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Description of document: Reports for Selected National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Investigations Closed During 2022

Requested date: 17-March- 2023

Release date: 18-April-2023

Posted date: 01-July-2024

Source of document: FOIA Request  
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[Electronic Freedom of Information Act \(FOIA\) Request Form](#)

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**NASA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**  
SUITE 8U71, 300 E ST SW  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546-0001

April 18, 2023

Re: Initial Determination on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request # 23-00013-IG-F /  
OIG # 2023-19

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552), you submitted a request to the NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG), dated March 17, 2023, and received by this office on March 20, 2023. Your FOIA request was assigned tracking number # 23-00013-IG-F / OIG # 2023-19. Specifically, you sought the following records:

"[...] a copy of the final report or final work product document from each of the following NASA OIG investigations closed during 2022:

O-JP-19-0137-S, O-GO-20-0140-HL-S, O-MA-20-0179-S, O-AR-20-0274-HL-S, O-KE-21-0042-S, O-ST-21-0044-S, O-KE-21-0048-O, O-MA-21-0089-P, O-GO-21-0111-S, O-GO-21-0135-HL-S, O-GO-21-0204-S, O-GO-22-0026-HL-S, O-GO-19-0151-HL-O, O-GO-20-0057-O, O-GO-21-0110-S, O-JS-22-0071-S, O-KE-23-0016-P, and O-KE-23-0022-P. [...]"

In response to your FOIA request, we conducted a search for responsive records within OIG's Office of Investigations. Our search identified the responsive information releasable under the FOIA as described below.

Certain exemptions have been applied to withhold information from the enclosed documents that is not releasable under FOIA exemptions (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(D), and (b)(7)(E). The exempt information has been redacted. In applying these exemptions, we have determined that the withheld information would cause foreseeable harm if released.

FOIA exemption (b)(5) protects inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. The

courts have interpreted this exemption to incorporate the deliberative process privilege, the general purpose of which is to prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions. The exemption protects not merely documents, such as predecisional documents, recommendations, and opinions on legal or policy matters, but also the integrity of the deliberative process itself where the exposure of that process would result in harm.

Exemption (b)(6) exempts from disclosure personnel and similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption (b)(7)(C) provides protection for law enforcement information and records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”. Exemption (b)(7)(C) is routinely applied to protect the personal privacy interest of law enforcement personnel involved in conducting investigations. Disclosure of the mere fact that an individual is mentioned in an agency's law enforcement files carries a stigmatizing connotation cognizable under FOIA Exemption (b)(7)(C). See, e.g., *Fund for Constitutional Government v. National Archives & Records Service*, 656 F.2d 856, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Numerous courts have recognized that individuals' privacy interests are substantial given the nature of law enforcement records, whether they are suspects, informants, witnesses or investigators. See, e.g., *Fitzgibbon v. CIA*, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1990); *Dunkelberger v. DOJ*, 906 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C.Cir.1990); *Stern v. FBI*, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also *Neely v. FBI*, 208 F.3d 461, 464-66 (4th Cir. 2000). Among other concerns, an individual's connection to particular investigations can result in harassment, annoyance, and embarrassment. See, e.g., *Halpern v. FBI*, 181 F.3d 279, 296-97 (2nd Cir.1999); *Manna v. DOJ*, 51 F.3d 1158, 1166 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975, 116 S. Ct. 477, 133 L.Ed.2d 405 (1995); *Nix v. United States*, 572 F.2d 998, 1005-06 (4th Cir.1978).

Exemption (b)(7)(A) authorizes the withholding of “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes...to the extent that production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” This exemption is applicable categorically to law enforcement case files throughout the pendency of long-term investigations and law enforcement proceedings. The purpose of the exemption is to avoid harm, such as the impairment of the agency's ability to control or shape investigations or the premature release of evidence or strategy in the government's case. Exemption (b)(7)(A) is designed to avoid interference with law enforcement proceedings, to include witness intimidation and reprisals, suppression or fabrication of evidence, and limitations upon the government obtaining information in the future.

Exemption (b)(7)(D) exempts from disclosure information that “could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source...”

Exemption (b)(7)(E) affords protection to all law enforcement information that “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.”

Despite extensive searching, the number O-KE-21-0048-O does not correspond to any NASA OIG case investigations.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of

the FOIA. This is a standard notification given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

You may contact our FOIA Public Liaison, Francis P. LaRocca at (202) 358-2575 for further assistance and to discuss aspects of your request. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

You also have the right to appeal this initial determination to NASA, Deputy Inspector General, George Scott. Pursuant to 14 CFR §1206.700(b), the appeal must (1) be in writing; (2) be addressed to the following:

NASA, Office of Inspector General  
Headquarters  
300 E Street, S.W., Suite 8V39  
Washington, D.C. 20546-0001  
Attn: George Scott, Deputy Inspector General;

(3) be identified clearly on the envelope and in the letter as “Freedom of Information Act Appeal”; (4) include a copy of the request for the Agency record and a copy of the adverse initial determination; (5) to the extent possible, state the reasons why the requester believes the adverse initial determination should be reversed; and (6) must be postmarked and sent to the Deputy Inspector General within 90 calendar days of the date of receipt of the initial determination.

Sincerely,



Digitally signed by ROBERT  
STEINAU  
Date: 2023.04.18 13:51:04  
-04'00'

Robert H. Steinau  
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations  
OIG FOIA Officer – Investigations

Enclosures



Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations

O-AR-20-0274-HL-S

February 24, 2022

**GRANT IRREGULARITIES - ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE PACIFIC**  
390 Ashton Avenue  
San Francisco, CA 94112

**CASE CLOSING:** Case opening was predicated upon a referral from the Office of Audits (OA) at the NASA Office of Inspector General wherein OA discussed irregularities with a grant, Transient Tracker, for which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the Principal Investigator (PI) [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) OA identified another cooperative agreement, CosmoQuest, for which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been the PI during an overlapping time period. OA implied that if one of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) projects experienced irregularities, then the other project, too, ought to bear the scrutiny of investigation.

Astronomical Society of the Pacific (ASP) was the managing agency for both contracts. Reporting Agent (RA) requested and received from ASP accounting, payroll and relevant management documents for Transient Tracker and for CosmoQuest.

RA conducted an interview of [REDACTED] who described the problems [REDACTED] had experienced while ASP had been managing both Transient Tracker and CosmoQuest—including an overcharge, payroll delays and a discrepancy in which employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working on the Transient Tracker project when [REDACTED] part-time hours were incorrectly charged by ASP instead to the CosmoQuest project. [REDACTED] remedied that situation by having [REDACTED] work exclusively on the CosmoQuest project thereafter. [REDACTED] also described how [REDACTED] was mistreated by NASA employees at a conference; (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) named three persons who had worked for [REDACTED] during the contracts' Periods of Performance (POP)—who were witness to the mismanagement by ASP. RA established contact with all three persons (one of whom was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)), and although all three initially agreed to assist, not one of them provided substantive information.

With the ASP documents Investigative Auditor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted an accounting analysis for both the Transient Tracker and CosmoQuest contracts. IA [REDACTED] noted that although (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had alleged NASA had been overcharged for work by a subcontractor, [REDACTED] had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). In 2019, ASP had made a repayment for

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approximately \$13,000.00 to the Payment Management System—which apparently had remedied the overcharge.

In a final report, IA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that for each of the contracts, review of the cost proposals, actual costs and the charged (billed) costs were largely in line with each other. No significant “red flags” resulted. Billed labor was based on actual effort and not simply based on the proposal. The billed costs did not exceed the proposed costs.

Any shift in costs noted, even if they had been disallowed, could be explained by timing of different activities and would not have been injurious to NASA. IA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not note any double billing for either time costs or labor costs between the two contracts—especially as it related to employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This case is closed.

Prepared by: Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), NASA OIG, ARC  
DISTR: File

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**Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations**

O-GO-19-0151-HL-O

December 7, 2022

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)  
100 University Drive  
Fairmont, WV 26554

**CASE CLOSING:** This investigation was predicated upon an anonymous NASA OIG Cyberhotline complaint alleging (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Facility, was allowing a NASA contractor to collect fees for work that the contractor was not accomplishing. Additionally, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would use (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to build a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at IV&V for future work with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The anonymous complainant filed three additional complaints through the NASA OIG Cyberhotline, which encompassed several more allegations against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ranging from close relationships between contract personnel and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) justifying excessive contractual costs.

We interviewed four NASA civil servants, one of whom was the anonymous complainant (IV&V (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Employee), and three (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) officials at IV&V. The four NASA civil servants corroborated most of the complaints that were disclosed to NASA OIG. The majority of these disclosures were associated with the following contracts: NNG12SA03C, NNG17SA26C, NNG13SA04C, NNG17SA27Z, and NNG14SA06D. In addition to the contractual concerns involving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) additional complaints were brought to NASA OIG's attention regarding misappropriation of NASA funds and Nonconsensual Monitoring at IV&V.

We coordinated with the NASA Goddard Procurement Office, NASA Goddard Office of the Chief Financial Officer, NASA OIG Cyber Crimes Division, NASA Goddard Office of the Chief Information Officer, and the NASA Goddard Chief Information Security Officer to assist with the contractual, financial, and nonconsensual monitoring allegations. Investigation revealed there was no direct evidence provided or recovered during the investigation to support any criminal, civil, or administrative remedies.

During the investigation, a new complaint alleged the IV&V Prime Contractor West Virginia University (WVU) and subcontractor ADNET Systems were purchasing educationally licensed and/or discounted software/hardware under NASA's O&M contracts and subcontracts NNG08LO01C, NNG13SA04C, and 80GSFC19C0074.

NASA OIG subpoenas were served to WVU and ADNET Systems for financial records supporting the aforementioned IV&V O&M contracts. We also interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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[REDACTED] Information Technology (IT) [REDACTED] IV&V, who were aware WVU purchased and installed educationally licensed software/hardware on government computers used for IV&V purposes without NASA approval. A review of the software and hardware purchases for the O&M contracts concluded that WVU's unauthorized installation of EDU on government computers impacted NASA's contract costs by an estimated \$2.2 million.

This matter was presented to the [REDACTED] United States Attorney's Office, Northern District of West Virginia, regarding WVU's purchasing of educational software/hardware. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] declined the matter and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We also referred this matter to the NASA Acquisition Integrity Program (AIP) for the potential contractual violations and administrative remedies. We also coordinated with the NASA Goddard Procurement Office, who related that a potential contractual remedy would be to disallow the \$130,024.04 in software product costs, however further coordination with NASA AIP and GSFC Procurement would be done before reaching a final decision.

We provided a management referral to [REDACTED], NASA Headquarters (HQ), who manages the IV&V program. The referral disclosed the educational software/hardware purchases made on the O&M contract, including NASA procurement procedures that were potentially circumvented to allow WVU to provide educational software and hardware to IV&V. The referral response was provided to NASA OIG and highlighted "The EDU licenses were acquired by WVU's subcontractor in an environment that lacked sufficient insight and purchasing controls by NASA. The IV&V Program remedied the flawed agreements and implemented process controls for future purchases."

Based upon a USAO declination, no direct evidence, and a referral to NASA AIP and referral to the [REDACTED] NASA HQ, no further investigation is anticipated. This case is closed.

Prepared by: SA [REDACTED], MSFC

DISTR: File

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Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations

O-GO-20-0057-O

September 8, 2022

**GIRI, Ana V.**

[REDACTED]

**CASE CLOSING:** This joint investigation with [REDACTED] was predicated on receipt of information from the United States Attorney's Office (USAO), Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA), concerning a potential bribery scheme involving NASA Contractor Ana Veronica Giri (Giri), Senior Help Desk Analyst, Global Science & Technology Inc. who was employed under NASA contract (NNH16CO92B-NRESS (NNH16CO92B))<sup>1</sup>.

During [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Sterling, Virginia, stated Giri worked for NASA approximately 17 years and placed orders and chose vendors for contracts. [REDACTED] alleged [REDACTED] received guaranteed subcontracts from NASA contracts for [REDACTED] company [REDACTED] for kickback payments, which [REDACTED] paid to Giri. Furthermore, [REDACTED] related Giri's husband Vishesh Giri was also involved in the scheme.

We interviewed [REDACTED] who stated Giri was a NASA contract employee responsible for awarding contracts to subcontractors, to work with the prime contractors for NASA Peer Review tasks throughout the United States. Specifically, Giri awarded subcontracts to companies who provided computer rentals and other IT items for NASA peer reviews throughout the United States. [REDACTED] emailed proposals for tasks and invoices directly to Giri and for 17 years Giri provided [REDACTED] privileged information concerning competitor's pricing and proposal information, so [REDACTED] could win the awards and remain a subcontractor. After the task was completed, Giri and her husband (Visheh Giri) received a 10% kickback from [REDACTED] for the contracts awarded to [REDACTED] s company.

[REDACTED] provided the NASA OIG with monthly [REDACTED] Technology and Leasing Information Reports with checks made out to Giri's Husband Visheh Giri. At the bottom of each invoice

<sup>1</sup> A review of the NASA Procurement Data View database revealed Giri works under Artic Slope Technical Services, Inc. contract out of NASA Headquarters, which was awarded in November of 2015, and provides administrative, logistical, and it Support for the peer review and Project Management activities of NASA sponsored Research and Education Programs.

<sup>2</sup> [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] captured how much the Giri's were paid as part of their kickback. For example, in July of 2018, the [REDACTED] Technology and Leasing earned \$96,353.34 for 14 NASA Peer Review Service jobs. The Giri's kickback amount equaled \$8,686.25 after [REDACTED] calculated the taxes [REDACTED] paid. The Giri's were paid 4 times that month, which calculated out to \$2,171.56 a check.

On May 20, 2020, agents from the NASA OIG, (B)(7)(D) [REDACTED], (B)(7)(D) [REDACTED], conducted a search warrant of the Giri's residence and subject interviews of Ana and Vishesh Giri. On July 6, 2021, GST (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED].

On September 30, 2021, Vishesh Giri plead guilty to 18 USC Section 1343: Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 18 USC Section: 1346 Scheme or artifice to defraud and to defraud the United States, specifically the IRS all in violation of 18 USC 371: Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.

On October 15, 2021, Ana Giri plead guilty to 18 USC Section 1343: Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 18 USC Section: 1346 Scheme or artifice to defraud and to defraud the United States, specifically the IRS all in violation of 18 USC 371: Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.

On March 4, 2022, Ana Giri and Vishesh Giri were sentenced to 20 months and 17 months incarceration, respectively. The Giri's also received 30 hours community service, \$165,472 restitution, \$100 assessment fee, \$707,331 asset forfeiture and 3 years' probation upon their release from prison.

Due to the aforementioned no further, investigative activity is anticipated. This investigation is closed pending action deemed appropriate by the NASA Acquisition Integrity Program.

Prepared by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], GSFC  
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Office of Inspector General  
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O-GO-20-0140-HL-S

February 16, 2021

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
Goddard Space Flight Center  
Greenbelt, MD 20771

**CASE CLOSING:** Investigation initiated upon an anonymous complaint through the NASA OIG hotline alleging the two [REDACTED] of [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of Education, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), received funded NASA summer internships since summer 2014, at both the high school and college levels. The complaint alleged violations of nepotism as [REDACTED] managed funding and award decisions for the NASA internship program at GSFC.

Joint investigation with the Office of Special Counsel revealed that [REDACTED] engaged in prohibited personnel practices and misuse of [REDACTED] position, violating 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702- Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch<sup>1</sup>, 18 U.S. Code § 208 (a)<sup>2</sup> – Acts affecting a personal financial interest and guidance provided by NASA’s Office of Chief Counsel relating to Nepotism<sup>3</sup> with the NASA internship program. However, the investigation substantiated that [REDACTED] advocated for only one of [REDACTED].

We found that [REDACTED] advocated for [REDACTED], [REDACTED] to receive six NASA internships, for a combined total of \$42,160 in stipends. In [REDACTED] official capacity, [REDACTED] sent prioritized lists of eligible interns for selection to NASA mentors that consisted of two to four students, even when others were qualified. [REDACTED] also provided a mentor a list of steps to help facilitate a Pathways Internship<sup>4</sup> for [REDACTED], participated in the approval process for an extension of [REDACTED] internship, approved [REDACTED] to telework (when others were not allowed to do so) and sent [REDACTED] offer letters on behalf of the agency. During our interview of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] should have recused [REDACTED] with official dealings related to [REDACTED].

<sup>1</sup> The regulation states, in part, "an employee shall not use his public office for his own private gain, or for the private gain of friends, relatives, or persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity . . ."

<sup>2</sup> (a) . . . whoever, being an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government . . . participates personally and substantially as a Government officer or employee, through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation . . . or any person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial interest—

<sup>3</sup> The nepotism statute (5 U.S.C. § 3110) prohibits public officials of the government from appointing, employing, promoting, advancing, or advocating the appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement of a relative in the agency in which the official is serving or over which the official exercises jurisdiction or control.

<sup>4</sup> The Pathways Internship Program provides current students with paid work experience and recent graduates with a dynamic development program at the beginning of their careers. Both offer the chance for permanent employment at the agency.

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In May 2021, we sent [REDACTED], Deputy Associate Administrator for STEM Engagement, NASA Headquarters a management referral explaining the facts and circumstances of the investigation. In November 2021, [REDACTED] with the assistance of the GSFC Office of Chief Counsel [REDACTED]

On [REDACTED] 2022, [REDACTED] final Standard Form 50 was approved with an effective date of [REDACTED] 2022, which outlined the nature of the action was a "Resignation."

The United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of Maryland, declined to pursue this investigation based on [REDACTED]

Give the aforementioned and [REDACTED] resignation [REDACTED] no further investigative activity is required. This matter is closed.

Prepared by: SA [REDACTED], GSFC  
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Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations

O-GO-21-0110-S

October 13, 2022

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], Goddard Space Flight Center – [REDACTED]  
Goddard Space Flight Center  
Greenbelt, MD 20771

**CASE CLOSING:** This investigation was predicated on information developed under O-GO-20-0140-HL-S, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The investigation identified prohibited personnel practices (nepotism) related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC).

Joint investigation with the Office of Special Counsel revealed [REDACTED] advocated for the placement of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in four NASA internships, in violation of Prohibited personnel practices (5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7)). Violations included but were not limited to [REDACTED] advocating on behalf of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by contacting colleagues (some lower graded than (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding internship opportunities at GSFC. As a result of [REDACTED] actions, [REDACTED] received four NASA internships and an accompanied stipend of \$37,960. Additionally, [REDACTED] advocated for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by contacting eight NASA colleagues inquiring about potential internships; however, [REDACTED] was never selected.

As a result of a NASA OIG management referral, the Office of Chief Counsel, GSFC and [REDACTED], (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) NASA Headquarters, found [REDACTED] in violation of "Conduct Unbecoming of Supervisor" based on the avocation for the internships. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 2022, [REDACTED] was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by [REDACTED] misconduct. Accordingly, [REDACTED] was suspended without pay from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 2022.

Based on the aforementioned no further investigative activity is required, this matter is closed.

Prepared by: SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSFC  
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Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations

O-GO-21-0111-S

June 23, 2022

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - [REDACTED]  
Goddard Space Flight Center  
Greenbelt, MD 20771

**CASE CLOSING:** This investigation was predicated on information developed under O-GO-20-0140-HL-S, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The investigation identified prohibited personnel practices (nepotism) related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC).

A joint investigation with the Office of Special Counsel revealed [REDACTED] advocated for the placement of [REDACTED], (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in a NASA internship, in violation of Prohibited personnel practices (5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7)). These violations included, but were not limited to, [REDACTED] advocating on behalf of [REDACTED] by reaching out to colleagues regarding employment opportunities at GSFC. As a result of [REDACTED] actions [REDACTED] received a GSFC summer internship in 2020 and an accompanied stipend of \$7,300.

As a result of a NASA OIG management referral, the Office of Chief Counsel, GSFC and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NASA Headquarters, found [REDACTED] in violation of "Inappropriate Conduct" when dealing with [REDACTED] internship. On [REDACTED] 2022, after being issued a proposed three-day suspension, [REDACTED] was issued a one-day suspension and was required to attend ethics additional training. [REDACTED] supervisor, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), [REDACTED] GSFC, was issued a letter of reprimand that will be placed in [REDACTED] official personnel folder for a period of two years, for [REDACTED] role in the selection of [REDACTED] and was directed to take additional ethics training

Based on the aforementioned and that [REDACTED] was suspended, [REDACTED] was reprimanded, and both were given additional training, no further investigative activity is required. This matter is closed.

Prepared by: SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSFC  
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**Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations**

O-GO-21-0135-HL-S

July 22, 2022

**QUESTIONABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MISSION SUPPORT FUTURE  
ARCHITECTURE PROGRAM**

NASA Headquarters  
Washington, DC 20546

**CASE CLOSING:** The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an investigation in April 2021 upon receiving an anonymous e-mail complaint alleging that the Mission Support Future Architecture Program (MAP) realignment plan reduced the number of attorneys providing mission support at NASA Centers and increased staffing at NASA Headquarters, thereby creating operational inefficiencies. The complaint also alleged that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), [REDACTED] at Stennis Space Center, recommended [REDACTED] for a [REDACTED] position in the realignment plan and managed the very process [REDACTED] created.

Investigation did not identify any notable operational inefficiencies related to the MAP realignment plan or any improper conduct related to [REDACTED] hiring process as a [REDACTED]. However, in reviewing the correspondence and actions of those identified in the complaint, the investigation did identify improper conduct on the part of [REDACTED]. Specifically, [REDACTED] repeatedly engaged in the unauthorized release of sensitive and internal agency information to [REDACTED], (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), via e-mail.

Investigation revealed since late 2015, [REDACTED] sent 7,903 e-mails from [REDACTED] agency e-mail account to [REDACTED] professional e-mail account. Many of these e-mails contained sensitive/internal use only agency information and work product. [REDACTED] also occasionally blind carbon copied [REDACTED] on agency e-mail chains that contained multiple agency recipients along with sensitive work product, strategy discussions, and other internal agency information related to the MAP realignment plan. In 2016, [REDACTED] sent four e-mails to [REDACTED] personal e-mail account with attached spreadsheets that contained the names of numerous NASA personnel along with their performance bonus amounts and Quality Step Increases for the years 2014-2016. In 2020, [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] a draft performance evaluation summary of the MAP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

In December of 2021, the OIG conducted an interview of [REDACTED] during which [REDACTED] admitted to sending sensitive and internal agency e-mails and documents to [REDACTED] personal and professional e-mail accounts. [REDACTED] relayed that the purpose of this activity was to employ [REDACTED] expertise with editing, formatting, and other administrative skills to improve agency work

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product. [REDACTED] also admitted that [REDACTED] blind carbon copied his [REDACTED] on agency e-mails in an effort to conceal the fact that [REDACTED] was providing assistance with NASA work product.

In January of 2022, the OIG provided a summary of the aforementioned facts to Sumara Thompson-King, NASA General Counsel, Headquarters, in a Management Recommendation. The recommendation highlighted that [REDACTED] actions constituted violations of NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 1382.17J, NASA Privacy Policy, and NPD 2810.1F, NASA Information Security Policy. The recommendation also noted that [REDACTED] actions may have violated the Antideficiency Act (ADA), as [REDACTED] employed [REDACTED] for administrative support on agency-related matters.

In July of 2022, Thompson-King provided a response concurring with the OIG’s assessment that [REDACTED] actions had violated the NASA Privacy Policy and Information Security Policy. However, she determined that [REDACTED] actions did not violate the ADA. Thompson-King relayed that she personally provided [REDACTED] with an oral reprimand, expressed her view of the serious nature the violations, and required [REDACTED] to take both the on-line Cybersecurity and Privacy Awareness Training and the Cybersecurity and Privacy Awareness Training for New Employees. Thompson-King also reviewed ethics training with [REDACTED]

Due to the aforementioned, no further investigative activity is anticipated. This matter is closed.

Prepared by: SA [REDACTED], GSFC  
DISTR: File

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Office of Inspector General  
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O-GO-21-0204-S

July 20, 2022

**WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINT – ALLEGED ABUSE OF AUTHORITY**

White Sands Complex  
Las Cruces, NM

**CASE CLOSING:** Investigation initiated upon information from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), [REDACTED] White Sands Complex (WSC), who alleged [REDACTED] was retaliated against, by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WSC, due to a driving incident which occurred on WSC and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) property. Specifically, [REDACTED] claimed that [REDACTED] pressured [REDACTED] to terminate [REDACTED] employment subsequent to a reckless driving incident that resulted in [REDACTED] WSC driving privileges being suspended.

On July 19, 2021, [REDACTED] was driving on NASA Road<sup>1</sup>, when [REDACTED] tailgated [REDACTED] at a high rate of speed. [REDACTED] not initially knowing the identity of the tailgater, become nervous, failed to slow down, and instead passed a vehicle in front of her to create distance between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. When [REDACTED] arrived at the main WSC building, [REDACTED] lectured [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] speed and reckless driving. [REDACTED] filed a security report and requested a citation be issued in order to suspend [REDACTED] driving privileges. Subsequently, NASA Security suspended [REDACTED] WSC driving privileges. [REDACTED] claimed that prior to the incident [REDACTED] did not have any citations or any prior work-related violations. On July 27, 2021, [REDACTED] terminated [REDACTED] employment after allegedly being pressured by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the current [REDACTED] contract<sup>2</sup> which [REDACTED] was employed under.

[REDACTED] completed an Initial Complaint & Questionnaire for Whistleblowers. However, OIG Office of Counsel determined that [REDACTED] whistleblower retaliation complaint be closed because [REDACTED] never prepared or made a disclosure protected by statute as defined under 10 U.S.C. § 2409.

<sup>1</sup> NASA Road is the entry way to the WSTF and WSC.

<sup>2</sup> Definitive Contract (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a Cost Plus Award Fee Federal Contract Award. It was awarded to [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]. The definitive contract is funded by the Goddard Space Center (NASA). [REDACTED]

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A review of [REDACTED] email revealed [REDACTED] also was driving recklessly. In the email, [REDACTED] admitted to pursuing [REDACTED] vehicle at a high rate of speed (117 mph) to “get the license plate of the [REDACTED]. Additionally, the investigation revealed an earlier incident, wherein [REDACTED] tailgated a different WSC employee. Afterwards [REDACTED] approached the WSC employee and asked if the car [REDACTED] tailgated belonged to them. [REDACTED] then lectured the employee about their high rate of speed. No action was pursued by [REDACTED] against the employee due to the incident not taking place off NASA property.

On January 21, 2022, we sent a Management Referral to [REDACTED] Flight Projects Directorate, GSFC, for Misuse of Position – Abuse of Authority / Reckless Driving. On June 9, 2022, we received a Management Response from [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Flight Projects Directorate, GSFC, stating [REDACTED] received written counseling for [REDACTED] behavior.

Due to the aforementioned no further, investigative activity anticipated. This matter is closed

Prepared by: [REDACTED], GSFC  
DISTR: File

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Office of Inspector General  
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O-GO-22-0026-HL-S

March 17, 2022

**ALLEGED WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION – (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

[REDACTED]  
Goddard Space Flight Center  
Greenbelt, MD 20771

**CASE CLOSING:** Investigation initiated upon a hotline complaint from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] Division, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). [REDACTED] alleged that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] Division, GSFC, removed [REDACTED] as the Principal Investigator (PI) from two science grants after [REDACTED] asserted that recent contract task changes would require the removal of one [REDACTED] Inc., employee who was not qualified to perform the work. According to [REDACTED] stated that such a change would put [REDACTED] in a difficult position with [REDACTED] since [REDACTED] promised the company that no cuts would be made. When [REDACTED] moved forward with the task changes despite (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] protests, [REDACTED] was purportedly accused of creating a toxic work environment for the team, prompting (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] to exclude [REDACTED] from all project communication. [REDACTED] further alleged the contractor employee in question had been “off-task” in excess of 40 hours, yet charged that time against one of the grants.

Investigation determined that [REDACTED] was a NASA civil servant; therefore, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) holds the authority to investigate [REDACTED] alleged violations of the Whistleblower Protection Act. On February 4, 2022, [REDACTED] was advised to contact the OSC directly to report [REDACTED] claims. An analysis of [REDACTED] whistleblower complaint was not written by Associate Counsel to the Inspector General, Eastern Region, NASA OIG, because OSC has jurisdiction in the matter. Furthermore, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] removal from the PI role with [REDACTED] does not affect [REDACTED] current position, salary, or ability to remain fully employed, and [REDACTED] did not want to return to the PI role.

Related to the allegation of possible inappropriate communications between (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]. A review of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NASA emails did not reveal any inappropriate email exchanges between (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] and members of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] related to illegal hiring practices, gifts, or favors.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] alleged that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] mischarged hours to the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] Project. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] determined [REDACTED] a classroom educator without an advanced degree, was not qualified to create curricula for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested the opportunity to pitch a new idea for the [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Project in a meeting with [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Program Managers. [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed and listen to [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) presentation and opined that [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spent too much time on the presentation based on the timestamps present in the shared Google Doc file and mischarged approximately 40 hours to the contract. However, NASA and [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) management determined the hours [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spent on the presentation were insignificant.

Based on the aforementioned no further investigative activity is anticipated. Accordingly, this matter is closed.

Prepared by: SA [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), GSFC  
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**Office of Inspector General  
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O-JP-19-0137-S

January 24, 2021

**PROACTIVE PROJECT: JPL RAW DATA FILE**

Jet Propulsion Laboratory  
4800 Oak Grove Drive  
Pasadena, CA 91109

**CASE CLOSING:** In March 2019, the Long Beach Resident Agency (LBRA) initiated a proactive investigation of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to record all proactive efforts, capture raw intelligence, and document potential investigative matters that did not call for immediate action. As a result of these proactive efforts, leads were generated which resulted in the opening of an additional (b)(7)(E) investigations.

Given the success of this investigation, additional proactive projects will be developed to serve as repositories of similar efforts (b)(7)(E). It is recommended that due to the length of time this investigation has remained open, the proactive be closed with no further action needed.

Prepared by: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), JPL

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Office of Inspector General  
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O-JS-22-0071-S

September 06, 2022

**WHISTLEBLOWER – MISSION INTEGRATION ENGINEER**

2101 E. NASA Pkwy  
Houston, TX 77058

**CASE CLOSING:** The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this case based upon a Whistleblower Protection Questionnaire submitted by email on February 02, 2022, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Law Firm, email [REDACTED]@ [REDACTED].com, phone [REDACTED], to the Counsel to the Inspector General, NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG). The questionnaire was submitted on behalf of [REDACTED], a [REDACTED] Engineer, phone [REDACTED], email [REDACTED]@gmail.com. [REDACTED] alleged in the questionnaire, and during an interview with the OIG, that [REDACTED] terminated [REDACTED] employment because [REDACTED] voiced concern that [REDACTED] could not ethically perform requirement verifications of the flight termination system for the [REDACTED] Rocket in an abbreviated timeframe as requested. It appeared based on his responses that the potentially impacted contract was the NASA Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) contract numbered 80HQTR19D0009, and associated delivery order numbered 80JSC021F0098.

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Manger for CLPS, regarding delivery order number 80JSC021F0098. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] has been in this position since the onset of the contract. [REDACTED] clarified that [REDACTED] as well as all other vendors for the CLPS are utilizing a SpaceX vehicle, not the [REDACTED] Rocket, to deliver the payloads to the lunar surface. [REDACTED] said the [REDACTED] rocket that [REDACTED] is developing is still in the trial and testing phase and mentioned the company has a separate division within the company for the rocket development. [REDACTED] stated the division developing the [REDACTED] does not crossover with the division or segment that is working on the CLPS contract.

On August 9, 2022, [REDACTED] Legal Counsel NASA OIG, provided the whistleblower complaint analysis. The analysis stated under 10 U.S.C. § 4701 an employee of a contractor may not be discharged, demoted, or otherwise discriminated against as a reprisal for disclosing information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of, among other things, “any violation of a law, rule, or regulation related to a NASA contract.” It further stated the first element of proof requires a NASA nexus when making a protected disclosure. While [REDACTED] allegations were concerning, they do not satisfy the first element in which the suspected violation related to a NASA contract. The analysis concluded that failure to meet the first element renders moot the answers to the other questions and therefore there is no need to conduct further investigation. However, [REDACTED] did raise questions in which NASA Legal

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believed the Department of Transportation OIG (DOT OIG) would be interested since the complaint potentially impacts the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) jurisdiction over commercial spaceflight activities. Accordingly, [REDACTED] recommended that the NASA OIG refer this case to DOT OIG.

On August 30, 2022, the NASA OIG referred the Whistleblower Protection Questionnaire to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Reporting and Data Analysis Branch, FAA.

Based on the NASA OIG Legal analysis and referral, this investigation will be closed.

Prepared by: SA [REDACTED], JSC  
DISTR: File

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**Office of Inspector General  
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O-KE-21-0042-S

January 5, 2022

**PROACTIVE: THOUSAND TALENTS PLAN**  
Kennedy Space Center, Florida

**CASE CLOSING:** This proactive investigation was initiated on November 19, 2020, to review the effect of an organized and patient effort by the Chinese government to acquire basic and advanced research in various fields of science and technology, agriculture, and defense.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) operated and utilized talent recruitment programs called Talent Plans for the benefit of PRC's economic development, industry, and national security by obtaining information and technology from abroad. The PRC primarily did this through its more than 200 talent recruitment plans—the most prominent of which is the Thousand Talents Plan. Launched in 2008, the Thousand Talents Plan incentivizes individuals engaged in research and development in the United States to transmit the knowledge and research they gain here to PRC in exchange for salaries, research funding, lab space, and other incentives.

The purpose of this proactive investigation was to review information for potential Talent Plan operations within the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Area of Responsibility and to determine any risk to NASA KSC programs.

This proactive investigation caused the initiation of the following seven spin-off investigations:

1. (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED]
2. (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED]
3. (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED]
4. (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED]
5. (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED]

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(b) (7)(A) [REDACTED]

6. (b) (7)(A) [REDACTED]

7. ALLEGED GRANT FRAUD – UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI  
NORS Case No. O-KE-22-0031-P

As of the writing of this report, (b)(5), (b)(7)(A) [REDACTED]

This proactive investigation also contributed to cross-office and interregional cooperation between multiple offices of the NASA OIG.

This matter is closed.

Prepared by: SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), KSC  
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Office of Inspector General  
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O-KE-23-0016-P

November 16, 2022

**BOMB THREATS AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER**  
Kennedy Space Center, FL

**CASE CLOSING:** This investigation was initiated on November 10, 2022, based on the following information: On October 22 and October 30, 2022, the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (KSCVC) received bomb threats via phone. The KSCVC received two bomb threats via phone on each day with all calls coming from [REDACTED]. Staff members advised that the KSCVC has received calls from this number weekly for approximately six months to a year, with the caller normally speaking incoherently and talking about conspiracy theories. Staff advised that calls received from this number were always made by the same male subject who had a [REDACTED]. The calls received on October 22 and October 30, 2022, were the first instances that the caller had made a threat.

On November 10, 2022, the RA contacted [REDACTED] who assessed the phone number. [REDACTED] determined the phone number belonged to a landline in New Jersey.

On November 14, 2022, the RA contacted [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] was able to verify the phone number was a Verizon landline registered to [REDACTED], New Jersey.

On November 14, 2022, the RA contacted the New Jersey State Human Services Police (NJHSP). The RA spoke with NJHSP Officer [REDACTED] and informed [REDACTED] of the identified phone number tracing back to a psychiatric hospital [REDACTED] New Jersey. [REDACTED] researched the number and determined that it was assigned to a landline located inside of the [REDACTED], New Jersey. Specifically, the phone was located inside [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] staff, who were able to review video footage from October 22 and October 30, 2022. A review of the footage determined that at the time of the bomb threat calls to the KSCVC, the phone was being used by [REDACTED] a patient [REDACTED].

On November 14, 2022, the RA interviewed [REDACTED], a [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] confirmed that [REDACTED] resided at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has a history of perpetrating violent acts and making threatening phone calls to government institutions. [REDACTED] was aware of at least 17 instances where [REDACTED] had made threatening calls to government

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organizations, with the majority being to [REDACTED] in the New Jersey area. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] nefarious phone calls began around 2018 and have been an ongoing problem. [REDACTED] further advised that the [REDACTED] Prosecutor's Office [REDACTED] in New Jersey had previously attempted to charge [REDACTED] in relation to the threatening phone calls but had been unsuccessful.

On November 14, 2022, the RA interviewed [REDACTED] an Assistant Prosecutor employed by the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]

On November 14, 2022, the RA spoke with the United States Attorney's Office, Middle District of Florida, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [REDACTED], who stated that [REDACTED]

On November 14, 2022, the RA then spoke with Florida State Attorney's Office, 18<sup>th</sup> Judicial District, Assistant State Attorney (ASA) [REDACTED], who [REDACTED].

All criminal, civil, and administrative remedies have been exhausted for this case. Information gathered during this investigation has been shared with the NASA Protective Services Office at KSC. This matter is closed.

Prepared by: [REDACTED], Special Agent, KSC  
DISTR: File

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**Office of Inspector General  
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O-KE-23-0022-P

November 25, 2022

**UNAUTHORIZED DRONE INCIDENT PRIOR TO ARTEMIS 1 LAUNCH**  
Kennedy Space Center, Florida

**CASE CLOSING:** This investigation was initiated on November 16, 2022, based on the following information: On November 15, 2022, at 7:36 p.m., the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Protective Services Office (PSO) was contacted regarding an unauthorized drone observed flying at the south end of the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF). The drone was observed by multiple people in the tower and nearby aircraft hangar. The drone had white and red flashing lights and was heading southeast across the tow way and possibly into the Launch Complex 39 (LC-39) area. As this was occurring, a T-38 aircraft was on final approach for landing. Additionally, Artemis 1 was scheduled to launch approximately five hours later.

PSO contacted the (b)(7)(E) command post to ascertain if any drones were detected. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representative stated that no drones were detected at that time. PSO relayed the information regarding the unauthorized drone to the command post. (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) Multiple Security Police Officers (SPOs) and (b)(7)(E) began conducting sweeps of the SLF from south to north. During the sweep, an SPO on the north end of the SLF observed the drone flying in a northerly direction away from KSC and lost visual contact.

A sweep of the SLF, LC-39, and the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge (MINWR) was conducted with no results. The MINWR had been closed to the public and screening checkpoints were activated on November 15, 2022, at 4:30 a.m. The only authorized personnel in this area were employees of KSC, National Park Service (NPS), and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Canaveral National Seashore and Playalinda Beach had remained closed since prior to Hurricane Nicole. Playalinda Beach was swept and cleared on November 15, 2022, at 3:00 p.m., as the Flight Caution Area extended into it. After an exhaustive search with no findings all units resumed launch operations with a heightened awareness for unauthorized drones. A PSO SA in direct communication with the Artemis Launch Director relayed information in real-time as tanking of the Space Launch System was in-process at the time.

On November 17, 2022, the Reporting Agent (RA) facilitated a law enforcement coordination meeting with NASA KSC PSO and an Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) expert from United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). All parties agreed that all investigative leads had

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been exhausted, and that there were no other practical means that could be used to identify the perpetrator.

All criminal, civil, and administrative remedies have been exhausted for this case. This matter is closed.

Prepared by: SA [REDACTED], KSC  
DISTR: File

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**Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations**

O-MA-20-0179-S

August 17, 2022

**PROACTIVE: NASA'S CHINA FUNDING RESTRICTION  
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL**

**CASE CLOSING:** We initiated this proactive case to engage with our federal law enforcement partners, specifically the (b) (7)(D) and United States Attorney's Offices, to identify individuals and institutions that may have violated NASA's China funding restriction.

Throughout the two years it has been open, this office received numerous referrals and requests for assistance from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), NASA Counterintelligence, and the NASA Cooperative Agreement team, which have been facilitated and tracked through this proactive investigation. Based on the completion of all current coordination/referral efforts related to this case, and due to the passing of new legislation with a broader focus on research misconduct, this investigation is now closed.

Prepared by: SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), MSFC  
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**Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations**

O-ST-20-0044-S

January 14, 2021

**INTERNAL INVESTIGATION - 2021-1**

**CASE CLOSING:** We initiated this investigation to explore alleged violations of laws and regulations, considered administrative in nature, by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a former employee of the NASA OIG at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) conducted interviews in an effort to ascertain the veracity of the allegations. These efforts included an interview of [REDACTED] who denied the allegations.

As a result of our efforts, we identified ten (10) adverse findings including false statements, lack of candor, conversion of check proceeds, and supplying false information on Questionnaire for National Security Position (SF 86).

[REDACTED] resigned from [REDACTED] position with the NASA OIG and annotations were made to reflect the adverse findings in [REDACTED] Office of Personnel Management file.

Based on the above information, no further investigation is warranted. Case closed.

Prepared by: SA [REDACTED], SSC  
DISTR: File

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**Office of Inspector General  
Office of Investigations**

O-MA-21-0089-P

February 2, 2022

**INTERNAL INVESTIGATION – 2021-2**

Marshall Space Flight Center  
Huntsville, Alabama 35808

**CASE CLOSING:** This case was initiated based on a referral from The NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) Advanced Data Analytics Program (ADAP). The referral stated in part that during a routine examination of NASA's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Handbook, ADAP discovered that former NASA OIG Employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was listed as the Principal Investigator (PI) for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), which was awarded on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The award amount was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and had a performance period of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The proposal was generated on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and showed that the PI (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be billing 484 hours at a rate \$85, for a total of \$41,140.00.

The investigation revealed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested outside employment with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and submitted NASA OIG Form 735, Request for Outside Employment, to his supervisor, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated on the form that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wished to perform 10 hours per week for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

During an interview with the OIG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there were no current or historical audits of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be mostly working on Department of Defense (DoD) Projects. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initially approved the request; however, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) withdrew the request and stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wished to retire from government service instead. The OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the responsible NASA contract specialist at the time of proposal and ultimate award of the SBIR contract. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the contract file and found no mention of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a NASA civil servant. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that this would have presented a conflict of interest or principal investigator eligibility issue, which was never addressed. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was hired at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retired from NASA on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

On March 10, 2021, the OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated during the interview that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted his supervisor, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Associate Counsel to the NASA Inspector General (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via email on numerous occasions about his relationship with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the only guidance (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received was from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in an email in July 2020 telling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to recuse (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from any work related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further

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stated that [REDACTED] submitted a request for outside employment, and that [REDACTED] was unsure what determination was made regarding [REDACTED] request. [REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED] intended to retire prior to the award of the SBIR contract; however, [REDACTED] retirement calculation for years of prior service with [REDACTED] took longer than expected pushing back [REDACTED] retirement date to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] only worked on [REDACTED] projects outside of [REDACTED] normal work hours or on annual leave.

The OIG learned during an interview of [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] sent an email to [REDACTED] on August 5, 2020, disclosing that [REDACTED] retirement had been delayed and requested guidance as to if [REDACTED] can begin working for [REDACTED] on the NASA contract while still employed by NASA. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] could not find a record of an email response to [REDACTED] request.

On May 25, 2021, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]. During the interview, [REDACTED] acknowledged [REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] was employed by NASA during the performance period of the SBIR contract; however, [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] was in the process of retirement. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] provided [REDACTED] with a letter from NASA granting [REDACTED] outside employment. Further documentation review by the OIG revealed this letter was the NASA OIG Form 735 signed only by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] acknowledged [REDACTED] understood the requirement in the SBIR contract that the PI must be employed by the small business concern, and that it precludes full time employment with another organization. [REDACTED] further acknowledged that the contract required written approval from the contracting officer for any deviation from the employment requirement and stated that [REDACTED] never requested nor received a deviation from this requirement. [REDACTED] acknowledged [REDACTED] digital signature on the contract and admitted that [REDACTED] completed the certifications in the Confirmations of Negotiation section of the contract, specifically Certification Number 2 which asks if the PI is primarily employed by the small business concern [REDACTED].

On December 21, 2021, the United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of Mississippi, declined prosecution on these matters since [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Therefore, this case will be closed.

Prepared by: SA [REDACTED], JSC  
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