that protection, we can and should also look at lesser issues. But it is only because of that protection that this is possible. It is only within such a conceptual umbrella that we can as this group will do turn our attention to the problems created by other forms of war.

War today, one might say, starts with what has been called "The Battle for Men's Minds." In the nuclear age this "Battle for Men's Minds" is the one form of war that we are certain to see. I think too that it is perhaps the one for which we are least prepared; surely it is an aspect that demands more effective effort.

The competition for men's minds has many manifestations. We have seen it waged under political, economic, and psychological banners, and we have seen it waged from one end of the world to the other. It has become evident that even our own hemisphere is by no means excluded from the arena.

This cold war is with us now. It has been with us for some years. Just how well we have waged it is a moot point. But the fact remains that if we are to recognize likely situations, and if we are realistic enough to recognize a most dangerous threat, we should apply our thinking and our effort in this area more effectively than we have in the past.

It may appear anomalous to you for a member of the military forces to express such great concern for what is essentially a non-military aspect of warfare. There is, however, good reason to justify this concern. First, we must recognize the cold war as the one aspect of warfare in which our country has been consistently engaged for the past several years and the only one in which we are likely to be involved for years to come. Aggressive communism has realized its most significant success in this, the cold war area. We must meet this threat and fight it on an appropriate basis, or give ground and face inevitable and serious setbacks in the political, economic, and psychological areas.

We are led, then, to a second reason for concern with this aspect of war. Most of us would agree, to paraphrase John Donne, that "No Nation is an Island." Science and invention have established that point more clearly than we perhaps are ready to recognize. The fact remains—today, more than ever before—we cannot be alone. If our country is to have the support it requires in the battle against communism, we cannot afford to lose this political, economic, and psychological war. This is true not simply because of the so-called peacetime disadvantages that would accrue, but also because our over-all military effectiveness, that guarantor of an uneasy peace, would diminish; our strategic position would be seriously eroded. The conduct of the cold war, while perhaps not basically a military problem in one sense, must always be a source of profound concern to the military. For us to fail to recognize the magnitude of the problem and the potential dangers inherent therein would be a grave error.

In the cold war we have the most likely, the most prevalent, and certainly one of the most challenging problems of warfare in the nuclear age. It is an area we can readily identify as one which requires improved planning and increased effectiveness.

There are, of course, as suggested earlier, other forms of war more readily compatible with classic definitions. These forms of war all involve actual conflict, and by their very nature are bound to remain varied in their manifestations.

Perhaps at the opposite pole from the form of war about which we have been talking is what we have come to call "general war." I think that we all have a reasonably common and consistent understanding of what is meant by this term, today, we mean conflict on a scale and of a nature which defy human appreciation. The destructive capability which science and invention have made available, the delivery means that are at hand, and the inability to guarantee complete defensive effectiveness combine to create a situation of awesome proportions. Having recognized the situation for what it is, there is no room for fear or handwringing; man cannot permit himself to be the slave of his own ingenuity. The American, the citizen of the free world, cannot permit himself to fall victim to the threat which is consistently before us because of the availability of this power in the hands of the masters of the Soviet Union. If this man of freedom is to remain the master of his destiny; if he is not to surrender to fear of the unknown, or fear of the known in the form of the Soviet Union; his first responsibility is to establish and maintain, for himself, the strength that will guarantee that the war that must not be fought, will, in fact, not be fought. Supplementing this strength, however, we must generate and maintain the courage, determination, and will which give authority to our strength. This is the situation that Churchill called "The sublime irony . . . where safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

The course of action that the nuclear age imposes upon us is a trying one. It has only necessity to commend it. What alternatives do we have, considering the philosophy, attitudes, and capabilities that are characteristic of the Soviet Union? Disarmament is certainly attractive and is worthy of our best efforts. We must all hope that it will be similarly regarded by the Soviet Union. But her initial, and apparently prevailing, attitudes in disarmament matters are somewhat less than convincing. Until we are convinced we must, of course, continue to negotiate, but only with due regard to our obligations for our own safety and continued existence.

There are those who hope for disarmament but at the same time suggest that a suitable solution for either the long term or the interim lies in imposing limitations on military conflict. This might be fine as theory, but once conflict begins, what is the possible cost of such limitations? What likelihood is there that such limitations would be observed? What would happen to the effectiveness of our deterrent? Who guarantees these limitations and how is this done? The suggestion is sometimes made that the guarantee of the limitation lies in massive deterrent capability. I would be the last to deny the effectiveness of these forces as a deterrent to all forms of war. Nevertheless, should the Soviet Union make the mistake of embarking on some limited military aggression, and if our over-all capability thus failed in

deterring significant conflict, there is perhaps room for question as to its effectiveness in guaranteeing the observance of the presumed limitations.

This leads appropriately to consideration of what we might call the limited manifestations of military conflict. Great attention is being focused on the issue of limited war, and in proper perspective it is indeed necessary that this issue be given due attention. Limited conflict has unfortunately always been a prevalent phenomenon of man's nature. But once again, when we use this vague term of limited war in the context of violent conflict, we are talking about something which has many aspects, and appears in many disguises.

At one end of the scale we have riots, internal problems generally requiring local police action. This is a form of limited conflict which we see about us almost on a daily basis. From riot we can progress onward to insurrection and guerrilla-type warfare. We can see one aspect of this type action in Algeria and still another in Indonesia. Certainly, situations such as these have occurred in the past with relative frequency and will probably continue on much the same relative scale. The nuclear age will do little to improve our ability to control them.

In continuing on up the scale in mounting crescendo, we have perhaps a potentially more dangerous situation, two national authorities who become involved in a given dispute and resort to force. A few years ago we experienced this situation in the form of the Arab-Israel War; we saw it attempted in the Anglo-French action against Egypt; and perhaps most recently, we have again seen a close approach to the use of open force in the current situation in Lebanon.

Establishing these manifestations of limited conflict has taken us pretty well up the scale, but to fill out further our view of limited military actions, we must of course, include the Korea-type conflict in which we were engaged at such great cost, a few years ago. Then, with Korean geography in mind, we must also think about another type of significant conflict, one that is without precedent; one that would in theory remain limited, but would be more serious in terms of area or weapons.

Having defined our spectrum, it is appropriate that we now study it a bit and see what conclusions it is reasonable to establish. First, it appears that we cannot aspire to eliminate riot and civil disorder everywhere in the world despite the instability and potential danger that this sort of conflict suggests and generates. We probably cannot plan to attack this type of problem directly. Yet, if our cold war efforts are successful; if we make progress

in the battle for men's minds; if we show better results in the political, economic, and psychological campaigns—we should improve the basic condition which generates the riot and disorder. Once again we establish the great importance of the cold war effort.

The problem of insurrection and perhaps even civil war, it would appear, is little more than an exaggerated phase of the problem we have just talked about. Similar conclusions would appear to be applicable.

Let us move on then to the next step up the scale as typified by the examples of the Arab States vs. Israel, Britain and France vs. Egypt, and finally, Syria vs. Lebanon. These are clearly more serious matters. They are problems that require—and I think have generally received—attention in keeping with their seriousness. Their primary military importance lies, however, not in the innate military problem but rather in the seed of possible expansion which they contain.

We might think about how these situations were handled. In the Arab States-Israel conflict the United Nations assumed an active role and was relatively effective considering the difficulties under which it had to operate. The problem which the U.N. faced up to, the way in which it handled this situation, is a promising omen for an even greater effectiveness in the future. This is an important fact for us to keep in mind. Still another important fact was that the two major powers, our country and the Soviet Union, were both interested in assuring the termination instead of the expansion of the conflict.

The next example, the unfortunate Anglo-French effort against Egypt, was abortive for several reasons, but once again primarily because of the great disinclination of the two major powers to permit the conduct of this military operation. Finally, we have the current U.A.R.-Lebanon situation behind which we clearly see the Soviet shadow. Yet, once again there appears to be no desire to encourage active hostilities for reasons which we can only surmise, but which certainly must include Soviet recognition of the dangers of possible expansion. The Kremlin might well be saying: "Why should we, the Soviet Union, accept the danger of direct conflict when, through activities of a lesser order, which will not allow for American intervention, we can gain our ends painlessly and effectively?"

Finally, at the upper end of the scale, we have the example, still all too fresh in our memories, of Korea. Korea represented significant conflict, directly involving a large scale effort by this country, and one in which we deliberately limited the scale of our response. It seems inconceivable that

we would for a second time permit the drain of lives and material resources that characterized Korea without response more commensurate with the challenge. All of us (and we should also include, I am sure, responsible authorities in the Soviet Union) are well aware of policy statements which have been made by responsible American authorities indicating our readiness to respond at times and at places of our choosing, with weapons of our choice.

With USSR's great appreciation of our capabilities; with their respect for our resolution, determination, and will; with their demonstrated preference for action which will not provoke military reaction - it seems clear why there has been no second Korea. For the Soviet Union directly to involve the United States in military action, or for the Soviet Union to permit any member of the Soviet Bloc to involve the United States in military action, is fraught with the greatest dangers. For the Soviet Union and for world communism these dangers are, I am sure, extremely well identified and appreciated.

In our limited military conflict spectrum we included a new variety; one without precedent. This would be a significant conflict but to differentiate it from a Korea-type War, it would in theory remain limited; but cover a greater area, or be more inclusive in terms of weapons. It would seem that the considerations which cause challenge of the likelihood of the other categories of limited military conflict, particularly the Korea-type War, have equal application here. Beyond this question of likelihood, there is considerable room for questioning the validity of this concept of imposed, durable limitations. In sum, our over-all military posture and the relatively low ignition point which any form of conflict must create suggest little possibility of this type of conflict.

Drawing upon this evaluation of the spectrum of war in the nuclear age, we establish the perspective which we referred to at the outset as one of the objectives of this discussion. War, in the broadest sense, specifically, cold war, is a characteristic of our time; cold war is the one form of war we must anticipate. War, in the sense of significant armed conflict involving U.S. forces is not, and need not be, likely. But this perspective established, it is not appropriate to drop the issue without at least brief treatment of our military capability to meet these situations of armed conflict should they occur.

Our capability for general war, reinforced by the national will, is what makes general war relatively unlikely today despite the fact that the Soviet Union has a general war capability where they had none before. It is

reasonable to apply like reasoning to the problem of limited military conflict. And this is precisely what has happened. Within our general war capability, we have the force which has kept limited war unlikely. We have today the capability to handle successfully any lesser situation which can be foreseen as requiring commitment of U.S. forces.

There can be no disputing that we must retain within the forces which we establish to meet the national survival threat - that is general war - appropriately designed force to meet lesser situations, unlikely as they may be. This must be done; it can be done; it is in fact, being done.

In summary then, gentlemen, I would suggest that war in the classic sense, that is, military conflict on any significant scale and involving our country, in the nuclear age is not, and must not, be looked upon as a likely eventuality. If we do the things that we can do, that we must do, there is every reason for this conclusion to remain valid. Maintaining the military capability to meet the unlikely eventuality of conflict is not an easy or cheap job. It can be done. And within the force—Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force—which is designed to meet the national survival threat, there can be and there is suitable balanced capability to cope with the lesser situation.

Yet, other forms of war can in the long run impose on us serious disadvantages; military, economic, and political. Unless we can win the cold war (and this appears to be the Communists' chosen battleground) we can find ourselves in a serious situation as the result of successive losses and withdrawals.

How to fight a cold war is a problem area in which I can lay no claim to being expert, although I do know we in the military have a part to play. As evidence of Air Force interest, I would note that this week representatives of Air Force activities world-wide are meeting to review our cold war operations. We received the full cooperation of other governmental agencies and interested professional groups. From this meeting we expect no panaceas; we do hope it will help us to develop a more effective Air Force program in this area and to offer more constructive thinking toward solution of a problem of first importance nationally.

Those of us who are here today have a very serious responsibility in this area; we have a task of major proportions. But our chance of being effective is seriously endangered unless we accurately identify our problem, specifically including its proportions and perspective. We face the difficult challenge of maintaining that military posture which will prevent war, big or little, and at the same time we must work quickly to combat the gains that

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have been realized in the battle for men's minds. In respect to this last area, and with due regard to the sponsorship of this symposium, it might be appropriate to take a minor liberty with the famous words of a justly famous man and say, "We have only begun to fight."

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General Pate states that, since World War II, the Communists have made a net gain; the Western World has, at best, only stood its ground. The need for deterrent forces is obvious, but our successes in the past twelve years have been linked to something far less than the use of nuclear weapons, or the threat of their use. Our few successes were due to our determination to resist, and to our freedom of action guaranteed by sea power. He reviews Marine Corps doctrine and capabilities and the part played by Marines in the Suez and Lebanon crises, in flood relief in Ceylon, and in the Viet Nam evacuation. He concludes that deterrents are not enough, and that we must maintain a capability to fight something far less than a general war.

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General Randolph McC. Pate, USMC

THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Gentlemen, I will not presume to lecture you on Communist doctrine, nor upon the strategy of the Soviet Union, but I would like to recall some of the events of the past twelve years or so as a background for our discussion.

In the years immediately after the second World War, the Russians were deterred from presenting a direct military challenge to the United States. Our atomic monopoly and the relative power positions so dictated. Later, after Russia had acquired nuclear power, the air base system which we had developed around the rim of the Eurasian heartland kept the Soviets at a strategic disadvantage. Accordingly, they confined their challenges to the indirect and irregular type, and they used their satellites to do their work.

In June 1950, the army of the communist North Korean government tested the firmness of American intentions in the Far East. The American response was immediate and affirmative, but the Soviets slipped the blow. The Chinese Communists entered the war. Even though the USSR supplied arms to the North Korean and Chinese forces, the Russians did not allow themselves to become drawn directly into the war. When, after a year of fighting, the communist forces in Korea were unable to win new ground and the American-South Korean build-up permitted potentially decisive offensive operations, the Russians suggested in 1951 that negotiations for a truce be opened.

The Korean truce, laboriously arrived at, only signalled a stepping up of the operational pace in Indochina. No vigorous Western response ensued. France had been too long embroiled; the political and moral issues involved were complicated, and little understood in the West. The Soviet Union thus embroiled the West in Asian wars waged by its Korean and Chinese as well as its Malayan and Indochinese proteges.

When it had achieved nuclear power of its own, the Russian leadership felt capable of introducing tactical innovations. At first, they sought to penetrate contiguous areas. In this endeavor, they depended

upon the Sino-Soviet superiority in conventional armies and guerilla warfare methods. Next, they hurdled the Western treaty barriers into more remote areas. By cleverly devised arms deals, the Soviet Union extended its influence to Guatemala, Egypt, Syria and, through Egypt, to Algeria.

Since 1945 the communists have been able to confine the Cold War almost entirely to the territory of the West, and at the same time they have kept their own area closed to Western intervention, or even to the ministrations of the United Nations. The West was victorious in Greece, Korea, and Jordan, but these victories were in defense of the status quo. When the communists won - as they did in Czechoslovakia, China, Indochina, and the Middle East - they gained access to ground previously closed to them. At best, we have stood our ground; but the communists have made a net gain. A look at the map gives rather startling emphasis to this statement.

The problem is primarily political, as Admiral Burke has said. Military strength alone will not solve all our difficulties. However, our military posture must be adequate to as wide a variety of situations as the communists can devise. It is obvious that we cannot forever tolerate piecemeal encroachments and adventures which erode our position.

The need for effective deterrent forces is too obvious for discussion here, but I think it time that we examine the overall uses of such power and the real contribution that it makes to the solution of our immediate problems. It appears to me that our successes in the past twelve years have been very closely linked to something far less than use of the atomic bomb, or even the threat of its use.

I suggest that it has been our determination to resist, coupled with immediately available military power, that has made our few successes possible and has prevented many other communist incursions into areas of Western interest. And I invite consideration of the fact that it was our capability in the complete flexibility of seapower which guaranteed to us much of the freedom of action we now possess. I invite your contemplation of that unique naval quality which can only be described as "ubiquity." How much has happened (or not happened) simply because balanced United States naval forces have been in position to react effectively; and been able to stay in position as long as necessary? I suggest that the Russian cry of "gunboat diplomacy" when the Sixth Fleet was standing off the Levantine coast was a cry of real pain.

It is my purpose here to explain some of the broader aspects of my own service to you. I have taken some pains to establish a naval background for

my remarks because it is only in that context that the Marine Corps can properly be understood and appreciated. We are versatile, we can perform to good effect as purely infantry troops in large scale ground warfare. We proved this in the first World War and again in Korea. But such actions are secondary to our main purpose. We actually exist only in response to the need for a highly mobile, instantly ready combat force particularly skilled in amphibious operations. The nature of such operations range from assisting in the evacuation of our citizens from a troubled area to the delivery of the full striking power of a major air-ground-naval force. Whatever the requirement, meeting it is our business.

To assist you in forming a clear mental picture of what we are and what we can do, I shall outline for you the principal features of our organization, our dispositions, and our doctrine for employment.

The primary combat elements of the operating forces are three Marine Divisions and three Marine Aircraft Wings, together with the necessary combat and service support units. These elements are formed into two Fleet Marine Forces, one of which is assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the other to the Pacific.

Our battlefields may be located in many nations in many parts of the world. In keeping with this condition, the Fleet Marine Forces are strategically deployed.

In the Hawaiian Islands is the 1st Marine Brigade. This is a balanced air-ground force, composed principally of units drawn from the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The 3d Marine Division, less some of its elements, is based on Okinawa; its air partner, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, minus some elements elsewhere deployed, is at present located in Japan. This Marine air-ground force, by virtue of its location, is prepared for employment in most any location in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia.

A third air-ground team is located on the West Coast of the United States. This is the 1st Marine Division and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. They are prepared to move in either direction, east or west.

The 2d Marine Division and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, both located in North Carolina, constitute another striking force. It is immediately available for assignment in Europe, the Mediterranean, or the Near East.

These Fleet Marine Forces are ready to move on a moment's notice. They are ready to fight on arrival.

Our primary job is amphibious in character, but our mission also requires that we be prepared to carry out any assignment the President may direct. We have always interpreted this to mean that we must be ready at all times - ready to fight when and where ordered regardless of the political conditions which may be imposed. In the present era, this is a broad responsibility.

On the one hand, the Fleet Marine Forces may be thrust into battle against the USSR where multi-megaton weapons, ballistic missiles, and other devices of advanced design are used freely and without restraint.

On the other hand, Marine Corps units may be employed to protect United States interest with a minimum of force, the amount and type being politically circumscribed. An example of the latter is the situation in which atomic weapons are not used initially, yet the threat of their use exists throughout the operation.

Varying conditions lie between these extremes. In any condition, whether or not atomic weapons are used initially, the threat of their use requires that Marine Corps forces use tactical concepts similar to those used in all-out nuclear war.

We emerged from World War II with a massive capability for over-the-beach assault. But in the light of atomic weapons, it was evident that we would no longer be able to concentrate a large, vulnerable amphibious task force at the water's edge and force entry with the combat powerhouse used in World War II.

The Marine Corps immediately embarked on the development of entirely new concepts for the conduct of amphibious assault. Tests and studies were undertaken on the helicopter; on light, easily transported weapons; on the development of all-weather guidance systems for close support aircraft; of surveillance and communications equipment suitable to dispersed operations; and a host of similar projects.

The end product of over ten year's labor is a doctrine for amphibious assault that is applicable to the present era of warfare. It is best described as "vertical assault." It is designed to exploit the speed and flexibility of VTOL and STOL aircraft. It permits us to project our seapower deep ashore

without having to make a direct assault on the usually heavily defended shore line. These are the central features of the doctrine:

First: Tactical Mobility. By reorganizing our troops and equipment, we have improved our tactical mobility. Troops and equipment required for the assault can now be lifted by helicopter instead of boats or amphibian tractors.

Second: Rapid Assault. By carrying the entire assault force in ships designed for unloading by helicopter we can close on our objectives quickly. The Navy has designed for us a troop ship called a Helicopter Amphibious Assault Ship. It has the speed to keep up with, and can benefit from the protection offered by, the carrier task force.

Third: Isolation of the Objective. By utilizing long range aircraft operating from carrier as much as 1500 miles at sea and through use of missiles we plan to effect the sudden and concentrated destruction of enemy air and ground forces, thus isolating the specific objectives of our mission.

Fourth: Unrestricted Movement. By transporting the assault forces from ship to shore by helicopter we can seize widely dispersed objectives as deep as 100 miles from our launching ships and along a frontage of as much as 50 miles; we will not have to fight over ground to these objectives. We can approach from any direction. We eliminate the need for beach exits, roads, and bridges.

Fifth: Exploitation. By exploiting the speed and versatility of the helicopter we can develop tactical opportunities after the original landing. We can by-pass the enemy's strength and attack his flanks and rear, and we can use the helicopters to speed up needed supplies.

Sixth: All Weather Air Support. Operating from carriers at sea our all-weather air support can be utilized for continued isolation of the objective area, for reconnaissance, and to furnish fire support. As soon as possible, landing force aircraft will move ashore. Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft or portable catapults and arresting gear will be employed to permit operations from hastily prepared airstrips.

Seventh: Transport Aircraft. Employment of both land and seaplane types of transport aircraft to provide additional reinforcements and supplies for the landing force is the last feature of our doctrine. We used to build up mountains of supplies on the beach in order to sustain an operation. Now we plan to deliver the supplies and reinforcements to the objective area as needed.

What I have just described is the optimum application of the doctrine for vertical assault in an amphibious operation. It is of course capable of lesser uses.

The capabilities of the Marine Corps to implement this doctrine, using either conventional or nuclear weapons, can be summarized as follows:

Limited War. The Marine Corps has combat units positioned in strategic locations from the Mediterranean to the China Sea, prepared to move immediately and to close with any enemy. Its combat divisions are air transportable; the assault elements of these divisions can be lifted by helicopter. The Marine Corps training system, with its emphasis on the individual and the part he plays in the fighting team (coupled with continuous exercises afloat, ashore, and in the air) produces and maintains a razor-sharp readiness for limited war or any thing less.

General War. The Marine Corps has two air-ground teams earmarked for employment in the NATO area should general war occur; and extensive plans are in existence for their commitment in every conceivable location from the Scandinavian Peninsula to the Turkish Straits. The third division-wing team can remain poised for action in the Pacific Ocean area. More than 80% of the Marine Corps Reserve is trained sufficiently to be available for immediate overseas assignment; and all officers in the Reserve have completed tours of active duty. The Fleet Marine Forces are continuously engaged with other U. S. services and in combined amphibious maneuvers with troops of our allies.

Conventional War. Marines are still trained in conventional combat techniques as well as in atomic warfare. Our new organization is designed to permit the Fleet Marine Forces to retain their traditional conventional warfare capabilities as well as to prepare them to fight in nuclear battles.

Nuclear War. In warfare where atomic weapons are employed, the combat doctrine of vertical envelopment is especially applicable; and Marine personnel are trained in the dispersed tactics that atomic weapons require. On the ground, the Marine Corps can employ nuclear warheads with its 8-inch howitzers and Honest John Rockets. In the air, its planes are fitted to deliver atomic bombs against enemy ground and sea targets. It is developing and adopting new equipment in the fields of surveillance, communication, transportation, and weapons.

What about the Marine Corps of the future? We will continue to advance along the general lines I have discussed. Refinements and improvements are

constantly being made. In addition, we are always looking for a break-through, a new angle, a new approach, a new technique. For example, we are now studying the range and possibilities of present and future chemical and biological agents. While it may sound a little bit far-fetched at the moment, just what would we do if we were suddenly capable of destroying our enemy's will to resist by rendering him unconscious for a useful period? This could represent a major advance for limited or general war. It could eliminate entirely the use of nuclear weapons in limited war or their tactical use in general war. It could also serve to reduce the need for HE munitions.

Plans are extant which cover almost every conceivable worldwide situation for employment of Marine forces. There are several reasonable events or combinations of events which could result in commitment of all available Marine forces. Whatever the situation, the Marines are ready. Its air/ground striking forces are uniquely suited (by tradition, organization, training, and equipment) to react with utmost speed and with the proper level of power to emergency situations anywhere in the world. They form part of balanced, homogeneous naval forces. A call to arms does not result in sudden introduction of unfamiliar planning techniques; it requires no flurry of training and re-equipping, but brings together forces who know each other's functions and methods. Our ready forces (the spearhead of Marines, and the related amphibious forces) are a balanced, adjusted, and finely tuned ready package.

A word about readiness. Perhaps the most valid way of predicting future behavior on the part of an individual is to study how he has behaved under similar situations and environments in the past. The same method can be used in judging an organization. Do we practice what we preach? Has our performance demonstrated this all important quality?

From the earliest days of our country, there have been continuing demands for small, trained, constantly ready military forces; forces available on the shortest possible notice for service beyond the seas in time of emergency.

The responsibility has fallen most frequently to the Marines. The requirements have been varied:

Suppressing piracy in such far-flung places as Sumatra and Tripoli.

Restoring law and order in Central America.

Quelling uprisings and safeguarding American lives and property from the West Indies to Asia.

Short-notice occupation of bases, such as Iceland and Samoa—or executing a major amphibious assault on the briefest of warning, such as at Inchon in Korea.

More recent, and relatively unknown because of their classified nature, are similar missions. Let me cite a few.

SUEZ CRISIS—October-November 1956:

On 30 October 1956 CINCNELM requested reinforcement of the 1st Provisional Marine Force, which was then afloat with the SIXTH FLEET in the eastern Mediterranean. On 6 November 1956 RLT-2 at Camp Lejeune was alerted for movement to the MidEast. A scheduled amphibious exercise was cancelled, and the ships carrying RLT made rendezvous off Camp Lejeune. Subsequently, they were ordered to Norfolk, where they were put on 48-hours sailing notice. On the other side of the world on 11 November 1956, the 3d Bn 3d Marines embarked at Yokosuka Japan and headed for the Persian Gulf. Tension relaxed in the Middle East, and on 27 November 1956, RLT-2 was released from alert and returned to Camp Lejeune. The 3d Bn 3d Marines returned to Yokosuka, Japan on 5 February. In addition to being available for employment in the Middle East, they had accompanied the fleet in showing the flag at such places as Karachi, Bombay, Singapore, Colombo, and Subic Bay.

CEYLON FLOOD RELIEF—December 1957:

In December of 1957, the monsoon caused floods and landslides in Ceylon. 300,000 people were rendered homeless, and on 26 December the Government of Ceylon accepted the assistance offered by the U. S. Navy. There was urgent need of medical supplies, and helicopters were required to deliver food and medical assistance to the stricken areas.

Within 24 hours the carrier PRINCETON, carrying 24 Marine transport helicopters and eight Navy anti-submarine helicopters was en route from the SEVENTH Fleet accompanied by two destroyers. They arrived at Colombo on 1 January. Four days later the seaplane tender DUXBURY BAY, carrying three medical officers, twelve hospital corpsmen and necessary medical supplies arrived from the Middle East Force.

The first helicopter flights began on 2 January 1958. By 10 January the operation was completed. In that 8-day period helicopters from the PRINCETON had flown 475 sorties in 781 flight hours. They had transported 261 passengers, and delivered 329,653 pounds of food and medical supplies. The

[redacted]

destroyers HENDERSON and SOUTHERLAND delivered 125 tons of food; the DUXBURY BAY delivered 12,000 pounds of medical supplies and 16 tons of food; and three medical teams gave over 9,000 innoculations against typhoid, and chlorinated over 1,000 wells.

VIET NAM "PASSAGE TO FREEDOM": The first ship commenced evacuation 16 August 1954; evacuation completed 18 May 1955. Major part of evacuation took place in August and September 1954. 113 USN ships participated, of which 39 were MSTS and 7 were merchant ships chartered by Navy.

Evacuees totaled 310,848.

68,757 tons of military cargo.

8,135 military vehicles evacuated.

During evacuation there were 184 births and 66 deaths.

LEBANON—May 1958:

Only last month, mob violence against USIA establishments in Tripoli and Beirut, Lebanon gave rise to the possibility that American troops would be required to protect American interests and evacuate our nationals in the area. We had one battalion afloat with the Sixth Fleet. It was scheduled to be relieved, on station, by another. That relief was cancelled, formed into a brigade with helicopter support and both battalions were directed to remain in the NELM area for possible use in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The variety of these tasks is impressive; the fact that they had to be done is significant too—but most important is the fact that when the need arose, there was a force of the proper kind ready to accomplish the task.

Gentlemen, we all know that this country will not initiate a war. But this is not to say there will not be one. It is my considered opinion, based upon some of the factors which I have outlined, that war is quite possible. If it occurs, I feel that war will be fought mainly in the territories which lie on the periphery of the Soviet and its principal satellites; in areas where we have allies or need them. We cannot simply obliterate these large areas with hydrogen bombs unless we wish to create even larger problems than those we now face. Such a war will be fought by men, and very probably our men, too, who will have to be placed ashore somewhere in order to reach the battlefield. They will fight under fluid tactical situations where targets are constantly changing.

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There are those who advocate that we can make all war impossible if we concentrate our energies and our resources on providing long range nuclear striking forces. In all conscience, I cannot agree. Indeed, I see real danger that in the rush toward advanced weapons systems for an all-out war we will lose sight of the necessity to maintain a capability to fight something far less than a general war.

In order to fight such a war, in order to bolster our allies, we must project our power to the other side of some ocean. We must get it there quickly and get it ashore quickly. We may have to supply it there for protracted periods. This is a primary task of the Navy and the Marine Corps. Without this capability in United States hands, the Communists would have free rein.

Dr. Atkinson states the American intellectual heritage has been to regard warfare either as absolutely immoral and hence to be abolished, root and branch; or as so unreasonable and repugnant to those of intellectual attainments that it will, in some mysterious way, be exorcised.

Remarkably, we see in the world of 1958 echoes of this view that war has become "absurd and impossible from its monstrosity" in the many expressions that war is unthinkable, that war is too horrible to contemplate in the nuclear era, and wonder of wonders, that war has finally abolished itself. The unfortunate fact is that while war may have reached a stage in which it is unthinkable to many in the civilized world, war or, at least certain variations of warfare may still remain thinkable to Russian, Chinese Communist and other leaders.

Although there are certain lesser figures, the only American who stands out as a great military theorist is Admiral Mahan and it has only been Admiral Mahan who has been recognized by historians as of a stature comparable to Clausewitz and other great European or Asian theorists of war. It seems prophetic that an American should be the great exponent of sea power now that the nuclear age offers America even greater possibilities for the exploitation of sea power. It should be noted that the development of nuclear weapons and, indeed the prospect of the intercontinental ballistic missile a war of shadows in which the traditional forms of both diplomacy and war have been made to "Stand on their heads," did not bring forth Marxist-Leninist theories of unorthodox warfare.

Dr. Atkinson reasons that the nuclear age has vastly extended the possibilities implicit in the Soviet approach to warfare. For the very possibility of a nuclear war gives much greater scope to the application of Marxist-Leninist theories of unorthodox warfare.

For the present struggle is a battle of will. Unless we have an understanding of the nature of this conflict, we may succumb not with the big bang, but with the feeble whimper.

Dr. Atkinson concludes that today warfare is not limited to battles between peoples whose whole physical and moral forces are mobilized with all their economic, industrial, and moral resources. And in the final analysis our will to stand fast against the combination of threats and blandishments levied against us - our ultimate moral resource. This can be decisive.

Some Aspects of Warfare in the Nuclear Age

Dr. JAMES D. ATKINSON, Georgetown University

The American Approach To War

The British economist, Lord Keynes, has written that, "soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil." Yet it has not been until our own times that men generally have come to see how intimately their own daily lives may be affected by the theories—often seemingly esoteric—propounded by writers remote from the seats of power and responsibility. Twenty-five years ago, for example, who would have attached much significance to the writings of a little-known Chinese, Mao Tse-Tung?

Americans, have, perhaps, been more inclined to disregard theoretical concepts in this way than have Europeans or Asians. The story is told of the famous Madison Avenue tycoon who, in the midst of a business conference, rushed to a dictating machine and bellowed "Have somebody give me a memo on what this philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is all about." And if such a story is somewhat exaggerated yet it is partially typical of the American approach towards theoretical concepts generally, and it certainly should be strongly underscored with reference to the American attitude towards the theory of warfare. Sir Charles Oman has written that, "both the medieval monastic chroniclers and the modern liberal historiographers had often no closer notion of the meaning of war than that it involves various horrors and is attended by a lamentable loss of life." Both classes strove to disguise their personal ignorance or dislike of military matters by deprecating their importance and significance in history. One must note that this has been especially true in the United States although, happily, an opposite tendency has been developing in intellectual circles within the last decade. The American intellectual heritage has been, however, to regard warfare either as absolutely immoral and hence to be abolished root and branch; or as so unreasonable and repugnant to those of intellectual attainments that it will, in some mysterious way, be exorcised by the spirit of reason. Thus, the

American philosophers who have taken up the study of war have tended either to dwell on its immoral nature and to look to some legal means for suppressing it, or to view war as so unreasonable that it will disappear or can be driven from the minds of men. The American philosopher, William James, wrote in 1910 that, "the fatalistic view of the war-function is to me nonsense, for I know that war-making is due to definite motives and subject to prudential checks and reasonable criticisms, just like any other form of enterprise. And when whole nations are the armies, and the science of destruction vies in intellectual refinement with the sciences of production, I see that war becomes absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity. Extravagant ambitions will have to be replaced by reasonable claims and nations must make common cause against them." Remarkably, we see in the world of 1958 echoes of this view that war has become "absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity" in the many expressions that war is unthinkable, that war is too horrible to contemplate in the nuclear era, and, wonder of wonders, that war has finally abolished itself! The unfortunate fact is that while war may have reached a stage in which it is unthinkable to many in the civilized world, war or, at least, certain variations of warfare may still remain thinkable to Russian, Chinese Communist and other leaders. This tendency to consider war as unthinkable is, however, not really new in the American experience. Despite Jefferson's suggestion that military affairs should constitute a definite part of American education, we have often looked askance at the role of warfare in human affairs and, as a result, have usually failed to understand the raison d'etre for the employment of force. Although there are certain lesser figures, the only American who stands out as a great military theorist is Admiral Mahan; it has only been Admiral Mahan who has been recognized by historians as of a stature comparable to Clausewitz and other great European or Asian theorists of war. It seems prophetic that an American should be the great exponent of sea power now that the nuclear age offers America even greater possibilities for the exploitation of sea power. American professional officers no less than American scholars have, however, in the past, tended to avoid coming to grips with the theoretical side of warfare. As Professor Edward Mead Earle has written, "our significant contributions to warfare have been in the fields of tactics and technology, rather than strategy." This, I believe, stems from the American national character and is of a three-fold nature:

1. The almost hyper-idealistic attitude that war is immoral and hence, rather than attempt to study warfare and try to understand it, all efforts should be directed towards its immediate abolition. This is a noble impulse but, regretably, not very productive.

2. The pragmatic nature of the American mind. One of the defects of our qualities is that we sometimes tend to be excessively

practical. In foreign policy this appears as an excessive leaning towards day-to-day solutions rather than long-range planning while in military affairs we tend to think of policy as geared to a profit and loss statement. In America the theorist is relegated not to an ivory tower, but, rather, to a sub-basement. Now, this is not in all cases a bad thing. It is, however, as a tendency, bad. For, as President Wilson said in addressing a group of naval officers early in World War I, "somebody has got to think this war out." We are now engaged in a war quite as serious as though a formal declaration of war had been issued and, much more even than in a declared war, the best thinking in America must be brought to bear on the problems which confront us.

3. The third thing which stems from the American national character as it affects warfare is our leaning towards the all-or-nothing-at-all answer to whatever problem arises. We are, as a people, essentially extroverts and we go all out whenever we engage in any activity be it sports or war. Now this is not bad in itself. Certainly, our spirit of competition is one of the things which has made us a great people. What stems from this predilection for the all-or-nothing solution is, however, another matter. For we have come to believe, that we must either have the black of war or the white of peace and that we must either annihilate our antagonists as enemies or else we must embrace them as our dearest friends. In our previous history this was really not so much a handicap as it is today for the rules of the international game were pretty much generally subscribed to by all the participants. In the age of modern totalitarian states, however, this American predilection has become something of a handicap and to this problem we shall now turn.

The Marxist-Leninist Revolution in Warfare

Every age and every society has its own rationale of war, and its own philosophy of warfare, whether that philosophy is implicit or has been expressly spelled out. We have noted that the American tendency is to approach war as an overt clash of arms and, further, that the emphasis is on the material side of things. The Communists--partially because of their predilection for conspiracy and underground warfare, partially because of the as yet unsolved weaknesses in their industrial (and especially) agricultural systems--tend to approach war in a way attuned to their historical past, to the writings of their major prophets (Marx, Engels, Lenin), and to their long-term weaknesses.

If we accept Marx's statement that he "stood Hegel on his head" we can certainly say with much greater emphasis that the Soviet Union—the embodiment of Marxist-Leninist theory—daily stands diplomacy and warfare on their collective heads. This has been accomplished not only by taking the traditional trappings of diplomacy which have evolved over the centuries and using them for purposes of propaganda and subversion, but still more by blurring the traditional distinction between peace and war. For the Communists, beginning as early as Trotsky's "no war, no peace" doctrine in 1918 have, by design and by preference, used the Western concepts of international law and diplomacy in such a way as to permit them to conduct a war of shadows against all non-Communist states and institutions. The Marxist-Leninist synthesis of war is a distinct body of doctrine not so much in that it formulates a theory that war can be waged by means other than military—for other nations, other systems, other men through the ages have appreciated this fact. The philosophical significance of the Marxist-Leninist synthesis lies in the fact that the Communist theory of unconventional warfare—a true revolution in warfare—envisages a unified theory of war in which both overt and conspiratorial methods based chiefly on political-economic-sociological-psychological lines may actually take the place of formal military action; and military action is considered either as a supplement to this type of unorthodoxwarfare or as a part of this unorthodox warfare which will be used in selected or specialized cases. It must not be thought, however, that regularly constituted formations—land, sea and air—do not play a part in this synthesis. They play a highly important part, but it is, again, a reversal of the usual role of such forces. Their possession enables the Soviet leadership to indulge in the game of nuclear blackmail, the alternating propaganda of intimidation and sweetly reasonable disarmament, and the maintenance of vast reserves for the conduct of clandestine operations, guerrilla warfare and peripheral warfare. In this, then, lies the distinctive nature of the Marxist-Leninist theory of warfare. It might well be called a war of shadows in which the traditional forms of both diplomacy and war have been made to "stand on their heads." As Professor T.A. Taracouzio has so aptly observed about the Communists, "peace must be ranked on a par with war, which has always been an instrumentality and never an end per se." One might well say that the Marxist-Leninist revolution in warfare has brought the idea of William James that "peace" and "war" mean the same thing, now in posse, now in actu to a unified whole in which there are no longer the blacks of war and the whites of peace but a vast, ill-defined series of grays which now conceal, now reveal the constant, relentless, tireless struggle against the non-Communist world through a vast panorama of unorthodox warfare. Sometimes this struggle, as in the Korean War, is sharply defined. Sometimes, as in the diplomatic maneuvering in the United Nations and in the exchanges over disarmament, it is partially revealed as distant flashes of lightning illuminate even the blackest summer night. Sometimes, as was the atomic

espionage-subversion war against Canada, Great Britain and the United States, it is conducted in secrecy and silence. But always, in all places--whether ebbing, or flowing strongly—it is an approach to warfare which has worked vast changes in the conduct of world politics. It gives the great promise to Marxist-Leninists that, in the words of Khrushchev, "revolutionary theory is not a collection of 'frozen' dogmas and formulas, but a fighting guide for practical activity for the transformation of the world, for the building of communism."

Warfare in the Nuclear Age

It should be noted that the development of nuclear weapons and, indeed, the prospect of the intercontinental ballistic missile did not bring forth Marxist-Leninist theories of unorthodox warfare. These have been germinating since the time of Marx and Engels and have flowered under Lenin and Stalin. This is well shown by Lenin's use of propaganda and deception in playing off the Germans and the Allies against one another on various occasions during 1918. And at Geneva on 30 November 1927 Maxim Litvinov put forth the Soviet proposal for universal world disarmament at the same time that the Soviet and German General Staffs were engaged in secret collaboration whereby Stalin hoped vastly to extend the military power of the USSR.

The nuclear age has vastly extended the possibilities implicit in the Soviet approach to warfare. For the very possibility of a nuclear war gives much greater scope to the application of Marxist-Leninist theories of unorthodox warfare. The current tactics of this philosophy of warfare are well illustrated in a communique issued in Moscow after the conference (November 16-19, 1957) of delegations from Communist Parties from all over the world. The communique underscores the power of the USSR by stating that:

> "The unprecedented development of industry, science, and technology in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries serves peace."

Then comes an outline which indicates Soviet political warfare objectives since Communist Parties and like-minded elements throughout the world are ordered to:

> "demand prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, as a first step, an immediate end to the testing of these weapons; demands that an end be put to the policy of military blocs and the creation of military bases in other countries; demand that the German militarists ... are not allowed

> to rearm in the very heart of Europe; demand an end to the plotting and military provocation of the imperialists in the Middle East ..."

And finally the propaganda task of forming world public opinion is laid out with the idea that:

> "We address ourselves to all people of good will throughout the world: Organize and work for: 1.—Immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests: 2.—Unconditional and speedy prohibition of the manufacture and use of these weapons."

This communique was followed up with the nuclear blackmail gambit. For on November 24, 1957, Communist Party boss Khrushchev told Mr. William Randolph Hearst, Jr. that:

> "We have already won over you. We have the absolute weapon ... Your cities and bases could be stricken from the face of the earth ... The ICBM permits this. We might strike Norway or Denmark or places like that, but they are not the main adversary, though of course, in case of war, we would have to eliminate bases there."

Statements of this kind have been massive in quantity if rather crude in quality. In summing them up, however, it would seem that they constitute nuclear age political warfare on the grand scale with the objectives of:

> (1) The destruction of the American system of defensive alliances and the neutralization of Germany—potentially the strongest link in NATO.
>
> (2) The inducement of an organized neurosis by means of a propaganda of nuclear disaster in order to influence public opinion—and this means the vocal elements—in non-Communist countries as well as in the United States to pressure their respective governments to make concession after concession with respect both to nuclear weapons and general disarmament. (And there is already some evidence of such an anxiety neurosis).
>
> (3) Above all, to paralyze the will to act of the United States.

An American Philosophical Approach Towards the Present Crisis

Now, what are the implications of all of this with reference to the changing face of warfare in the nuclear age and to the American role therein? We must modify our tendency to look to the blacks of war and

the whites of peace and, instead, be prepared to accept a long struggle in the misty grey areas of unorthodox warfare. This will present a definite challenge and may try our patience sorely, but we may well take heart in the remembrance that the first great innovator of political warfare in its modern sense was not V.I. Lenin but Woodrow Wilson. We must avoid the tendency to develop the atrophy of military thought by refusing to become wedded to any single weapon system and, in a positive sense, we should encourage the build-up of a body of doctrine for the guerrilla warfare and the peripheral warfare which we may well be required to engage in. From speculative thought in these areas will come sound military policy as well as the willing support from the Congress and from the American people without which the most ambitious theories must fail. A calm and speculative appraisal of our own strength and of that of the Soviet orbit area is very much in order with reference to public opinion generally. Now, I do not want to take so dim a view of Soviet scientific achievement as that of British Police-Constable Trevor Davies who, after catching a glimpse of Sputnik No. II told a reporter:

"Personally, I was rather disappointed."

I do believe, however, that this exhibition of the traditional British phlegm might well be kept in mind and that the intellectual community as well as our national leadership—military and civilian alike, has the duty of informing the public that panic thinking is not merely foolish, but may well be, in time, destructive. For the present struggle, although a many-faceted one, is, above all else, a battle of will. Unless we have a clear understanding of the nature of this present conflict, we may very well succumb not with the big bang, but with the feeble whimper. Americans can, however, draw strength from one philosophical approach towards government which has permeated our thought from Washington and Jefferson onwards. This is the approach which, based on the Judaeo-Christian and Graeco-Roman ideas of civilization, transformed the concept of man from a confused and spiritually limited one to that of a rational human being; or, as the poet has written, man as created "a little lower than the angels." This is the idea of the dignity of the human person. It is the idealistic thread in the American philosophy which has been the source of our greatest strength. Make no mistake about it, Americans are not materialists. It is not the possession of material goods with which God has blessed us in abundance—but rather the obsession with them, the inordinate love for them--which makes the materialist. Americans have much of the material goods of this world, but do not, as a people, love them excessively. The private beneficience of Americans towards the rest of the world given willingly by all walks of life is indicative of our attitude. There is no need to labor on this point; there is much evidence to sustain it. It has been this eternal spark, the concept of man's dignity, which has ever been the prime mover in the

willingness of men, acting together, to risk their all in defense of freedom and against the encroachment of the tyrannical state, be it ancient or modern. Through the ages no man ever readily sacrificed anything either for the denarius or the dollar, but is not liberty worth any sacrifice? Higher taxes, fewer amenities, greater service; these may be unpalatable realities in a democracy's domestic politics, but there is ample reason to believe that the American people will accept any sacrifice if they are convinced of the need and if they are offered vigorous leadership. Today warfare is not limited to battles between armed groups. It has now grown to being a combat between peoples whose whole physical and moral forces are mobilized with all their economic, industrial, and moral resources. And in the final analysis our will to standfast against the combination of threats and blandishments levied against us--our ultimate moral resource--this can be decisive.

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

Dr. Osgood concentrates on two aspects: (1) the function of U. S. capacity for total war as a deterrent to aggression, and (2) the effect of Russian capacity for total war, and of our reliance on massive retaliation, upon our defensive military alliance in Europe. Four decisive considerations might shape a nation's decision whether or not to take a particular military action: (1) the value of the objective, (2) the estimated effectiveness in achieving the objective, (3) the cost (estimated liabilities) and (4) the risk of counteraction. As Soviet capacity to respond to massive retaliation has increased, the risk to the USSR of our carrying out the threat implicit in our total-war capacity has decreased. The continued emphasis upon our total-war capacity as the protector of Europe, and our continued failure to clarify publicly a strategy of intermediate response (both conventional and nuclear), deprives our allies of the incentive to give the NATO "ground shield" their material and moral support, and exacerbates the adverse political and psychological effects of a strategy that seems to leave no choice between occupation and obliteration.

Capacity For Total War

Dr. ROBERT E. OSGOOD, University of Chicago

It is natural at a time like this, when the dramatic events in outer space seize our attention, that we should be preoccupied with the technological race for military supremacy in the weapons of total war. I want to direct some of the attention we have lavished upon this technological race toward an even more important question than who has the most powerful and the longest-ranged missiles, toward a question that should logically precede our concern with the technology of destruction; and that is: How does this race serve our foreign policy?

To answer this question we must probe not only the military but also the political and psychological impact of this vast accretion of destructive power in our hands, in Soviet hands, in British hands, and perhaps in others before long.

I shall spend as little time as possible discussing hypothetical models of total war or in prescribing operational strategy and tactics, military capabilities, forces, and weapons systems for total war in order that I may have as much time as possible to discuss the political and psychological significance of the capacity for total war. If I should encroach occasionally upon the domains of limited war that fall within the province of succeeding papers, that is partly because of an inveterate habit I have recently acquired and, partly, because problems of war and military power exist along a continuum of armed conflict in which one dimension of warfare interacts with another.

At the outset, we had better be clear what we are talking about when we speak of total war. I am thinking of total war as a war in which the United States and the Soviet Union are directly engaged in a military struggle for national survival, waged by all means designed to destroy each other's will or ability to resist. In this definition, it should be noted, total war is not identical to unlimited war, which, in my opinion, is more of a logical construct than a real contingency upon which one can base strategic plans. Total war, according to this definition, would still be a political act and, therefore, would—theoretically at least—be susceptible in some degree to political discipline and direction.

A total war might be deliberately initiated by an all-out Soviet attack on an objective that we would be bound to regard as essential to our survival. If we assume a modicum of rationality in Soviet leadership, this contingency is exceedingly improbable, because the risk of destruction would be far out of proportion to the objective at stake and quite excessive considering other less risky military and nonmilitary means available to the Soviet Union. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of total war resulting from a Soviet miscalculation of our response or from miscalculations on both sides. However, the most likely source of total war would seem to be a limited war in which, through ambigous stages, physical limitations were removed in a series of counteractions until the belligerents believed that their very survival were at stake in the contest.

Exactly how a total war might be fought—with what strategy, tactics, weapons, and forces—I shall only briefly speculate upon in passing. Certainly, an intercontinental thermonuclear exchange would be the prominent feature. If this exchange were massive and virtually unrestricted, chemical and biological weapons might be superfluous; but, even so they might play a selective role in neutralizing areas intended for occupation rather than mere obliteration.

Might there not be some kinds of restrictions upon the weapons, targets, and geographical areas involved, even in a total war? One can at least conceive of geographical restrictions, combined perhaps with weapons and targets restrictions, resulting not only from military exigencies but from deliberate political direction. For example, the Soviet Union might grant nuclear or some other kind of immunity to the countries of western Europe in return for their abstention from nuclear strikes, their political neutrality, or perhaps their acquiescence in occupation. For different political reasons the United States might grant weapons and targets immunities to the geographical area of eastern Europe. However, whatever the scope for limitations outside the Soviet Union and the United States might be, it seems quite improbable that in a war for survival there would be significant weapons and targets restrictions—say, open cities—within the United States and the Soviet Union. If this war should occur at a time when both powers had substantial numbers of operational solid-fuel, including mobile, missiles, the very difficulty of locating and eliminating the enemy's striking power would place a premium upon achieving the only feasible military objective under the circumstances: the disruption of the enemy's social and political cohesion and the destruction of his capacity to exploit any military gains. And this objective would be quite incompatible with mutual restraints or with the kind of limitations upon destruction that at least theoretically were conceivable when one could envision a "counterforce" strategy in the age before missile-plenty.

Nevertheless, it might be that just because both powers realized that they faced social and political collapse—or perhaps even an intolerable level of radioactivity in the world's atmosphere—long before they could eliminate the enemy's striking power, they might tacitly or formally find a basis of mutual interest in restrictions upon military means, perhaps as the beginning of a bargaining process looking toward the termination of the conflict while the level of destruction still bore some relation to rational political objectives. Stranger things than this have happened to upset the images of war that men have taken for granted in their illusion of foresight. Such a development would be the more conceivable if the total war had grown out of miscalculation, accident, or limited war; because then there might be a mutual desire to reduce the dimensions of violence to a level more commensurate with the original political objectives of the belligerents.

I raise these speculations not because I am convinced they are realistic but only to suggest that we make a mistake in envisioning total war as a single, uniform entity and, especially, as something that is predetermined to be fought without any political or military restrictions at all, except those dictated by military exigencies. Total war is only an approximate point along a spectrum of armed conflict. There are possible varieties, forms, and degrees of total war—even though they are not so significant as the varieties of limited war—which we cannot afford to overlook in our planning.

But I shall not speculate further about possible models of total war or about the means of fighting total war. It is enough for my purpose this afternoon to observe that it would be madness to count on total war leading to anything short of the virtual destruction of the fabric of our civilization. At least it is the anticipation of this likely outcome that accounts for the political and psychological impact of the capacity for total war.

When we think of this political and psychological impact, we should think of a great variety of effects exerted upon the behavior of the United States, upon a potential or actual aggressor, upon our allies, and upon uncommitted nations; we should think of a great variety of effects exerted for a great variety of political objectives. But I shall concentrate upon only two aspects of this impact: (a) the function of America's capacity for total war as a deterrent to aggression; (b) the effect of Russia's capacity for total war and our reliance on massive retaliation upon our defensive military alliance in Europe.

The function of our total-war capacity as a rational instrument of policy must lie in the objectives it enables us to accomplish by its mere existence, for its active use would lead to consequences that exceed the bounds of rational benefit. The most important of these objectives is the deterrence of aggression. But what kinds of aggression will this capacity deter? If we

knew the answer to that, we would solve one of our most troublesome strategic problems. Yet we can never know the answer with assurance, because it depends so largely upon a calculation of subjective factors. However, we can at least know something about the nature of these factors and that will at least help us to make our calculations of deterrence systematically. Let me present an outline of a calculus of deterrence that I find helpful. It is susceptible to considerable refinement and elaboration, but I think that its rudimentary form is adequate for testing the efficacy of our capacity for massive retaliation as a deterrent.

We can say that deterrence exists when X causes Y to refrain from taking an action he would otherwise take because Y fears X's counter-action. But to calculate the efficacy of a deterrent we must know what kinds of considerations might cause Y to act or to refrain from acting under various circumstances. I think we can single out four decisive considerations which, assuming a modicum of rationality, might shape a nation's decision whether or not to take a particular military action. These considerations, it is important to note, are as decisive for the subject as for the object of deterrence. They are interrelated. None of them has the quality of mathematical precision. All must be roughly estimated. Some are quite intangible.

The first of these considerations and the most important one is the value of the objective at stake, either in terms of achieving a positive gain or avoiding a loss. The value of the objective is the measure of a nation's desire to achieve an intended outcome through a proposed action.

The second rational consideration that shapes a nation's decision whether to act or to refrain from acting is his estimates of the effectiveness of the proposed action in achieving the objective at stake.

Together, these two considerations establish the benefit that is expected to accrue from an action. But the net benefit cannot be figured apart from the estimated costs of the action in question.

Therefore, the third consideration is the cost of the proposed action: that is, the estimated liabilities. The cost will depend heavily upon the nature of the counteraction that is anticipated—particularly, the scope and intensity of the response and the resulting war; therefore, the estimate of the counteraction—whether there will be one and, if so, what will be its nature—deserves a separate place as a decisive consideration.

Put another way, the fourth consideration that shapes a nation's decision whether or not to take a proposed action is his estimate of the risk of counteraction of various kinds.

Now, applying this rough benefit-cost-risk calculus to the requirements of deterrence, we can say that X will deter Y from acting if he causes Y to estimate that the cost will be too high in relation to the potential benefit in the light of the objective at stake. But how does X establish this disadvantageous estimate in Y's mind? This is the crux of the question of deterrence. One way would be for X to confront Y with a threat of resistance that promises to deprive Y of the effective achievement of his objective. This we might call the method of denial. Another way is to threaten Y with a reprisal that will impose costs that Y will regard as out of proportion to the value of the objective at stake. It is this latter method upon which the deterrent effect of our capacity for massive retaliation, or total war, depends.

But we have left out a crucial consideration in the calculus of deterrence. It is not enough merely to threaten a potential aggressor, Y, with a counteraction that will impose out of proportion to the objective at stake. X must also convince Y that the risk of the counteraction that would impose these costs is too great to make aggression worthwhile; for otherwise Y may calculate that it is worth taking a change that X will not exercise his capacity for total war in retaliation.

Here we encounter the two-way aspect of deterrence. For Y will estimate the risk of massive retaliation or any other counteraction largely in terms of the benefit-cost-risk calculation that he believes X will make. Thus if the leaders of the Soviet Union believe that American leaders must calculate that the costs resulting from massive retaliation will be disproportionate to the value of the objective—or the benefit—from the American standpoint, the credibility of that counteraction is greatly reduced. Put another way, the risk of massive retaliation facing the Soviet Union is reduced and the temptation to aggression is increased. This means that as the Soviet capacity to respond to massive retaliation by comparable means has increased, the risk to the Soviet Union—or the credibility—of our carrying out the threat implicit in our total-war capacity has decreased.

However, we cannot say that this fact necessarily reduces the effectiveness of the Great Deterrent against a particular form of aggression in a particular circumstance without taking into account the other decisive considerations in the calculus of deterrence. In determining the efficacy of the Great Deterrent special importance will attach to the relative value that the United States and the potential aggressor assign to their respective objectives when the costs to each are virtually equal and equally costly. Thus it is now widely assumed that, whereas our capacity for massive retaliation may be sufficiently credible to deter an all-out assault upon an area as important to us as western Europe, it may well fail to deter a limited aggression on some objective of less immediate importance to us in the rimlands of Eurasia, assuming that the aggressor assigns a sufficient value to obtaining his limited

aggression by military means to offset the risk that we would find it worthwhile to respond massively.

Even so, it remains true that we cannot calculate the efficacy of any deterrent—massive or less-than-massive retaliation—with certainty, because so many considerations, so many variables, are involved and because such a large element of subjectivity and mind-reading is unavoidable. All the more reason, then, that a prudent government should base its deterrent strategy upon a margin of safety commensurate with the penalties of miscalculation; that is, with the costs of the situation with which the government would be faced if the deterrent should fail.

Nevertheless, I must inject a word in behalf of the efficacy of the Great Deterrent, lest we depreciate the importance and the wisdom of accepting the risks of total war under some circumstances. Just as we must be careful not to overestimate the efficacy of the Great Deterrent, so we must beware of underestimating its efficacy, especially where the alternatives of local ground resistance or "selective retaliation" entail some considerable disadvantages and difficulties of their own. It would be disastrous to work ourselves into the frame of mind in which we operated as though all the risks of total war fell upon us and none upon the potential aggressor.

After all, there must be few political objectives, aside from the defense of its homeland, for which the Soviet Union would be willing to incur the penalties of total war and, therefore, not many objectives that it would be willing to pursue by overt military aggression at even a slight risk that we might retaliate with our capacity for total war. Moreover, it is probably true, as Mr. Dulles has stated, that as long as we make our determination to resist overt aggression clear in advance, we can safely afford some ambiguity as to the means and scope of resistance; for since the potential aggressor must calculate that in this age of tactical nuclear weapons the chances of less-than-massive counteraction developing into total war are increasing, more of the risk of total war becomes implicit in any counteraction. Finally, we should realize that the Communist powers are not eager to incur the costs and risks of any overt military action as long as they have so many attractive opportunities to pursue their objectives by non-military means. (I hasten to add that this is not an argument for maintaining our vulnerability to nonmilitary incursions and that, regardless of our present vulnerability, the attractiveness of military and paramilitary aggression is bound to fluctuate with changing circumstances that neither we nor the Communists can predict with assurance.)

Yet, having said this much in behalf of the efficacy of the Great Deterrent, I must still stress its limitations in the light of the full spectrum of contingencies in which we might find it wise or essential to employ our

military power to support our security objectives. Considering the full range of contingencies we should like to deter, I think we still expect too much of the threat of massive retaliation. And, by overloading its deterrent capacity we not only render ourselves vulnerable to less extreme aggressions, we also jeopardize what credibility the Great Deterrent retains.

Let me list the contingencies which the Great Deterrent may not deter, in order of their descending or disappearing susceptibility to deterrence: (a) direct limited aggression, involving the employment of Soviet or Red Chinese forces, threatening objectives of limited value to us (If the forces employed are sea forces, such as submarines, their employment would probably be less susceptible to deterrence than the employment of ground troops); (b) indirect overt military aggression by powers other than the Soviet Union or Red China but incited and supported by Soviet or Chinese equipment, economic aid, staff personnel, agents, or volunteers; (c) ambigious forms of aggression (that is, forms other than an overt attack across a clearly-defined border) growing out of indigenous revolutions, guerilla warfare, subversion and paramilitary operations, supported indirectly by the Soviet Union or Red China, but not by Soviet or Chinese troops; (d) conflicts among uncommitted nations, possibly inflamed by the Soviet Union or Red China, which impinge upon American security; (e) Soviet satellite revolts that come to involve western forces.

Merely by envisaging these various kinds of contingencies in concrete terms, you can readily see that our capacity for massive retaliation is of dubious efficacy as a reliable deterrent. For the purpose of deterring some of these possible contingencies this capacity is irrelevant, either because the deterrent threat would not be delivered to the right address, so to speak, or because there would be no reliable means of verifying whether the threat had been violated or observed. In the case of these contingencies America's capacity for total war could at best serve the function of deterring an existing military action from exceeding certain limits.

And yet, despite the apparent limitations of the Great Deterrent, we are strongly tempted to overload its deterrent capacity; for the economic and the other advantages that are supposed to accrue from a strategy of massive retaliation, as opposed to a strategy of local defense and limited war, are in proportion to the number of different kinds of aggressions or contingencies which this single military capacity can deter. Therefore, we naturally seek to extend the range of contingencies—or, more recently, at least withstall the contraction of the range—that we rely upon the Great Deterrent to prevent. We try to do this in two general ways which deserve more analysis than they commonly receive: (a) by increasing our capacity for total war; (b) by verbal reaffirmations of the implicit or explicit threat of massive retaliation.

As for the efficacy of the first method, several observations are in order: (a) With respect to those contingencies to which the threat of massive retaliation is simply irrelevant, no increase in our offensive or defensive capacity for total war will increase its efficacy as a deterrent. (b) With respect to those contingencies for which the threat of massive retaliation is of dubious efficacy because it would entail for us a risk of total war far out of proportion to the value of our objectives, regardless of the destruction we can deliver upon the Soviet Union, only the prospect of being spared virtual annihilation ourselves would increase the efficacy of the Great Deterrent—and this prospect is quite remote. (c) With respect to those contingencies which our capacity for total war is effective in deterring, the preservation of its efficacy depends not upon a material superiority or even a parity in destructive power but only upon sufficient destructive power to impose unacceptable damage upon the aggressor. What would constitute unacceptable damage is another question, and the answer depends, in part, upon the compensatory benefit the aggressor anticipates. But whatever this level of damage may be, we must seriously ask the question: May we not reach in the coming age of mobile and solid-fuel missiles a point of diminishing or perhaps nonexistent returns in the deterrence we derive from a given increase in our offensive and even our defensive capacity for total war? Or is this point of "saturation," as Sir Winston Churchill called it, merely a hypothetical situation which, in practice, we can never be sure of attaining because of the dynamic state of military technology? The answer depends upon more considerations than I have the time to discuss. But whether or not we are approaching the saturation point, I suggest that we have already reached the point at which we get more deterrence and security for our dollar in increasing our capabilities for limited war than in increasing our capabilities for total war.

How about the efficacy of the second method by which we try to maximize the range of contingencies covered by the Great Deterrent; that is, the method of verbal affirmation? Of course, the words we use—that is, our declaratory strategy—exert an important deterrent effect; but in a democracy their importance is severely limited by the extent to which they reflect a reality of national will. If they do not reflect national will, they are likely to be exposed, sooner or later, as a bluff. For a potential Communist aggressor will judge our national will to carry out counteraction by more important criteria than official statements. Pre-eminent among these criteria will be the benefit-cost-risk calculus we confront; related to this criteria, our actual military capabilities and their strategic function; our record of performance in responding to overt aggression and threats of aggression; the effect of allied and neutral sentiment upon our government's decisions to use force; and, finally, the effect of domestic opinion upon our government's decision to use force. Certainly, the potential aggressor will estimate at least these crucial factors, quite apart from our official pronouncements, in calculating the

risk of counteraction he incurs. Moreover, he will be sensitive to any discrepancy between our words and the inferences he draws from his estimate of these factors. Therefore, we should beware of assuming that we can maintain the credibility of our will to fight a total war merely by the power of positive affirmation.

Actually, when one takes account of its effect upon allied and domestic opinion, such affirmation may undermine rather than reinforce the credibility of the Great Deterrent. For, when such affirmation does not truly reflect a substantial popular will, it will excite apprehensions and alarmed protests which will undermine official affirmations. The government spokesmen themselves will feel called upon to qualify their threats of massive retaliation, by giving assurances that the government will not necessarily turn every small war into a thermonuclear holocaust, etc. It seems to me that this is exactly what has happened in the United States and Great Britain.

I think that these facts of democratic life mean that the scope of successful bluff in strategic pronouncements is very narrow indeed. I would add that for the same reasons—and because of the nature of their political objectives—democracies cannot effectively manipulate the threat of total war as an instrument of psychological warfare with the boldness that serves the Soviet Union well. In any case, considering the penalties of having one's bluff called, we should regard the deterrent effect of our capacity for total war as a very precious currency, the value of which depends upon its sparing and judicious use.

With the increasing awareness of the limits of the Great Deterrent that has accompanied the growth of Soviet nuclear power, the great majority of amateur and official strategists have concluded that our total-war capability needs to be supplemented with a limited-war capability that will enable us to tailor our military capacity to the circumstances; to keep the costs and risks of war proportionate to the objectives at stake, and to bring national power into balance with our will to use it. However, many who intellectually subscribe to this thesis hesitate in practice to support a serious effort to develop an adequate limited-war capability—and, especially, they hesitate to support the clear public pronouncement of a limited-war strategy—because they are afraid that this would undermine the credibility of the threat of massive retaliation and actually invite limited aggression. I think it is apparent, if the preceding analysis of what establishes the credibility of the Great Deterrent is correct, that their fears are groundless, and that the formulation, the material support, and the clear declaration of a limited-war strategy will not undermine the deterrent effect of our capacity for massive retaliation any more than it has already been undermined by factors more important than our official pronouncements. At the same time, the worst course we can follow is to permit our threat of massive retaliation to be qualified by consoling

official pronouncements and the processes of democratic discussion while we fail to develop an adequate capacity for less-than-massive war. And, yet if one follows the trend of American and British strategic pronouncements and their defense policies, it is apparent that we are already drifting far down this very course.

So far, I have spoken only of deterrence, but this is only one aspect of the manifold political and psychological effects exerted by the capacity of the nuclear powers for total war. The question of whether the Great Deterrent succeeds or fails in preventing different kinds of aggression is a crucial one, but of almost equal importance is the effect that the very existence of the capacity for total war exerts upon diplomacy and upon the configurations of national power, interest, and will. As George Kennan has recently said, "Armaments are important not just for what could be done with them in time of war, but for the psychological shadows they cast in time of peace."

I suppose that the political and psychological assets of our capacity for total war are fairly obvious, but the liabilities of our overwhelming dependence upon this deterrent are not yet so generally appreciated. These liabilities spring from the fact that our will to fight for vital objectives depends, in effect, upon our willingness to commit national suicide. Since our diplomacy and the political positions we assume must rest, ultimately, upon the sanction of force, our overwhelming dependence upon a catastrophic response is bound to weaken our diplomacy and reduce our scope of political maneuver. For either we shall tend to take a firm diplomatic position only when we are willing to assume risks of total war or else we shall tend to take positions that exceed our willingness to support at such risks. In either case or both combined our diplomacy will tend to be rigid, unimaginative, weak, vacillating, or unconvincing. The political and psychological liabilities will be as apparent in our relations with our allies as in our position with respect to the Communist bloc or the uncommitted nations. I am afraid that some of these liabilities are already manifest in NATO's troubles.

From the beginning NATO strategy has depended overwhelmingly upon the deterrent effect of America's capacity for massive retaliation. Our allies had confidence in the Great Deterrent and were content to be dependent upon it as long as we enjoyed an atomic monopoly or a meaningful superiority. But the growth of Russia's nuclear power has steadily undermined this original confidence. It has been undermined, on the one hand, by doubts that we would be willing to commit suicide in their behalf—especially if the aggression took a limited or ambiguous form—and, on the other hand, by fears that if we did respond to aggression it would lead to their obliteration as well as our own. Now the question arises: Can a working defensive alliance be based upon a strategy that compels its members to choose between

inaction and total war, especially when the power of choice seems to rest almost exclusively in the hands of its nuclear members? For to the extent that our allies must depend upon our Great Deterrent for their security, they must anticipate that we can only leave them defenseless or else drag them into a suicidal war. Therefore, they must look around for means of reducing their dependence upon NATO; they must seek alternative means of security. Whether they find these means or not, they become increasingly vulnerable to the Soviet Union's dual strategy of nuclear blackmail combined with gestures of conciliation and detente—a strategy that is clearly intended to dissolve the bonds of NATO and leave each of its members isolated in the face of Russian political and military pressure.

In recognition of the political and psychological—not to mention military—liabilities of an exclusive reliance upon America's capacity for massive retaliation at a time of growing Soviet nuclear capacity, NATO planners have looked toward the creation of a ground shield, which would have as one of its functions the ability to relieve NATO from confronting in all contingencies the choice, as General Norstad has put it, between passive acquiescence and thermonuclear Armageddon. However, within the context of a total-war strategy it has been very difficult to provide our allies with sufficient incentive to support this shield adequately. Yet, NATO has been reluctant to announce a less-than-total-war strategy for fear of reducing the credibility of the Great Deterrent, upon which the defense of Europe overwhelmingly depends in the absence of an adequate shield.

If the ground forces are intended to protect Europe from occupation and liberation following an all-out Russian assault—which was one basis of NATO's original appeal for contributions and which has been since called essential—then they are obviously too small. It should be quite evident by now that our allies are not remotely willing to support a force that would be large enough for this purpose, especially since an effective defense in a total war would lead to their obliteration. If the ground forces are intended as a trip-wire—which is something that some government leaders have argued but which NATO has been forced to deny—then there is no need for the approximately 30 divisions on the central line for which NATO has called in vain. Indeed, no troops at all should be necessary to signal that an all-out Russian assault on Europe had begun. In any case, in terms of a total-war strategy there is no more incentive for our allies to furnish troops for a trip-wire than for defense. If the ground forces are committed to defend Europe with tactical nuclear weapons, regardless of the form of attack, in order to compensate for NATO's inferiority in mobilized manpower—which is what the North Atlantic Council decision of December 1954 seemed to promise—then within a total-war strategy such a commitment only assures our allies that NATO resistance means nuclear obliteration for them.

Therefore, it may be that only in terms of some credible intermediate function, including a conventional capacity, some responses between the smallest police action and total war that NATO's ground shield can have sufficient meaning for our allies in terms of their own security to relieve NATO from the political and psychological liabilities of depending upon America's willingness to commit suicide. However, the mitigation of these liabilities might not be a sufficient reason in itself for NATO's developing a larger capability for intermediate responses if such a capability were not objectively needed for deterrence and resistance against forms of aggression short of an all-out assault. The psychological and political argument for a strategy of intermediate responses might not be persuasive if the threat of limited, indirect, and ambiguous aggressions in Europe were negligible or if limited war in Europe were too improbable to be worth preparing for. But as the fact of Russia's parity in nuclear destructive power sinks into the consciousness of democratic peoples and governments, fewer and fewer observers are willing to base NATO's strategy on these assumptions, even though officially they are still virtually axiomatic.

Evidently, General Norstad himself believes that NATO's capability for intermediate responses is crucial, since one of the arguments he has made for the ground shield—be it noted, in terms of a conventional as well as a nuclear response—is that it is essential in order to prevent limited fait accomplis, to meet conflicts starting by accident of miscalculation, and to relieve the West of choosing between acquiescing in a limited incursion or launching a thermonuclear Armageddon. Yet, at the same time, statements continue to come from high civilian and military officials in the United States that there can be no limited war in Europe, that a limited war there is impossible, and that certainly a non-nuclear war is impossible because nuclear weapons are "conventional" and NATO would be at an insuperable disadvantage if they were not. So if one tries to reconcile all these statements at their face value, one reaches the confusing conclusion that it is essential for NATO to be prepared to fight something that is short of total war and yet not a limited war.

One suspects that the chief source of the confusion is first the attempt to preserve the credibility of the Great Deterrent (supplemented by the threat-value of tactical nuclear weapons) and, secondly, to avoid encouraging limited aggression, by verbal reaffirmations of the one and staunch denials of the possibility of the other. If so, one can sympathize with the attempt and yet be very skeptical of its succeeding. One must be skeptical because of the other more substantial tests of NATO's will and intentions that are readily available to the Russians, who can scarcely be expected to base their calculations upon official pronouncements alone. For that matter the credibility of our declaratory strategy in Europe is undermined even on the level of official pronouncements by the contradictory nature of our public

statements, including those elicited by debates in the House of Commons and the Buddestag. One must be very optimistic to assume that this kind of ambiguity is itself a deterrent; it seems more likely to the kind of ambiguity that the Russians interpret as a sign of indecision and weakness of will.

At the same time, the continued emphasis upon our total-war capacity as the protector of Europe and the continued failure to clarify publicly a strategy of intermediate responses (both conventional and nuclear) deprives our allies of the incentive to give the shield their material and moral support and exacerbates the adverse political and psychological effects of a strategy that seems to leave no choice between occupation and obliteration. Exactly what practical political form the psychological reaction to NATO's seemingly inflexible strategy will take, under the dual leverage of Russia's nuclear blackmail and offers of accommodation and detente, one cannot predict. But the psychological reaction itself is becoming all too evident in Europe. Most noticeably, in this recent year it has been manifested in its most extreme form by demands for the unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons, by books like the military analyst Sir Stephen King-Hall's (which advocates a strategy of nonviolent resistance as the only way out), and by statements not only by Bertrand Russell but by responsible political leaders suggesting that occupation is preferable to obliteration.

On a more practical level of governmental policy this psychological groundswell has put pressure behind two expendients—one military and the other political—which seem to promise our allies an escape from the doubts and fears surrounding NATO's strategy. The first expedient is their acquisition of an independent nuclear capacity; the second involves deals with the Soviet Union for disengagement, neutralization, de-nuclearization, or merely the relief of tensions. I believe that one can make a reasonable case for the diffusion of nuclear weapons to our allies under some conditions, though I should always regard this as a concession to the least objectionable alternative, made in the assumption that they are going to get their own nuclear weapons anyway regardless of whether we help them. One can also make a reasonable case for some kinds of political accommodation in the center of Europe, though none of the conditions that would lead me to favor disengagement or de-nuclearization exist at the present time. But under any conditions these expedients will make sense only if they do not destroy the vitality of NATO and the credibility of America's commitment to come to the defense of Europe, upon which that vitality depends. If, on the other hand, these expedients gain currency chiefly as panaceas or as devices for escaping from dependence on NATO, they could prove disastrous. Instead of restoring confidence in NATO and providing Europe with a new sense of security and control over its destiny, these measures could undermine America's willingness to involve itself in Europe's wars, they could dissolve the bonds of mutual obligation that hold NATO together and reduce the alliance to a collection of isolated nuclear units,

each one forced to rely exclusively upon its independent will to commit suicide. At the least, this trend would provide the Russians with dangerous political leverage. At the worst, it would encourage limited and ambiguous forms of conventional aggression.

I am not predicting. I am merely projecting present trends into the future. And I am raising the disturbing question that is suggested by developments during recent months: Is it possible that we may be witnessing even now the inception of one of those great psychological groundswells like the one in the thirties that progressively undermined Europe's will to fight? If so, we shall be sadly misguided if we believe that the will to fight can be preserved merely by repeating our determination to massively retaliate and by exhorting our allies to share our determination. For, given NATO's choice between total war and nonresistance, such repetition and exhortation terrifies not only our allies but ourselves far more than it terrifies the Soviet Union.

I suggest that in Europe as in other parts of the world the West can preserve its will to accept the risks of total war and convincingly communicate it to potential aggressors only if it has a strategy and the capabilities that permit it to draw upon that will economically instead of dissipating it in a vain attempt to cover contengencies that do not directly impinge upon national survival. In order to counter these far more likely contingencies, the West can demonstrate its will to fight only to the extent that it has recourse to effective responses beyond inaction but short of suicide. But this problem I gladly leave to subsequent speakers.

DECLASSIFIED Unclassified

The Honorable Garrison Norton

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (Air)

We have had a busy, interesting, and for me a most informative day, and tomorrow promised to be equally rewarding. You gentlemen gathered in this room are responsible for a large part of the creative thinking on meeting the problems of war in the nuclear age, and the Navy is extremely fortunate in gaining our collective and individual counsel.

I certainly would not presume to guide your deliberations, but I would like to take this opportunity to put to you a rather general concern which I have felt increasingly over the past years.

The Navy, the Defense Department and many private groups have produced a number of studies over this period on various aspects of nuclear war. My concern is not with the quality of these works. Among them there have been intellectual analyses of strategies, tactics and techniques which are proving of great value.

It is rather that I question whether enough of these studies give adequate weight to the emotional and often somewhat irrational factors that affect our national performance in war. We sometimes find it difficult to bring our strength to bear most effectively. I believe our difficulties stem more from inhibitions and doubts than from material or technical shortcomings. These intangible factors must be carefully evaluated in any realistic estimates of how we can best conduct modern war.

Let me give you one or two examples of what I mean.

Probably the most important imponderable factor stems from the American popular concept of suitable war aims. We have traditionally tended to subordinate political objectives to the achievement of absolute military victory, and to feel that there is something a little discreditable in doing otherwise. Waging war, once we have been attacked, has been for us a moral obligation, in which the punishment of the aggressor equated with our own survival. The enemy had to be brought to his knees not only to assure our safety, but because he deserved it.

Certainly over the last few years the American people have come to see the essential differences between all-our war and lesser levels

of conflict, but I believe we still suffer from what has been called the unconditional surrender syndrome. We have not yet accepted the fact that a limited war, no matter how hard fought, can only lead to limited victory. Our resentment during the Korean hostilities that American blood should be shed for what seemed to be minor returns was natural and understandable, but it was hardly compatible with our realistic decision not to enlarge the scope of the war.

America's attitude toward costs in war, most particularly casualties, is another factor to be considered. We have a commendably high regard for the life of the American fighting man and it is a tribute to our standard of values that we should feel as we do. To preserve the life of an individual, we will expend quantities of materiel that stagger our enemies and astonish our friends.

Therefore, to send Americans into battle without providing them with the maximum firepower our technology can devise, runs directly against our traditional way of doing things. Yet we are now faced with the possible necessity of doing just that. You will discuss at length the problems of nuclear weapons in limited war during these two days but I think we can all visualize small war situations where the use of even the smallest tactical nuclear weapon would have adverse political repercussions far outweighing any military advantage we might gain. It is hard for me to forecast popular feeling in this country should such a situation arise, but it will be a major factor in determining our course of action.

We have developed strong popular views not only on the survival of our fighting man but also on his comfort and well being which constitute another factor in gauging our ability in modern war. As Thomas St. George wrote, "We are certainly the only Nation that puts crushed pineapple ashore on a beachhead on D+2. No one wishes to deny any possible amenities to our fighting men at any time, but in an age when mobility is crucial and air transport necessarily limited, austerity must rear its head. Again popular feeling and reaction is a factor.

Another aspect of our military strength which must be considered but which defies evaluation is our decision-making capability.

The need of modern vehicles, particularly aircraft and missiles and indeed the pace of modern war as a whole, have made the ability to reach quick decisions more crucial than ever, but the decision-making process has never been more difficult to pin down and improve. I believe two primary factors have contributed to this difficulty. First, for better or for worse, modern world-wide communications are virtually instantaneous, so that ultimate responsibility for even tactical decisions no longer has to rest at

a subordinate level. It is always possible to draw it nearer to the top, and the tendency usually seems to be to do so. The man on the spot is no longer alone. A modern Nelson could hardly evade orders by anything so simple as a blind eye. He would have to arrange a multiple power failure.

Second, the power to decide is the power to control. In a working democracy at peace, there is a natural tendency to place checks on that power through processes of review and reconsideration. While these processes assure that the issues will be aired and balanced against other considerations, they also move the ultimate decision nearer to the center or top of the government structure.

Placing decision-making authority at that point in any organization, where the appropriate man handles appropriate matters, is never easy. It is peculiarly difficult when the wartime need for flexibility and promptness of action run counter to the workings of a long-established and proven system of checks and balances. I sometimes wonder whether in our search for the optimum organizational pattern to achieve substantive ends, we have not let tidy organization become an end in itself. At any rate, in our deliberations we must not assume that we will approach this aspect of our problem in the most rational way.

These are but a few of the intangible factors that introduce an unknown element in any estimate of American performance in modern war.

They raise, in turn, the larger question of whether a democracy can wage war effectively in the nuclear age. Traditionally, we have been at our worst in the early stages of a war. A general war in the future is likely to have only one cataclysmic stage, and prompt action will be necessary if limited hostilities are to be prevented from growing and spreading.

I am convinced that, if necessary, the U. S. can wage effective war. But today, military victory will not be a sufficient objective. Our aims will have to be a carefully considered body of political and only incidentally, military objectives. Our policies must be known and they must be clearly understood by the people who have to support them and carry them through.

I hardly need point out to this group that we are still a good way from achieving the clarity and certainty of popular understanding that we may hope for either at home or abroad. The deliberations and conclusions of assemblies such as this can do much toward making such understanding possible.

Finally, gentlemen, let me refer briefly to another subject, or perhaps I should call it another aspect of our many-sided problem.

In my view there has been too little exploration of the pros and cons of maintaining a decentralized approach to defense research. There seems to be considerable acceptance of an assumption that basic and supporting research should be entirely removed from service sponsorship, and centralized in a single, separate agency, leaving to service sponsorship only the research associated with development of weapons systems for which there is a specific requirement, duly blessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Well, gentlemen, even this one aspect of defense organization is a big subject—too big for discussion here; but after five years of association with the research effort of the Air Force, and two years with the Navy, I have been tremendously impressed by the cooperation between all three services in this field. I personally have never encountered a single example, either in basic or supporting research, of the alleged rivalry and bickering featured, always in general terms, by the press. In a sense, I believe research is self-policing as far as over-lapping and duplication are concerned, if only for the fact that the scientist gets no credit for paralleling a trail already blazed by others.

The very examples so often used nowadays to justify centralization, strike me as good arguments for decentralization and competition. One such example, frequently put forward these past months, is research in solid propellants by all three services. But look what has happened to the specific impulse of solid fuels during this same period of time! We Americans believe in business competition; in fact, we write laws to guarantee its continued existence. Are we to lose sight of the value of competition, properly regulated, in our Defense Establishment?

Even more important, are we to lose sight of the fact that scientists and military men for the teams upon which our survival as a Nation depends? Are we now about to forget, in the interests of tidy organization, that the prompt, direct feed-back between the scientist and the military man is the very foundation of our defense in this nuclear age?

Well, gentlemen, this is an after-dinner speech and I have expressed enough concerns. So let me end by saying to you once more how much we of the Navy appreciate your taking the time and trouble to join us for these discussions.

Thank you.

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Dr. Elliott states Khrushchev is obviously trying to impose his own frame of analysis on us by suggestion, mass hypnotism, and terror. We have to have our own—not only to resist him, to beat him, to impose our frame of analysis to get off the defensive, to carry the initiative in the spheres in which thought and moral action, and faith and commitment are necessary to any kind of use of weapon systems.

How can you count on our nation taking risks, necessary risks, but not bad gambles, if there is nothing for which people are prepared to risk the supreme risk, "The last full measure of devotion," as Lincoln spoke of it.

In this sense, the struggle that we are talking about goes beyond conventional war, with limited objectives and a beginning and end. The very nature of the protracted war on all fronts with the Soviet System is that it is with us now and will continue to be until the Soviet System changes or cracks, or we do.

Dr. Elliott concluded this is a protracted war on every front we are engaged in. It is for our lifetime and for our children's lifetime, if we are lucky enough to draw it out—barring the miracle of the Soviet Bear changing his nature. Pray God we are going to win it because on our winning may depend, for a considerable period of time, whether humanity becomes conditioned animals under the control of a magician (the magic formula)--or human beings who still have some conception that they are the creatures of a God, however mysterious, in whom they continue to trust and rely on for strength outside their own, as Lincoln did.

[redacted]

Limited Conventional War

Dr. WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT, University of Harvard

Captain Gentry—Gentlemen—Now I must hasten to live down your kind introduction. You know what the counting of what one has written and other people have not read amounts to: I must be one of the most widely unread authors in the world. In that respect I am unlike my friend, Bill McGovern, who does, it is true, write a lot of books that he doesn't expect people to read, like The Early Empires of Central Asia. But he also writes a lot of books like Into Lhassa in Disguise that people fight to read for a generation or two.

Well, being a consultant is a difficult thing, too. If I may depart from my text for a moment to tell the plight of consultants: I don't tell any more the story that I used to tell so freely around University circles. It was about a man who borrowed the parrot trained in the Coué method of suggestion to increase his egg-laying production—I'm now a farmer and this went very well with my problems. The parrot kept saying to the hens all night long, over and over again, "Lay more eggs, lay more eggs"—a sort of a Coué treatment to the hends. Joined to keeping the lights on all night and having a parrot repeat his formula, this method apparently produced a marked increase in egg production. One of the neighbors wanted to borrow the parrot (to try it out and maybe get one of his own). The owner said, "He's the most valuable property I have, take care of him." The first night went off without incident. But in the morning the man who had borrowed the parrot came down and found all the young cockerels in the pen standing around with their necks ruffled and ready to flog the parrot with their spurs. The unfortunate parrot was backed into a corner and he had one claw—one foot lifted. He said, "Now, gentlemen, you've got me all wrong; I'm only here in a consultant capacity."

Now, that used to seem to me to be a very good story; but, unfortunately, I began to reflect on it a little bit and I thought: "Heavens! In my view, the government over a period of years (both Republican and Democratic) has been laying more than a fair proportion of eggs. Maybe I could be thought to have something to do with it! I won't tell that story on myself anymore!

[redacted]

In times like these I hope it's permitted for us to be a little less serious than my student, Henry Kissinger, who has a thoroughly dramatic seriousness and the sweeping philosophical perspective that I marked earlier when he was my tutorial student. He demonstrated it later on when he wrote an excellent thesis on the philosophy of history and in his work, A World Restored, which I am happy he dedicated to me. It's a book that I would recommend to you. Dr. Kissinger's book on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy is more widely read and better understood.

What he was concerned with in his historical book on Metternich and the period particularly before the Congress of Vienna, is the principle of "legitimacy." What is legitimacy? It is a principle for which people will fight. How can we today not only restore a world as Metternich was trying to do, but run a coalition (which he tried to shape against Napoleon) and make it aware of the dangers today from a determined and singly-centered enemy. Well, in some sense I think Henry has been trying to do this for us today, a young Metternich, not yet in Office. To me it was great comfort—bottled up as I was in the National Security Council Planning Board and unable to say a word in public anywhere—to see Henry trying to do a little bit what Metternich was trying to do at that time—to spell out a doctrine to meet Communist strategy, to give a framework of basic analysis.

This effort is in many ways the most important thing that we have to do because Khrushchev is obviously trying to impose his own frame of analysis on us, by suggestion, mass hypnotism and terror. We must have our own—not only to resist him—but as Dr. Kissinger has pointed out in his last concluding words in his very fine talk: to beat him—to impose our frame of analysis—to get off the defensive—to carry the initiative in the spheres in in which thought and moral action, and, I dare use the words, faith and commitment—are all necessary to any kind of use of weapons systems.

How can you count on our nation taking risks, necessary risks, but not bad gambles, if there is nothing for which people are prepared to risk the supreme risk, "The last full measure of devotion," as Lincoln spoke of it.

In this sense the struggle that we are talking about goes beyond conventional war, with limited objectives and a beginning and an end. The very nature of the protracted war on all fronts with the Soviet system is that it is with us now and will be until the Soviet system changes or cracks, or we do.

Conventional limited war, like limited war with nuclear weapons, fits into this total picture of protracted warfare. It is the particular part of the puzzle that I want to try to frame. We must therefore look at some of the

assumptions underlying limited war without being merely semantic about it. Does "war" today mean to people a regular engagement of main forces in the old tradition of the eighteenth century when the French could say to the English, "Tirez les premiers, messieurs--les Anglais?" Alas, we seem to have adopted that chivalrous maxim as a matter of democratic necessity, if not dogma, during a period in which it would be--it would have been very useful not to have made a commitment, at any rate, of that character, either at the summit or elsewhere: "Fire first, messieurs the English" is to give the other fellow the first shot today. It involves a heavy policy risk, as a known commitment. It relaxes tensions by freeing your opponent (and I think we have by no means too much underlined this) a strengthening of our own capacity to resist a surprise attack, and quick reaction times to get off planes and missiles on tactical warning. Unless we can adequately survive a surprise attack to retaliate devastatingly, the Soviets may well act on the assumption that we won't risk limited wars because we fear too much the big one. On our capability for fighting a total war, and on our willingness to fight it, though we may be hit and desperately hurt, even crippled, in the last analysis, depends a great deal of the validity of the whole of the rest of the argument about our capability for fighting limited war. This needs underlining. It is really a basic necessity--not just an assumption.

If at any time it becomes perfectly clear from our actions (or even reasonably doubtful from our actions) that we are not prepared to fight a limited war, we had better embrace puckish Berty Russell's views-- better to live a slave than die in masses as heroes--lock, stock, and barrel, and quickly. We can spare ourselves and everybody else great trouble and embarrass the Russians by dumping the world on them all in a piece--not piecemeal--as a whole! Because if we ever give up the idea of retaliation, to strike them back at all costs, they have only to raise the ante to force us to quit. If we say we won't ever loose SAC or missiles, even to retaliate for the "big bang," we have had it. In any poker game where it is know that you play with declared table stakes as your own limit--where your potential enemy is not restricted to this kind of bet, you can be run out of any and every pot.

It would be a nice kind of war, if you could get it--"so far and no farther," on our terms. But, where you are known to not be willing to risk beyond a certain amount of any pot you are going to be run out of the game. This, I think, is a very important framework to any analysis and one that must be widely understood because it is not clearly undersood. Henry and I sat down with a few other people at Harvard recently--some of them are here today--with Admiral Buzzard, a very intelligent and able fellow, an Englishmen who has inherited the tradition that Dr. Terman reminded us

about last night of understanding psychological warfare. Dr. Terman alleged that William the Conqueror relied largely on psychological offensives to begin with—probably he did, but he backed it up with other things, especially the fire power of the day that put an arrow through the eye of Harold, the Saxon King and war leader.

Buzzard, at the end of an interesting evening of talking about his version of "graduated deterrence" said that, in order to carry along some of the churchmen who were interesting themselves in some of these questions and who are increasingly important in England as they are in this country, he was finding it very tempting to accept one part—a small part of the program—to say that "under no circumstances would we in Britain ever resort to all-out use of nuclear weapons, involving as it might the destruction of a considerable part of the human race."

I think Dr. Kissinger would join me in saying that we warned him that this was fatal. Certainly, I tried to. We said: "Once you go down that slope, Admiral, you've had it." Because at the moment you announce that you're never going to resort to the use of your nuclear retaliation, you haven't a prayer of escaping being pushed to the wall by Soviet-inspired aggression, as direct as they wish to make it. If people get in the habit of thinking this way, i.e. that we can never use massive nuclear retaliation, it might readily affect the behavior of a President of the United States, confronted with this kind of horrible choice. You would, therefore, make other things fall in place, quite naturally as a succession of piecemeal surrenders.

I emphasize that because that is one way of getting really unlimited war, i.e. by the unlimited necessity of surrender—if you're not really prepared to use these weapons ultimately. I think this also makes us think very hard about one of Dr. Kissinger's propositions: We cannot even co-exist militarily if nuclear war can be chosen by the enemy at will because disadvantageous to you, and you have to admit it. If you are backed off of this business of retaliation to the degree of saying, as some people are prepared to, "under no circumstances would we ever fight the all-out war; if we can't risk all-out retaliation, then we can't risk engaging an enemy who is prepared to use even the threat of all-out nuclear war." Why shouldn't he mean it, if it costs him nothing in return?

It becomes terribly important to see under what circumstances, therefore, we could survive an all-out war. This, in turn, raises those issues that Lloyd Berckner and others have been trying to get this country to consider for a very long time and tell us about: What we can do with shelters and so-called passive defenses. It is the cheapest, certainly the most

effective way to cut national casualties from fallout to bearable proportions. It raises questions which I think you would do well to consider if you are talking about bringing people to the brink. We have to bring them to the brink, and to push beyond the brink for limited war purposes, we hope. We must, however, engage in limited war with the determination that no one shall face us down, by threatening that kind of decision. And no one, at this time, has any prospect of hitting us without being himself destroyed. Mr. Krushchev knows this. We act sometimes as if we didn't. Ought I to say we sometimes don't act as if we did know our own immensely superior power.

Now, I am persuaded that it is not a risky decision—to accept limited war risks and not be bluffed out. On the contrary, in the other attitude of uncertainty and manifest timidity lies the real risk—the greatest risk. We have had two wars because foreign war leaders misjudged our willingness to take risks and to make commitments. Perhaps the Kremlin, itself, the child as well as the father of lies, would never believe it if we said we meant to avoid all risks. We were talking about it this morning and some gentleman said, "Even if we did make such an announcement the Russians would never believe us! They would think we were trying to trick them—as they would us."

Well, they might not. But if our behavior and our character patterns had led them to believe we would back down, they would be encouraged to try. If the relaxation that Mr. Khrushchev so obviously enjoyed of his tensions—created by him (notice that he can create them at will)—if we relax his tensions in the way that we obviously did at the Summit meeting not by just talking about inspection, but by letting him understand, by all the methods of communication, by our behavior, that we do not intend, and under no circumstances aim, to employ a strike—an all-out nuclear strike to punish him first—that we are trying to work toward peace by a purely defensive posture—by essentially a containment posture; then we might invite, I think, miscalculations and mistakes.

Therefore, I want to underline that part of what Henry said about the willingness to take risks.

But there are some points that I think in all conscience one ought to explore: what kind of risks one ought to take, where, how, and so forth. Let us start off with these questions: What do we mean by limited war, first; and what do we mean by conventional limited war, second?

I think you will agree that it is no longer fashionable or indeed even necessary for legality to bless with the term "war," and a declaration of

war by Congress,—actions aimed at curbing hostilities on very large scales, comparable to Korea—which was our first large scale "limited war." Let me say as a footnote that at that time, and at that place, and under those circumstances, it seemed to me that it would have been right to push that one to a conclusion. I was on record quite early and often to that effect. I think we could have done it, even without nuclear weapons, though the use of some nuclear weapons would have set a salutary precedent. At one time tragically, just before we accepted Armistice negotiation, the mass defections of the Chinese Communist soldiers had given us some grounds for believing that we could have cleaned up Korea and carried out the United Nation's mandate for really free elections in the whole country.

We should look hard, I think, once or twice at the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons (not in that theater (Korea) perhaps, where we presumably had at stake something as serious as we have in NATO), to consider whether or not we need conventional capabilities, also. In the course of time, with the erosion of public support for taking any risks that would lead to all-out nuclear war, even those two areas might be brought into jeopardy, so far as ability to use nuclear weapons is concerned. But "war" as I mean "conventional limited war," we can say, can be fought. It has been fought in Korea. Mr. Truman was successful in keeping Congress out of it. I think you couldn't very well call the Korean episode anything short of massive hostilities that amounted to a war, limited because neither side wanted to raise the stakes. We demanded that the rules of war to be applied to them. We are still seeking the return of prisoners kept contrary to the rules of war. We, imposed limitations on ourselves that went beyond the rules of war. The Chinese Communists never bombed Pusan from their safe haven beyond the Yalu to keep it safe.

Second point: What does the word "conventional" mean? Well, "conventional" means what you're used to. A convention is something that is accepted by usage: the conventions of a constitution often become quite as important as what is written into it. The British constitution is largely one of convention. And conventions are very necessary things. In a sense, Kissinger is trying to make limited nuclear war "conventional" by supplying a doctrine that gets itself accepted by both sides, including proof by usage. I suppose only examples in practice and enough of them, would tend to confirm the capability of fighting a limited engagement with nuclear weapons within limited theaters for limited purposes. Gas warfare was limited by this convention. Our intentions could be made known, presumably, in such a way that the enemy would gage them correctly, and would not respond as Mr. Khrushchev so far has responded by words, not tested by deeds.

[redacted]

He hasn't accepted Henry's "invitation to the dance" (a limited dance). Indeed, he has turned it down very firmly, if he could be believed. Of course, he can't. He has said in a syllogism of bald threat: "We possess the capacity (we, the Soviet system) to destroy you, or any other part of the human race it is necessary to destroy. Since Sputnik we have been demonstrating this in terms that are unmistakable to others and must be to you. We are not going to fight—we, the Russians (I ought not use the word 'Russians' —the Soviet system—the rulers of Russia) are not going to fight any more limited wars. Therefore, remember that you can co-exist with us only on our terms."

This attitude has had a very serious effect in eroding our moral attitude toward co-existence. We accept military co-existence as a necessary fact because we aren't prepared to force a showdown. But some people have accepted the implications of moral co-existence, also, which means either that we must persuade these people to be Quakers or that we believe their system to be as good for humanity as ours; or that we do not believe there is enough difference to quarrel about. This is an attitude that many churches have accepted. I regret to say, being by usage (if not convention) a humble Presbyterian (if that is not a contradiction in terms), that the Presbyterian Synod recently addressed itself to the language of diplomacy and found that it was unchristian for the President of the United States not to meet face to face with Khrushchev. You know diplomacy is not Christian art, and if you're practicing it with nonbelievers you do well not to insist upon the habits of gentlemen's discourse. Indeed, it may have been a mistake to have elevated Khrushchev and Company to this rarefied atmosphere. It has not, though, so far induced the requisite behavior. To hope that it will, may lead to dangerous delusions! The Pope used some language about not using nuclear weapons that by Catholic friends assure me as not an ex cathedra utterance, and therefore not a binding moral charge on even his great world congregation, I am glad to mark. I wish he would not talk on these obiter dictum terms too much.

Now, what about nonconventional war, and what are its limits? Well, I'm going to make a very arbitrary suggestion. But I think it has something of good sense to back it up. Everything that we have been talking about means that the weapons of mass destruction which we are not used to employing (up to this time) and which have changed the whole picture of war—are the things which determine what is nonconventional or "unconventional." Of those systems, of course, nuclear weapons are primary.

We have had chemical weapons before. I bear the scars of mustard gas pretty liberally on my legs and also some scar tissue inside my nose

and upper lungs from World War I. The latter was relatively simple compared to the kind of things that we are up against now. Biological warfare has not been practiced in the past among civilized societies. Therefore, it would be, I suppose, also unconventional. By international convention (Geneva) nations have made efforts to eliminate the practice of gas warfare. But it wasn't used in World War II (outside of some Japanese try-outs in China), just because nobody found it really convenient or useful on balance, I suppose. I don't think any other restraint would have affected the Nazis in their use of it, and I doubt very much if any other considerations of human values would affect the Soviet system in the future. If we had some unique capabilities, not likely to be matched, in gas warfare, it could be considered conventional, because we could make it conventional. But the balance of advantage would have to be carefully estimated.

On the whole, I do not consider that biological weapons offer very rewarding consequences as compared with nuclear weapons. They involve all sorts of uncontrollable and difficult factors both of delivery and in other political respects that would make one want to use them only under very, very special conditions, if at all.

Chemical warfare, I take it, would be another matter, and since it wasn't covered as unconventional limited war in Dr. Kissinger's talk, I rather want to include it in my own extension of the idea as one of the most safe and effective conditions, if at all.

It could become conventional rather more easily than could war with nuclear weapons. Now, Henry did make one or two propositions which I want to footnote and clear up, at least for myself. He puts down the question of the number of divisions that we, as opposed to the Soviet System, can put into the field as being the determining factor as to whether or not it would be useful for us to decide whether we could and should fight conventional wars rather than wars with nuclear weapons. He points out (and I think on the whole quite correctly) that you can't have your economy and eat it too, so to speak. If you're going to practice necessary economy and cut down the size of divisions or the numbers of them available, and particularly the methods of delivering them rapidly to some part of the world with logistical support and in large enough numbers to deal with something more than a "brush fire," then you may have to fight nuclear wars or wars with nearly equally effective weapons. That is, you would have to fight limited wars with the most appropriate weapons to equalize your limited manpower in its striking or fire power. In most instances, manpower imbalance and inferiority in numbers might indicate that you would fight with nuclear weapons if you were

directly engaged with Soviet forces, or even if you were overborne by other forces, e.g., Chinese.

Now, on the whole, I think that is probably a sound analysis if you are directly engaged with the Soviet troops themselves. Up to now, there has been only a very piecemeal type of enegagement of that sort with Soviet pilots in Korea. I think we did not do well to ignore their presence there—but we were winking at many provocations at that time.

It would be my judgment that we should address ourselves in the most categorical terms (and I speak, of course, only personally with the awful irresponsibility of the college professor) to the rulers of Moscow and of Peiping, alike, to make it certain that we never intend to accept again without punishing the authors of the trick, the use of the word "volunteers" to cloak the intervention of the Sino-Soviet system anywhere. There are no "volunteers" in a totalitarian system. We should make that an article of faith and a policy for immediate action that is clearly understood by them. It has already been foreshadowed by our intimations after the Soviet threat to Britain and France in the Suez crisis, but it should be made explicit.

Unless we make our determination and ability to deal with them on terms of direct responsibility for their "volunteers" quite clear and well understood, limited hostilities are possible in many parts of the globe. These may not and probably will not directly involve the Soviets so long as "volunteers" are not tolerated by us. Indeed this is the most probable type of hostilities as I read the book. I don't think the Soviet system itself is going to start something immediately in any part of the Far East and particularly in South East Asia. Nor do I think the Soviet or the Chinese regimes are going to retaliate against anything that we intervene in—by direct action against us, our bases, or our forces—should we intervene in any area not on Russia's doorstep. I forbear even in a conference of classification up through "secret" to speculate on the areas that might be involved in such indirect but obviously stimulated, supported and controlled types of aggression. But I would like to give you this study of probable types and forms of indirect aggression (mostly by "take-over") as a subject for close study, and I equally recommend it to the Department of State. A very close staff study should be made by areas, as to the weapons, and methods for war appropriate to the circumstances, in order to determine beforehand what considerations would guide the action policy decisions. Action decisions have an awful habit of going to the top in the United States without much preliminary staff work under existing circumstances.

As to the use of nuclear or non-nuclear weapons in the initial instance, we don't always or perhaps ever have control over this choice. Obviously, if the enemy is supplied with nuclear weapons by the Soviet system or if the enemy involves the Soviet system, and he begins, you top him if you can and do it thick and early as Henry emphasized. But if you have the initial choice in an area like North Africa—let's say at a venture, you don't go in necessarily with nuclear weapons at the outset, do you? I don't think so. There may in some such area be entirely inappropriate circumstances for the use of nuclear weapons. The Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East was meant to be a doctrine of "participation only by invitation" during the period in which I had anything to do with it. The pre-invitation was a pretty general requirement for our participation elsewhere.

You aren't likely to get an invitation to this dance if you bring along more than conventional arms (enough planes, tanks, etc.). Even spurs strapped on to your boots are considered a little ill-bred by the U.N.!) It would be even worse social form to carry in with you a nuclear weapon to dish out as a souvenir for the occasion! You wouldn't often get re-invited, even if your "Nuke" is only a little baby one—a small, nice, pleasant bang. I suppose a "clean" bomb would help. I believe that this testing business is of considerable importance, to get cleaner bombs and smaller ones of a usable character. We have bombers, we have carriers, we have submarines, we have missiles—and I hope to heavens we'll have missiles with solid fuel with ICBM ranges, as soon as we can, that we can get off quick.

That's the thing to answer Sputnik—Beyond reconnaissance powers, now it doesn't make too much difference what's floating around in the air. The psychological harm is done. So if we can deliver something with a megaton warhead 5,000 miles on a target—quick—and from a reasonably protected position that doesn't have to be built up, like the company town, above ground, we can keep up with the Soviet—or catch up.

But then there are other ways of delivering death and destruction and in the tight packages which I think go along with limited conventional abilities that we could tremendously improve and be asked back so that we wouldn't be shunned even by the wallflowers in the dance, on the basis of invitations. Let's get some of them like anesthetizing gases, ready on a limited basis as an alternative means to nuclear weapons so that we can really say we have immediate conventional limited warfare capabilities.

My guess, as a lifelong student of political human nature is that we are not going to be invited in by many countries, if we limit ourselves to the power to use nuclear weapons only. Certainly the invitations are less likely

unless there are certain ground rules very carefully established and unless we have clean ones and the other fellow, too, is likely to use clean ones. I would think that it is very much to the interest of the Soviet system and therefore likely to be their tactic to point this out—to rub it in—and indeed to show by practice—if it should occur—and in the first engagement or so, that we will be driven to use big "dirty" weapons. Therefore, I think it might well be that there are circumstances in which the capability of delivering a sufficient body of troops, who could develop big fire power quickly, without nuclear weapons, would be very useful.

In the very few brief minutes that are left for me, I want to suggest some things that I've always thought would improve our posture. In the first place, I think we need more trained manpower and readily mobilizable and "packaged" manpower to back up indigenous forces, which I hope we'll also do a better training job on. I mean by that a job comparable to the one that was done by Van Fleet in the old days, and one that we can keep up today in M.S.A. countries. Alliances are tricky businesses and coalitions are never reliable. Political overturns and takeovers can destroy any merely economic aid programs. I don't blame Henry, therefore, for not counting in the NATO Divisions, given what has happened in France and what has not happened in Germany and what the British have said in one of their recent white papers on defense, and what they are practicing by cutting back ground troops and compulsory service.

We do have potential manpower enough to meet any limited war but will we politically be able to sacrifice Americans for people who won't fight for themselves? But we must not cut back Marines and Air Force troops and infantry below safe limits for immediate response. In a long drawn out limited war where we were indeed not directly attacked by a mutual kind of consent on both sides to fight with and through other people, the Navy might well have to fight a very considerable "limited" war of a conventional kind. It ought to be prepared to do so, as well as to operate with and against nuclear weapons. That is what costs money. But it can cost all we have invested and may be our whole future as a free world, as a free country, not to be able to operate both ways. The Navy ought to be prepared, of course, for nuclear war. I assume it is, from its emphasis on POLARIS and on its nuclear submarines, as well as long range seaplanes and carriers.

But it also ought and must be prepared to put those Marines down quickly somewhere to prevent a war from spreading. This speed may be the essence of the matter; with a follow up of protected supply lines by sea.

We have three or four conditions of Soviet-inspired "take-overs," gentlemen, which you must confront as realities. If you don't nip a "take-over" in the bud, you become the invader. This is not escapism from willingness to use "nukes." These are the things that decisions may have to be made on any day, any week, for a long time.

If you intervene, with what you are going to intervene? Can you intervene? How would you intervene effectively in a situation such as some of those you know confront us today? It would be very stupid of Moscow and Peiping not to force action in several theaters at once. And for my money it would be very comforting, indeed, if the capability of intervening included a larger number of ready striking forces, an airlift that really existed, operating with subsidies for overseas commercial freight, and one that wasn't at the complete disposal of SAC. We must have long range big carriers and smaller transports that can land almost anywhere there is cleared ground.

Think about that one, look into it a little bit. MATS was a very comforting thing, limited as its lift is, as long as MATS could certainly (and all of it) be used for airlift for troops. When I was in the ODM I didn't believe that the Civil Aviation Reserve Fleet, that we are going to put into an airlift "within 48 hours," was capable of the kind of airlift that you're talking about at all,—certainly not in 48 hours, much of it in 48 days. There may be 30 or 40 transport planes in it that can fly overseas with freight, but very limited kinds of freight. The rest are passenger planes, so built. There are all kinds of bugs in this assumption of their availability for airlift that you had better consider if you are thinking of quick action in prospective limited wars. Where is the enemy going to pick them out to try? Probably, he is going to pick the unlikely places, at least the less pleasant places for us. He is not going to concentrate them in one sector. He is going to hit you in three or four places by the use of other people. A combat team won't do. Two combat teams, a brigade, won't do for these purposes.

Now, I am, I think by honorary plaque, the oldest living consistent lecturer at the Naval War College and deeply "indoctrinated," though I don't profess to be an old salt. But you can't lift the stuff for quick brushfire action in time with the Navy alone, or even with merchant ships. It is fine to have the Navy to move into the Mediterranean or the Far East, and we have to have it to back up airlift anywhere. We must have depots and all the things that the Navy and the Merchant Marine can provide for support landings. But for the initial action we must have something that logistically can keep several divisions, not just one, supplied on a 30-day basis with an airlift properly packaged.

Is this too expensive? Well, it would be if it were a question of mothballed air freighters—but if they are kept operating commercially with crews. If we can subsidize air freight at anything around 8 cents a ton-mile course, we can almost break even on planes that will soon be available for overseas air freight. The Harvard Business School studies, I think, are reliable in their estimates. For 6 cents we don't have to subsidize, if the government lets the airlines amortize the planes over a long period on an advance by public purchase. There is enough air cargo "developed commercially to put some 40 to 50 big planes of up to 50 tons capacity payload; maybe double that in at 8 cents; and 200, probably, at 6 cents a ton-mile. Big planes, planes that are worth the investment are the quick way to intervene decisively when we are dealing with a situation in terms of fighting a limited war. Nuclear or non-nuclear, this does for one just as much as for the other. Indeed speed may be needed more for conventional war. We must have this capability of putting down troops in strength, quickly, with vehicles to operate. Of course, the long overseas lift must be supplemented by planes that can put down packaged loads up to 8 or 10 tons in very small fields. I don't care whether it's the Safaris or the Martins, or the Douglases, or the Boeing types. There should be something to take the place of the C-47s and the DC-3s that are going out of existence—without replacements in adequate numbers to replace them. These are the only planes usable in many underdeveloped countries.

The Russians are doing it as part of the economic warfare that Mr. Nutter is going to talk to you about. I'm going to leave this side of it to him. Airlift is absolutely essential for limited war under the conditions of our long lines of communcation, even backed by Navy, merchant ships and depots. These we do not now have in safe places.

SUPERIOR WEAPONS OF NON-NUCLEAR TYPES

Under the classification that we're talking under I'm not at liberty to talk about one or two of the systems that I'm sure most of the military people here are familiar with. But there are weapons systems that are very promising to supply great fire power without nuclear weapons. I can talk about chemical and anesthetizing gases for disabling people. These could have an extremely valuable use if they were in being in adequate stocks, not in a laboratory. We must be able to deliver them either by airdrop or by artillery methods or by other types of delivery. If that was feasible in World War I (and it was) it ought to be feasible today.

I urge that this capability is a matter of some consequences because this is a weapon of wide usefulness, though not as spectacular as the nuclear

weapon. For the kind of jungle warfare where are you going to pick up these targets for nuclear weapons? You can not just spread them, broadcast.

Finally, we must remember that Secretary Norton was talking about last night. There's too much desire to cut back the kind of things that are the essential ingredients for basic research or for suppressing some disagreeable types of information which come out of research. Sometimes real protection of not only their own mission but a big new breakthrough comes out of the rivalry of services. Sometimes it dosen't. Sometimes a failure of communication does hinder over-all progress. And sometime there is a real overlap that is purely wasteful.

But in any case, unless we have the capability of the dual purpose weapon systems and a quick airlift we are not going to be able to fight in some of those areas where any of the kind of staff studies that I mentioned to you would show the need for dual readiness. If the choice of nuclear or non-nuclear weapons remains at our discretion, we may start off with non-nuclear weapons and perhaps be able to sustain that sort of war should the occasion and the enemy allow it.

Now I agree that that does not mean limiting or abandoning the use of nuclear weapons where they can be and must be appropriately used, and where otherwise you would not make a dent on the situation. I believe with Henry and with Gilbert and Sullivan's Mikado that "to make the punishment fit the crime," punishment of aggression is better than so-called containment. Unless you establish in the minds of Moscow's rulers in advance that the risk is not worth taking, that we are in danger of being pushed out of the world piecemeal; or sometimes run out of it with a sharp end of a peachstone because we haven't the courage to stand and be counted and to move forward. If we can be persuaded to take mob demonstrations and student ruckuses as vox dei as well as vox populi then we can be run out of any country—probably even our own.

As a concluding point, I would like to say this: The explanation of these problems and policies to our people and to our Congress is terribly important—more important than anybody seems to realize in any administration, but particularly important today.

I don't believe that Mr. Stevenson would have made some of the campaign propositions that he did (especially on voluntarily stopping testing) had he been briefed properly. He repeated some of them recently. Maybe he has not had any briefing since then. If he had been thoroughly briefed at that time (the fall of '56), if he had understood that to build up the idea that all use

of nuclear weapons is poisoning the atmosphere hopelessly then, of course, he must have seen that we can't fight, with dreadful results for national security and survival, any limited wars with nuclear weapons. If you can not even test them without endangering the future of the race, then certainly we can not contemplate suicide by using them in even limited war. We ought to look into the possibilities of underground testing and work on that line, I am sure, but we ought never to get ourselves in the box of saying that it is the danger from testing because once you conceive that look what a slippery slope you're on.

You can't doubt that the use of nuclear weapons in limited wars is going to be more doubtful when intercontinental ballistic missiles are in place or usable in large numbers. Therefore, it becomes extremely important to get clean weapons and to insist that the Russians get them by every device that we can. We must have stockpiles of this kind of weapon for both defensive and offensive purposes.

I know that tests have been made for different kinds of weapons and that the new series is going to test some more of them. Weapons do have to be tested to be reliable, and I think it is extremely important not to walk into a trap on this one, without knowing what we are doing. There is a Soviet trap which looks beyond the testing to banning also the use of these weapons. If that should happen, then we don't have that open choice that Henry and I both believe in. We should calculate very carefully whether or not it would be safe to use these weapons in this place or that; and whether the results are the kind that you want, certainly in the initial stages.

We should have no choice but to decline combat and to back away from it in some areas of the world if we found that we were not prepared for it in a politically feasible form. It would then do you very little good to rely on massive retaliatory deterrent capacity, which you might be even less able to use.

Now, gentlemen, this is a rather gloomy picture and I want to close with a less gloomy note: Khrushchev has all these same difficulties, if we but realize it and some more too. We must always remember that he is also vulnerable. In the days when I was a staff member of the Colmer Committee, we all went down to see Stalin, down three flights deep (each one as deep as the Crown Prince's dugout in World War I) to the bowels of the Kremlin. It is pretty far down in the ground, but no place is safe today and they know it and they're not going to risk engagement even with a crippled U. S. that can and will strike back. That will is the best guarantee that we will never have to use it. The breed of men in this country is prepared to

do it if it has to. Then humanity can reject the idea of Bertrand Russell and these fellows who believe that we can only live at all by giving the Soviet complete monopoly of this weapon. After all, why should that guarantee no future use of nuclear weapons on a massive scale? They might fall out among themselves and destroy humanity perhaps just as effectively, maybe more. I don't see any logic in Russell, the great logician. He is too trustful in his assumptions, too. I would prefer to keep something to keep people sane by strength and the threat that we have of defending ourselves. We lived that way with the Indians in my part of the country for quite a long time. If you get in the habit of it, and if you are morally prepared, I think it's the only road to safety. Furthermore, a change is going on inside of Russia and elsewhere. We don't know where it leads, yet. I don't think it leads anywhere very far, scarcely in the direction of peace or relaxing of tension at this time. Nor do I think that it is increased in its pace by conceiving everything on a unilateral basis with no bargaining advantages to us in the deal. I don't believe that's the way you do it at all.

I do believe that by promising so many things Mr. Khrushchev has really got himself in a pickle. I believe that it may be of some interest that the Chinese begin to threaten his position in the party in Russia. That will not be a matter that any dictator can let go unremarked. The party discipline that he has to keep inside his own system is not something he wants the Chinese to upset when he steps out of the country to see Tito. And he may remember that. There are other things that may in the course of time change the situation by handing U.S.S.R. the whole world as a package just to embarrass them! It's a little premature for that alternative strategy; if you don't have that strategy, please come up with one that acts both self-respectingly and cautiously.

I think that it is the essence of caution to use what we have with the maximum economy. I would like to see it done by a requirements committee type of approach, if you can remember back to this method of enforcing "first things first" during the war rather than by the Budget Bureau determining what policy is by default and with an axe. What things are first, and are they adequately provided? What things can we afford to do without that are not essential? What things are necessary for this conspectus that I have been trying to lay out so that we have a flexible capability to deal with a flexible enemy?

I have not said a word to you about the things I mostly work on: political warfare; economic warfare; and training people against the Russian training program abroad, which we will have to do on a colossal stage. This is a protracted war on every front we are engaged in. It is for our lifetime

and for our children's lifetime, if we are lucky enough to draw it out—barring the miracle of the Soviet bear changing his nature. Pray God we're going to win it because on our winning may depend, for a considerable period of time, whether humanity becomes conditioned animals under the control of a magician (the magic formula) or human beings who still have some conception that they're creatures of a God, however mysterious, in whom they continue to trust and rely on for strength outside their own, as Lincoln did.

In that feeling, gentlemen, rests, I think, our ultimate strength as a nation. When our men in high positions learn to turn to it and to act "with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, then we'll be in a better position to check the wars we have to confront, to win those we have to face; and to avoid, if we can, those that would be disastrous to the nation.



Dr. Nutter states that economic warfare encompasses (1) actions taken to weaken the economic strength of the enemy, actual or potential, and (2) the economic means used to further our political or military policies. Our attempts to reduce communist trade volume have had little effect, trade by the Communist bloc not being important to the block in the long run, and this trade being mostly with countries other than the U. S. Withdrawal of existing U. S. economic aid has also failed, as a nation concerned is quite willing, as has been demonstrated, to accept help from whichever side will give it. We should be fully prepared for the failure of our economic aid program. Our strength in the cold war does not lie primarily in weapons of economic warfare. We should put less faith in untested economic schemes, and more faith in tried political and military tactics, including the crucial area of psychological warfare. Five recommended courses of action are: (1) to have a reasonably clear idea of the end we seek, (2) to examine the facts, neither underestimating nor overestimating the enemy, (3) to pay more attention to the committed nations, (4) to pick and choose carefully among the uncommitted countries, and (5) to avoid selling ourselves short.

Economic Warfare

Dr. WARREN NUTTER, University of Virginia

Bad luck comes in pairs, but most other things seem to come in threes. We have animal, vegetable, and mineral; wine, women, and song; red, white, and blue; and so on. This symposium would therefore seem incomplete if it covered only political and military warfare. A triplet must be found, and we more or less naturally think of economic warfare.

What do we mean by economic warfare? Presumably, we have two rather different things in mind. First, there are actions taken to weaken the relative economic strength of enemy nations, actual or potential. Second, there are the economic means used to further our political or military policies. In both cases the ultimate goal is to promote our national interests in political struggles, but economic means are used somewhat more indirectly in the first than in the second case.

The political struggles take place these days in an atmosphere of either hot or cold war. It is idle to look for an early return of what used to be called peace, when nations exercised their rivalries through making and breaking alliances and other diplomatic maneuverings. It is doubtful that this period of comparative bliss characterizes more than one century of man's history, the nineteenth. The present state of things is illustrated by our yearning for an age of so-called limited wars.

I scarcely need elaborate the role of economic warfare under conditions of actual military operations. Trade with the enemy is severed ultimately by means of blockade. All feasible means are used to disrupt and damage his internal economy. Everything possible is done to weaken the economic base of the enemy's military power.

Under conditions of cold war as we have come to know them, the nature of economic warfare is not so clear. The struggle is as much an aligning of sides as an engaging in conflict. We try to "win friends and influence people," at the same time that we try to weaken the economies of the opposing country and to strengthen our own. This means not only winning friends but also keeping those we have; the

struggle is defensive as well as offensive. The big question which I shall return to later, is whether we can buy friendship.

In this type of economic warfare, the weapons are bribes and fines. We reward those who go along with us and try to penalize those who are committed against us. Both have a dual purpose: to influence behavior and to strengthen the relative economic position of our side. I fear that we are often less than frank with ourselves as to what we are trying to do in our programs of economic warfare, and as a consequence our policies are often inconsistent and self-canceling. I have in mind here our propensity to delude ourselves that promoting self-interest (which today means simply protecting our political system from destruction) means nothing more than doing good in the world, helping the less fortunate. Business is business; charity is charity. Each has an important place in our way of life, but it is suicidal nowadays to mix them up in international affairs.

At present the economic penalties at our disposal are not very powerful. We may try to reduce the volume of trade being carried on by the Communist countries, but there really is not much we can do through this course of action. First of all, trade by the Communist Bloc with the outside world is not very important to the Bloc in a long-run sense. Imports from the outside probably amount to around 2 percent or possibly 3 percent of the gross product of the Bloc. In this sense, they are of even less importance to the Bloc than our own imports are to the American economy.

In the second place, most of this Bloc trade is with countries other than the United States. We can control it only as far as we can persuade other countries to control it. Since trade benefits both partners, we cannot easily persuade. Indeed, it is not clear that the net loss from severance of all this trade would fall on the Bloc. In any case, we have had ample experience with efforts to restrict this trade, most of it discouraging in all respects.

Trade severance is best reserved for that unhappy time when military operations seem imminent. It is the immediate impact that is most severe. Given time to adjust the economy to the strains imposed by loss of trade, any country can soften the damage. Since the permanent effects would be relatively small in any event, we should be careful to use this weapon when it will be most immediately effective. We can hope meanwhile that time will never come.

A second weapon at our disposal is withdrawal of existing economic aid. A reward once given later becomes a penalty when withdrawn. In a cold-blooded appraisal of economic aid programs, we might want to think of them as getting the recipients in the dope habit. We might then go on to

believe that this would put us in a position to make countries behave by threatening to shut off the supply of dope.

I doubt that there is much in this reasoning but delusion. If we have learned anything from events in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, it is that the driving force is a craving for national power and prestige—a craving utilized by clever demagogues seeking personal power. Of course, these countries seek economic aid, but with the view to building military strength, not to raising standards of living. They are quite willing, as they have clearly demonstrated, to take help from whichever side will give it. The Communist countries have some important advantages over us in these circumstances, advantages I shall dwell on at a later point. In any case, if we were actually to give what amounts to an ultimatum to a country receiving aid and have them refuse to obey, our only recourse would be withdrawal of aid. What would we accomplish? As far as I can see, nothing. The leaders of these countries are quite aware of our weak bargaining position and they are almost certain to go on playing the game of courting both sides. The Soviet Union is faced with many of the same problems in areas not actually dominated by Soviet troops, as illustrated by their troubles in Yugoslavia.

If we wield but a tiny economic stick, perhaps we can extend some irresistible economic carrots. Perhaps we can bribe where we cannot penalize. One road open to us would be to liberalize our trade policies with other countries. Applied to the non-Soviet world, I think such a program would have great significance, not so much for its direct economic effects as for its demonstration that we intend to practice what we preach about competitive private enterprise. Applied to the Soviet world, I see little indication that expanded trade would benefit our long-run political objectives. The Soviet Union is obviously eager to increase its imports of Western machinery, particularly chemical machinery at the moment. The purpose is the same as it has been many times in the past: a cheap acquisition of Western technology. Insisting on bilateral exchanges negotiated through governments, the Soviet Union can twist terms of trade to her benefit, so that we could gain virtually nothing from the trade itself. Meanwhile, her interest is not in those gains but in the technology embodied in Western machines. If I could believe that there has been a significant change of heart among the leaders of the Soviet Union, I might favor an effort to resume more normal trading relations. I have searched hard for signs of such a change and found very few. Things are stirring within the country, but we must wait for more favorable developments before strengthening the hand of current rulers through gifts of this nature.

The other road open to us is economic aid in the form of gifts and loans. These would presumably be used to bolster our ties with friendly nations

and to win over so-called uncommitted nations. The key question here is how much friendship can be bought at what price. Since economic aid has obviously become the cornerstone of our international economic policy, I want to spend the rest of my time discussing this program and its likely effectiveness.

Let me draw a sharp distinction between economic aid and military assistance. Both are to some extent the same thing in that they amount to our giving other countries some extra resources. One might argue that military assistance from the United States simply means that a country can divert to other uses the resources it otherwise would have used for national defense. In part, this is undoubtedly true. But it is equally clear that it is in part not true: the countries receiving military assistance simply would not have built up the same military establishment in the absence of assistance. We are in effect purchasing our own national defense in other countries through this program, providing a small subsidy for their economies on the side. None of the remarks I am about to make should be taken as applying to this military assistance program.

I would say that we should be fully prepared for failure of the economic aid program. We have, in fact, nothing but earnest hopes to be optimistic about. We have no single concrete example to show that a country whose economic development has been speeded up by substantial gifts from outside will commit itself against the communist bloc. We are acting on faith, and in some cases it is misguided.

The single most important fact in the present international struggle is that the East stands for overthrow of the existing order in the civilized world, while the West stands, more or less, for preservation of that order. We of the West are in the unfortunate position of the conservators of the nineteenth century, who tried through the Congress of Vienna and ensuing alliances to restrain the surging radicalism unleashed by the French Revolution. The danger to civilization as they saw it was real enough, but it hardly compares with the latent catastrophe in our age of successful totalitarianism and nuclear weapons.

The second most important fact is that significant groups in the West are openly doubting the superiority of the established order. These doubts come from high offices in our own government. Thus, Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, recently stated in a public address that

> "the Soviet economy has been growing, and is expected to continue to grow, through 1962 at a rate roughly twice that of the United States. Annual growth over-all has been running between 6 and 7 percent, annual growth of industry between 10 and 12 percent.

> These rates of growth are exceedingly high. They have rarely been matched in other states except during limited periods of post-war rebuilding."

In this statement and in much of the remainder of the speech, Mr Dulles suggests, first, that we in the United States consider the rate of economic growth a critical test of the success of any political system; and, second, that we do not measure up to the Soviet Union in this test. Who could have spoken with more authority, at least on the matter of Soviet performance relative to ours? If we are to accept these statements as true, what are we to expect of uncommitted countries who have their eyes fastened on economic, political, and military growth, with little serious concern over matters of personal freedom so precious to us? What course of action, economic or political, are we to follow if the wave of the future belongs to the Soviet world? Surely it is idle to expect that the capitalistic system should suddenly perform better than it ever has in its history. And if, as Mr. Dulles says, "a recession is an expensive luxury," what lesson are we (and, more importantly, the uncommitted nations) to draw from that? These are, indeed, serious questions. As I shall mention later, I do not believe Mr. Dulles was correct in his facts, but that does not alter the impact of his statements.

Let me now call your attention to the proposals made by an influential group of economists from the Center for International Studies in a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Aid. In outlining the conditions under which aid should be given, the report stressed that the receiving government should be required to, first, initiate measures "to capture a good part of increases in income for the purposes of further investment," and, second, set up "an over-all developmental program." In short, government should take over the role of saving and investing in the economy and run the economy in accord with a comprehensive economic plan. If not, we should not give foreign aid. Here, again, is public praise for the efficiency of the economic and political system we are presumably struggling against. Do these economists mean what they say? If so, what are we hoping to accomplish through economic aid?

The West, then, is on the defensive, with a weakening faith in what it is defending. The East is on the offensive, with a growing confidence in ultimate victory, at least among the leaders which is what counts at the moment. The world is filled with restless people and ambitious leaders, most of them completely ignorant of the workings of Western democracy and the content of Western civilization. We now propose to buy their allegiance to our cause.

The East has a much simpler task. It needs only to help trouble along wherever it finds it. A few pennies here, a few pennies there, wherever unrest is brewing; a little boost to the revolutionists, directly or indirectly. The East merely helps undermine a tottering order that nobody seems eager to save.

During the recent political debates in this country over foreign aid, our newspapers suddenly began informing the public that great sums of money were flowing out of the Soviet Bloc in the form of generous foreign aid without strings. This is simply not so. The grand total of all bloc commitments to the outside world runs under $2 billion, virtually all in the form of loans extended over the last three years with deliveries to be made over more than a decade. Moreover, these loans are by no means stringless, as the world clearly sees from recent Yugoslav experience. Compare this $2 billion in Soviet loans with our gifts alone of almost $32 billion in the postwar period and of $1.8 billion in fiscal 1957 alone. Total gifts and loans in the postwar period come to $40 billion, to which should be added $20 billion in military assistance grants.

I do not mean to say that the Soviet venture into economic warfare need not be taken seriously. Quite the contrary, it poses a grave challenge. Its effectiveness in stirring up trouble for the West cannot be doubted. But the big question is: Can we meet the challenge merely by increasing the flood of American foreign aid? The enormous discrepancy between our and their expenditures to date points up the terrible handicap we suffer, as far as buying allegiance is concerned.

I am sure of one thing: if we follow the advice of those who advocate giving aid only to the underdeveloped countries that commit themselves to a comprehensively planned society, we shall worsen the handicap. The political consequence will be deliverance of these countries to the Communists, the only disciplined group prepared to take over their direction. Since we should have given our blessing to planning, we could scarcely be indignant when the countries follow our advice to its logical conclusion. If in the meantime our economic aid should have strengthened the lost economies, we should have done ourselves that additional harm.

But perhaps the only way out is to spend more and more until we overcome our handicaps, at the same time trying to bolster confidence in our system rather than helping to undermine it. On this matter, it is sobering to look at the statistics more closely. In 1956 the gross investment in foreign countries from private United States sources amounted to about $5 billion.[1] Of this sum, $1.8 billion was invested in underdeveloped areas.

[1] E.G. Collado and J.F. Bennett, "Private Investment and Economic Development," Foreign Affairs (July 1957), p. 634.

That is to say, the total flow of American capital to underdeveloped areas was around $3.6 billion, or double the amount of official American foreign aid. From an economic point of view, the private capital is at least as productive as governmental gifts. It will, of course, be objected that private investments are not identified as aid from the "American people," and hence they are less effective than governmental gifts. This leads to highly controversial matters, on which I can only give an opinion.

We should do well to reflect on the truth of an old saying: "Nobody loves a rich uncle." We all know instinctively what it means. If the rich uncle gives you nothing, he is stingy. If he gives you something, he is still stingy. If he gives you everything, he is merely setting things straight; he had no more right to the fortune than you did in the first place.

I am impressed and depressed by the fact that the areas we have helped the most seem to resent us the most. It is instructive to note which countries in Latin America had the greatest disturbances during Nixon's visit. Similarly, greatest unrest seems to come in rapidly growing economies, not in the poorest and most stagnant. Anthropologists and others have some valuable things to contribute on these matters if we will only listen to them.

What am I trying to say by all this? Am I just another crank taking an inflexible and doctrinaire position against all varieties of foreign aid? I do not mean to be or think I am. I merely ask that we restrain our sentiments and recognize the brutal certainty that foreign aid will not work miracles or near miracles. I think we should be psychologically prepared for the loss of areas in which we have poured large sums of money, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. I think we should recognize that our strength in the cold war does not lie primarily in weapons of economic warfare. If we draw the lesson from that, we will put less faith in untested economic schemes and more faith in tried political and military tactics, including the crucial area of psychological warfare.

There are some who will say that the foreign aid program must succeed, for it is our last hope. I do not believe it is our last hope, but in any case we cannot make it work merely by saying it has to. Uncle Remus once told the story of Brer Rabbit's being chased by a dog. Brer Rabbit ran and ran until it seemed he could run no more. Suddenly he saw a tree in front of him, and so he climbed the tree. The little boy listening to the story said: "But Uncle Remus, rabbits can't climb trees." And Uncle Remus replied: "I tells you, honey, dat rabbit was "bliged to clime dat tree."

I have been very negative so far, and I want to close with a few remarks on a more positive level. Let me be utterly presumptuous and suppose I

really know what is the best way out of our present crisis. I should introduce every statement with an "I don't really know the answer, but..." This would soon get tedious, and so I shall pontificate.

First of all, we should continually ask ourselves what it is we are trying to save. What is the struggle all about? Each of us will have a slightly different answer, but that does not matter. The important thing is that we have a reasonably clear idea of the end we are seeking so that we do not choose means that in themselves forfeit the end. As we think these matters through, we are certain to realize that development means much more than growth, and perhaps we may tone down our awed praise of Soviet accomplishments.

Second, we must get the facts straight. There is a military maxim: "Never underestimate the enemy." The importance of this maxim cannot be stressed too strongly. But it is equally dangerous to overestimate the enemy, particularly if we broadcast our estimate over the globe. Many of our critical troubles of the day can be traced directly to a serious overestimation of the power of our military enemies in World War II. If I had time today, I would challenge almost every statement of fact made by Mr. Allen Dulles on the overall strength and rate of growth of the Soviet economy. His statements were all, in my opinion, serious exaggerations in favor of the Soviet Union. This is not to say that economic growth of the Soviet Union has been unimpressive. It has been impressive, indeed. But it has not been unprecedented and it is currently being more than matched in other Western economies, as France, West Germany, Japan, and so on. I fear that many of the recent public statements on Soviet growth are intended primarily to stir the American people into action, to drive away so-called complacency. Such efforts may very well backfire with most serious consequences. We need to be made to understand something quite different, namely, that a country can have enormous military strength without great economic wealth. In all matters, we must keep our heads when we examine the facts and not let our fears and desires run away with us.

Third, we should pay more attention to the committed nations. Our European Allies are the great reservoir of strength for us now, and over the next few decades. In 1956 the OEEC countries had a total population of 287 million, over 100 million larger than ours, and a combined gross national product of $240 billion, about 57 percent of ours. Both population and gross national product are larger than for the Soviet Union. From 1953 through 1957 their combined industrial production increased by 31 percent, which is not far below the Soviet performance; for some individual countries, the performance is above the Soviet level.

The other committed countries are those in the Bloc. It is reasonable to say that the people who want least to be ruled by Communists are those who are. The problems here are tragic, as we know from the Hungarian uprising, and I cannot prescribe foolproof ways to utilize this great body of discontent. At a minimum, we can play the Soviet game and take every opportunity to stir up trouble. As with them, it would not cost much.

Fourth, we should pick and choose carefully among the uncommitted countries. We should focus on countries of most strategic location and with the most stable political orders. There is no point in giving the historically unstable government that extra shove into the chasm of Communism.

Finally, we should not sell ourselves short. The development of Western civilization is a feat unparalleled in man's history. We have had our sweeping periods of exciting and rapid economic growth. Even as late as the Civil War, this country was underdeveloped by modern standards. Forty years later we were a prosperous and powerful country. We must be careful not to boast, but we should not let Communist propaganda about unprecedented economic achievements go unchallenged. Nor should we fail to remind others of what other things went along with sheer growth, and how empty and meaningless growth is without those other things.

Perhaps we should be willing to admit once again what was said over a hundred years ago:

> "The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization...
>
> The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together."

It might be embarrassing to cite the source. These are the words of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as written in The Communist Manifesto.



Mr. Burnham states that political warfare comprises all types of operation that may be involved in a struggle for power, short of the commitment of basic formal military force. We must proceed from a correct estimate of the situation, decide on clear and specific objectives (long-term and short-term), and select the means appropriate to achieve our objectives. The objective of communist political warfare is unlimited, and is, in simple terms, to conquer the opponent. Its successful application is exemplified in the conquests of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and, particularly, China. Soviet nuclear propaganda is another example, designed to hamper U. S. nuclear development and, by paralyzing our will, to prevent our making effective use of our nuclear superiority. A further example is the "anti-imperialist" campaign against the western world in its colonies and in underdeveloped areas. Our government and private agency propaganda has achieved little, and world opinion is influenced more by actions than words. The speaker criticizes our passivity in the East German, Polish, Indonesian, and Hungarian rebellions, and our "incredible" intervention against our allies in the Suez crisis. We are not so much failures at political warfare; we are just not conducting it.

[redacted]

Political Warfare

Mr. JAMES BURNHAM

In the time allotted me this morning, I shall try to cover the following points: First, the definition and nature of political warfare in general. Second, Soviet political warfare, with a number of examples of Soviet operations. Third, I will argue, also by reference to examples, that we—the United States that is—do not carry on true political warfare; and I shall discuss a few of the reasons for this failure. Finally, I shall list without comment a few promising political warfare operations that we might carry out, if we made up our minds to do so.

In current usage there is a narrow and a broad definition of "political warfare." When narrowly defined, a distinction is made, or alleged, between "political warfare" on the one hand, and "economic warfare" and "psychological warfare" on the other. Political warfare is supposed to be restricted in its meaning to various operations, short of general war, that have as their aim the overthrow of a government, or at least a major change in its policy. According to this restricted meaning, psychological operations designed merely to influence public opinion along certain lines, or economic operations aiming at commercial or financial advantage, would not be instances of true political warfare.

At first this narrow definition seems reasonably clear-cut; and it provides us with a row of neat pigeon holes. At one end we have War, just plain war; then, in order, comes the holes marked Political Warfare, Psychological Warfare, Economic Warfare; and then Diplomacy, which connects with the pigeonhole at the other end, which is labeled Peace.

However, more careful scrutiny will suggest that reality, particularly modern reality and above all Soviet reality, cannot be squeezed into these neatly separated pigeon holes.

There is, therefore, reason to adopt a broader definition. In this broader meaning, political warfare between two or more opponents comprises all types of operation that may be involved in the mutual struggle for power, short of the commitment of the basic formal military force. Let me repeat: all types of operation involved in the struggle for power, short of the commitment of the basic formal military force.

Thus, according to this broad definition, political warfare is a general term that includes as subdivisions economic warfare, psychological warfare and propaganda, a good deal of diplomacy, and still other branches. Indeed, on this view political warfare also includes some military operations, so long as these fall short of the commitment of the main formal military apparatus. Guerilla, auxiliary, partisan and other irregular military operations, as well as the use of specialists, instructors, terrorists and even limited units of the basic forces, can all be considered as part of political warfare.

It is this broad definition that seems to me appropriate to the problems of our day.

Political warfare is a struggle or competition between two or more opponents, nations, empires, social classes, races or political parties. This means that political warfare, like any other kind of struggle or competition, is strategic in nature; the principles of strategy apply to political as to the other forms of warfare, games and business. To conduct any strategic enterprise effectively, there are certain familiar requirements that must be met. We must proceed from a correct estimate of the situation, of our opponent's situation as well as our own. We must decide on a clear and specific objective: both a long-term objective to guide the Grand Strategy of the contest as a whole; and short-term objectives which define the goals of particular operations or campaigns. And we must select the means that, in the light of the given situation, are appropriate to the achievement of the chosen objective.

In the case of true political warfare the objective is always defined in terms of power. My purpose in conducting political warfare is always to increase my power in some definite way, or to decrease the power of my opponent; in either case, positive or negative, my aim is to alter the power equilibrium in my favor. The power objective may be grandiose, conquest of a nation, disintegration of an empire; or minor, the takeover of a trade union by my agents, the sabotage of a factory, but whether big or small, the objective is always power.

Our enemy's international operations, diplomatic, economic, psychological, political and military are carried out in strict accord with this general analysis that I have here summarized. And note very particularly that by "political warfare" the Communists mean warfare. They are not thinking about mere rivalry or competition or conflict of some vague kind. By war they mean war; political warfare is a form of war.

As in the case of any war, the objective of political warfare, as the Communists understand it, is to impose one's own will on the opponent,

to destroy the opponent's will to resist; that is, in simplest terms, to conquer the opponent.

The long-term Communist objective (never varied since the founding of the Bolshevik enterprise in 1903) is a monopoly of world power; what their literature calls "a world federation of socialist, soviet republics," or in short, a Communist World Empire. Thus, the objective of Communist political warfare is unlimited. They do not aim, by their conduct of political warfare, merely to needle the opponent, to influence him to various changes of policy, to win a few concessions on this or that point. They aim at conquest, at a decision. In the primarily political phase of the struggle they do not commit the main units of their formal military forces. In that sense the means they employ in political warfare are limited. But the objective is not limited.

Moreover, although the communists realize that political warfare in many instances may not be able by itself to reach a decision, may have to be supplemented by full-scale military measures - they are convinced that in at least some cases political warfare alone can bring the decision. They have evidence to support this belief. Czechoslovakia was conquered twice in this century by political warfare - once by Hitler and once by Stalin - without the commitment of major armed forces.

But the supreme case of successful political warfare is the Communist conquest of mainland China. As early as 1920 the communist high command began a systematic, all-sided political warfare campaign with the specific objective of the conquest of China as a major stage toward the final objective of world conquest. In 1949, without the mass intervention of the main armed forces and with a total expenditure of probably less than half a billion dollars, China was added to the Communist Empire. Of course, there was fighting in the process, some of it on rather a large scale. But the fighting—for the most part by guerilla, partisan and other paramilitary methods—was only one phase, and always a subordinate phase, of the whole combined operation.

From the beginning, the Communist approach to the Chinese problem was strategic. They set themselves a clear political objective, the conquest of state power in China. At each stage they made careful estimates of the situation, and selected the available means - of whatever kind, whether direct or indirect - that they believed would best advance them toward their objective.

At no time did they allow the war with Japan to divert their primary attention from their own objective. They saw very early that the key to the situation was to block determined intervention by the Western powers, in

particular by the United States. To secure this key they carried out one of the most brilliant infiltration and indoctrination campaigns in history, through which they first befuddled Western minds about the Chinese realities, and then - through that befuddlement and through the placing or winning of agents and dupes in the western governments - they paralyzed Western action in the last four crucial years.

In essentials the Yugoslav operation was a short-term, smaller-scale analogue of the Chinese. Substitute Tito for Mao Tse-tung; Draja Mihailovitch for Chiang Kai-shek; Germany for Japan. The western dupes, both the nations and the individuals, remain the same in both shows. Just as in China, the Communists kept their attention fixed on their objectives: state power, and the destruction of all rivals. Fighting the Germans was strictly subordinated to the main goal. As in China, the Communists understood that the key to the situation was to strifle effective interference by the West, specifically by Britain and the United States. This meant throwing their weight against any plan for a Balkan invasion, and getting Britain and the United States to shift their support from Milhailovitch to Tito. The latter must have seemed a formidable political job at the outset, but the Communist world apparatus proved equal to the massive outlay of propaganda, lies, espionage, and treachery that it required.

Czechoslovakia, China, and Yugoslavia are examples of full-scale political warfare campaigns where the conquest of state power was directly at stake. They are comparable to the present Communist campaigns in Laos, Indonesia, Singapore, the Middle East, the British West Indies, and Venezuela. I want to emphasize, however, that smaller-scale Communist campaigns - as well as all their propaganda, economic, and diplomatic operations - are conducted according to the same strategic principles. The objective is always to increase Soviet power, and to weaken the power of the non-Communist world.

Communists engage in strikes and other labor activities in order to win control of trade unions.

For the same basic reason, they join a boy scout troop, a neighborhood Sunday school, the local precinct club of the Democratic or Republican party, or the United Nations: to take it over and use it to advance the general interest of their world enterprise; if they can not take it over, to disrupt and destroy it.

The propaganda activities are similarly conceived in a strategic perspective. Their general aim is to destroy the enemy's will to resist, and to lead him into a line of conduct favorable to the objectives of Soviet policy. For the most part the Communists try to conceal their hand in

the propaganda campaigns. By shrewd and practiced maneuvering, they operate at several stages removed, through a chain of secret agents, fellow travelers and innocent dupes. Thus, in their world campaign on nuclear weapons, which has gone on continuously since the first atom bombs were dropped, they manage to manipulate a vast and motley array of puppets: from their own activists, to conscious fellow travelers, hypertrophied verbalists, senile businessmen, crackpot preachers, softheaded humanitarians, not to speak of all the liberal journalists and TV commentators who cover up for them.

The objectives of Communist and Soviet nuclear propaganda--as it might be called—are obvious enough, or should be. It has been designed to hamper our nuclear weapons development, and, still more basically, to prevent our making effective use--even indirect political use—of our nuclear superiority: that is, to paralyze our will. And, of course, it has been triumphantly successful. While non-Communist soldiers and technicians have been desperately debating for 15 years what technical defense can be devised against nuclear bombs, the Communists long ago proved that political warfare was a perfect defense for the purpose, even when, as for at least five years, they had absolute nuclear inferiority.

In addition to these continuing goals, the nuclear propaganda has specific objectives adjusted to the particular stage of the world struggle. For example, in the present period the nuclear campaign, centered on the slogan of an end to nuclear tests, is tied in with the campaign for a summit meeting, the Rapacki Plan proposal for the atomic neutralization of east and central Europe, and terrorist propaganda correlated with the Sputniks. The combined operation aims to prevent if possible, otherwise to delay and disrupt, the installation of operative intermediate range missiles around the Soviet periphery.

It may be remarked that there are no mass campaigns inside the Soviet empire to demand immediate stopping of Soviet nuclear and missile development; no newspaper ad signed by prominent private citizens; and no marches on the Kremlin to protest whatever is at the moment declared to be official policy.

Besides the campaign on the inter-related complex of negotiations-disarmament-peace, the other principal Communist propaganda campaign of this past period has been on the colonial issue. Here the objective is still more obvious and the results more spectacularly successful. And in their "anti-imperialist" colonial campaign, as in the peace campaign, the Communists have been able to manipulate the conflicts and illusions of the non-Communist world, especially the illusions of the ideology of liberalism.

Communist propaganda on the colonial issue combines into a rounded political warfare operation directed toward the world's underdeveloped areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The intermediary aims, prior to total Communist take over, is to deprive the western powers of the strategic, economic, and human auxiliary resources on which their world position depends. The primary specific objectives in the present phase would seem to be: (1) to gain control of South Seas passage - the Strait of Malacca and what some geographers call the Malay passage - by winning political ascendancy in Singapore and Indonesia; (2) to control the land bridge to Africa and the flow of Mideastern oil, through exploitation of Arab nationalism; (3) to disrupt the security of the southern half of fortress America. Against the background of the history of the past year and a half, no one will feel that these objectives are unrealistic.

Before leaving the Communist conduct of political warfare I will list three other of its characteristics:

First, Communist political warfare is multi-dimensional, making use of nearly every field of human activity. It includes: propaganda; economic pressures; bribery; lies and rumors, subversion and infiltration; blackmail and smearing techniques; exploitation of existing social rifts between races, classes, nations, religions; electoral and parliamentary processes; physical terror, kidnappings, torture, assassination; guerilla and partisan fighting. There is no sharp line between the irregular fighting of Communist political warfare and all-out fighting by formal units.

In fact, it would really be correct to say that from a Communist point of view, full-scale war, in the military sense, is only one dimension, one branch, of political warfare. The supreme goal is political: a monopoly of power in each nation and in the world as a whole. In pursuit of this goal, various weapons and methods are used in accordance with the demands of time and circumstance.

Second, Communist warfare is integrated. All of these various phases and dimensions are related to the supreme objective and the appropriate subordinate objectives that are set for each period and each operation.

Third, Communist political warfare is continuous. It never lets up; there is no period of truce or armistice. The methods change. Sometimes there is tough talk; sometimes there are smiles. Sometimes there is shooting, sometimes assassinations, sometimes cocktail parties. One day you call Roosevelt or Eisenhower or deGaulle a fascist; and on the next, a hero of the free world. Sometimes you trot out your newest weapons, sometimes your strongest vodka. The methods change, but the objective remains unaltered: to destroy the enemy's will to resist, and thereby to conquer him.

For the Communists there is no distinction between a state of peace and a state of war. The Communists are in a permanent state of war with all the non-Communist world; they will not rest until all the world is Communist.

Even so brief a review of Soviet political warfare discloses how much the Soviet conception and practice differ from our own. As we--or most of us at any rate--see it, the world is now at peace, and has been since the latter part of 1945. The peace has been threatened and disturbed, but it has been peace and not war. Even the Korean fighting we were not willing to call "war." We speak of economic warfare, political and psychological warfare, cold war; but we do not interpret these phrases quite literally. We think of the political and psychological warfare operations in which we are engaged as a special kind of competition, rather than as literally war. We are trying to get the better of a competitor and opponent, certainly; to block certain of his moves, divert others, influence him to make certain changes in his behavior and policies. But we are not trying to impose our will on him in any general way, certainly not trying to destroy him. In fact, the aim of most of our leaders is to coexist with him in peace and friendship.

Let us take one of our political warfare operations as a definite example, and let us make it one of the most successful rather than one of the lamentably numerous failures. Incidentally, I am not going to make any references this morning to our foreign aid program, which was the subject of one of yesterday's papers. However, I would make the same basic analysis of the foreign aid operations.

Soon after the beginning of the cold war, certain agencies of our government decided to mount a campaign on the subject of Soviet slave labor, about which there had already been spontaneous agitation by private individuals and groups. This was a combined white and black operation. That is, it was conducted partly in the open by official government spokesmen, who made speeches in the United Nations and elsewhere, called for official investigations, etc. And on the black front through a variety of actions; organizations and individuals were covertly guided, stimulated, and supported.

An international organization was built around a Frenchman, who had been an intimate of Nazi concentration camps. The outfit conducted elaborate inquiries, published books and magazines, held public meetings, provoked some publicized European lawsuits, etc. Other books were subsidized, translated and widely distributed, along with magazine articles and pamphlets. The American Federation of Labor came prominently into the act, and through it a map of Soviet slave camps got international attention. Friendly Congressmen were fed information, and one of them was induced

to hand a copy of the map to Molotov, with photographers close by, at the Japanese treaty conference in San Francisco. In Europe, a slave camp exhibit was put together and shown in several big cities. Escapees from the camps were helped in getting books or articles published, making lecture tours, and so on. The Voice of America and Radio Free Europe broadcast material into the Soviet sphere as well as in the free world.

The campaign was persisted in for some years, involving a good deal of effort and money; and has petered out only lately, with the modification of the Soviet slave camp system that took place a couple of years ago. The campaign was handled reasonably well, on the whole. But if we ask the really essential questions - just what did it accomplish strategically? Just what do we have to show for it in terms of the world power equilibruim? It is hard to point to anything much. Possibly it weakened the moral prestige of Communism a little, made it less attractive to some people. But it affected very few, really. Those who were capable of being influenced, one way or the other, by the Soviet slave camp practices, already knew about them. The Communists knew all about them, and accepted them as part of the revolutionary process. The masses of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa could not care less. A certain impression was made on a few European workers, perhaps. Probably the operation was worth while, but it would be foolish to over-rate its results.

Actually this was a psychological rather than a truly political operation. I doubt that its objective was ever very clearly defined, but in practice it would seem to have been to try to modify opinions and ideas - that is, a purely psychological objective. This was not connected with any definite political objective, which means a power objective, an aim of loosing the enemy's hold on some position of his or of winning a new position for ourselves - whether that position is the local of a trade union or the government of a nation. A merely psychological campaign, even if well handled, doesn't lead anywhere, doesn't have any lasting consequences, but in the end just evaporates. It's like the salesman who may persuade his customers of the beauty of his product, but somehow never gets the signature on the dotted line.

In the case of our slave camp campaign, the psychological aim was at any rate correct from our point of view. But in many of our operations, the psychological aim is itself questionable, quite apart from the political vacuum. As a nation we seem to have an obsessive wish that others should love us and most of our psycho-political warfare is designed to get them to do so by giving them what we regard as the truth about ourselves, and refuting what we consider the lies and misconceptions about our way of life and our motives. You would think that we would have learned from the experiences of the past decade that the attempt is both futile and pointless.

Both governmental agencies and private foundations have spent scores of millions of dollars trying to persuade people all over the world that we Americans are highly cultured in the arts, heart and soul for peace at all costs, and 100% dedicated to social and racial equality; and that therefore everybody ought to love us and be nice to us.

Now in the first place, propaganda along such lines is useless. Other peoples are not going to judge us by what we say about ourselves propaganda-wise, but by our policies, actions and achievements. Who is going to take our talk about equality seriously when he knows with 7% of the world's population we keep half of the world's wealth for ourselves? And if the Arab laborer or Hindu servant or Peruvian mine worker doesn't know this by studying statistics, he sees it as he watches the U. S. information officer ride back to his big house in a big Buick from the speech on equality he has been giving at the local university. And it's a peculiar kind of passion for peace that expresses itself by keeping soldiers in 87 countries, spending $40 billion on armaments, and making bombs big enough to blow up all mankind.

To prove how cultured we are, we spend millions to ship imitation French abstract paintings and second-rate disharmonic musical composers around the world, subsidize highbrow magazines, and stage international conferences of leftwing intellectuals. The masses couldn't be more uninterested. They have their own idea of American cutlure, and, incidentally, they like it fine: it's a combination of Hollywood movies with the mass produced mechanical gadgets that make for a comfortable mass standard of living. But they won't get much help there from the cultural organizations, magazines and conferences that CIA spends some of its black millions on. These end up by becoming gravy trains for anti-American leftists who despise American culture, envy American power, and spend most of their time and our money denouncing everything we stand for. I might add that among these anti-American leftists lapping at the CIA trough are not a few American citizens. For a case history of such a useless and self-defeating propaganda operation I refer you to a well known organization and its various auxiliaries, currently active in two dozen nations of Europe, Latin America and Asia.

But even if this love-me, love-my-culture, social equality and peaceful intentions propaganda were successful in its own terms, it would injure rather than help us in solving what is the basic political problem - namely, national survival in the struggle for the world. In fact, we are probably lucky that it is unsuccessful. A great power is never going to be loved in any event. What the people of the world want to find out is not whether our artists can paint square circles and our musicians compose in the twelve-tone scale, but whether we as a nation mean business, whether we can provide the world with the assured, confident leadership it needs and wants, whether we are ready to slap down nations that keep a decent world order from working. Do

you think that the Indonesian anti-Communist rebels and the pro-Western Lebanese of today, the Hungarian students and workers of yesterday and tomorrow, the anti-Russian Poles and the anti-Communist Russians are going to love us because we keep telling them how peaceful we are? What they would like on the political warfare menu are—at the appropriate times and places—guns, planes, medical supplies, volunteers, radios, money, firm public support and guidance.

To put the matter in its crudest terms, what the people of the world are trying to figure out from the competing propagandas, from the psychological side of political warfare, is: who is going to win?

When we do operate in terms of a political instead of a purely psychological objective, this is likely to be purely defensive. We do not choose the political goal; it is thrust upon us. For example, the airlift into Berlin was a dramatic act of political warfare. But its purely defensive objective had been imposed on us by the initiative of our opponent in establishing his land blockade. We succeeded in our negative aim—that is, we kept Berlin from starving. But we neither advanced our own position nor weakened that of the enemy; we did not remove the constant threat of a renewed blockade which hangs over Berlin today as it did nine years ago.

Our actions in Korea and Guatemala, even the successful action in Greece, similarly have been defensive only. Now, purely defensive actions can at best only keep the enemy from fresh advances; and they can accomplish this merely negative task only if each and every one of them is 100% successful. But 100% success cannot be expected. The enemy, pushed back from this salient, will try that one; at some point he succeeds, or partly succeeds. We prevented him from reaching the eastern Mediterranean through Greece; but now he makes a more formidable thrust through Egypt and Syria. He has been held in Burma; but—a satisfactory enough exchange from his point of view—he took China.

Sometimes there is just no objective of any kind. We have, for example, poured enough black dollars into the French Socialist Party to float the new Saratoga. For what conceivable purpose? Why should keeping that moribund political corpse alive matter a damn to the United States? What did we ever get out of it? Its newspaper, Le Populaire, would have gone bankrupt years ago without our support, and its spokesmen have continued to denounce most of our international policies and to favor most Soviet proposals. Several weeks ago, when faced with a serious political crisis, that party cracked up the way a socialist party always does when confronted with a serious crisis. If we are going to buy political agents, we should insist at least that we get something for our money.

Even in those cases where we seem to have an objective that appears be both political and offensive, examination will usually disclose that it usually only the rhetoric, not the action, that is genuinely offensive.

Take, for example, the so-called policy of liberation that was proaimed for Eastern Europe and Asia by the members of the present administration before they took office. Ostensibly implementing that policy, ve have spent many tens of millions of dollars on the Free Europe - Free Asia - Free Russia complex of organizations, radio stations, exile committees, balloon flying, publishing houses, exile universities, and so on.

These multifarious and expensive activities would make sense if, and only if, they were organized in subordination to the political objective of freeing some parts of the Soviet Empire from Communist control, or at the very least of bringing about major political modifications therein to the injury of the Communists and to our benefit. Otherwise they are a waste of time and money.

But in practice they are not guided by any such objective, and by now everyone knows it. Our total passivity in relation to East Germany in 1953, Poland and then Hungary in 1956, and Indonesia yesterday and today—as well as our incredible intervention against instead of alongside our allies in the Suez crisis--prove that we have no clear political objective that we are willing to stand by. When the time comes for action, we wash our hands, preach a few sermons in the United Nations and write a couple of notes about international morality. The problem then, as I see it, is not so much that we are failures at political warfare. We are just not conducting true political warfare at all, well or badly. If we decided to begin, I imagine we could do as well as the next man.

I do not have time to analyze the reasons for this vacuum of ours in political warfare. I can do no more than list what seem to me the three principal factors:

First: We are making an incorrect estimate of the situation and the enemy. We refuse to recognize that we are in a desperate struggle for survival against an enemy who is irreversibly determined to destroy us, and to take over the world for remaking in accordance with his interests and values, which mean the end of ours.

Second: Because of this incorrect estimate, we have failed to adopt appropriate and specific political - that is, power - objectives of our own, by the attainment of which we could counter the enemy.

Third: Underlying the incorrect estimate and the failure to take counte measures is a self-hypnosis with the ideological abstractions of liberal-humanitarian ideology, at the expense of the blunt truths of a strategy, geo-politics, and history. We are so "hopped up" with pipe dreams about peace, disarmament, equality, non-aggression, rule of law, self-determination, an so on, that we seem to have forgotten the realities of geography and power. Our moralistic action against the Suez aggressors may have given us for a day or two nice headlines in the Arab, neutralist and left wing press; but it lost Suez. When it comes to aggression, after all, it makes quite a difference who's doing the aggressing. The exchange was not in our favor. It is worth keeping in mind that there is only one way in this world for a nation to avoid the risk of war: by accepting defeat, by surrendering in advance.

If we are to fill the vacuum, and to shift into the effective conduct of counter-political warfare, the first step is to correct the false estimate; and the second is to adopt a general long-term objective adequate to meet the problem that the situation poses. This objective could only be: the reduction of the power of the enemy to a point where he no longer threatens the security of the United States and of the world. The achievement of this objective requires not merely the containment of further Soviet advance but at least the partial breakup of the present Soviet empire.

In the pursuit of this general objective, specific campaigns with specific limited objectives would presumably be assigned as missions, in the same manner as campaigns in conventional warfare. Admiral So-and-so would be ordered, say, to detach Albania from the Soviet sphere within 18 months, and would be assigned the necessary resources and support. Assistant Secretary Such-and-such of the State department might be put in charge of a combined diplomatic, propaganda, economic and subversive operation aiming at the unification of Korea as part of the free world. Mr. X of CIA could have been (or let us say, should have been, and still better, should be) commanded, with the unofficial support of the Navy and Air Force and covered by intense diplomatic activity, to prevent Sukarno's liquidation of the anti-Communist rebel movement in Indonesia.

Still bolder and more massive operations are called for. Three major objectives almost leap out of the immediate situation. The first is defensive: to force a showdown with Nasser, in order to halt the now rapid erosion that is leading toward the complete collapse of the Western position in the Middle East. The other two are offensive: to give France under De Gaulle all necessary backing in the attempt to construct a North African Federation tied to France, and through France to Europe and NATO; and on and on a still bigger scale, to get the Red Army out of the East European captive nations by a combined campaign of pressures, promises, threats,

[redacted]

Mr. de Toledano states that the nuclear age has not made obsolescent what may be called horse-and buggy concepts of internal subversion. If the West, and particularly the U. S., does not understand, assimilate, and employ the methodology of applied subversion, then we are lost. It is a prime axiom that no revolution in modern history has succeeded without a concomitant destruction of the will to resist in the legitimate government. The function of any local communist party, therefore, is not the violent overthrow of government (in the limited legal sense, demanded by our contemporary courts), but in the sapping of allegiances, the dissemination of confusion, the instillment of fear, and the poisoning of faith in our institutions, ourselves, and our God. The U. S. Communist party is supported not only by its "Open Party" members and by its undergound, but by the "Reserve" (or "Sleeper") apparatus, the most potent and dangerous of the three groups. The "Sleepers" are those who never joined a communist front, but who, never defending treason, besmirch those who expose it.

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Civil War and Internal Subversion

Mr. RALPH de TOLEDANO, Newsweek

The topic before the house, as you have been adequately reminded, is "War in the Nuclear Age." Men more informed and more scholarly than I am in the gentle techniques of destruction have confronted this topic from the vantage points of their specialized knowledge. It is now my lot to beg the questions by dealing with an aspect of the problem so old-fashioned that it almost may be called quaint. I mean, of course, civil war and disturbance, subversion, and the internal assault of this nation—warfare so open that on the principle of the purloined letter it is completely secret.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose is a tired maxim. Yet it is hardly in the nature of paradox to note that the nuclear age, with all the revolutionary technology of warfare it has introduced, has not made obsolescent what may be called horse-and-buggy concepts of internal subversion. Though the modus operandi may have been slightly altered by the Soviet application of Pavlovian techniques, the salivating dog remains a symbol of intensification, not change.

The Great Mushroom which bloomed over Hiroshima added but one new fact to the strategy and tactics of subversion. Whereas in the past subversive conspiracy was but one arrow in the sling of revolutionary states, it has become the main weapon in the Soviet arsenal. It may manifest itself in many forms; but the categorical destructiveness of nuclear weapons has neutralized them. Our armies and navies, our air forces—these are vitally necessary in the elaborate process of stalemate which has become the function of Western and Soviet armed forces. This process must continue. We are lost if the West—particularly this nation—does not understand, assimilate, and employ the methodology of applied subversion.

Let me here note with some saddness that Americans do not understand this methodology—that, in fact, they think there is something a little overripe about those of us who devote our attention to the problem. When Whittaker Chambers remarked some years ago that "there are spies and traitors all about us," those who mold our minds

were either outraged or convulsed. The fact he was stating, however, should have been apparent to anyone whose reading of history extends beyond elementary school texts.

Since the overthrow of Charles the First, civil war and subversion have been endemic to the western world. Communist revolutionists did not invent the techniques so successful today. Lenin's seizure of the Constituent Assembly and Cromwell's overthrow of the British monarchy, by their controlled interaction of troops and mobs, were brothers under the slogans. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries were a series of internal upheavals linked by an international Weltanschauung which in 1919 concretized itself in the Comintern. Today civil war is all about us in a thousand manifestations of subversion and conspiracy, of stupid acquiescence and cynical resignation. It is the toy of millionaires and the self-abuse of intellectuals.

The A-bomb, the H-bomb, the ICBM are, in the active sense, significant and commanding only insofar as they are not used. The arsenal of nuclear weaponry serves a psychological rather than a military function. For the Soviets, it is designed to destroy the will to resist in the free world, to make Goliath stretch out before David and ask for the stroke of the sword.

Nuclear weapons serve to stir the Gargantuan mind and picayune understanding of Bertrand Russell, who urges us to disarm unilaterally and to accept Communist domination rather than what he chose to call "the end of the human race." They encourage the outbursts of a Cyrus Eaton who rattles his dollars and seeks to discredit the guardians of our internal security. A justice of our Supreme Court, writes the introduction to a book by a notorious fellow traveler—a book which belabors the United States for its defense of the Korean Republic and equates us with the Communists.

Communist strategists know what we do not—that the secret weapon of any state when confronted by internal subversion and disturbance is the will to resist.

It is a prime axiom that no revolution in modern history has succeeded without a concomitant destruction of the will to resist in the legitimate government. There is much talk of belly-Communism—talk which thrives on a complete falsification of history. The French Revolution is always the example given—and generations of school children since the days of William Wordsworth hold the passionate belief that hunger and oppression led the Jacobin mobs which guillotined Louis and Marie Antoinette. The meticulous and inspired reporting of Alexis de Tocqueville, ignored by the popularizers,

proves conclusively that France was going through the greatest prosperity in several decades when sansculottism swept in—and that the Bastille, presumably crowded with political prisoners, was literally empty—and had been for a long time—when the mobs of Paris stormed its ancient walls.

We forgot that Lenin himself described the Kerensky regime which preceded his as the freest government in the world. Whereas—desperate heroism, hunger, ideological fervor, and the desire for freedom could not prevail in Hungary.

Let me repeat then: The overthrow of established government does not precede, but follows, the collapse of constituted order and the halt of the civil peristalsis.

As a corollary: The successful revolutionary assault is not on the government but on the national will.

The function of any Communist Party, therefore, is not the violent overthrow of the government—in the limited legal sense demanded by our contemporary courts—but in the sapping of allegiances, the dissemination of confusion, the instillment of fear, and the poisoning of faith in our institutions, ourselves, our God. Its aim is to halt the civil peristalsis.

The Communist Party is a paramilitary force, true—but its ammunition is far subtler than bullets and hand grenades. With this in mind, let me digress long enough to discuss first the nature of the Communist who makes up this paramilitary force. For the sake of precision, let me refer to him as the Bolshevik.

I ask you first to put aside some preconceptions. The Bolshevik is not "a liberal in a hurry." He is a Marxist only to this extent—that he accepts a general theory of organization of the state. "Scientific socialism," the totality of a regimented world structure, certain outward patterns and certain semantic stridencies—all these he has incorporated into his thinking.

But the ancestors of Bolshevism are not Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. They are two men, one hardly known to the West, Bakunin and Nechaev—two faces merged into the Janus-like configuration of Leninism and Stalinism. There is no facet of the Communist world revolution which does not reflect the baleful light of these two Messianic Russians—one self-deluded, the other so obsessively evil that he served as a model for Dostoevsky's "The Possessed." The Bolshevik practitioners, piling faggots on the world's trouble spots, may think that they were suckled on the

Communist Manifesto, but they drew their milk from a forgotten little pamphlet, twenty-five hundred words in all. It is called Catechism of a Revolutionist, it was written by Bakunin and Nechaev; this is how it begins:

> "The revolutionist is a doomed man. He has no personal interests, no affairs, sentiments, attachments, property, not even a name of his own. Everything in him is absorbed by one exclusive interest, one thought, one passion—the revolution."

The Byronic concept of the revolutionist—or its more intellectualized counterpart in a man like Andre Malraux—is cast aside. So too is the doctrinaire conformity demanded of the orthodox Marxist. Morals, the accoutrements of culture, the softening decencies of every-day associations—these no longer exist. The revolutionist of the Bakunin-Nechaev school—and hence, the Leninist school—makes a pact with the revolution which prepares him for torture or death.

His enemy is established society—a society he categorizes neatly. Some members of society are to be condemned to death and ruthlessly liquidated. Those of the ruling class who contribute to the revolutionary spirit by their acts of brutality against the people are to be encouraged and preserved. They will goad the inert mass into unreasoning violence.

And, the Catechism adds:

> "One may conspire (with the liberals) in accordance with their programs, making believe that one follows them blindly, and at the same time one should take hold of them, get possession of all their secrets, compromise them to the utmost . . . use them as instruments for stirring up disturbances in the State."

The Bakuninist-Nechaevist has a basic contempt for the "doctrinaires" who spend their time "talking idly in groups and on paper." This contempt we have seen in the utterances of Joseph Stalin, and in his disregard of the Marxist dialectic. The Catechism of the Revolutionist argues that these Talmudic debaters of revolution are to be tugged into the arena of force and violence which will destroy most of them but serve as "real revolutionary training" for a hard core which will break loose and join the true faith. Agents in what Harold Laski called the "organization of catastrophe," and makers of despair, these revolutionists are urged to seek out the "bold world of bandits" and to combine with it. Have we forgotten that Stalin robbed banks?

Here then is the iron law which binds the Bolshevik, reiterated many decades later by J. Peters in his Manual of Organization, a Communist vade mecum, summed up poetically by Bertoldt Brecht in that chillingly luminous line, "Slink into the mud, embrace the butcher, but change the world"—and chanted in tender ditty by the German Communists as the Weimar Republic sank into its own morasses. You may recall the lullaby: "Grease the guillotine with the fat of the tyrants. Blood, blood, blood must flow."

If we are to understand what faces the free world, we must first come to grips with the Leninist concept of the revolutionary. Not every conspirator or subversive is cut from the same heroic pattern or shares the same determination. There are time servers and bureaucrats in plenty, all helping to make up the corpus of international Communism. There are weak men and scoundrels—and men of soul who defect to freedom. But the weak and the dishonest do not command the paramilitary forces of Communism—they are merely a part of them. If military victory were a simple function of unanimous courage, what wars would be won?

We once thought of the Communist as an unkempt type futile debating in a Union Square cafeteria. It would be an equally serious mistake to accept the stereotype of the steely eye and the commissar manner. Alger Hiss was, and is, one of the prototypes of the Bolshevik. Yet on the surface and in ordinary intercourse, he was a man of somewhat mincing step and manner—and behind the charm a crashing bore. Richard Sorge, perhaps the most effective espionage agent turned out by the Red Army's Fourth Bureau, was hard-drinking and hard-lusting, yet he plundered the secrets of the very Nazis and Japanese whose whiskey he drank and whose wives he seduced. The leaders of the American Communist Party seem flabby, even a little fey—yet the incidence of combat decorations among them is startlingly high.

It is from this diversity that Communism fills its table of organization. Each comrade has his rank and his assigned role. Each comrade delivers himself to a military discipline. Thousands of intellectuals, to the lecture platform born in 1948 accepted party orders to join the campaign of "industrial concentration"—a process of colonization and infiltration of the nation's key plants and factories.

"Plant you now, dig you later," the Communist Party said. One man held in reserve until the calibrated moment can do more damage than a dozen rioting mobs—just as a single sniper can immobilize a company of troops. A strategic minority can achieve much with little—on somewhat the same principle. Neither theory is original with the Communists, nor is it exclusively theirs. Walter Reuther, with less than one hundred men,

employed the theory of the strategic minority in the 1930s; with this fulcrum he broke management resistance to the UAW and launched a powerful mass union.

Size, therefore, is secondary in Communist organization. When the "revolutionary situation" comes about, sergeants become colonels as new recruits are trained by the Bolshevik cadres. For those who find the size of today's Communist Party a cause for encouragement, let it be recalled that Lenin disapproved of mass membership in the pre-combat stages, and he developed the technique of the continuing purge to keep the party vigorous. That organization must fit the situation. In the CPUSA, that organization is triangular. There are, then, three Communist Parties in this country by parallel chains of command directed from Moscow, the Soviet Embassy, and a highly mobile "field headquarters." These three parties are: the so-called Open party; the underground party; and the reserve, or sleeper apparatus.

I have not listed any of the dozen apparatuses, working in tandem, which carry out the Soviet Union's espionage missions. These fall into the category of military intelligence and are directed by the Red Army, the secret police, the Comintern, or the torture brigades known as Smersh.

Of these three parties, the "open party" is the least important. It is made up of the expendables, the old hacks, the swing men of the front groups, the shouters and debaters. It has a double mission: To draw fire and to bring in the recruits. Its membership is estimated at seven to ten thousand.

The underground party is organized on Bakuninist lines, concretized by one B. Vassiliev in 1931, under the title: "Organizational Problems in Underground Revolutionary Work." The outline runs to five pages. It merits serious study.

> "In proportion as the legal apparatus of the party is liquidated," Vassiliev directed, "the directing functions will inevitably require a regrouping of party forces and a reorganization of the party apparatus. This reconstruction of the work will inevitably require a regrouping of party forces."

This has been going on, carefully and methodically, since the inception of the cold war. The underground party has been split up into several thousand fragments, the base being a cell of no more than ten, but usually five, members. Maximum security is maintained in liaison between cell, section, district, and national leaders. There is frequent use of couriers—telephones

are banned—with the time honored use of "cut-outs" to evade discovery. The party's financial structure has been overhauled to make the millions of dollars previously invested in legitimate enterprises more easily available. Caches of money—one of about half-a-million dollars—are kept.

Each member of the underground party operates like a soldier behind enemy lines. The more important comrades are provided with a false identity, false Social Security cards, and a false driver's license. For the top echelons, party doctors are available to change the color of hair, shape of eyebrows, size of nose.

In Vassiliev's detailed instructions, it was mandatory—and I quote:

> "(a) to find a building for storing the Party archives; (b) to organize an illegal printing plant in which it would be possible to print the Party organ in case of suppression and closing of the legal Party papers and journals; (c) to form an apparatus for distributing illegal Party literature; (d) to prepare a definite group of leading Party activists to pass into illegality; (e) to prepare addresses and houses for illegal correspondence, for secret sessions of the leading Party organs and also for housing the illegal Party activists and for conferences between them and the workers who continue to be on a legal footing; (f) to prepare a minimum number of workers who understand the elementary rules of the technique of underground work (. . . code work, the technique of of the defense of the illegal part of the Party apparatus, etc.)"

Every one of these organizational plans are now operational. Combat veterans in the party have been organized into hard-hitting flying squads for use in riot work, as at Peekskill. Beyond this, the Communists have set up a Red equivalent of the underground railroads which existed prior to the War Between the States. The policy of "industrial concentration" has put more than 75 percent of the underground party's mobile effectives into plants and factories where they can mold trade union policy now and sabotage by slow-downs and flash strikes in times of international crisis. Today, they control the largest local in the United Auto Workers Union, and have begun the slow recapture of other unions. Less muscular troops have been carefully planted in everything from Parent-Teacher organizations to the grass roots echelons of legitimate political parties—and this includes the Republican Party. For the first time in a decade, spheres of influences have been reestablished in the Congress of the United States.

The third grouping of Communists is the most dangerous—and the most potent. I refer to the "reserve" or "sleeper" apparatus. It is made up of

people who have never joined a Communist front or identified themselves with a secret party cell. Record of the membership is kept in Moscow, and an approach to them may not be made for months or years. The member of the reserve remains on tap for one great assignment which will expose him—or for the small, subtle undermining of the will to resist of the nation.

There is another function of the sleeper apparatus, effective but beyond the reach of counter-intelligence. It operated silently during the Hiss case when from the bars of Wall Street clubs to the comfortable reaches of Park Avenue their poison dripped down every day and in every way—never defending treason but always besmirching those who exposed it.

It is not the purpose of this discussion to name members of the sleeper apparatus. However secret these sessions may be, there would be a leak were I to mention the editors and editorial writers on great newspapers, the commentators, the artists, and entertainers, any of those responsible for the propaganda fallout which deforms the minds and thoughts of people in these terrible times. It is enough that we know who they are—and that this knowledge will be put to use on the day this nation regains its courage.

For our purposes today, it is also enough to know that this sleeper apparatus exists—a part of the three-way drive to destroy America.

I have, so far, described the paramilitary organism which threatens us. Seizure of power is its ultimate goal, but not by any frontal attack. The civil war to which it is directed has been going on for years, and despite our smug complacencies its victories have been considerable and steady. Let me enumerate:

1. In the past four years, anti-Communists in this country have been systematically discredited and destroyed. With wise looks and bright sayings, those with specialized knowledge have been driven out of the market place of ideas. By innuendo, they find themselves deprived of standing in the intellectual community. They are accused of being "hysterical," of "seeing Communists under beds," of having lost a sense of proportion. And in time, they are elbowed out of the scholarly projects, the entertainment field, the bookstores. Foundations, which control so much of the nation's intellectual life, shun them.

This is not accident. It is all planned—the work of the sleeper, but never, sleeping, apparatus—and in most cases those who carry out the plan do not know they are being manipulated.

2. Communists and pro-Communists who were painstakingly forced out of positions of influence in the mass media and the field of communications are returning. They are back on the networks, in Hollywood, in the publishing houses. They are strong enough to keep the paperbook field clean of anti-Communist material. They are back in the teaching profession. Even convicted traitors like Alger Hiss are now being renovated by such publications as the Saturday Review of Literature.

3. At every point of vulnerability campaigns are being mounted and meeting with success: Stop nuclear testing, with or without adequate safeguards; recognize Red China, however it may open the way for Communist domination of the critically important overseas Chinese. Lower barriers on trade with Iron Curtain countries, even if it means strengthening their war potential. Curb the FBI, whatever the cost of internal security. Abolish congressional investigation of subversion. Rip away all forms of government secrecy, legitimate or not, in the name of press freedom. And most of all, let's not be beastly to the Russians; turn the other cheek.

4. Coincident with these campaigns, voices urge the superiority of the Soviet system—its science, its education, its armaments, even its creaking productive capacity. At every hand so-called experts loudly deplore presumed American inadequacies—till the average citizen believes that this nation is hopelessly weak and unable to withstand the Communist onslaught. Bertrand Russell's plea that we surrender begins to make sense.

I do not mean to imply that every man who raises his voice in behalf of these causes is broadcasting on a Moscow wavelength. I do not say that we should become a nation of tub-thumpers. But I do maintain that the intellectual atmosphere which agitates decent people over these issues—and the direction that agitation takes—is a function of the civil war now being waged in this country.

When a union newspaper—and I have one in mind—attempts to terrorize its readers into a belief that their milk is poisoned by strontium 90, this is as much a manifestation of the civil war as the drilling squads of underground party activists. Those squads exist—trained in the uses of baseball bats, picket sticks, hatpins, and the rest of the close-order drill of riot duty. But they are used almost never—and when the order comes to put them into the field the battle will be over. It will be over because the will to resist will be dead. The activists will storm an empty Bastille.

I remember a day, not too many years ago, when the Office of Naval Intelligence was ordered to disband its Red Desk and destroy its files. I am

not being indiscreet when I say that those files were never destroyed. They were carried out, as an admiral later told me, on the backs of high-ranking officers who would not let politics triumph over patriotism.

Would the Navy do as much today? Or has the will to resist begun to crumble.

Civil war and the violent seizure of power is something even the Washington Post can understand. The will to resist is intangible. If I have made it the central theme of this presentation it is because once destroyed it may never be recreated. Not all the nuclear weapons of a nuclear age, not all the brilliant strategic plans devised by minds far wiser than mine, not all the genius of production and logistics can prevail once that will is gone.

That is what the Communists understand.

That is what they mean by civil war, by internal subversion.

Karl Marx once wrote: "Neither a nation nor a woman can be forgiven for the unguarded hour in which a chance comer has seized the opportunity for an act of rape." Can there be less forgiveness for those of us who watch the rapist at work?